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AN INTRODUCTION TO 


ARISTOTLE ‘ETHICS 


*BOOKS I—IV-? 


(Book X. Cu. vI—Ix. IN AN APPENDIX) 


WITH A CONTINUOUS ANALYSIS AND NOTES 


Entended for the use of Beginners and Junior Students 


BY THE 
REV. EDWARD MOORE, D.D. 
HON. D. LITT. DUBLIN 


PRINCIPAL OF S. EDMUND HALL, OXFORD, AND LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR 
OF QUEEN’S COLLEGE 






sat 


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wry eh SIXTH EDITION 
3 V7 S TY 


Ba ad Wes | 


LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 


39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 


1897 









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CONTENTS. 


PREFACE, . : " , A : : : 
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION, ’ : * : : 
INTRODUCTION, é ; - ‘ ° ° ° 
GLOSSARY, , 4 : ‘ . . . 
BOOK L. 
CHAP. 


I. Explanation of Terms, ‘ End,’ ‘ Good,’ ‘ Chief Good ’—Dif- 
ferent kinds of Ends, and their degrees of finality, . 

If. and III. There is such a thing as-a jimal end of action, 7.¢. 
a Chief Good. If so—(a) It will be practically useful to 
define it. (6) The Political (or Social) Science is the Science 
which treats of it. (c) This is not an exact Science. (d) Its 
study requires special training and conditions, 

{V. What is the Chief Good !—Conflicting Guistahs“Deetibiti: 
tion of the method to be adopted, 

V. Criticism of the chief typical theories as és the atte of 
Happiness, . ° 

VI. Criticism of the Platonic Theory that the Chief Good is the 
abstract ‘Idea’ of Good, 

VII. Construction of the Definition of the Chief Good. gg 1-8,— 
Certain positive characteristics of the Chief Good stated 
with a view to its Definition. §§ 9-16.—A Definition con- 
structed out of another such characteristic. §§ 17-21.—The 
Definition not to be treated as mathematically exact, 

VIII. Other views, popular and philosophical, on the subject of 
Happiness compared with the above Definition, : 
IX. On what does the acquisition of Happiness depend? . 


vi 


CONTENTS. 





CHAP. 


X. and XI. What is the relation of Happiness to the varying 


XII, 


XUL 


fortunes of life, especially in reference to a well-known 
dictum of Solon’s, . 
Comparison of another soualie sii with Aristotle’ 8 Defi 
nition, ; ’ . 
Commencement of the elucidation of the wivess terms in the 
Definition of Happiness, and b pepertey of the word Soul 


(yuxt), . 


BOOK IL. 
Moral Virtue is not implanted in us by Nature, ' . 


. Some general characteristics of such Habits as are Virtuous, 
. The test of the formation of Habits is the pleasure or pain by | 


which acts are accompanied, 


. Explanation of the apparent paradox that we ‘penne just by 


doing just actions, 


. The Genus of Virtue aaleeantnon: 
. The differentia of Virtue determined, and ial its full Defini- 


tion arrived at, 


. A Table or Catalogue of Virtues with their sslatail Vices, 
. The nature and degrees of the opposition existing between 


Virtues and the Vices related to them, 


. The difficulty of Virtue—Practical rules for attain the 


Virtuous Mean—The liberty of private judgment in points 
of detail, ° e . . . a . 


BOOK IIL 


. Voluntary, Involuntary, Mixed, and Non-Voluntary Actions 


distinguished and discussed, é ; 


. Deliberate Choice (wpoatpesis) is sonipioante’: of an cleinént 


of impulse and an element of judgment, . ‘ 


. The proper objects of Deliberation (GovAevois}, 
. The proper objects of Wish (BovAnsrs), 
. A retutation of the theory that Virtue is voluntary, but Vice 


involuntary, . On, : ‘ ° : 


PAGE 


105 


108 


114 
123 
128 
134 


13¢ 


CONTENTS. vii 





CHAP. PAGE 

VI. The proper sphere and objects of Courage, . 145 
VII. Courage considered as a mean state, with its related eXcess 

and defect, . ‘ ‘ . 148 

VIII. Spurious forms of tones Ainaion, 152 
IX. How can the exercise of Courage, which eosin pain ta 

loss, have a ‘pleasure initself’? . ; : . 158 

X. The proper objects of the Virtue of Temperance, . 161 


XI. The excess and defect related to the Virtue of ieteiibia 165 
XII. (a) Is the external compulsion stronger in Cowardice or in 
Intemperance? (5) The nature of dxodaola is illustrated 


by its etymology, . ‘ : : ° - 16 
BOOK IV. 
I, On Liberality, . ; ; - ‘ ey? yc 
II. On Magnificence, : ‘ ; ; ° . 188 
II. On Highmindedness or Self-Esteem, ° : ot ia) eae 
IV. On Ambition, . ; ; : ; - 210 
V. On the regulation of the Tecier, ’ ¥ i BE 
VI. On Friendliness, or Amiability, ; y : BF 
VII. On Straightforwardness or Truthfulness, ‘ oy ae 
VIII. On Geniality, . : . 226 
1X, On the quasi-virtue, ‘ shined of Shame,’ : . . 230 


APPENDIX.--BOOK X. 
VI. Happiness does not consist in Amusement, but in Active 


Excellence, . : . 242 

VII. Pre-eminence of bitetlectait over Moral isiitense, , - 247 

VIII. Secondary position of Moral Excellence, : 254 
TX. Conclusion of the Treatise on Ethics, and Ganeilioti to the 

Complementary Science of Politics, . } ; - 262 


SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES aND ILLUSTRATIONS, ; u Oi 


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PREFACE. 


Tux object of this work is to provide a simple introduction 
to the subject of the Ethics for beginners generally, and 
especially for those who are commencing it with a view to the 
Oxford Final Examination. It may also perhaps be found 
useful in the Upper Forms of Public Schools. The chief 
aim throughout has been clearness and simplicity, even at 
the risk of occasional repetition and diffuseness. Technical 
phraseology has been as far as possible avoided, and the 
principal technical terms occurring are explained in a 
Glossary. 

The author hopes that this specific object of the work will 
be borne in mind throughout the whole of it. 

Thus the Introductory Sketch, which simply aims at 
giving a beginner an intelligent notion of the subject upon 
which he is entering, makes no pretence to be exhaustive. 
Several important systems and writers are omitted altogether. 
The object has been to select systems which have a distinct 


x PREFACE. 





(perhaps one-sided) character: such as are typical of some 
well-defined bias or direction of thought. In fact names and 
references have been added in the notes almost as an after- 
thought, to give the clue to further inyuiry to those who may 
desire it. 

In the Glossary likewise, the explanations given of some of 
the more important technical terms of Aristotle’s philosophy 
are altogether popular and rudimentary. To have attempted 
anything like an adequate account of such difficult words as 
apxy, pvovs, vx, Sbvapus, etc., would have defeated the 
purpose of the work altogether, and repelled those for whose 
benefit it is intended. 

The same considerations must serve as an apology for 
language sometimes consciously loose and unphilosophical in 
the Analysis and Notes. The attempt to put such a treatise 
as that of Aristotle into such a ‘modern’ light as may be 
intelligible to a reader ex hyp. unacquainted with philoso- 
phical phraseology, seems necessarily to involve the sacrifice 
of technical accuracy. This desire to appeal as far as possi- 
ble to modern sympathies has occasioned a certain amount 
of diffuseness in parallel quotations from recent popular 
writers. | 

The best thanks of the author are due to several friends who 
have kindly assisted him by their advice in various parts of 
the work: and he will feel grateful for any further criticisms 
or suggestions that may be offered to him. 


PREFACE. xi 





The difficulty of the task has become more apparent on 
further acquaintance with it, and this experiment is now made 
public not without hesitation and a full consciousness of its 
defective execution. 


S. Epmunp HAui, Oxrorp, 
Jume 1871. 





PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION. 


Taz University of Oxford having adopted Professor 
Bywater’s revision of Bekker’s text for use in the Ex- 
amination Schools, I have, by permission of the Delegates 
of the Clarendon Press, availed myself of the opportunity 
afforded by the demand for a new Edition of this Book to 
embody in the text the more important alterations which 
appear in Professor Bywater’s work. 


K. M. 


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INTRODUCTION. 


mucu difficulty is sometimes felt, especially by beginners, 
in distinguishing the spheres of LKthical and Religious 
teaching. A dilemma like that which traditionally proved 
fatal to the Alexandrian library represents not inaptly the 
feeling with which the Science of Ethics is regarded in its 
relations to Religion. It is thought that if its conclusions 
agree with those of Religion they are superfluous, if they 
differ from them they are wicked. We will first then 
endeavour to gain a clear conception of the purpose and 
limits of the Science of Ethics, as contrasted with those of 
Religion. 

We may consider this and kindred sciences to have their 
origin somewhat as follows. 

Man is obviously compounded of two distinct natures, 
which may be roughly described as Body and Soul. He 
desires to know more of each of these natures. The nature of 
his Body is investigated by the Science of Physiology, which 
reveals to him that it is composed of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, 
ete. His Soul (using the word broadly for the immaterial 
side of man’s nature) is similarly discovered by the Science 
of Psychology to contain Reasoning, Imaginative (or Artistic), 
Moral, and other powers. Further inquiries in each of these 
last-named departments give rise to the practical Sciences of 


xii 


Sr. . 
Pe 
ne 


div INTRODUCTION. 





Logic, Aisthetics, Ethics, ete., which are Sciences becau 
their main object is to ascertain the laws and facts of the 
several portions of our compound nature; practical becau 
the enunciation of these laws and facts, when discovered, co 
stitutes zpso facto practical rules for the direction of # 
faculties to which the investigation refers. In each ca 
notice that the process is one of a careful but simple observ 





__tion of facts, followed by a judicious | enunciation of the la 


_which bind those facts together. In a word the method 
what logicians call Inductive. This cannot be too clear 
insisted upon. Let us ‘therefore explain it a little more ful 
in each of the cases mentioned. The primary object of Lo; 
_is to ascertain under what laws, principles, limits, 1 men do, 





Kiran matter. oO of fact, reason and think, The statement of the 
R _laws becomes ¢ the groundwork of practical 1 rules for easonir 





The primary object of Austhetics is to ascertain what cons 
tutes, as a matter of fact, good and bad taste in art of | 
kinds according to the decision of those competent to juds 
The enunciations of these principles become the practi 
rules to which the Sculptor, Artist, Poet must conform. |) § 
lastly, the primary object of Ethics is to ascertain, as a mati 


| of fact, what are the principles, feelings, or motives whi 
' regulate men’s conduct as moral agents, what is the distir 


tion which men do actually draw between Right and Wron, 
by what faculty or faculties are they enabled to draw such 
distinction? on what sanction do such distinctions res 
The answers to such questions, when formulated, becor 
ipso facto practical rules for the conduct of life.) But in| 

these cases the practical rules are as it were adjuncts to t 


INTRODUCTION. 


XVI 





Science in question is concerned. We will reduce them to 
these four questions : 

1. What constitutes the difference between Right and 

Wrong in actions ? 

2. What is the faculty in owrselvzs which is able to recog- 

nise that difference ? | 

8. What is the nature of the feeling of Duty or Moral 

Obligation ? 

4, What is the ‘Chief Good,’ or ultimate aim of human 

action ? 

A brief account of the answers that have been given to | 
each of these questions by the best known systems of Moral 
Philosophy will serve as a general introduction to the subject 
before us. a 


L, The various answers given to this question reduce them- 
selves to two types. One is that Right and Wrong may be re- 
solyed into manifestations of some other familiar notions, such 
as (e.g.) Advantageous and 1 Disadvantageous. The other is that 
they cannot be resolved at all, but are ultimate ideas which 


are incapable of analysis. Tho former 8} systems may be called 
Utilitarian? systems of Morality, because they consider the 





1 Note.—Owing to the diffi- 
culty of finding one word to 
include all systems non-Intuitive, 
I use Utilitarian here and else- 
where in this Introduction in 
its widest sense, to include all 
Systems which reduce Virtue to 
a question ofj Utility or Advan- 


7 


tage whether it be of one’s-self 
only, or of others only, or of 
one’s-self and others conjointly. 
These are sometimes  distin- 
guished as Selfish, Benevolent, ) 
and Utilitarian Systems respec- / 
tively. , j 


INTRODUCTION. 


xViil 





recognition of Right and Wrong to depend upon a calculation 
of Utility or Advantage. The latter are called Intuitive 
Systems because they refer the perception of Right and 
Wrong to a special faculty which simply approves and dis- 
approves without being able always, or even usually, to assign 
its reasons: in other words to an Intwitive Faculty. But 
we must not encroach upon our second question. We will 
now therefore illustrate these two divergent theories as to 
the nature of Right and Wrong in themselves. 


(A) Urinrrartan Systems. 


(a) Some assert that all Morality is a thinly-disguised selfish- 
‘ness, that man has and can have, no motive for action but self- 
| interest!, and that even benevolence, gratitude, and love are 
but forms of the desire of power, the wish to exhibit our 
\superiority, the appreciation of possible advantages to be 
derived from the goodwill of others. (8) Others again that 
virtuous actions are simply the observance of the varying 
enactments of law, framed at first by the rulers in their own 


1 Hobbes, Mandeville, La 
Rochefoucauld, etc. Take as a 
specimen Hobbes’s account of 
Love—‘a conception a man hath 
of his need of the person de- 
sired.? Or Mandeville’s state- 
ment that ‘men do not really 
admire such actions as those of 
Regulus or Decius, but only 
observe that men of such dis- 
positions are very useful for the 
defence of any state, and there- 


fore by panegyrics, etc., encour- 
age such tempers in others.’ Or 
La Rochefoucauld (Maxime 264): 
‘ Pity is a clever foresight of ills 
into which we may ourselves 
fall. We assist others in order 
to secure their services for our- 
selves under similar circum- 
stances: and the services we 
render are strictly speaking 
conferred upon ourselves in ad- 
vance’ ! 


INTRODUCTION. xix 





interest’, and observed afterwards by others from fear of 
civil punishments or hope of rewards, ¢.e. from a calculation 
of self-interest. (7) Others*, that ‘honesty is found by experi- 
ence to be the best policy,’ that virtue conduces to health of 
body, and peace of mind, that it secures the honour and good- 
will of society, and, as some add®, above all the friendship and 
goodwill of Heaven. Hence taking a far-sighted view of their 
best interests in this world, and still more, regarding the over- 
whelming balance in favour of virtue in the probable arrange- 
ments of the next, men prudently choose virtue and avoid 
vice. (5) Amore refined system‘ teaches us that human nature 
is by its very constitution endowed with so strong a feeling of 
sympathy that it cannot but experience pleasure and pain at 
the happiness and misery of others, and that it is thus 
impelled to strive after what makes for the general welfare, 
to dislike whatever has a contrary tendency; and that this 


1 Theancient Sophists, Hobbes, 
Mandeville, etc. eg. Hobbes 
says, ‘The notions of right and 
wrong, justice and injustice, 
have there (i.e. in a state of 
nature) no-place. Where there 
is no common power, there is 
no law, where no law, no in- 
justice.’ 

2 Butler to some extent—See 
especially Anal. pt. I. c. iii— 
though his Utilitarianism is quali- 
- fied bythe frequent assertion that 
‘duty’ and ‘conscience’ are 
really supreme, yet ‘ Conscience 
and self-love, if we understand 


our true happiness, always lead 
us the same way. Duty and 
interest are perfectly coincident,’ 
etc. See Summary at the close 
of Sermon iii. 

8 Especially Paley. 

4 Hume and Hutcheson main- 
tain that Right is what con- 
duces to Utility in general, as 
contrasted with mere personal 
and selfish Utility, as Hobbes 
would say. Hume, Adam Smith, 
and Bentham in different ways 
connected these opposing theories 
through the medium of the feel- 


ing of Sympathy. 


1x INTRODUCTION. 





instinct of sympathy overrides the instinct of self-interest: 
in a word, that Right is that which tends to produce the 
greatest aggregate amount of happiness, ‘the greatest happi- 
ness of the greatest number;’ Wrong, the reverse of this. 
(€) Finally we ought to notice a theory! which serves as a sort 
of connecting link between the Utilitarian and Intuitive 
systems—viz., that originally Virtue was chosen for its ad- 
vantages, but that soon it came to be sought without a 
conscious sense of the advantage to be derived from it. It 
had been found from the first so uniformly to be advantageous 
that the calculation whether it was so in any special case was 
- omitted, and virtue as such, and so apparently for its own sake, 
was chosen. Just in the same way that money is sought after, 
first with a view to its use, and then, as the habit of hoarding 
grows, for its own sake, and without any thought of using it. 
Such are some of the answers given by various systems of 
Ethics, which resolve Right and Wrong into some form of 
Utility or the reverse. We pass on now to the 


(B) Inrurrive Systems. 


The following will serve as specimens of this type of solu- 
tions. Itis said that Right and Wrong are distinctions swe 
generis, They cannot be further analysed or explained. 
They differ from any other notion as much, for example, as 
Light differs from Sound. All we can do is to recognise them 
and accept them simply as we do the phenomena of Light, 
Sound, ete. Thus Right is something which commends itself — 
necessarily and naturally to us. To explain this (a) some — 


1 Hartley, Mackintosh. 





INTRODUCTION. xxi 





maintain that it exhibits a certain propriety, and an accordance 
with ‘ the'fitness of things’! which we cannot choose but recog- 
nise, though we cannot analyse the feeling, or explain the 
_ grounds of our approbation. The distinction between Right 
and Wrong would thus be eternal and invariable. (() Or if 
‘accordance with the fitness of things’ be thought vague ana 
beyond the reach of verification, at least it is said there is in 
Right and Wrong a conformity or suitableness (and the re- 
verse) to the natwre of Man* in the truest sense and highest 
development of that nature; very much in the way that fresh 
and bracing air is naturally wholesome to our bodily consti- 
tutions provided they are in a sound and healthy state, or 
that certain tastes and smells are agreeable to us, whatever 
they may be to other animals or organisms, from some suitable- 
ness to our organs of sense which we are unable to explain. 
Thus these and similar systems regard the distinction 
between Right and Wrong as a specific and essential differ- 
ence in the nature of things, which we must simply recognise 
as @ fact, just as for instance we recognise the contrast 
between Hot and Cold, Black and White, Bitter and Sweet. 
It is no part of our purpose to criticise the merits of these 
several systems, but only to state them in outline: we will 
therefore now proceed to our second question, viz. :— 


If. By what faculty in ourselves is the distinction between 
Right and Wrong recognised ? 
The answers given to this question fall under two general 


+ Cudworth, Clarke. Plato's it is loved by the gods, but is 
‘Ideal’ System. [eg. Plato in loved by the gods because it is 
the Huthyphron contends that a holy.] 
quality or act is not holy because * Butler. 


xxii INTRODUCTION. 





types, as is pointed out by Hume. The one, that the recog- 
nition of Right and Wrong is derived from Reason; the other, 
that it is derived from Sentiment. To these may be added 
the view which Hume himself maintains, that ‘Reason and 
Sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and 
conclusions.’ ‘To illustrate these types :— 

Those who (as we have seen) maintain that Right and 
Wrong consist in an immutable ‘ conformity to the nature of 
things’ hold further that Reason in general (¢.e. Intuitive 
Reason), or a special department of Reason (i.e. Practical 
Reason), is the faculty by which such distinctions become 
known to us’. 

Those who refer the origin of the notions of Right and — 
Wrong to Sentiment in some form or another may again be — 
divided into two classes, (1) those who trace it to some 
already recognised Sentiment, such as Self-Love or the 
Desire of Utility; and (2) those who assert that the notions 
of Right and Wrong, being primary and fundamental notions, — 
require a special sense or faculty for their recognition. The — 
latter class, with whom we are chiefly concerned, argue some- — 
what as follows. Looking at the case of our bodily senses we 
observe that differences of Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, — 
Touch, can only be appreciated each by a special sense. If — 
any of those senses be wanting the distinction of objects — 
corresponding to it is lost. One sense cannot do the work of — 
another, except perhaps in a very slight degree and by arti- 
ficial training. Thus each sense has a special and appropriate 
object of its own. Another characteristic of the Senses is 


1 Cudworth, Clarke, Whewell, etc. 








KXIil 


INTRODUCTION. 





that they are ‘ Intuitive,’ ¢.¢. they tell us as a fact that one 
object is green, another red, that one sound is loud, another 
soft, and so on; but they cannot say why the rose is red or 
the leaf green, much less inform us as to the essential dis- 
tinction in the nature of things between red and green. 
Here then we have an exact parallel (it is argued) to the 
recognition of the distinction between Right and Wrong. 
That distinction we feel to be suc generis, and whether the 
feeling be, as the Utilitarian would say, a deception or no, at 
any rate we do feel that we mean by it something different 
from the distinction between Advantageous and Disadvan- 
tageous or any other such antithesis that might be suggested ; 
just as the difference between a good and bad Smell is dis- 
tinet from the difference between a good and bad Taste. If 
this be so, then, on the analogy just explained of the bodily 
senses, it will require a special faculty for its recognition, 
just as much as Taste and Smell require different faculties; 
and further, that faculty must be Intuitive, because it is clear 
that we continually apply the terms Right and Wrong in- 
stinctively, and without being able to say exactly why we 
apply them, much less to explain what constitutes the precise 
difference implied by the words. Hence this faculty is not 
inaptly described as the Moral Sense?. But, it is said by 

1 Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 


etc. The latter insists on the 
fundamental distinction between 


(e.g. Honesty, Generosity, etc.) 
in reference to which he sums 
up his theory as follows :— 





‘Natural’ Good (eg. Riches, 
Health, etc.) which we pursue 
from a view of Interest or from 
Self-Love, and ‘Moral’ Good 


(i.) ‘ That some actions have to 
men an immediate goodness ; 
or that by a superior sense, 
which I call a Moral one, we 


xxiv INTRODUCTION. 





others, this Moral faculty not only affirms Right and Wrong 
of certain acts, but it also involves a sentiment of appro- 
bation and disapprobation of them. The Senses in fact 
suggest here a further analogy. To recognise the distinction 
between Harmony and Discord so as to derive satisfaction or 
the reverse from sounds, it is necessary not only that we have — 
the sense of hearing, but also that we have to some extent 
what is called ‘a musical ear.’ To appreciate harmonious 
and inharmonious combinations of colour it is necessary not 
only to possess the sense of sight, but also to have what is 
called ‘an eye for colour.’ Hence, it is urged, the recog- 
nition of Right and Wrong, involving as it does also the 
approbation and disapprobation of them, is analogous to the 
operation of the cultivated ear and eye rather than to that 
of the simple Senses of hearing and seeing. In a word the 
element of Taste is so conspicuous in the operations of this 
moral faculty that some have preferred to describe it as a 
Moral! Taste rather than a Moral Sense. Others observing 


perceive pleasure in the con- 
templation of such actions in 
others, and are determined to 
love the agent (and much more 
do we perceive pleasure in being 
conscious of having done such 
actions ourselves) without any 
view of further natural advan- 
tage from them. 

(ii.) That what excites us to 
these actions, which we call 
virtuous, is not an intention to 
obtain even this sensible plea- 


sure, much less the future re- 
wards from sanctions of laws, or 
any other natural good, which 
may be the consequence of the 
virtuous action, but an entirely 
different principle of action from 
Interest or Self-Love.’ 

An Inquiry concerning Moral 
Good and Hvil—Introduction.— 
See further § I. viii. 


1 ¢g. Hume: ‘As virtueisan 


end and is desirable on its own 
account, without fee or reward, 








INTRODUCTION. xxV 





that this perception together with approbation (or the reverse) 
of Right and Wrong is further accompanied by a feeling of 
Duty, or of Obligation to regulate our own actions accord- 
ingly, lay stress upon this portion of the complex phenomenon 
and describe the moral faculty as Conscience’. 

Thus the complex phenomenon is threefold. It involves 
(1) The recognition of Right and Wrong; (2) Approbation 
or disapprobation based upon that recognition; (3) A Sense 
of obligation to regulate our own actions accordingly. As 
each of these functions respectively is considered the most 
important the Moral Faculty is described as Moral Sense, 
Moral Taste, or Conscience. 


III. This brings us naturally to our third question, What 


is the Mot Motive for Moral Action? or in other words, the | 


nature of Moral Obligation ? 

The distinction which we have met with before reappears 
in this part of our subject. Some regard the Motive to Moral 
Action as something swi generis ; others as a particular appli- 
cation of some other already recognised Motives. Among 
the latter we may class those who view it as merely a natural 


mined by sentiment. We define 
Virtue to be whatever mental 


merely for the immediate satis- 
faction it conveys, it is requisite 


that there should be some senti- 
ment which it touches, some 
internal taste or feeling, or what- 
ever you please to call it, which 
distinguishes moral good andevil, 
and which embraces the one and 
rejects the other.’— (Inquiry con- 
cerning. Morals, App. I. p. 331, 
Ed. 1825.) ‘Morality is deter- 


action or quality gives to a 
spectator the pleasing sentiment 
of approbation.’—(Jb. p. 326.) 
Compare also JZthics, II. iii. 7 


(kal yap rd Kaddv kal rd oupde- 


pov 700 aivera), and the argu- 
ment in III. ix, 2-5, 
1 ¢.g, Butler, 


XXVi INTRODUCTION. 





prudential regard for our own interest, or as an instinctive 
benevolent desire for the good of our fellow-men, or as a com- 
bination of both these impulses. Those also who adhere to 
the theory of a Moral Taste give a somewhat similar answer 
to the question, viz., that the pleasure derived from the grati- 
fication of that Taste disposes us to act so as to secure it, as 
naturally as a musician would seek for the enjoyment of good 
music. So far then the answer given would deny the exist- 
ence of Duty or Moral Obligation in any distinctive sense. 
It is merely a phase, or a special application, of some other 
familiar instinct. 

Many Intuitive Moralists however claim for this feeling of 
Duty a character perfectly distinct and independent. They 
affirm it to be different from a sense of approbation, or of gra- 
tification; from a desire of self-interest, or of general expedi- 
ency. It is declared to be a primary fact of our nature’, and as 
primary, to some extent inexplicable, just as is the case with the 
axioms of Mathematics or the fundamental Laws of Thought. 
That it is so is evidenced by an appeal to the various 
languages of men? which provide a distinct word for the idea 
of ‘Duty,’ ‘ Ought,’ ‘ Obligation,’—distinet that is from Self- 


1 eg. Kant. “noble” and “ despicable,” had 


2 Compare the following argu- 
mentof Hume forthereality of our 
conceptions of Moral distinctions : 
—‘Had Nature made no such 
distinction founded on the origin- 
al constitution of the mind, the 
words “honourable” and “‘shame- 
ful,” “lovely” and “odious,” 


never had place in any language; 
nor could politicians, had they in- 
vented these terms,ever have been 
able to render them intelligible, 
or make them convey any idea 
to the audience.’—Jnquiry con- 
cerning Principles of Morals, 
§ 5.) 














INTRODUCTION. XXVii 





Interest, Benevolence, Utility, Approbation, or any other 
motive that can be assigned—while each and all indicate it 
by a metaphor, the imperfect applicability of which bears 
witness to the difficulty of expressing the thing signified. 
Two metaphors generally occur—that of a debt due, or that of 
a binding-or compelling force. Of the former, peta, xp), 
‘debeo,’ due,’ ‘duty,’ ‘ought’ (owed), are examples: of the 
latter, Se?, ‘ religio,’ ‘obligation,’,‘bound.’ Imperfect metaphors 
they are, because a debt implies a creditor, as well as some 
service received from him which is to be repaid: obligation 
implies a superior power by which the compulsion is exer- 
cised. But in the case before us, though we feel that there is 
a ‘due’ or ‘debt,’ we have no distinct conception of the acces- 
sory circumstances just enumerated, or at least not neces- 
sarily so: and the ‘obligation’ is one which is not strictly 
binding or compulsory. The debt is one which we are free 
to repudiate, the obligation one which we are free to neglect. 
These metaphors thus indicate efforts on the part of the mind 
to express a feeling which it cannot adequately explain to 
itself or others because it is swt generis, the effort to 
do so however evidencing the real existence of some such 
feeling. 

Thus we see the same broad twofold division runs through 
the various answers given to the three questions we have now 
discussed, a division depending on the consideration whether 
(1) the distinction of Right and Wrong in themselves, | 
(2) the faculty by which it is appreciated, (8) the motive 
by which it is acted upon, are, or are not, sui generis. It is 
not however the case that systems which adopt either of these 


xxviii INTRODUCTION. 





opposed lines in answer to any one of the questions necessarily 
adopt the same line in regard to the others. 


IV. Whatever be the character of the motive power of our 
moral nature, whether it be a calculation of self-interest, or a 


_ desire for the good of others, or the instinctive gratification 


of a Taste, or a Sense of Duty generically distinct from other 
motives, the question still remains open, What is the ultimate 


| end to which our moral nature tends? What is it, by the con- 
duct which it adopts, struggling or hoping to reach at last — 


as its ideal consummation? or, as Aristotle phrases it, 
‘What is the Chief Good for man?’ This is a question 
scarcely, if at all, inferior in importance, and certainly not 
so in practical interest, to the three already considered. 


Aristotle, as we have seen, regards it as the main question — 


of Ethical Science. 

We cannot then do better than answer this question in his 
own words. ‘That final end and aim is Happiness, ¢.e. a state 
in which there shall be no deferred hopes, no unsatisfied 
desires. All are agreed upon this, high and low, learned and 
unlearned, but the conceptions of the conditions constituting 
such a state are as various as the varieties of human aims 
and human characters. Hach selects his own favourite desire 
or pursuit, and considers the state of Happiness to depend 
mainly upon its gratification. (It will be remembered that 
we are now speaking of Man apart from the influence of re- 
vealed Religion on his aspirations or his conduct.) Still in 
the midst of this variety certain leading types may be noticed, 
which are generally speaking characteristic of different 


SN A fo 2 


INTRODUCTION. xxix 





stages of growth in Society or in the Individual. (See 
Kthics, I. v.) 

1, The whole occupation of savage life (where society 
means little more than local proximity of habitation), is to 
secure by hunting and fishing the precarious support of daily 
life. The highest happiness conceivable is the abundant 
supply of the best food without toil, trouble, or anxiety. 
Heaven is a perpetual banquet. The full and free gratifica- 
. tion of Bodily pleasure (750v7)) constitutes Happiness. 

2. When the growth of civilisation (by organization of 
labour, mechanical improvements, etc.) is able to secure the 
supply of these simple wants of the community, then the 
desire for power over others and social distinction (tpm1) 
becomes the ruling passion. Successful kings, rulers, generals, 
are the ideals which command the admiration of mankind 
at large. Nobler spirits however regard these distinctions 
as deriving their value from Active Virtue and Goodness of 
Character (dper?)), and endeavour to persuade themselves and 
others that the desires of human nature would all be satisfied 
if this type of Character were fully attained. 

8. In a state of still more advanced cultivation and refine- 
ment, this divergence between higher and lower natures, the 
one pursuing dper7), the others t1j.7), becomes yet more marked. 
The former—experience having shown the practical attainment. 
of their ideal standard (dper?), at least on any large scale, to 
__be hopeless—take refuge in literature, philosophy, intellectual 
~ cultivation (Aewpyrtxds Bios), The latter, and the majority, 
—finding out of the pursuit of distinction and power that ‘the 
quest is not for them,’—betake themselves to the accumulation 


fr a) 
INTRODUCTION. 





\ Areata (xpnparirrixcs Bios). Hence the familiar remark 
~~ that both high literary cultivation, and also wealth with its 
natural accompaniment of luxury, are signs in societies of full 
maturity verging towards decay. 

In the life of the Individual we may trace a somewhat 
similar progress in his various conceptions of Happiness. 
Pleasure is the sole thought of youth; Ambition to excel, in 
its lower or its higher forms, is the characteristic of manhood; 
and the closing scene is marked either by ‘ years that bring 
the ene mind,’ or by ‘avarice, the prevailing passion 
of old age.’ 

Such are the chief types of that aim or end of life which men 
are found, as a mere observation of fact (see p. xiv.), to place 
before themselves as the Chief Good, the attainment of which 
they think would wholly satisfy the desires of their nature. 
In this last, as in the case of the other three questions, it be- 
comes the office of the Science of Ethics to judge of the 
merits of these conflicting theories, and if allmust be pronounced 
imperfect, to point out if possible ‘a more excellent way.’, 


, 1 We are now in a position to explain the broad features of | 
‘Aristotle’s system of Ethics in particular, as delineated in 
the following Treatise. We may perhaps notice these three 
distinctive characteristics :-— 

| (1) His attention is directed to the external rather than to 


‘the unternal aspect. of morals’. The central question of this 


i 1 The student may omit pp. 2 This idea will be found 
xxx. to xxxv. until he has ac- clearly worked out in Grant’s 
quired a certain familiarity with thics, vol. i. Essay vii.) 

the text of the Ethics. 





INTRODUCTION. xxxi 





system is, What is the Chief Good for Man? What is the Final : 


End of action, the End-in-itself? So again it will be seen that 
a large portion of Books II. III. and IV. is occupied with the 
distinction between Virtues and Vices as manifested in out- 
ward actions, while we hear little or nothing of the faculty 
in ourselves by which that distinction is apprehended further 
than that it is ‘right reason’ (dp@ds Adyos); and the sense of 
Duty or Obligation is scarcely touched upon (Cf. perhaps 
IIT. i. 24 wv de? dpéyer Oar). So again we find a full discus- 
sion of Voluntary and Involuntary actions (B. III. chaps. 
i—v.), but not of the Nature of the Will in itself or of its 
relation to the other parts of our moral constitution. 


Tt must be clearly understood that this is no deprecia- — 


tion of Aristotle’s system. It simply amounts to a statement 
of the totally different standpoint of ancient and modern times. 


The accumulated experience of more than two thousand years, , 
together with the influence of Christianity pervading, even: 


when not explicitly recognised, all modern thought, has given 
us an utterly different position at starting in Ethical Science, 
just as in Natural Science now-a-days a schoolboy starts with 
appliances and discoveries at his disposal which enable him to 
leave the wisest of the ancients far behind before he has 
mastered the very alphabet of his subject. 

(2) The political or rather social- character of Aristotle’s 
system of Morals will also attract our notice. The science of 
Kthies is regarded at the outset as a branch of Political or 
Social Science (roAurixy ris I. ii. 9), while at the close of 
B. X. it is said absolutely to require the sanction and com- 
pelling powers of Civil Government to enforce its precepts in 











xxxii INTRODUCTION. 





practice. Throughout the treatise the discussion of various 
moral questions is justified by the argument that Statesmen 
have employed or might employ such knowledge (e.g. aperi 
in I. xiii. 2-4; Yvyy 2b. § 8; add I. ix. 8, I. i. 5, and IIL. 
v. 7, etc.). This characteristic again is due to the cireum- 
stances of the writer’s age and country. If we consider (1) the 
absence, comparatively speaking, of domestic life among the 
Greeks; (2) the fact that in the ancient Greek states, which 
were cities and not countries, representative government was 
comparatively unnecessary, and practically regarded with dis- 
favour!; (3) the practical disabilities and general contempt 
visited upon trading and commerce; we can see how, under all 
these circumstances, a man’s social and political life acquired 
an importance which it is difficult for us, with our domestic 
habits, our vast empires, and our commercial pursuits, at all 
to realize. It was in fact the only avenue to distinction. 
Poets, philosophers, artists, were almost always statesmen or 
soldiers. The wealthy did not merely pay a larger sum to 
the aggregate of national taxation. A rich man raised and 
equipped so many horsemen, or he fitted out a vessel of war 
(which was usually commanded by himself), or he undertook 
the expenses of an embassy, or of a public festival. Hence 
the prominence of civic virtues in Aristotle’s? and other 


1 Aristotle says in the Politics of Courage, which is,in Aristotle’s 


that one who does not himself 
share in political life might as 
well be a resident alien (So7ep 
pérotxos yap cot 6 TaY Tin@Y 
pay perexav). 

2 eg. The primary importance 


conception, almost restricted to 
military Courage. With the 
Spartans this Virtue was so pre- 
eminent that others were entirely 
subordinate to it: eg. Theft was 
encouraged because of the cour- 


INTRODUCTION. Xxxiii 





ancient systems of morality. Hence too the tendency to 
regard virtues generally from their social or ocial or political side? side}, 


The relative badness of different vices is Ys frequently estimatec estimated 
by Aristotle in reference not to the depravity of character 
which they either imply or tend to generate, but to their 
effect iety*, With many ancient moralists, and notably 
with Plato, the consideration that ‘ public benefits’ may re- 
sult from ‘ private vices’ is so strong as to obscure the sense 
of wrong in such cases altogether, e.g. when community of 
wives, the practice of abortion, the destruction of weakly 
children, pious frauds, ete. ete., are not only sanctioned, _ but 
advocated, on the ground of advantages that may be secured 











thereby to the State’. 
eae 


age cultivated by its execution. 
That the Greeks in earlier times 
generally displayed an excessive 
regard to this Virtue is noticed 
by Gladstone, Juventus Mundi, p. 
380. It was not the treachery nor 
the adultery but the effeminate 
cowardice of Paris which chiefly 
moved their indignation. The 
very name for Courage is avdpeia, 
Manliness. Also the distinction 
drawn between peyadorperesa 
and €AevGepia (II. vii. 6, IV. ii. 
1), and we may perhaps add that 
between peyadoWuyxia and dido- 
ryia (in its good sense) (II. vii. 
8, IV. vi. 1) are socially rather 
than morally important. 

1 The limitations imposed upon 


That Aristotle’s Ethical System 


the sphere for the exercise of 
Courage in III. vi. may be so 
explained. (Plato’s Definition 
of Courage exhibits still more 
strongly this tendency, which in 
fact distorts his whole Ethical 
system. See Rep. p. 429, B. 
Courage is ‘such a power as will 
preserve under all circumstances 
that precise estimate of things to 
be feared which the legislator 
has imparted in education.’) . 

2 ¢g. dowria is preferred on 
this ground, among others, to 
dvedevOepia, IV. i. 32,44. Com- 
pare IV. v. 12, in reference to 
Anger. 

8 We even find a moralist 
(Archytas) quoted in Cic. de 


XXXIV 


INTRODUCTION. 





should have a 


‘political’ hue is almost as much a neces- 


sity of his age and country as that the language in which 
he wrote should be Greek!; that this colouring but seldom 
disguises important moral questions is a merit peculiarly his 


own. 
(8) Third] 


attentive student will be struck by a 





tendency in Aristotle to regard Virtue very much on its 


intellectual side. 





This again was an inheritance from the 


times in which he hved?, and with his master Plato it is found 


in a vastly ly greater ee. 
and Vice is ts ‘Tgnorance. 


PR TA aE, 


can 


deliberately act against knowledge. 


With Plato Virtue is Knowledge 
No man, according to his system, 





When any man 


chooses the Wrong he must do so with the conviction, at 
least for the moment, that it is preferable to secure the for- 
bidden pleasure and risk the future consequences than to 
undergo the present pain of the self-denial. This is simply 
a miscalculation, and Vice is due therefore to an error of 


Senect. xii. § 40, denouncing 
sensuality on the main ground 
that it leads te actions politically 
dangerous. 

i ¢ Every nation, from its pecu- 


liar circumstances and position, 
tends to some particular type, 


both of beauty and of virtue, 
and it naturally extols its na- 
tional type beyond all others.’ 
—(Lecky, Hist. Hur. Morals, 
vol. i. p. 82.) 

2 «Tf we compare the different 
virtues that have flourished 


among Pagans and Christians, 
we invariably find that the pre- 
vailing type of excellence among 
the former is that in which the 
will and judgment, and among 
the latter, that in which the 
emotions are most prominent. 
Friendship rather than love, 
hospitality rather than charity, 
magnanimity rather than tender- 
ness, clemency rather than sym- 
pathy, are the characteristics of 
ancient goodness.’—(Lecky, Hur. 
Mor. vol. i. p. 200.) 


INTRODUCTION. XXXV 





judgment, a mistake, an intellectual blunder, and is conse- — 
quently with Plato, at least in theory, involuntary. We find 
no such exaggeration of the intellectual portion of moral 
action in Aristotle, but on the contrary frequent protests 
against it. But we do find, as compared with our modern 
ideas, little account taken of the emotional or impulsive side 
of Virtue. 3° Phough . Aristotle insists in ILL. ii, at much length 
on the compound character of Moral Choice (apoatpecis) 
—which is an essential condition of all Moral Action (see II. 
iy. 3)—as involving an element of Impulse (épegs) as well as 
of Judgment (Sd£a), yet in his detailed account of the Virtues 
it often strikes us that he makes the Moral Agent too self- 
conscious’; there is a sort of cold and studied riety, an 
absence of impulse and enthusiasm, even in virtues which 
seem to involve a large element of impulse in actual practice, 
such as Courage, Liberality, Benevolence, and High-Minded- 
ness.2. No doubt it might be said that this unruffied pl philoso-~- 
phic self-control is his ideal of Moral perfection. We are 
not now discussing the merits of such an ideal. We are 
simply noting that Aristotle’s conception of Moral Virtue 
does in a marked way, compared with our modern habits of 
thought, fall under this type. 

2 Finally, the beginner should be warned of the difficulties 














1 The often-noted absence of one’s-self and especially of one’s | 
humility in Aristotle’s ideal moral character, which, if unde- 
character, the High-Minded Man served, is mere folly; if deserved, 
(IV. iii.), is an instance of this. implies the reverse of a Virtuous 
Humility viewed on its intellec- condition. 

“tual side (as a Greek would view 2 See notes on IV. i. 27, ii. 10,. 
it) beconies a low estimate of iii. 24 





xXxxvl INTRODUCTION. 





which lie before him in the way of (i.) literal translation, (ii.) 
analysis and distinction of argument, in this Book. 

i. It is difficult, or rather in many cases impossible, to 
translate the technical language of Aristotle by any precisely 
equivalent terms in English. It is very rare to find two 
technical words in different languages precisely agreeing in 
their significance, in their extent, and still more in their 
associations. The words of different nations, like their 
coinage or their weights and measures, are often incommen- 
surable. We cannot exactly translate frances into shillings or 
kilométres into miles. Hence we must not be startled if we 
read that it is absurd to ‘ praise’ (eracvefv) the gods (I. xii.), 
or if we find physical functions such as nutriment and growth 
attributed to the ‘soul’ (vx) (I. xiii.), or if we are told that 
moral science is a branch of ‘political’ science (zoAcriKy) 
(I. ii.). The explanation is that our words ‘ praise,’ ‘soul,’ 
‘political,’ have different meanings and associations from 
those of the most nearly corresponding Greek terms. Still 
more impossible is it to translate passages the force of which 
depends on the double meaning of a Greek word or phrase 
(e.g. axdrAacros in IIT. xii, Adyov yew in IL. xiii., réAcwos 
‘final’ and ‘perfect,’ I. vii. 4), or upon the etymology of a 
technical term (e.g. 4@cx7 in IT. i. 1). 

In all such cases as we have mentioned, we must either 
(1) paraphrase, ¢.e. describe rather than translate the words 
in the text (e.g. this will be found recommended in I. ii. for 
woXitixy), or (2) adopt different English words at different 
times for the same Greek word according to the particular 
side of the complex idea which is for the time prominent, e.g. 


INTRODUCTION. xxxvii 





we may sometimes translate ¥vx7) ‘soul,’ sometimes ‘ mind,’ 
sometimes perhaps ‘vital principle.’ It must always be borne 
in mind that the object of translation is not ‘ verbum verbo 
reddere,’ but to convey to a modern hearer as far as possible 
the same ideas and impressions as the original would have 
produced in a contemporary. | 

ii. It would be an error to regard this work in the light of 
a modern treatise carefully written and revised by its author, 
put forth as the formal result of his labours in one special 
field of knowledge, and intended by him to occupy a definite 
position among his collected works. So far is this from being 
the case that the Nicomachean Ethics as they have come to 
us are generally thought to consist of fragments of two or 
more distinct treatises which were never intended to form 
parts of one whole. And more than this, they have some- 
times been regarded as merely notes of different courses of 
oral lectures, taken down by one or more pupils, perhaps, and 
perhaps not, revised by Aristotle himself. We find (1) 
promises of subsequent discussion unfulfilled, or announced 
arrangements departed from!; (2) inconsistent theories or 
statements in different Books*; (8) confusion in the grouping 
of arguments or in the statement of single arguments*; (4) 
sometimes a series of arguments appears in a sort of skeleton 
form, as if they were merely heads or memoranda‘; (5) some- 
times arguments in support of a point from which the discus- 
sion has passed on, seem to be added like after-thoughts, just 

1 See II. vii. 16. 8 As perhaps in I. viii. 10 


2 This applies chiefly to other ete., IL. ix. 4. 
Books than I. -IV. * See II. iii., v. ; III. ii. 


INTRODUCTION. 


XXXVili 








as they occurred to the author, instead of being placed in 
their natural position!; (6) misquotations occur from well- 
known authors, which have evidently been cited from memory 
and not verified?; (7) perhaps the note-theory might explain 
occasional instances of confusion, such as that in respect of 
pOdvos and émexapexaxia (II. vii. 15); or the sudden 
collapse of an unfinished discussion, as in IV. ix. These 
blemishes, and especially the last four, are just such as might 
be expected in oral lectures, or notes from such leetures, but 
not in a revised or finished treatise. Hence the student 
must not expect to be always able to analyse satisfactorily, 
or distinguish quite clearly, the several arguments in the 
text, as it stands; nor to develop a finished plan of treat- 


ment for each subject under discussion. 


leg, I. viii. 12, ete.; II. ii. 
7; III. iii. 14, ete. 

2¢g9. Calypso for Circe, II. 
ix. 3; and perhaps the illustra- 
tion from Homer about Thetis, 
IV. iii. 25 ; but see Suppl. Notes. 

3To the arguments given 
above might be added two con- 
siderations derived from the 
diction: (i.) the frequent use of 
dkpoaral, dxovev, etc. Shilleto 
(note on Thuc. i. 90) remarks on 
this: ‘If the Nic. Ethies and 
some other works of Aristotle 
were not syllabuses of lectures, 
what is the meaning of more 
than once calling 6 remardeupévos 
(the pupil) adxpoarns, and of the 
expression pataiws axovoera Kat 


dvopedas?’ He proceeds to 
defend the reading mp@nyv for 
apérepoy in Eth. II. iii. 5= ‘as 
we said in our lecture the other. 
day,’ and suggests that the fre- 
quent use of dda v7) Ala in the 
Polities fi.e. the Ethics con- 
tinued] points in the same direc- 
tion. (ii.) The use of accusative 
and infinitive without any strict 
grammatical construction ; which 
quasi-reminiscence of Or. Obj. 
is suggestive of the process of 
jottmg down notes. This is 
very common in the Politics, 
and in the Ethics we may cite 
as examples, IV. iii. 25 (86 nat 
K.T.A.), 1. § 28 (eipwva dé x.4.A.), 
ete. 


As) Sai ; 
aN 
hoes © 


niger 
i 


A 
1; 










+ 








: atts = oe ria) a 
‘ + rf =" Vo 
ts 
' , + 
, ig 
2 Ld , re Ape ‘ 
+ wea > At 
4 4 ft b 
Wet / “Mm Hay } ‘ 6 Asa? . ‘ 
; a Ly 42a} Me "ager SMS Pio. > , aR, “tee 
FU ARS Mee Ae Ee Pela, & Cer eT Mee! 
: rel er | aL | v, ‘ 
¢ 
4 s d - 
J faa eee VN ee , 
ees, ATLA ANY TEL ky Thiet 
/ " . 4 
- ’ : s ‘wy * 4 
. : AP LAN y bach, Pie, b+ 
rel fa i : t R ‘ ; ‘5 . heid vk ' 
em pest sp ah ee ewe] RAL Ces 
4 et a i" : ; : . ee Fo ti 
‘ r 4 hiv AS oat Al 
“Lt: 1A ae A ~y ; \ ; ‘ 
17) F iM ANT AR Pate ome lal ’ APD Sehr Kee ti B, Oy in 
' 7 / Ay : y i. 
Ber ibs of is! PAE ahs Liiyhs ar" 
Pay ei Lye cee ¥ ) Oy ar y 
s | 7 3 4 
. ao 
. bay dpa) gs¥ . wile sey wih Prat an) 
{ . y ee Th 
Pde } } Ne : i AR, ‘ 
‘ Tle bs Ley, Oa de! A VR) oes AMIE Bee) ' 
ad ia, . 
Piva ih 
i 


7 i ° 4 

#5 ‘ t : -_ tj A may } ; : 

eh U1: BLE Bays “eh we Afi CUR ple Gs PEre RET e Al 
7 oe 


MCAD caravtaets Ld hey te (ree) ARE PE NOe ge Aer Nee 





ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE NOTES. 


‘of. ‘conzer,’ ‘compare.’ 

q.v. ‘quod vide,’ ‘to which refer.” 

sc. ‘seilicet,’ ‘ namely.’ 

s.v. ‘sub voce’ (e.g. ‘see Glossary s.v. ré\os’ means ‘see the Glossary 
under the word réXos °). 

lc. ‘loco citato,’ ‘in *he passage quoted.’ 

h.l. ‘hoc loco,’ ‘in this passage.’ 

ib. ‘¢bidem,’ ‘in the same place or passage.’ 

K.T.r. ‘Kal Td Nowra,’ ‘et cetera.’ 


The references to Books, Chapters, and Sections are made in different 
figures, thus: II. iii. 5 means Book II., Chapter iii., Section 5. 





‘= ~ 
Kare ” as a 
~ 7 : 
i LF a = 
. 


UNIVER Iry) 






LIST OF TERMS EXPLAINED IN THE 
GLOSSARY. 


mpatis—roinats, egal ; 5 ARR ane rey ea 
SE U2 ae ge wren, eit me 
Art—Science, . ; : ; ; .  xliv 


A priori—a posteriori, . Sw eel tne 


divapis—evéepyea, sien: =o) ee 
Tehos—Tehewos, » ine . xivii 
apxn, . y ae : - xivii 
vuxn, . . ° : . +: . xlviii 
dpertn, . , F oo sk 
@poaipecis, » , | ; l 


The Four Causes, . , , 4 li 
Gcds—gvors, BSP ha) i Se tit 


mh; 


DURUM 


: 
alt She 
Se 





e — © 
7 Cs) . +e ”~y wr Le 
4: THAT Beg 
“dy d * 15 Ty & ” 
<= as w= gi 


te — 


ne ————— 
rene — eal 


mpantis—rroinos. 


fipdéis (1) has the general sense of outward action, in contrast with 
inward and mental activity (@ewpla, for which see below). (2) It is ap- 
plied to a particular kind of outward actions, viz., such as have no tangible 
result distinct from the action itself; where our aim is not at making some- 
thing but at doing something. e.g. The practice of the Art of Navigation, 
or the Art of Healing: for the safety of the ship or the health of the 
body is not a result of a distinct and tangible character. (3) Since the 
most important cases of such actions are Moral Actions, where either the 
action itself is the result in view, or the character which it tends to form, 
mpaéis acquires the still more limited sense of Moral Action. 

Iloineis is applied to actions which leave some definite and tangible 
result; actions which aim at making something; asis the case in most of 
the Arts: e.g. mm house-building or ship-building the house or the ship is 
such a result; in composing poetry (zolyois), the poem (zolnua); in 
sculpture or painting, the statue or the picture, 

The adjectives mpaxrixh, movnrixh, Oewpyrich, naturally follow the 
same distinction. See in illustration, X. viii. 7. So in Pol. I, iv. 4, 
Aristotle describes a Shuttle as dpyavoy rocnrixdy, its value consisting 
in its productions, but a. Bed or Clothing as Spyava wpaxrixd, their 
value consisting in their wee. 


Oewpia. 


Gewpla is grouped with rolyois and wrpaéis by Aristotle, and he regards 
these three as the only possible forms which intelligent activity can take. 
Observe they are all forms of activity (évépyea). Activity of the pro- 
ductive or artistic powers is rolycts. Activity of the powers of action, 
and especially moral action, is rp@%s. Activity of the powers of intellect 
or contemplation is Pewpla. In the first, there is outward action and a 

tangible result ; in the second, there is outward action but no tangible re- 

sult; in the last, there is neither outward action nor tangible result ; still 

it is not a passive state, but one of internal, mental activity, ‘the depth, 

and not the tumult of the soul’ (Wordsworth). (See Pol. IV. (VIL) iii. 

sub. fin.) As Pope writes (Hssay on Man, ii. 106), the ‘ strength of 

mind is exercise, not rest.’ But further, it must be distinguished from 
xiii 


xliv GLOSSARY. 





Sa 


the mental activity displayed in the pursuit or acquisition of knowl 

It is the active fruition of knowledge already possessed. (See X. vii. 5, 
obdéy dm’ adrijs ylyverae rrhv 7d Oewpfoat.) It is, to use a homely 
illustration, like ‘chewing the cud’ of knowledge, dwelling upon it, 
assimilating it. Persuasion, or discovery, of a truth leads to belief or 
knowledge of it; if it be a matter of personal interest, faith in it follows; 
finally it may become as it were a part of our very selves, our intellectual 
food, the thought upon which our minds for ever dwell and meditate. 
This last condition would constitute Oewpla of it, These stages are 
admirably expressed by Wordsworth: 


One in whom persuasion and belief 
Had ripened into faith, and faith become 
A passionate intuition. 


This ‘ passionate intuition’ is @ewpla. It is this intellectual energy in 
repose, this active yet tranquil contemplation and enjoyment of Truth 
and Knowledge already possessed, that, under the name of @ewpla (in 
B. X.), Aristotle considers to be perfect and ideal Happiness, as realized 
only in the life of the gods. 


Art—Scetence. 


’ Science is knowledge for its own sake (scire wt seiamus). Art is 
knowledge for some practical end (scire wt operemur). It is objection- 
able to say that Art is ‘Science turned to account,’,because an Artis 
generally prior in time to its related Science. In fact the existence of an — 
Art in a rude state is generally the stimulating cause of the study of the 
related Science. e.g. The Science of Astronomy was originally cultivated 
with a view to the Art of Navigation, or the Art (or practical Science) of 
Astrology: the Science of Anatomy with a view to the Art of Surgery: 
the Science of Chemistry with a view to the Art of Alchemy. 

So much for the general distinction of the terms., There is however 
an ambiguity about the word ‘practical,’ which causes some difficulty 
in the application of the words Art and Science (e.g. Logic, Grammar, 
Rhetoric, Astrology, Navigation, etc., are called by either title). This 
makes it desirable to have an intermediate term, ‘ practical Science.’ Let 
the reader refer to the difference already explained (p. xli.) between mpaiis 
and molyovs, and he will then understand the following distinction: ‘Art’ 
is strictly applicable to cases of aolyows, ‘Practical Science’ to cases 
of mpagis, ‘Science’ (as above explained), to knowledge for its own 


GLOSSARY. xlv 





sake. Hence Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics are ‘ prac- 
tical Sciences.’ (See further, Introduction, p. xiii.) 

Speaking broadly, éwiorjun corresponds with Science, and réyvy with 
Art. We find however ém:er7un used in reference to practical applica- 
tions of knowledge (e.g. I. i. 5, vi. 15, IT. vi. 9, IIT. iii. 8) and réxvn, at 
least by implication, referred to Moral action, @.e. mpa@és, not zolnocs 
(II. i. 4, vi. 9, etc.). We must not therefore press the correspondence 
too closely. 7 

Also it must be observed that réxv7 and émriorjun with Aristotle more 
usually refer, not to Art and Science regarded as external results of 
man’s genius (i.e. a body of practical rules, or a system of abstract 
knowledge), but rather to the mental states by which we stand related to 
the objects of practical or theoretic knowledge respectively. 


a priori—a posteriore. 


These terms refer to what is prior, or posterior, to observation and 
experience. 

An @ priori argument means one which starts from principles which 
are (or were thought to be by those who invented these terms) prior to, 
and independent of, experience. Such for instance are Mathematical 
and other Axioms. These have been held to be prior to experience, 
either as being ‘innate ideas,’ or as not depending for proof on experi- 
ence. Without entering into this controversy further, we may assert 
that the phraseology a priori, having arisen in this manner, is now used 
to describe arguments starting from general principles. 

An @ posteriori argument, on the other hand, is one that derives its 
whole force from experience and observation of facts. Its premisses are 
not general principles or obvious truths, but statements of facts of 
experience. } 

Consequently the Mathematical Sciences are purely a priori Sciences. 
They start from general principles such (e.g.) as Euclid’s Axioms, and 
end in particular, or at any rate less general, statements, such as Huclid’s 
Propositions. They proceed, as Aristotle would say, dd rév dpydv. 

On the other hand the Physical Sciences are purely a posteriori 
Sciences. They assume no general principles, but start from observed 
facts, and end in the discovery of general laws, e.g. that of gravitation. 
They proceed émi ras dpxds. 

As to the Science of Ethics, or Morals, both methods have at different 
times been advocated and adopted. See note on I. iv. 5. 





; x 


xivi GLOSSARY. 





duvapus—evepryera. 


We first explain the principal meanings of Sivayus, which may be 
connected thus:—dvvas is (1) power or capacity, in a literal or general 
sense; (2) power merely, i.e. power existent, but not exercised ; dor- 
mant, not in operation (see below) ; (3) power regarded as the source 
and spring of practical results, such as is given us by Arts in contra- 
distinction to Sciences (see p. xliv). Hence dévapus is sometimes used as 
a sort of equivalent term for réxvy, e.g. Tivos Tay ériornuav 7 Suvdpewr, 
I, ii. 3; and again 7b. §§ 5 and 6. See also V.i. 4, 

The most important of the usages of the word is (2). In this sense it 
stands in contrast with évépyeva, somewhat as ‘potential’ and ‘ actual,’ 
‘latent’ and ‘developed,’ are contrasted in English. Take these illustra- 
tions. The flower exists potentially but not actually (Svydmec but not 
évepyeia) in the bud, or in the seed ; the ear of corn in the ‘ bare-grain’ ; 
the oak in the acorn. So the photographic picture, which exists poten- 
tially on the collodion film, becomes actual when brought out by the 
developing fluid. Again, an infant has not actually the power of 
speaking or reading any more than a horse ora dog. Still there is an 
important difference between the two cases, because experience tells us 
that there is that in the infant which may be developed into these powers, 
whereas no amount of training would develop anything of the sort in 
the lower animals, any more than cultivation could produce an oak from — 
an imitation acorn though undistinguishable to the eye from a real one. 
It is convenient therefore to say that these powers exist in the infant 
potentially (Suvduex), in distinction to cases where they do not exist at all. 
So again if we have information given us in cipher, or in sympathetic ink, — 
or in a sealed document, we have the information duvdmex but not évepyela. 
This distinction is also sometimes indicated by the antithesis of és and — 
évépyera, or of xrfjots and xphots, Passages in illustration will be found — 
in I. viii. 8, II. i. 4. See also the use of d¥vames in contrast with wdos 
and éécs in II. v. 2. 

Again, the distinction may be applied both to eazstence and action. 
As regards the former, ddvayus is applied to that which can be, but is not: — 
as regards the latter to that which can do, but does not. See especially 
the use of dévapus in I. xii. . 


GLOSSARY. xlvii 





Ténos, TENELOS. 


Tédos == our word ‘End’ (1) in its literal sense of a ‘termination ’; 
and (2) in its other sense of a ‘ motive ’ or ‘aim’: of which the latter use 
is much more common in Aristotle. (8) It is also used in reference to 
his doctrine of the ‘ end-in-itself,’ or ‘final end’ of all human action, 
described in other words as ‘the Chief Good.’ Often however these 
meanings are combined in a manner which it is all but impossible to 
represent in translation, eg. I. ix. 3, 7d ris dperfis @Aov Kal rédos. 
Similarly 7éAecos means ‘complete,’ ‘perfect,’ and also ‘final’: e.g. in 
I, vii. it is difficult to retain this double signification in translation. 

Aristotle’s doctrine of the ‘end-in-itself’ may be thus explained :— 
There must be an end or purpose (in sense (2)) for which man exists 
in the world, as there is for everything else (see I. vii. 11). There must 
also be an end or limit (in sense (1)) to man’s desires and efforts, else 
they would be in vain and useless (see I. ii. 1). That end once attained, 
man would ‘rest and be gatisfied.’ There could be nothing further to 
look to or to wish for. Hence it is called the ‘absolute end,’ or the 
* end-in-itself.’ To discover this in theory, and to secure the attain- 
ment of it in practice, is regarded by Aristotle as the main object of 
Ethics. This is spoken of as #5 ré)os, e.g. III. ix. 5. Also as to 7d ray 
mpaxtay rédos, I. vii, 8, and 7d rév dvOpwrlywy rédos, X. vi. 1. 


> 4 
apxX- 

*Apx?) means literally a ‘ starting-point’ or ‘ beginning,’ or, as Aristotle 
himself explains it, 7 éoriv 4 ylyverat 7} yeyroKerau To mparypua, ‘that by 
which anything exists, or is produced, or is known.’ Thus it is a very 
general term. 

As a cause of existence or production. In this sense it may be used for 
any of the Four Causes (explained p. li) ; see Metaph. I. iii. We find it 
in ths Bthies for Efficient Cause, as when man is said to be the dpyh of 
his own ections (III. v. 5) ; and when Volition is described as the dpxi 
of the movement of the limbs (III. i. 6); for Final Cause, as when Happi- 
ness is said to be the dpx7% of our actions (I. xii. 8). 

As a cause of knowledge. At either end of the scale of knowledge 
there must be a starting-point (dpx}), which is taken for granted with- 


xiviii GLOSSARY. 





out demonstrative proof, otherwise mpdéeow ofrw vy’ els daretpov. Hence 
the general principles or axioms, at the top of the scale, and the particular 
facts of perception or observation, at the bottom, must be assumed to 
start with, and hence both are sometimes called dpyal. Hence (says 
Aristotle) vots rév dpyGv éx’ dudbrepa, ‘There is an intuitive faculty 
for the truths we start with in both directions.’ An example of one kind 
would be, ‘ T'wo straight lines cannot enclose aspace.’ An example of the 
other, ‘ This is a straight line, a triangle,’ ‘ This magnet attracts iron,’ etc. 
See the following passages in illustration: I. vii. 20, rév dpxGv at péev 
Oewpotvrat x.7.r., ‘Of the truths we start from some are apprehended, 
etc.; the last word, purposely vague, expresses at any rate an immediate 
apprehension, independent of proof. Again, 7d 8 8rt rpGrov Kat dpxh (ib. 
and I. iv. 7), ‘ The fact is a beginning and a point to start from.’ 

In the quotation, I. vii. 21, dpyxh . . . mdelov 7 Husov wavrés, we have 
dpx% in its literal meaning, but the dictum is applied by Aristotle to the 
technical sense of the word also. , 

Since the Greeks seldom employed any other than the a priort method 
(see p. xlv) in the pursuit of knowledge, dpxi comes to stand often for 
‘ general principle,’ ‘ first principle,’ or ‘axiom.’ This will explain its 
use in I, iv., where Aéyo. dd T&v dpyGy =‘ arguments starting from 
general principles’; Adéyor él ras dpxas =‘ arguments leading up to 
general principles.’ 


4 
Puy 

This word, generally translated ‘Soul,’ has no precise English equi- — 
valent. It stands for all that is immaterial in man, including Mind, 
Desires, Will, and even Life. On the one hand, ‘Soul’ includes too 
much. It is impossible to disconnect theological and religious ideas 
from the word ‘Soul,’ which are quite foreign to the conception of 
Aristotle: e.g. To employ such expressions in translation as ‘the life of the 
Soul,’ ‘the good of the Soul,’ would be misleading. On the other hand, 
‘Soul’ includes too little, as it does not reach to mere physical life, such 
as Animals and even Plants possess (see I. xiii. 11). Again, the word 
‘Life,’ or Vital Principle, is too narrow, excluding Reason, Moral action, 
etc. So also is ‘Mind,’ excluding all else beside Reason. 

The following passages will serve to show how impersonal, and how 
widely different from our notion of ‘Soul’ is Aristotle’s conception of 
yux4. ‘If the eye were a living creature, sight would be its yux}’ 

: Y 


GLOSSARY. xlix 





(De An. II. i. 9). So again the Soul is said to bear a relation to the 
Body like that of Form to Matter. Again (and this throws light on the 
abbreviated discussion in Hh. I. xiii—note especially the expression in 
§ 15, An Tis dicots THs Yvxijs), in De. An. II. ii, Aristotle explains 
that there are different kinds of Life (cf. Ath. I. vii. 12, etc.), such as 
Motive, Nutritive, Sentient, Intelligent, and that to each of them, 4 yux} 
éorw dpxh xal robros Spora, each kind of Life corresponding either to 
a different kind of yvxi, or to a different part of the yuxh (De An. 
IL. ii. 8; cf. Hth. I. xiii. 10), but in either case the higher kinds or 
parts possess all the qualities of the lower, as well as their own (De An. 
II. iii. 5). The Nutritive vy belongs to Plants; the Sentient 
(+- Nutritive) to Animals; the Intelligent (++ Sentient +- Nutritive) to 
Man. 
Compare Dryden (Knight's Tale)— 

‘First vegetive, then feels, and reasons last ; 

Rich of three souls,’ 

In reference to the two important controversies as to (1) the Origin; 
(2) the Immortality of the Soul, we may note—(1) Aristotle considers 
that Man derives the @perrixy yvxn from the Female (hence the state 
of the embryo at first is that of mere vegetative life), the alc@nrixh puyh 
from the Male; while of the d:avonrixh he says, Xelrera: roy vodv pdvov 
Gbpaber érevorévas Kal Geiov elvar pbvov (De Gen. Anim. IL. iii. 4, 7, 10). 
Thus it would seem that Aristotle (like Dante, Purg. xxv. 77, etc.) 
combines in some sense the Traducianist and Creationist theories of the 
Origin of the Soul. (2) As to its future existence, Aristotle never 
explicitly pronounces himself, not even in Hth. I. x. and xi. It would 
appear, however, even from the above very imperfect sketch, that a 
personal immortality could not attach to yvx7y as understood by Aristotle ; 
and it is clear, throughout the present and other treatises, that such a 
notion did not at any rate enter into his Ethical theories. (See further 
Grant’s Aristotle, Essay V.) 

On the whole, we may perhaps best translate yux} conventionally by 
‘Soul’ as a general rule, adopting the words ‘ Life’ or ‘Mind’ occasion- 
ally, when the passage refers especially to those parts of the complex 
idea. 

> / 
apeTn. 

Aperh means ‘excellence’ in all its various senses and applications. 
(It is obviously connected with the same root as dpicros, “Apys, etc. 
Compare the connexion of virtus in Latin with wir.) Hence 


a 






1 GLOSSARY. 





applied to the eye, and to the horse, in IL. vi. 2; to a musician (by impli- 
cation) in I. vi. 14; and by Plato to the dog, to a pruning-knife, etc. ete. ° 
in short, to anything that has any work or function to perform; the 
dperi) in each case consisting in the good performance of that work. We 
cannot describe this general sense of the term better than in Aristotle’s 
own words in II. vi. 2: ‘Every excellence (dper)) perfects that of 
which it is the excellence, and causes its work to be well performed.’ 

_ There are however two special kinds of excellence to which the word 
dperh is most frequently applied :—(1) Excellence of our intellectual or 
rational nature. Instances of such excellences are, prudence, wisdom, 
intelligence, argumentative power, retentive memory, acuteness, etc. etc. 
(2) Excellence of our moral nature; %e. a well-regulated condition 
of the appetites, passions, and desires. Instances of such excellences 
are, temperance, courage, gentleness, high-mindedness, etc. etc., in other 
words, the moral virtues. It is in this restricted sense of the term that 
we translate it by ‘Virtue.’ These two kinds of excellence will be 
found in I. xiii. 20. 

In this case, as in others that have been mentioned, the meanings are 
often so blended in Greek that we cannot translate by one word in 
English, 

Tpoapects. 

In any deliberate action the following steps or processes may be 
traced :— 

(1) Desire or wish for some end to be attained (SovAngts). 

(2) Reflection or deliberation upon the several means by which the 
end may be reached (fovAevots). 

(3) Deliberate Choice of some one means or series of means as the 
most eligible (zpoatpeois). This choice once made, the action follows 
accordingly, 

Thus the distinction between BovAnots, Boddevots, and mpoalpeois re- 
embles that with which we are familiar between ‘holy desires, good 
counsels, and just works’ (or at least resolutions to act). 

mpoalpeots sometimes corresponds nearly with ‘ purpose,’ or ‘ resolu- 
tion,’ or even ‘will,’ but as these translations, and especially the last, 
would often be misleading, it seems best to adopt ‘deliberate choice.’ 
This translation has the further advantage of displaying the composite 
nature of the process, which Aristotle constantly insists upon, it being 
not merely ‘ choice’ or ‘ purpose,’ nor merely ‘ deliberation,’ but a choice 
succeeding upon deliberation. 


GLOSSARY. fi 


—- 





The following passages from the Ethics may be referred to in illustra- 
tion. For a general account of wrpoalpeots, especially in its compound 
character, and its relation to processes or faculties more or less similar to 
it, see III. ii, and ITI. iii. 17, 18. (Compare also VI. ii. 5, where 
mpoatpecis is described as # dpexrixds vods # Spekts Suavonrixy.) It has to 
do with the Means, not (like BodAnots) with the End in action, ITIL ii. 9, 
It is coupled with rp@és in I. i. 1 and I. vii. 1. It occurs in the sense 
of * purpose,’ or a ‘ particular state of the Will,’ in contrast with ‘action’ 
or ‘ performance,’ in II. iv. 3, VIII. xiii. 11, X. viii. 5; and similarly 
in IV. vii. 12 (on which see Suppl. Note). It is an essential condition of 
a Virtuous Act, see II. iv. 8, and the Definition of Virtue as d£is 
Wpoatpercxy K.T.r., in II. vi. 15. It can only be good under the 
guidance of ppéyyois, VI. xiii. 7. Finally, in two passages it seems to 
waver between the ordinary sense of ‘ purpose” or ‘ intention,’ and ‘ the 
design or plan purposed’ (‘id quod disputatione propositum est,’— 
Bonitz) ; viz., 1. xiii. 4, xara rhy é dpxijs mpoatpeow ; X. ix. 1, rédos 
éxew Thy mpoalpecty. 


The Four Causes. 


A complete knowledge of any Being or Object implies an acquaintance 
with Four different Causes to which its Existence is in different senses 
due. i 

(1) The Matter of which it is composed. The Material Cause, 

(2) The Form by which it is distinguished. The Formal Cause. 

(3) The Force which has brought about the particular combination of 
Matter and Form which constitute the Being or Object under considera- 
tion, The Efficient Cause. 

(4) The Purpose or Object in View in such a combination. The 
Final Cause. ’ 

(2) and (4) require farther explanation. 

(2) ‘Form’ is to be taken not merely for external shape, but for what- 
ever is characteristic or essential. The same Matter may be made into 
@ hundred different objects, but the same Horm (within certain limits) 
belongs to one class of objects only, and hence ‘formal’ came to mean 
‘essential’; and the ‘formal cause ’==‘ the essential nature’; 7.¢@ the 
group of such qualities or characteristics as are essential to the existence 
of anything in its barest form, or to the simplest conception we can have 
of it; which qualities are therefore always present in all different types 


hii GLOSSARY. 





or developments of it. Thus the ‘formal cause,’ when described i in 
words, becomes the Definition of the object. 

In Aristotle’s phraseology, ‘ Formal Cause’ is identical with ovota 
(when = essence), and with 7é ri fv efvar, which will be found explained 
in note on IL. vi. 17. See Metaph. I. iii. 1. 

Hence to take a single example—a Statue :-— 

The Material Cause is the marble or metal of which it is made. 

Its Formal Cause is in one sense the shape by which we recognise it 
as a statue, and in another, the qualities which would constitute the 
scientific definition of ‘ Statue.’ 

Its Efficient Cause is in one sense the Artist, in another the Chisel, 
or the Furnace. 

Its Final Cause the purpose with which it was made, e.g. the gain of 
the artist, the decoration of some public place, honour to be paid to some 
great man, etc. etc. Again, the Final Cause of a clock is to mark time. 
As soon as a certain combination of wood, brass, etc., fulfils this condi- 
tion, we call it a clock, and thus ‘marking time’ may be said to be the 
cause of its being a clock rather than anything else. 

(4) The Final Cause (an expression familiar to us from the theologi- 
cal ‘ Argument from Final Causes,’ or ‘Argument from Design’), is the 
Purpose, End, or Object-in- View of anything. In all cases however we 
may trace (as Aristotle shows, B. I. c.i. and c. ii. iit.) both proximate 
and ultimate purposes. All purposes if traced far enough resolve them- 
selves into this one, that there is some good to be gained by the action; 
or, in more technical language, all ends ultimately converge to the Chief 
Good or 7d dyalév. Thus, strictly speaking, there is only one really 
Final Cause. The term however is applied to any subordinate end or 
inducement to act. (See further s.v. rédos, 7éXevos.) 

It will further follow that the Efficient Cause must be prior to, but 
need not be simultaneous with, its Effect; the Formal Cause must be 
simultaneous but need not be prior; the Material Cause must be both. 
(Cf. Post. Anal. II. xi.) 


Geos—dvars. 
It may be worth while to explain very briefly once for all Aristotle’s 


conception of God and Nature in relation to the world, as several passages ” 


1 In this sense Bacon speaks of the Sorths Mea 
Form of Light and of Heat. Compare Qy Netie ee ommunes with the Forme 


Wordsworth’s use of the word in the j.6 ine great essential types of Nature’s 
passage :— . varied operations. 


ies 


GLOSSARY. Bii 





in the Ethics would mislead those who adopted without some precaution 
the two English words in question. 

Aristotle’s philosophical conception of God excludes the ideas of the 
Creation, the Moral Government, and even the Providential Government, 
of the world. Creation and providential government are excluded, since 
Aristotle maintains that the world is eternal, and distinctly asserts (in 
X. viii. 7) that wolyots (creative energy) of any kind is unworthy of God, 
and also in B. X. and elsewhere, that God is absolutely unmoved, 
unchangeable, unaffected by anything external to himself; his existence 
consisting in thought thinking upon itself (védnots vorjoews vdnors), or in 
a conscious fruition of perfect knowledge (see above s.v. Oewpla). Moral 
government is excluded, partly for the same reasons; and also because 
mpaéts (or moral action) is likewise in the same passage of B. X. distinctly 
stated to be unworthy of the divine nature. Also in VII. i. 2, it is 
asserted that the condition of excellence in @eds is rimuwrepoy dperfs. 
(Cf. the distinctions made in I. xiii.) 

In short, any kind of agency was held by Aristotle to be unworthy of 
the Divine perfection. Such action would be dvayxatos, Plaids Tis (see 
note on I. v.8). This was the main point of the much misunderstood 
theory of Epicurus as to the-gods. (See Grote’s Aristoile, ii. p. 486.) 

Yet Aristotle maintains that God, though unmoved, is the cause and 
source (alrioy xat dpxh) of all motion. This paradox is thus explained : 
God is not the efficient but the final cause of all motion (see above, s.v. 
‘The Four Causes’). In other words, the universé moves under the 
attraction of, and by striving after, the supreme Good, which is God: in 
its endeavours thereafter, it for ever, so to speak, circles and revolves about 
God as a centre, who thus, himself unmoved, becomes 

The one far-off divine Event 
To which the whole Creation moves. 
So Dante :— 


(Dio) Solo ed Eterno che tutto il cielo move 
Non moto, con amore e con disio. 
(Parad. xxiv. 181.) 


Still it should be noted that Aristotle often speaks popularly of Divine 
agency, feelings, etc., in a manner quite inconsistent with his formal 
theories, ¢.g. Hth. I. ix.; X. viii. 18; ix. 6. Cf. Rhet. II. ix. 2, rovs 
Geois drrodldouev 7d veueogv. It should be added also that Aristotle (like 
Plato), following the popular usage, speaks indifferently of ‘God’ and 
‘Gods’ (e.g. 1. xii. 3; X. viii., etc.), yet his conception of the nature of 
God, taken strictly, excludes altogether the idea of plurality of Gods. 


liv GLOSSARY. 





The precise meaning of géoxs, and its relation to deds, in Aristotle, is 
perhaps as difficult to define as it would be to formulate accurately our 
own conception of Nature. Aristotle doubtless would not, in strict speak- 
ing, regard Nature as a personal or rational agent (see th. ITI. iii. 7, note), 
though he often (as we do) uses language which would imply it. Con- 
fining our attention chiefly to such passages as occur in the Bthics, or 
obvious illustrations of them, we may note :— 

(1) Optimism in Nature. See Hth. I. ix. 5, elrep ra xara tow, ws 
oléy re Kddd\uora exew, oftw réguxev. [Compare De Caelo, I. iv. fin., 
5 Geds Kal % dios ovdév pedrnvy moodow. Also Pol. I. ii. 8-10. Again, 
in various passages cited by Bonitz, s.v., 7 picts oddév pdrny rore?, obde 
meplepyov ode édde7rov, ovbé Gredés, GAG Tavra wpds 7d Aptorov a1ro- 
Bréroven.] 

In regard to this Optimism we may observe :-— 

(a) It is assigned to a conscious and intelligent purpose in Nature in 
such passages as De An. II. iv. 5, &orep yap 6 vods Evexd Tov rotel, Tov 
avbrév tpbmov kat % giots, etc. etc. Also such expressions as Onpoupye?, 
Botrerat, drrodidwow, and many others, are frequently applied to dvors. 

(8) Nature, like Art, often falls short of its aim, being thwarted by 
Necessity, or Chance, or the Matter it has to work upon. Hence the 
limitation ds oféy te kdd\d\cora Exew above. Cf. De Caelo, Il. v. 3, 
éx Tay évdexouevwy 7d BéXriorov, and see Pol. I. vi. 8, 4 dbows Bodrerau 
perv todro roveiv wodddxes ob pévrot Sdvarat. With this we may compare 
the exquisite simile of Dante— 


*La natura... 

Similmente operando all’ artista, 

C’ha l’abito dell’ arte e man che trema.’—({Par. xiii. 75.) 
‘Nature... 

Resembling thus the Artist in her work, 

Whose faltering hand is faithless to his skill. 

(2) vars is the source of order, fixity, and regularity in the Universe 
(e.g.seeds and animals reproducing their like), being intermediate to Neces- 
sity on the one side (implying the impossibility of any variation), and 
Chance on the other (implying the absence of any law). Of. De Caelo, 
III. ii. 8, 4 rdécs H olxela r&v aloOnrav dios éorly. 

Hence we may perhaps explain ra dice Hdéa, I. viii. 11, and dice 
Bovdnrdv, III. iv., as contrasted with the irregular tastes of individuals. 
[Comp. Rhet. I. xi. 8, where #5 picet, and hdéa EO. are contrasted, 
especially, ori % weév pious rod del 7d 52 EO0s Tob wodddxes.] So Hth. I. iii. 
2, ahd kat dixaca pices as opposed to vduw. (Cf. ddcer opposed to kara 


GLOSSARY. ly 





oupBeBnxds, De An. I. iii. 3.) See also the distinction between pvorxdy 
and vouuxdv dixasoy, as explained in Zth. V. vii.1; the former, however, not 
being rigidly invariable (as though due to dvdyxy ; see note on III. iii. 7), 
though exceptions are so comparatively rare as ‘to prove the rule’; just 
as (Aristotle adds) the right hand is ¢éce: stronger than the left in spite 
of the existence of duqidééiox. So again, yrwpiyua tH pice elsewhere 
occurs as synonymous with yvdpyua amrdGs in Hth. I. iv. 5. Under this 
head also compare th. II. i. 2, od0év r&v pice SvTwv Gdrws Eblferas. 

(3) dvots and Geds seem sometimes almost identified, as our own usage 
might lead us to expect; ¢.g. in Hth. X. ix. 6, that which belongs to us 
dice is said did rwas Oelas airias bwdpxew. Many passages occur 
elsewhere in which direct creative and providential functions are attributed 
to pvots. 

(4) dots is often used in reference to the operations of Nature in a 
limited sphere, such as the constitution of Man, or of some other Animal, 
or class of Objects. Though it is difficult to discriminate such a usage 
precisely, yet something like ‘human nature’ seems to be the prominent 
idea in the following :—Zth. II. i. 3, etc., 70:ch dperh neither pice. nor 
twapa piow ; IIL. v. 18, 19, whether our end and aim in action ¢ice 7 
drwodirore palverar xal Keira. See X. ix. 14, in reference to rarpixol 
Abyor, children wrpoitirdpxove. crépyovres kal edree’s TH pice. Com- 
pare further with this usage the sense in which some moralists have held 
that Human Virtue consists in ‘ following Nature.’ 

(5) ddors and réxv7 are frequently put into relation and comparison, 
e.g. Lith. I. ix. 6; Il. vi. 9. These passages may be illustrated by 
others in which it is more definitely laid down that Art follows and sup- 
plements Nature; and also that the mode of their operations is similar, e.g 
mwaca téxyn ... 7d Tpoordetrov ris picews BobAerac dvamdnpody (Pol. 
IV. (VIL.) xvii. 15); 4 réxvn 7d pev emcrere? & h pbors ddvvare? darepyd- 
cacbat, 7a dé wtpetrar (Phys, Il. viii. 8). Dante, referring to the Physics 
by name (Inf. xi. 101), amplifies this Aristotelian idea by making Nature 
the child of God, and Art the child of Nature (si che vostr’ arte a Dio 
quasi 6 nipote), and therefore includes in the same punishment those who 
have offered violence to God, or Nature, or Art. 





ye ae a he Bt ot TRE Me } 
Mas ie) ih RM SL aed AG ARR 
eit <i 2 f ah BPH ey P yy aoa. ae th ; ah th. int ft 


. a0 Aes : ia + Litt \ : ‘ 
hs Pare. fy 00 FS ReRre yas cp te Aprady ds ee bors Bae 














t 
; i : nr a (yt N rs | } 4 
; eg 0 GL Ae ee ROR Cae! Paddy of 
‘ : i rt cs oe Te . i 
¥, SPN FE SCAT SUPORTE Sh NGA. 4 ea. 
’ 
4, nite Oe ; ‘ 
at bWiay ae 42 ’ 
If 7 
\ yi - oa) . 
ae, Ae te ge . 
ie OFT. A ibaa: 3 
i ¥ v . 
¥3 = . 7 7} 
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a 2 . 


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; J t AY ) © tie 
> ‘ a 
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: P ¢ » es 
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¥ 7 . 4 
Vosrthh-> Cob Bia Te eee 
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7 % e432) 7 wT £F,t% re 
#! - Peih : tit ahd if ne At, ht 
erye iJ ie 2 
, ; : t 4 ah AS ® | < 
«ns Pert. 
é ; ) Patt TPs 
tebe 
’ — 
7 
' t A ees 7 1 
F 
. yak si / 
; ; ft ee 
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; : F eee) 
; ; ay 
‘ a - 
t~ * + F i im ” & a 
, ' . 2 . 
; ; roth lS 
4 * 2 
j . ohet ii. 
' 
» " > 
« : 
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5 : Ay Walt ty ‘ 
j ~ 
ah ’ 
but 
4 hy s 
{ fi . ; ~ 
Gael 
; r . wil } 
ei ‘ea ane4 Pd fe pan 4 ter Wh vv i oe 
< NA be YY Cheha Zs, Araiier Hi HA Way 
poe . ee ek per ay 








HOIKNN NIKOMAXEINN 


i. 
.B,—The marginal figures on the left-hand side denote Sections, and on 
4 the right the lines in the page. See the first page of the Glossary 
Sor an explanation of the references to Books, Chapters, and Sections 
occurring in the Notes.] 


1 I. ASA réyvn cai waca peOodos, swoiws Se mpakis 


‘ / > a ‘ >,/ a ‘ 
Te Kat Tpoaipects, ayafov Tivos ediecOat Soxet S10 


Cuap. I.—Zxplanation of Terms, ‘ End, ‘ Good, ‘ Chief Good’ 
—Different kinds of Ends, and their degrees of finality. 


1 ALL of whatsoever kind, implies an end Theswmmwm 
or purpose, i.e. the attainment of some good, The Chief fom ney 
CMe ee ee as the ulti- 


mate end of 
all our ac- 


method, etc., of its investiga- 


The main purpose of the 
Science of Ethics is, in Aris- 
totle’s conception, the discovery 
of the Chief Good, or Final End 
of all man’s actions and aspira- 
tions, the attainment of which 
would leave him nothing to de- 
i He commences, therefore, 
in this chapter with first laying 
down broadly the conception of 
the Chief Good, and points out 
the prima eos difficulty in 
seme such a conception of 
it. Next (in ch. ii. and iii.), 
having asserted that it is a reality 
notwithstanding (i.¢., that there 
is a Chief Good or Final End), 
he settles some preliminary 
points as to the utility, scope, 


20 


tion. Then, in ch. iv., he passes tions. 


on to the question, What is the 
Chief Good? and finding that 
the general agreement that it 
is Happiness vanishes as soon 
as we further ask, In what does 
Happiness consist? he usually 
puts the main question thence- 
forth in the modified form, What 
is Happiness ? 

1. peOodos is strictly a method 
or of science, and is 
therefore contrasted with réyvn, 
which stands for a process of 
art. (See Glossary, s. v. Art and 
Science). mpaéis = action, and 
especially moral action. smpoai- 
peots = purpose or resolve which 


2 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I, 





aA b , b] / 
2 KaN@S aTrepnvavTo TayaOov, ov mavT epierat. Aradhopa 
4 / a ra \ 9 3 
O€ Tus paiverat TaY Tehav’ Ta MEV Yap Elow evEpyerat, 
‘ > > a 4 @ > 
ta Se map avtas épya twa’ “Qv § eiot TeAn Twa 


Good is well described as the ultimate end of all our 


actions and desires. Ends differ from one another im a 





“” 


precedes action. Theopening sen- 
tence then amounts to this :— 
Whether we are working to pro- 
duce anything (réyvn), or to 
know anything (yé8odos), or to 
do anything (mpaéis), or even are 
forming resolutions to act (mpoai- 
pects), in all these cases we 
must have an end or purpose (in 
other words, some good), in view. 

1. rdyaOdv, literally ‘the 
good,’ te. the chief good, or 
‘summum bonum. ‘End’ and 
‘good’ are nearly synonymous. 
The ‘end’ of an action is the 
‘good’ we hope to secure by 
the action; it being obvious 
that every end must at least 
appear good or desirable, at the 
time it is chosen, to the person 
choosing it. ‘Tis real good 
or seeming moves us_all.’— 
Pope. See IIL iv. and IIL v. 
17. The first words of the next 
chapter assert the identity of the 
Final End (the conception of 
which is developed in this chap- 
ter) and the Chief Good, the 
definition of which is the main 
object of the whole treatise. 

1, Avahopa S€ tis aivera 
x.t.A.| Though the general con- 
ception of a Chief Good can be 
readily explained, as has just 


been done in the words ot wdavr’ 


eierat, yet the variety of ourends 
and aims (d:apopa rév TeAG@r) is 
such that we cannot assume that 
all things do converge to any 
one such end; in other words, 
that there is a Chief Good, much 
less say what it is. The former 
point is established in ii. 1; 
the solution of the latter is the 
subject, more or less, of the 
whole treatise. See especially, 
however, iv. 1 and vii. l. 

2. If we take a walk simply 
for the sake of walking, or to 
‘kill time,’ the action (evépyera) 
of walking is itself so far the 
end that we look for no wlterior 
result (épyov). If we walk to 
get an appetite, or for the sake 
of health, then the appetite or 
health is a further end beyond 
the action of walking, and is 
therefore, as Aristotle proceeds 
to point out, an end of higher 
value to us than the act of walk- — 
ing. In this passage, however, 
Aristotle is thinking chiefly of 
acts of soinots, which are dis- 
tinguished from acts of mpaégis 
by having definite and tangible 
products resulting from the ac- 
tion. (See Glossary.) 

3. téAn obviously correspond 
with épya, and mpd&es with évép- 
yewa, in the previous sentence, 


CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE’ S ETHICS. 3 





Tapa Tas mages, év toutous BeAtio mépune TO evep- 
3 (yevav Ta épya. ITod\X@v be mpageny ovoay Kat _Texvey 
Kat emuaTn pay TOANG yiverau Kai Ta TéAN’ lar pucis 
pev yap dyleia, vavmrnyLKns Se motor, oTparnyiKns Se - 
4 viren, olKovopuxins Se mAovTOs. “Ooat eit TOD TOUT EY 5 
vTo play TWA Svvapuy, xabarep O10 Ty dare ue ” 
xXadworosine Kal boat G@AXat Tov bmrmiKav opydvev 
eiaiv" airy Se Kat mace Tone en} _mpagis bro Ty 
oTparny ny TOV aurov 87 TpOrov adnrat vp’ érépas 
év dmdcais Se Ta TOY ApYLTEKTOVLKaY TEAN TraVT@V éoTiV 10 
GipeT@TEepa TOV UT avTa* ToUTwY yap YaplY KaKelva 


variety of ways. (a) They differ in kind: sometimes the (e) In kind; 
action is itself the end; sometimes a ‘a definite result beyond 
the action. And notice that when there is such an end 
beyond the action it is obviously something better than the 

3 action itself, which is subordinate to it. (() But further, (6) in gener- 
the character of ends is as various as the character of the ™ cuter 
actions of which they are ends: e.g. health, victory, wealth, 

_ a boat, a house, the equipments of a horse, etc. etc., are all 

- ends of different actions, and differ iter se accordingly. 

4 (y) In the midst of this variety, however, we may trace a re- @)but many 
lation of subordination, or degrees_of finality, in ends, One connected in 
art often ‘embraces a variety of others, and their ends being the way ot 
subservient to the production of its end are of inferior value ; tion. 
for the ends of the higher and more comprehensive arts are 





6. duvapis is here equivalent 
to réxyyn. Art, differing from 
Science in that it supplies the 
power to produce practical re- 
sults, is not unfrequently de- 
scribed as Suvapus. See in next 
ch. § 3. tivos trav émortnpav 
ij Suvdpewy, i.e. ‘of which of the 
sciences or arts.’ (See Glossary 


under dvvayis, and also under 
Art and Science.) 

10. apxirexrovki)] i.e. master- 
science, or arch-science, if we 
allowed such a compound. dpxr- 
réxtov is literally a ruler or 
director-of workmen, (See next 
chapter, § 4, and esp. the expres- 
sion avrn duardooes i in § 5.) 


However, I 
this su 


ordination 
must stop 
some- 
where; 4.¢. 
there must 
be some 
Final End. ° 


4 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


{BOOK 1. 





5 Svesnerau. Atadépes 8 oudey Tas | vepyetas auras eivae 


Ta Tem TOV mpagewy %j 7) mapt TavTas GAXo TH, Kadarep 
emt TOV Nex Geuody € eTrUaTN MAD. 

II. Ei 8 te rédos éoti trav mpaxtav 0 St avro 
Bovrcpeba, Tarra Se Soa Tobro, Kal pn Tavta ov érepov 5 
aipovueba (mpdeae yap oUTw ¥ «ls drrerpov, dor eivaw 
Kev Kal paratay Tay opekwv), SHrov ws TovT ay cin 


5 obviously more final than those of the subordinated arts. 


In 


regard to this relation of subordination, it will make no dif- 
ference whether the ends compared together are actions them- 


selves or the results of actions. 


Cuaps. II. AnD Il L.—TZhere ts such a thing as a final end of 
action, i.e. a Chief Good. If so, 
(a) Lt will be practically useful to define tt. 
~(B) The Political (or Social) Science ts the Science 
which treats of it. 


A (y) This ts not an exact Science. 


(8) Lts study requires special training and conditions. 


Now we may safely infer that this subordination of ends 
cannot go on ad infinitum, because we should in that case be 
endued with a desire (viz. of finality) which would be object- 
less and useless: in other words, we may infer that there 2s 


3, TaY exOetoay emuornpar] 
émioTnun appears to be used 
here, as elsewhere sometimes, 
for TEX). (See Glossary. ) 

% Kev, empty, i.e. objectless. 
paraia, vain and useless. This 
passage resembles what is called 
the argument from design. The 
major premiss is (as Aristotle 
elsewhere phrases it) ovdey parny 
n piers move, ‘ Nature does no- 


thing in vain 5’ or, as we read 
in ix. 5, ra Kara pow, « @s oioy 
TE chiieta% Exew, oUT@ méuke, 
‘ All things are by nature ordered 
in the best possible way.’ The 
fact that human nature is created 
with a desire for some final good 
proves that such a good must 
exist. That it should not exist 
is as inconceivable as that nature 
should have created an animal re- 


CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 5 





> \ \ we 3 > Mages \ ‘ S / e 
2 taya0ov Kai TO apiotov. “Ap ovv Kai Tpos Tov Biov 7 
a > ~ f. 54 \ \ / 
yVvaots avTov weyadnv exer porrnv, Kat Kalarep tokoTaL 
“ Mv a 3 , A / >] 
3 OKOTrOV ExoVTES, WAAKoV ay TUYYXaVvoLwEY TOU SéovTOS ; €& 
/ 4 A au 
oUT@, TeipaTeoy TUT@ ye TepihaBely avTO Ti TOT 
5 X / r 3 ral DY , 7 
4 €0TL Kab Tivos TOV emioTnuav 4) Suvvapewv. Aokee 8 5 
/ A /. > A 
5 av THS KUplwTaTns Kai padiota apytTeKtoviKys. Tor- 


avrn 8 7 moduTiKn paiveras. 


Tivas yap évat ype 


one supreme and Final End, to which all. eTge ; If so, the 
, 3 and that is, in faet, the (a) If this be so, it knowledge 


must be useful to define it, because we shall be more likely to be _practi- 
4 hit the mark when we have a distinct view of it., (8) The 


science to which pertains the knowledge of the Chief..Good._is 





5 Socia 


quiring a particular sort of food, 
and then have placed it where 
that sort of food eould not be pro- 
cured. Take as another illustra- 
tion the precisely similar argu- 
ment for a future state (which is 
still often regarded as the strong- 
est, apart from revelation) based 
upon the aspirations of mankind 
for immortality, and for a higher 
ideal than can be reached in this 
life. ‘It is not at all probable 
(says Dr. Clarke) that God 
should have given men appetites 
which were never to be satisfied, 
desires which had no objects to 
answer them, and unavoidable 
apprehensions of what was never 
really to come to pass.’ 

1. kat mpds tov Biov] ‘even 
upon life.’ These words are 
emphatic. The knowledge of 
the Chief G might perhaps 
be thought to theoretically 


naturally thé’supréme of sciences, and this is the _Science.of 
I Life We argue this supremacy on two grounds—(1) 
etIEEDT a 


interesting, but not practically 
important—just as Optics and 
Acousties increase our know- 
ledge, but do not help us to see 
and hear better. The objection 
here implied may be compared 
with that sometimes made to 
the utility of the study of Logic, 
viz., that men do reason correctly 
without it. Theanswer would be 
similar to that given in the text. 

5. Suvdueov] See note on 
i, 4, 

6. xvupios = authoritative or 
supreme—as explained by the 
first argument in § 5. 

apxtrextoviky] (see note on 
i. 4). This epithet is justified 
by the second argument in § 6. 
§ 7 merely sums up the two pre- 
ceding arguments, inverting 
their order. 

7. qoXcrwxy is difficult to trans- 
late, because both ‘ Politics’ and 


cally useful. 


It is the 
Science of 
Social Life 
which treats 
of it, 


6 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 1. 


— 





= 


ry > al 5 e /. .. / ee 
TOV ETLOTNUGVY EV Tals TOAECL, Kal TOlaS EKATTOUS 
6 6 , \ / / ef 5 , e O rn Se 
pavOavew Kat pexpt Tivos, avTn Svatacce. Opapev oe 
\ ‘ ? / a / com / x 
Kal TaS EVTL“OTaTaS TV SuvaL“Eewy UVTTO TAVTHY ovVCAS, 
e a > ‘ e / / ‘ 
7 OloY OTPATNYLKNY OLKOVOMLKTY pnTopLKnY. Xpwpevys oe 
4 a a a 3 a ” \ 
TavTns Tals AoTrais mMpaxtiKais TOV eTLoTHUaV, ETL Se | 
4 / a / \ / 3 / x 
vowolerovens tt Set mpattew Kat Tivov amexecOat, TO 
, f x \ a + / a3 
TavTns TENOS TEplexoL AV TA TOV AAAWV, WOTE TOUT 
x of ’ / > / oe \ Dt. ee 
ay ein tavOpwrivov ayaov. (Et yap Kat Tavtov eo 
eX \ /. rel \ / \ a 
évi Kal model, peitov ye Kal TeAEWTEPOY TO THS ToAEWS 
/ \ c ‘ 4 b) ‘ S S \ 
gaiverar kat AaBew Kat calew ayarntov pev yap Kat 1 
ee / 4 \ \ / + } /. 
Evi Lov, KaArLoV Se Kat OevoTepov EOver Kab TrodEoW.) 
¢€ ‘ 9 / / >,/ 4 
9 H pev ov peOodos tovrmy edietat, TodTiKn TIS 
3 


cc 


for this this science regulates the study of all the other sciences in a. 
on 57 community ; = (2.) it employs their results, even in th 


tobethe —_ case of the most esteemed of them, in its own service, and 
Science. 8 thus their ends are subordinated to its end. (If it be argued 
that the good of society, which is the end of this science, is 

only another name for the good of the individual men who 

constitute society, we reply that the science which secures 

9 this good on a large scale is still the supreme science.) Hence 

49 Science of Hthics is a branch of the Science of Social 


apne 


‘Social Science’ have acquired therefore unless he lives in a 

a technical and inappropriate society a portion of his nature is 

meaning. Paraphrased,it means undeveloped. We cannot there- 

the science which investigates fore treat of the well-being of 

the conditions of the perfection man without considering him as 
_ of social life, or of man living as a member of a society, nor 

a@ member of a well-ordered therefore without also consider- 
_ community. Aristotle remarks ing the conditions of the well- 
_ elsewhere, Man is created by being of society. See further 
\ nature a social animal, and note on vii. 6. 


CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 7 





HL Aéyouto & a av ixavas, el Kara THY /Drroxcenpevmy 
Dn Suacadn bein’ TO yap aupyBes oux, opotws ev amact 
TOUS AByous embry Teor, aomep oud ev TOUS Snptoup- 

2 ryouuevors. Ta Se Kara Kat Ta Sixava, trept ov ) TON- 
TUN oxo evra, TooquTnY ever Siapopav Kat wAavnv 5 

3 date Soxeiy open povov elvat, duces 5é Ln. (Tovavtnv 
Sé tia many exes’ Kat rayaba bua TO TONGS cup ° 
Baivew BrdBas an’ avtav dn yap Ties dm@Novro 

4 dia \mrovror, Erepou Se be’ _ avd peiar) "Ayamnrov ou 
Wépt TOLOUT@WY Kal eK TOLOUTwY A€yovtas mayvAas Kal 10 


1 Cuap. I1l.—(y) In this subject we must be content with This. is not 
general and approximate conclusions. Ethics is not an moe ecn 


2 exact science. Exactness in a science must always be ieabie: at- 


proportionate to the sain : Now the 

ideas of ‘right’ and ‘ : Ce and ‘unjust,’ are so 

fluctuating some bee een led to deny the reality of 
3 such distinctions _altogether. 


(We may just note in pass- 
ing that this is due to 8 confusion of thought between 


‘wrong’ and ‘harmful,’ or ‘injurious.’ Many things in them- consequent. 


and desirable are on occasions a source of {;,007,%n: 


4 selves 
Such then being our subject-matter and such be general 
and approxi- 
mate only. 
ment in a subject variable and 












1. Lay and wzokeyuévn are 


philosophical terms. The former 

= ‘matter’ or ‘material,’ and 
the latter (as is seen from its 
etymology) = ‘underlying’ or 
‘subject.’ Hence the words to- 
we he ‘ subject-matter.’ 

3 ovpévois]  dnu- 
oupyos ap aac. Hanae 
Snmiovpyovpeva are ‘products of 

art.’ See note on vii. 18. As 
we do not expect a model in 
cork or wood to be as well 
finished as one in ivory, so we 
ought not to expect an argu- 


fluctuating to be as rigid as one 
in mathematics. 

6. We may notice, once for 
all, that doxei in Aristotle’s 
phraseology does not necessarily 
imply (like our expression ‘it 
seems’) that what follows is the 
writer’s own opinion. Here, for 
instance, he proceeds to argue 
against the statement introduced 
by doxet in § 3. It would gene- 
rally be better to translate, ‘it 
has been thought.’ 


8 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK “4, 





Tum@ Tarnbes evdeixvucbat, Kat Tept TOV ws emt TO TONY 

Kal eK TOLOUTOOD Aéeyovras ToLavTa Kal oupmepaiver Oat. 
Tov avtov 8€ tpéTov Kat arrobexec bat xpewv éxao- 

TOV TOV Neryopeveoy merrardevpevov yap éorw TO- 


covrov TaxpiBes eritnteiv Kad exaorov yevos, ed’ Soop 5 


) ToD Tpdyyatos puows emideyeTat' TapaTAnovoy yap 
paiverat pabnpariKov Te , miavohoyovvros amodéxea bat 
Kat pytoptkov arodeifes arrauteiv. “Exaoros S¢ Kpives 


our premisses, such must also be our conclusions, in respect 
of exactness. 

(8) The aims of the teacher being thus qualified, so also must 
be the demands of the learner. He must neither require too 
rigid’ accuracy, nor be content with any needless generality. 
Such exactness as is admitted by the subject-matter, neither 
more nor less, should he demand. But this discrimination 


1. @s-eri-rd-7oAv is equival- 

ent to one word, and means 
‘ general’ or ‘variable.’ Ta os- 
€mi-ro-7oAvd yryvopeva are things 
which happen as a general rule 
in such and such a way; ‘gene- 
ralities’ as opposed to ‘certain- 
ties.’ 

3. amodexer Oar means ‘to 
allow,’ in the old English sense 
of ‘to approve’ (e.g. ‘ The Lord 
alloweth the righteous’); hence 
h.l. ‘to accept as satisfactory,’ 
‘to acquiesce in.’ See IV. 
vi. 3, where amodéferat, ‘he will 
allow,’ stands in opposition to 
dvoxepavet, ‘he will disapprove.’ 

6. mapamAnotoy yap daiverat 
K.T.A.] It would be equally 
absurd to be satisfied with plaus- 
ible arguments from a mathe- 
matician, as to insist upon rigid 


demonstration from an orator. 
Mathematics being an exact 
science, no considerations of the 
probability of a theorem being 
true, however great, are of the 
slightest use. Rhetoric being 
the ‘art of persuasion,’ the logi- 
cal value of its arguments is 
entirely subordinate to their 
persuasiveness. 

8. exaoros dé xpiver k.T.A.] 
‘Cuique perito credendum est in 
sud arte.’ The right of criticism 
in any subject depends on 
special training in that subject. 
We bow to the dictum of the 
painter in painting, to that of 
the musician in music. In 
general matters we look, in like 
manner, to the man of general 
knowledge and cultivation. 
This is evidently the sense re- 


CHAP. III. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 9 





a A , \ , ae A > \ , 
KOA@S & YywwoKEL, Kat TOvTwY eaTiv ayalos KpLTNS. 
e/ 4 e / ‘ n e \ 
Kal &xactov dpa o memaidevpevos, arrd@s 5S o Tepe 
al ‘ A Tide > + b>) a 
Tav Temawevpevos. Alto THS TOALTLKHS OVK ETTLY OLKELOS 
>] ‘ / + ‘ lot ‘ : / 
axpoaTns 6 véos* ameipos yap Tov Kata Tov BLov 
/ e / > / \ / yy 
6 mpaktewr, ot Aoyou 8 ex TovTwv Kat Tept TovTwr. “Ets 5 
N , ; \ R ’ ae 
de Tois wabecw axkoXovOnTiKos WY PaTAaLwWS AKoUCETAL 
25 ° r >] ‘ ny > \ > nr > 
Kat avadedas, erreidn TO Téhos EoTV OV YVa@oIs GANA 
/ > AX / \ weet 
7 mpakis. Avadepes 5 ovOev véos tHv nrtKiav 7} To HOos . 
y 2 \ ‘ 4 s ¢ ». > 
veapos* ov yap Tapa Tov xpovoy y EAXEWPIS, GAXa Sia 
“ ‘ / mn 7 / - ‘ / 
To Kata Ta00s Ej Kab Siwxew Exacta. Tots yap Tovov- 
3 e “ / ni vad > / 
TOLS AVOVNTOS 7 Yvwots yiweTal, KaDaTEp TOLS aKpaTécLW” 
_— 


implies special education and special qualities in the learner, 
else he will have neither the right nor the power of exercising 
such a judgment.( The young therefore are not fit students of (L.) matare | 
6 Ethical Science, -partly from their ignorance of life and its ex- °°’ 
periences, and partly from the strength of their passions, which 
7 they have not yet learned to master» And we must further @) well. 
exclude all who, however old in years, are but children in passions. 


quired; and so the following 
passage would certainly be 
clearer if it read thus :—Ka? 
exaoTov 6 [xka@ &xacror] 
memraoevjevos, GmAa@s Se k.T.X., 
the words in brackets being 
supplied. Some critics suppose 
this to have been the original 


3. The young should be 
taught the practice of morals 
before they attempt the theory. 
Their duty is to obey, without 
asking questions, without criti- 
cising the principles of what 
they have to obey, until the 
habit of obedience is gained. 
Then they may be trusted to 


look into the theory and prin- 
ciples of conduct, and indeed, 
unless they would always be 
children, they ought to do so. 
‘ Oportet discentem credere, edoc- 
tum judicare’ (Bacon). For the 
latter point see the end of § 7, 
where ecidévac is emphatic; for 
the former see X. x., where 
Aristotle maintains that moral 
teaching will be lost labour 
unless either parental authority 
or State laws can be relied on 
to enforce this preliminary work 
of training and discipline. 

1l. dxparéow] The following 
explanation of terms may be 
useful :— 


— 


All allow I 
that ‘Hap- 

piness’ is 

the Chief 

Good. 


io ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK I. 





tois S€ KaTa Aovyov Tas opeteus Trououpevous Kal wWpar- 


Touct Todvagencs é av ln TO meph TOUT@V eiBevau. Kat 
TEpl eV akpoaTov, Kal mas amodeKTEoV, Kal TL TpOTL- 
Oéucba, medpoiacOw Tocavra. 


IV. Adyouer § avaraBevres, ereidn Taca yoots Kat 5 


/ b) A \ > ed JEM @ / 
Tpoarpeots ayalov twos opeyeTal, TL EoTW OU AEYOMEV 


char ; all, that is, who live under the ovey 
and not reason. For Kthics is a science In W eee 
kn eiedze profits pothing nless it is ee: byright 


CHAP. 1V.— What is the Chief Good ?—Conflicting opinions— 
Determination of the method to be adopied. | 


After these preliminary explanations.we recur to.the ques- 
tion, What is the aim of this Science of Social Life? or, 


axpatjs is a man who acts 
wrongly after a struggle be- 
tween good and bad desires. 

eyxparns is a man who acts 
rightly in a similar case. 

aké\aoros is one in whom vice 
has become a habit, and the 
desire of good is eradicated ; 
he does wrong without a 
struggle. 

cappev is one in whom virtue 
has become a habit; bad 
desires are conquered ; he 
does right without an effort ; 
or, as Bishop Butler expresses 
t, ‘particular affections be- 
come absolutely coincident 
with the moral principle.’ 
Anal. p. 101 (Angus’s edit.). 


See, 1 in illustration, I. xiii. 15; 
III. ii. 4. Hence the axparjs is 
precisely in the case described 
in the text: he knows right but 
does wrong. 

IV. Compare Pope, Essay on 
Man, iv. 1 :— 

Oh Happiness ! our being’s end and aim ! 
Good, shenatourd Ease, Content, whate’er 


thy nam 

That something still which prompts the 
eternal sigh 

For which we ‘haan to live, or dare to die. 


Or again, line 21, etc. 
Some place the bliss in action, some in 


ease, 
ung bee call it Pleasure, and Contentment 
Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end 


in pain 
Some, swelled to gods, confess evn 
e vain; 


—- 


CHAP. IVv.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


1% 





THY mrohurueny epiec Oar Kal Ti TO mavreoy axporaroy TOV 


2 Tarr ov ayabiv. 


"Ovopare pev ov oxedov vTo TOV 


Trelorov opororyerrau’ TV yap evdaipoviay kat ot i modnob 
Kat ot yaplevTes Aéyouow, 70 8 ev hv Kat To ev mparrew 


TAUTOV vrodapBavovar TO evdarpovely. 


epi Se TIS 


evdaipovias, Th éoTL, dudioBnroiet Kat ovy Opolws ob 


Trohhot "TOUS oois arodidoaow. 


Oi pev yap tov 


evapydv Tt Kal pavepar, otov ndovnv i movTOV 1) TONY, 
adrot & ado, modraKis Sé Kab 6 avToS &repov" yooncas 
pev yap vyiear, mevdpevos de movTov" ouverdores 5 10 
EauTots ayvouay TOUS peya TL Kab UTep avtous Aéyouras 


Oavpavovow. "Evie 


govt mapa Ta jmo\Aa TavTa 


ayaba GAro tt Kab avTo elvat, 0 Kal Tolcde Tacw 


2 as we put it at first, What is the Chief Good? In name all 
alike agree that it is Happiness: but when we further ask 
3 What is Happiness? one says one thing, and’ one another, But there: 
and even the same person says differently at different times. 
Pleasure, wealth, honour, health, some abstract ideal - good, fons as 


i indolent, to each extreme they fall, 
To trust in everything, or doubt of all. 
Who thus define it, say they more or less 
Than this, that Happiness is Happiness? 


2. mpaxtav is emphatic. See 
note below on line 13. 

4. xapievres] ‘men of culture.’ 

6. This divergence of opinion 
may be illustrated by the fact 
that an ingenious writer (Varro) 
claimed to have counted 285 
different theories on this subject. 

10. ouveidéres k.t.A.] We 
always value that most which 
for the time we want. In sick- 
ness we think no good can com- 
pare’ with health; in poverty 
we think nothing would make 





us so happy as money; when 
conscious of ignorance ourselves 
we are dazzled by a display of 
knowledge which is beyond us. 
13. This is Plato’s theory of 
the ‘Idea’ of Good, criticised by 
Aristotle at length in chapter vi. 
The Chief Good, according to 
Plato, is the Quality or Condi- 
tion invariably present in every- 
thing Good, the possession of 
which causes the same term 
‘Good’ to be applicable in each 
case. We speak of a good man, 
or horse, or poem, or poison, or 
antidote, etc. etc. We should 
not apply the same term ‘ Good,’ 


endless vat 
ety of opi} 


Happ 
ness consis: 
in, 


12 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 1. 





wine (9 as. | . pe , N ees , 
4 abTLoVv EoTL Tov elvan ayaa, Amacas pev ovy e&eravew 
‘ / / 4 9 \ < ‘ \ Q t 
tas So&as patavTepoy tows €aTiv, txavoy dé Tas padtoTa 
5 / / x N 03. he N 
5 emimoNaloveas n Soxoveas eye Twa AOyov.. Mn rav- 
/ Bie |) ee od / C'S a > n f 
Bavetw 5 nas ort Siadepovaty ob aro TOV apyaVv doryot 
i any: ee N > y 5 N N / oF ; 
Kat ob emt tas apyas. Ev yap kat IIhatwv grope 5 
a \ 9¢/ / ~ eb a > A > \ 
TOUTO Kal étnTel, TOTEpoY amo TOV apxav % em Tas 
5] , b ¢ ¢aXt ed > a / aa na > 
apYas €oTW n 000s, WoTTEp EV TH OTAdiM amo TAY aOho- 
A Be a / ome we > / N 5 >” 
Oerav emt TO TWepas 7} avaTradw. “ApKtéov per ovv atro 
an / a ‘\ n \ \ \ “€ a Xx 
TOV Yyvopimwv, TavTa dé SiTTaS* Ta pev Yap Huy TA 


| 4. are some of these various answers. We shall not attempt to 
do more than investigate the more obvious or more reason- 
5 able of these conflicting views. At the very outset we must 
We deter. determine the method of Our inquiry. Shall we start a prior 
method of {from general principles, or shall ‘we start a postercor: from 


ouringuiry observed facts? One thing is clear: we must.argue from the 
factsofob- known to the unknown; and that in reference to our human 
kobe all knowledge, not in reference to any abstract or idéal system of 
ciples, and knowledge. . Now, in the order of owr knowledge, facts come 
versd, 


4. See the Glossary on the 
terms @ priori and a posteriori, 
and also s. v. apxn. 

9. yvopipov..... ditras] 
Aristotle elsewhere explains that 
general laws are better known — 
than particular facts in the per- 
fect or ideal order of knowledge 


unless the same idea were pre- 
sent in all these various cases. 
Whatever that be which is thus 
the one cause of Goodness, where- 

\, ever it is found, is itself the 
.Y Chief Good of all. This Plato 
termed the ‘Idéa of Good. 

- §Notice the contrast between the 


.*\gearch for this ‘Idea’ of Good, 


and Aristotle’s carefully limited 
_ inquiry for the Chief Good for 
\ man, the Chief Good of human 
leptin: etc. 

3. émuroAn is a ‘surface’ or 
‘superficies’; emuroAd{a is ‘ to lie 
on the surface; hence A.l. either 
‘ obvious’ (the reverse of ‘re- 
condite’), or ‘ widely-spread.’ 
(See Suppl. Note.) 


(yvapiporepa pice. or drdOs), 
but particular facts are better 
known than general laws in the 
order of human knowledge (yve- 
piuorepa piv). We are more 
familiar with the fall of an apple, — 
or the motion of a particular 
star than with the law of gravi- 
tation. A being with more 
perfect knowledge would be 
more familiar with the general 


CHAP. IV.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 13 





e mn y > a. > af aie nr ew 
& amras. “Icws ov nyiv Ye apKTEoV ato TMV nyiv 


6 yvwpipor. 


before general laws. 


ws governing the universe, 
with particular instances 
f their application. As we 
ascend in the scale of initelli- 
gence ‘the individual withers and 
the world is more and more.’ 
Hence, practically, yvepipa 
dice come to be Laws, Prin- 
ciples, Universals; yvdpipa npiv, 
Facts, Particulars. 

1. Observe the emphasis on 
jpivye. ‘Perhaps then we at any 
rate must begin from what is 
known tous.’ Aristotle does not 
assert that there may not be a 
more ideally perfect way of 
approaching the subject. Com- 
pare the two methods of ethical 
teaching explained by Bishop 
Butler (Introd. to Sermons): 
‘There are two ways in which 
the subject of Morals may be 
treated. One begins from in- 
quiring into the abstract relations 
of things (amd ray dpyayv), the 
other from a matter of fact, 
namely, what the particular 
nature of man is, its several 
parts, etc. (emi ras dpyds).... The 
first seems the most direct formal 
proof: ... the latter is, in a pecu- 
_ liar manner, adapted to satisfy a 

fair mind, and is .more easily 
_ applicable to the several parti- 
cular relations and circumstances 
in life.’ So also Hume (General 
Principles of Morals, p. 221, ed. 


Aw Set trois eecw HyOat Kadads Tov Tepi — 


We must therefore start from facts. 
6 But seeing that the very facts of moral science are unintel- . 


1800): ‘As this is a question of 
fact, not of abstract science, we 
can only expect success by fol- 
lowing the experimental method, 


‘and deducing general maxims 


from a comparison of particular 
instances (Adyou emt tas dpxds). 
The other scientific method, 
where a general abstract prin- 
ciple is first established (Adyot 
ams trav dpxay), and is after- 
wards branched out into a 
variety of inferences and conclu- 
sions, may be more perfect in 
itself, but suits less the imper- 
fection of human nature’ (piv ye 
apxtéoy amd TOV Hyiv yepipov). 
To begin with yropiya jpiv is, 
of course, to proceed émi ras 
dpxds, and not awd rév apyéar. 
2. Ao Set trois Ceow 7xOat] 
The facts of morals (in the sense 
of this passage) are the notions 
(in their most simple and rudi- 
mentary form) of right, wrong, 
just, unjust, duty, etc. 
study presupposes that these 
notions are, at least to some 
degree, intelligible to us; that 
when the terms are used they 
convey some sort of meaning to 
us (rd dri), though we may not 
be able to define them accurately, 
or to say what constitutes right- 
ness, wrongness, ete. (rd did71), 
or even to prove that there are 
any real distinctions in the 


The . 


14 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 1. 





ral X iA \ of. nw rn b 
KAaX@V Kal SiKalwY Kai OKwWS TOV TONTIK@V akouvcoMEvoOY 
e ral > ‘ \ \ 9 “ / b] 
7 iKavas. “Apyn yap To Ott Kab et TovTO daivotTo ap- 


_ligible without some preliminary training in good habits, we 


7 must further presuppose such a training. Nor is it necessary 


nature of things corresponding 
to the notions expressed by 
these and similar words. Still, 
even such a dim appreciation as 
this implies some training in 
good habits, and it would 
scarcely be found in a perfectly 
untutored savage. Nay more, 
even in civilized life it is only 
experience of a virtue (rois 
€Oeow 7xOa) which can make 
it intelligible to us individually. 
iHence the idea of ‘humility’ 
was unintelligible to the Greeks; 
it was never practised, and so 
their language had no word for 
it. Missionaries find it impos- 
sible to explain or express to 
savages some of the fundamental 
ideas of the Christian religion 
for the same reason. The con- 
dition ‘rois €Ocow 7xOa’ has 
not been fulfilled. 

2. "Apxn yap to dr] ‘For 
the fact is a starting point ;’ or, 
‘the assumption of moral facts 
(without their reason or theory) 
will enable us to make a start.’ 
All that we need presuppose, and 
that much we must presuppose, 
is the primd facie fact of moral 
distinctions, and a capacity for 
their recognition in the learner, 
though he may not at first know 
how to apply them to the details 
of action. Without this much, 
Ethics would have noraisond’étre 

e 


(see Introd. p.xvi); there would be 
no subject-matter for the science 
to treat of, or faculties to which it 
could #ppeal. This will appear 
plainly if we look at the case of 
one or two other sciences. The 
Science of Painting (1) assumes, 
or does not question, the existence 
of colours; and (2) presupposes 
that the learner is able to distin- 
guish colours—that he is not 
blind. The Science of Music (1) 
assumes the existence of harmoni- 
ous and discordant sounds ; and 
(2) presupposes that the learner 
can appreciate the difference— 
that he is not deaf. That 
would be the meaning of dpy7 
TO Ort as applied in these two 
cases. Similarly the Science of 
Morals assumes (1) a distinction 
between Right and Wrong; and 
(2) a capacity in the learner to 
recognise that distinction (hence 
Sei trois eOeow HxOa). The 
grounds in Nature which consti- 
tute differences of colours, or har- 
mony and discord of sounds, or 
the essential distinction between 
Right and Wrong,—these lie not 
at the threshold, but in the 
inmost shrine of the respective 
sciences. These questions would 
correspond with 7rd éid6r1, with 
which, as Aristotle says, we have 
nothing to do at the commence- 
ment, 


CHAP, V.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, 


15 





KouvTas, ovdev mpoaserjcet Tov S.0Tt. 


exet 1 daBor ay a dpxas padios. 


‘O 8 ToLovros i) 
“Qe Se ynd€repov v umdpyee 


TovTav, axovedtw tav ‘Howddov 


Odros pev mavdpiaros és avrds mdvra, vonon, 
*EoOXbs 8 a av Kdxeivos és ev elrovTt miOnrau, 
"Os S€ xe pyr’ adros voen pit’ GAAov dkotwv 
"Ev Oupd BadrdXrnrat, 6 & avr’ axpyios avip. 


¥; Apes Sé Aeyopen dev mape&eBn per. 
dryaboy Kal THY evdarpoviav OuK adoryeos €OlKaTW Kk TOV 


Td yap 


Biwv vrodap Pavey Ob meV moot Kal doprikataror TY 10 
noovnv, S10 Kat tov Biov ayamaos Tov aTodaveTiKér. 


r , 5 4. e 4 od a > 
2 Tpeis yap evot wadiota ot MpovyorvTes, O TE VUY EeLpn- 


at the outset that the learner should be able to explain the 


principles and reasons of the facts from which we start. 


To 


the learner who is worth anything these will come in due 
time, if he have them not already. 


CHAP. V.—Criticism of the chier typical theories as to the 
nature of Happiness. 


Returning from this digression, let us consider some typical wenextcon- 


2 views as to the nature of Happiness. 


Some say that it con- 


sists in bodily pleasure, others in honour, others in philosophic # 
ee 


Car. V.—Threemain theories 
about Happiness, which may at 
least be inferred from the actual 
lives of men, are suggested for 
examination in this chapter ; 
two more come in incidentally. 
That they are justly selected as 
typical and progressive views 
of the nature of Happiness is 
shown at length in the Intro- 
one: p. xxix. 

8. G0ev mapeEéBnpev] viz., the 
promise in § 4 of the last chapter. 





9. ‘They are not unreason- 
ably inferred from their manner 8is 
of life to suppose happiness to 
consist in pleasure.’ Most men 
have no conscious theory about 
Happiness and the Chief Good, 


sider some 
of the chief 
theories 
aoe Hap- 
ess, such 
fiat be con- 


(a) Pisastiees 


but what they really think may | 


be inferred from their practice. 

10. poprixos = = ‘troublesome,’ 
‘burdensome’ and then (like Bay- 
avoos) ‘coarse,’ ‘vulgar.’ It is 
applied to buffoons in IV. viii. 3. 
See also X. viii. 7. 


16 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[Noon! i 





‘4 Xe x A / e 6 U 
3 MEVOS KAL O TOALTLKOS KaL TPLTOS 0 VewpnTiKos. 


Oi pev 


a / 
ovv TOOL TavTEAas avdpamodwdes haivovtas Bockn- 
4 / 7 / ‘ ¥ ‘ ‘ 
patwv Biov Tpoatpovyevot, Tuyxavouct Se Noyou Sia TO 
‘\ Lal > nr > r 
ToAdous Tay ev Tals eovoias omovoTrabely Sapdava- 


4 TaAR. 


\ , a 
Oi Se yapievtes Kat mpaKtsKol Tiny’ TOU yap 5B 
wn / a 
TonutoKov Biov ayedov TovTO TENOS. 


/ 5 
Daiveras § ems- 


/ 5 fa / a \ > ~ 
ToNaleTEpoy eivar TOU EnTovmevou' SoKet yap ev ois 
A A > e- 2 A / ) N \ 
TIL@oL paAdov civas ) EV TH Tipwpevp, Ttayabov Se 
> af \ / > / 7 
5 o1Ketov TL Kat Sucadaiperov eivas pavtevoucOa. “Ett 8 
ay ‘\ ‘\ / 7 e \ > 
coiKacs THY TYunY SiOKELY, Wa TLOTEVWOLY EaUTOUS atya- 
x 3 va) a ek / 
ous eivary &yrovor youv vio Tav dpovipev tipacbat, 


\ 2 ®@ / Ahi 
Kat TAP OS YlYVoo KOVTQL, KQt €7T 


ape Sidov oov Gre 


3 contemplation. As to the /irst, it is the life of mere animals, 
fhough the ignorant have the example of the great and 
As to the second, we object : 


4 powerful to justify their choice. 
y Honour; (1) Honour is precarious, being dependent upon others, 


Honour is only sough j 


5 who may refuse it however well it be deserved; and (2 
of recogniti i 


on the ground of virtue, 


And if so, 


irtue is, according to 
the principles already laid down, a more Tost sat eee 


4, Sardanapalus was the last 
king of Nineveh, whose name be- 
came proverbial for luxury and 
effeminacy. 

5. mpaxtixol] ‘of an active 
turn.’ 

6. émirohatdrepor] ‘too super- 
ficial.’ See note on iv. 4. 

7. €v Tois tTiyzaor] Compare 
Pope— 

What’s fame? A fancied life in others’ 
breath, 
_ A thing beyond us, e’en before our death. 

And with the next clause com- 
pare— 

All fame is foreign, but of true desert. 


ws 


Pe 


9. oikeidy rt] ‘something pecu- 
liarly one’s own.’ 

10. Compare Bacon’s Essay on 
Praise, which commences,— 
‘ Praise is the reflection of Virtue 
(iva mrrevaow éavtovs ayabods 
eiva), but it is as the glass or 
body which giveth the reflection, 
If it be from the common people 
it is commonly false and naught, 
and rather followeth vain persons 
than virtuous’ ((nrovee yoov brd 
Tav ppovpav tinacbat K.T.A.) 

12. én’ apern] ‘on grounds of 
merit.’ We do not care to be 
held in honour by worthless 










CHAP. V.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


17 





6 KaTd ye TOvTOUS 1) apeTn KpeiTTav. Tdya Sé Kai waddov 


4 4. a / / e , 
av Tis TéXOS TOU TrOALTLKOU Biov TaVTHV UTTOAaBoL. 


Pai- 


P 7 RE. / ‘ ed a \ > / \ 
vetas dé atéedeoTépa Kat avTn’ SoKxet yap evdeyecOar Kat 
, ¥ Ny Py ‘ a? a \ , \ 
Kabevdew eyovta THY apeTny, n aTpaxtew dia Biov, Kat 
an > Aa ‘ “ 
mpos Tovtos KaxoTrabeiy Kal atuyelv Ta péyiotar Tov 5 
ed A > > é > 
oltw favta ovdeis av evdatpoviceer, && pn Oéow Sia- 
‘ ‘\ 4 e/. n 
4 purdtrov. Kai repi wev tovtwv adus* ikavas yap Kat 
> 5 yy > an 5 
év Tois eyKUKNoIS elpnTaL rept avTav: TpiTos 8 éoTiv 
‘ eas & > + > a y 
0 Gewpytixos, Tepi ov THY emloKepiy Ev Tois ETrojevoLs 
/ c ‘ Sap 3 ‘ a: sg 
8 mouoopeOa. O Se ypnuatiotns Biawos Tis eotiv, Kato 10 < 
A ? ‘ 4 b / / 
mdovTos SHrov Stt ov TO Lytovpevov ayalov: ypnotjwov 


6 Honour, which cannot therefore be the Chief Good. If it be 


7 ii 





accidents lead a 








———— 


t 
ox be called a happy 


g present. We ought perhaps to add that wealth cannot be 
the Chief Good, because wealth is obviously a means and ngt 


men, or upon trivial or discredit- 
able grounds. Cf. IV. iii. 17. 

6. déow dSvapvdAdrror refers to 
the discussions in the rhetorical 
schools, where, a subject or thesis 
(@go1s) being proposed, the 
pupils took different sides of the 
question to defend (d:apvddr- 
Tew) a8 an exercise, irrespective of 
their own views on the subject. 


8. éyxu«Xiots] sc. Adyos. i.e. 
* Pop treatises,’-—such as. 
might be met with in the ordi- 
nary round of life. 


9. éwioxeis] ‘a thorough in- 
vestigation.’ This will be found 
in B. X. 


\o Ae 
or ~% ‘ 





10. Biatds tes may be explained 
either (1) ‘under a sort of con- 
straint,’ opposed to éxovcvos (as 
in ITT. i, etc.), because no one 
would toil for wealth if he could 
secure the luxuries etc. which 
wealth procures without this 
toil ; (avayxaios is used to express 
the same idea in X. vi. 2); or 
(2) ‘unnatural’ (= mapa dvov), 
because it is a perversion of the 
nature of things to make an end 
of wealth, which is essentially a 
means, as much as it would be 
(e.g.) to accumulate railway- 
tickets without any intention of 
travelling. 


farther asked, Is Virtue itself the Chief Good? we re ly, No: () Virtue; 
because a man may be tiows-mnd yer Through vations 
e of forced inactivi ny ot of positive suffer- 

x 


ing, and This could not without para 
e€ 


. _ As to the third, we reserve what we have to say for the Shi oyprs 


cal con- 
templation : 


(<) Riches, 


18 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK 





yap Kat addov Xapiv. Avo parov | Ta mpSrepov AeX- : 
Oévta TédAn TIS ay UrodaBou oe aura yap ayan arab, 
Daiverar & ovd éxeiva: Kairos woAXot NOyou mpos avTa 
kataBEeBrnvrar. 

VI. Tatra per odv agers Bor To Se Kaborov Benriop 
tows emucneypac Oat Kat Siatropnoar Tas déyeral, Kaimep 
mpoodvrous THS ToLauT NS Enrnoews ryevomevns Bua, TO. 
Pérous av8pas eicayaryeiv Ta etn. Aogeve S av, iows 
BeXrwov elvat Kai Seiy ert owrnpia 6 THS adn Geias Kat 
Ta oiKela avaspely, GrAdkws Te Kat diNocdous OvTAs* 


an end, and, as such, men seck it of compulsion and not_of free 
choice, in order to secure the results to which it a it leads. 


CHAP. VI.—Criticism of the Platonic Theory that the Chief 
Good ts the abstract ‘Idea’ of Good... 


_ We proceed to the last of the important theories as to the 
nature of the Chief Good above mentioned (iv. 3), viz., that 
it is some one abstract ideal entering into each several mani- 
festation of ‘good.’ Respect for the authors of this theory 
makes the discussion unwelcome, but the love of truth renders 


4, xataBéBAnvra] ‘have been 5. rd xaOddov] literally ‘the 


constructed.’ The metaphor is 
probably from  xaraSddAew 
Oepedia, ‘to lay down the foun- 
dations of a building.’ 

CHarp. VI.—This_ chapter 
simply continues the proposed 
examination of the theories of 
the Chief Good selected in ch. iv. 
as being the most important and 
worthy of notice. See note on 
iv. 3 for a brief explanation of 
the theory criticised in this 
chanter. 


Universal,’ i.e. the theory of one 
abstract and universal Good 
present in all particular mani- 
festations of Good, and yet separ- 
able from them. This was 
called by Plato the ‘Idea’ of 
Good. 

8. ra eid] much the same as 
ras idéas, i.e the theory of 
* Ideas.’ 

idtouvs  avdpas] 
Aristotle’s own 
teacher, Plato. 


Especially 
master and 


CHAP. Vi.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


19 





aypoiv yap OvTOWW pirow 6 davov mpoToav Ty arndevav. 
2 Oi be Kopioavres 7 dofav TavTny ovK éroiouv ideas ev 
ois TO ™ poTepov Kal TO dorepov eheyor, So7rep ovde TOV 
api wav idday Kareckevatov" TO 6 aryabov héyeras Kat 
&v TO Ti EOTL Kal EV TO TOL Kal EV TO TpOS TL, TO Se 5 
Kal avro Kat a ovaja mporepov Tm pvoer Tov 7 pos TT 
mrapapuddi yap TOUT EouKe kai oupBeAnndre TOU ovToS," 
3 HoT oUK ay ein KON TIS emt TOUTOY ia. "Ere éret 


- 


2 it necessary. We argue agninst it as follows :—(i) There We object to 
can be no one abstract ‘Idea’ of several objects of which That Good 
some are necessarily prior or posterior to others. (This is Gof ob 
allowed by the authors of the theory, who on this account jects prior 

denied its application to nwmbers.) Now this is evidently the pra ps 

case with the numerous objects called ‘ Good,’ since we have a a in 

Good in Substance and Good in Relation, ete, ./Therefore 


3 there cannot be one abstract Idea of ‘ eet. ’ (ii) If all Good (a) 2 Fen | 


under vari- 
ous Cate- 


1. Hence the well-known 
saying, ‘ Amicus Plato, sed magis 
amica veritas.’ 

6. mpdrepov rn hice.] Aris- 
totle (Categ. xii. 1, 2) distin- 
eh mpdorepov kara xpovoy and 

ov in the following sense 
rence practically amounts to pé- 
Tepov tH vce): When two 
things, A and B, are so related 
that the existence of B necessarily 
implies the existence of A, but 
not vice versd, then A is mpérepov 
‘in the order of Being’ as com- 
pared with B. He gives as an in- 
stancethe numbers | and 2, which 
stand in this relation to one an- 
other. On this ground (he argues 
in the text) the Platonists made 
no ‘Idea’ of Numbers, such an 


interdependence in respect of gories; 


essential priority and posterio- 
rity being out of the question 
among phenomena partaking of 
one ‘Idea’ (see further note on 
§ 6). Thus the major premiss 
would be granted by his oppo- 
nents. In the minor premiss 
Aristotle contends that such an 
essential priority (mpérepov tH 
dicer) belongs to Substance as 
compared with Accident or Rela- 
tion, and as Good is predicated 
of each, there cannot be a com- 
mon Idea of Good in these cases. 
8. This second argument is 
little more than a repetition of 
the first, clothed in more techni- 
eal Aristotelian phraseology, and 
worked out into more detail. 


20 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [nog I. 





rayabov i Waxes heyerae TO ovr (caus yap . ro) 7] a rd 
yer at, otov Oo Beos kai i vous, Kau ev TO troup ab dperal, 
Kal ev TO Toop 70 METPLOV, Kat ev T@ 7 pos Tl TO xp" 
CULO, Kant év “pore Kapos, katt ev romp Stata Kab 
erepa TolavTa), Syrov ws ovK av ein KoWwov TL KaMoAOU Ff 
Kab ev" ov yap av edeyer év Tacals ais karnyoptass, 

4 aN’ ev pug porn. “Ere 8 eet rev Karas py iSéav pola 
Kai erua THN, Ka Tov ayabev dmavrov 7 av pia TIS 
ertaTnpm viv & elot ToNAaL Kal TOV UTO play KaTHYO- 
pia, otov KaLpou év TONED jev oTpaTnytKn év voow 8 1C 


were included under one ‘ Idea,’ it ought to be predicated 
under one Category only: but it can be predicated under all 
and each of the Categories. Hence again it cannot be reduced 
8) of ob-4 to one ‘Idea.’ (iii) The knowledge of things reducible to one 
Jeet yreate’ Idea must be one and indivisible, whereas of things Good 


ous divisions there are many divisions of knowledge, and that even of Goods 


l. ioay@s éyerar TH GyvTt] 
‘can be predicated in as many 
ways as Being itself.’ The ex- 
pressions which follow are taken 
from the phraseology of Aris- 
totle’s Categories. Only the 
first six out of the ten usually 
given are mentioned in the text, 
They have been variously held to 
be a classification of things, 
words, or thoughts. For a clear 
and succinct account of Aris- 
totle’s Categories, and the con- 
troversy respecting their nature, 
the student is referred to Dean 
Mansel’s edition of Aldrich’s 
Logic. Note B. in the Appendix 
(Ed. iii.) The argument in the 
text is, that as ‘good’ may be 
predicated of each and all of the 


several modes of existence classi- 
fied in the Categories, such 
variety cannot be reduced under 
one ‘Idea.’ 

7. "Ett & éeret] Aristotle now 
arguesthat the divisions of Know- 
ledge relating to the various 
manifestations of Good indicate 
a still further subdivision even 
than the distinction of Categories. 
It should be remembered that 
emoTnpn in Aristotle refers rather 
to a mental state (see VI. ii, and 
Glossary, s.v. Art, Science) than 
to a concrete body of know- 
ledge. He argues therefore that 
if the various manifestations of 
Good were reducible to one ‘Idea,’ 
the knowledge of one would be 
the knowledge of all. 


CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 21 





> bis N a , ; Ae® 9 \ 9 , 
LATPLKN, KAL TOU peTPLoU Ev TPOdH MEV LaTPLKN EV TrOVOLS 
‘ 7 / ¥ / 4 
5 Se yuuvactinn. “Amopnaee § av tis Ti Tote Kat Bov- 
> / 7 ¥ > / 
RovTar Neyew avToeKacToy, eiTep Ev TE avToavOpaT@ 
XN 3 / ® wre > Ns / > \ e a 3 oe 
Kat avOpaT@ cis Kat 0 avTOS Noyos EoTiv O TOU avOpa- 
2 7 LAND / > 
mov: 9 yap avOpwros, ovdev Swoicovaw e& 8 ots, 5 
e 2 > ‘ Ios a df a 
6 ovd abov. “Adda pny ovde To aidiov eivat waddov 
y ay add | ( be 
5) ae ” ; \ / hy / 
ayalov éotal, evmep ‘nde AevKOTEpoY TO TOAVYpOVLOY 
a 3 / / > / ec , 
7 Tov ednpepov. TIiCavwrepoy § eoixacw ot [IvOayopeot 


5 which can be brought under one Category. (iv) Again, Further we 
What is this abstract ‘Idea’ of anything? and how does its sbiect (4) 
definition differ from that of any object in which it is em- ‘Idea’ is in- 
bodied ? and if there is no difference how can the ‘ Idea’ lay pine ages 

6 claim to a separate existence? We cannot admit the answer Phenomena 
that the ‘Idea’ is eternal, while the objects in which it is body it. 
embodied exist only in time, for mere length of duration does 

7 not alter the intrinsic nature of anything. In short we pre- 


2. "Amopnoee & dy tis] Aris- 
totle now argues, ‘There is no 
difference between the Definition 
of anything and the Definition of 
its ‘Idea,’ and conceptions with 
one and the same definition are 
not to be distinguished. 

3. a’toéxacror] ‘the ideal of 
anything,’ or more literally, ‘the 
abstract-anything.’ 

6. tO didiov «iva:] Aristotle 
here assumes that ‘duration of 
time’ and ‘eternity’ are identi- 
eal. This at any rate would be 
repudiated at once by Plato, who 
held that time and eternity were 
different in kind, and that time 
was created, so to speak, when 
the material world was created. 
Moreover, he held the Abstract 
Ideas to be eternal and uncreated, 


and therefore prior to and inde- 
pendent of all relations of time. 
They existed independently of 
the Deity himself, and were 
voluntarily adopted by Him as 
the types which the created 
world should embody. Another, 
but later, view of the Platonists 
was, that they existed only in 
the Divine Mind, as His ideas 
(in the modern sense) of what 
creation should be. In either 
case, however, they would be 
independent of relation to Time. 

8. Il:Oavwrepoy x.t.A.] There 
is not exactly a logical opposi- 
tion between the theory of the 
Pythagoreans and that of Plato. 
They deal with the question of 
the relation between Unity and 
Goodness from somewhat differ- 


8 


Adit If on 8 
limited bes 


22 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK I. 





dere rept avrob, Tuevres € ev TH Tov ayabav cveToLyia 
TO év ois 87 Kan > mevounmos eraxodovOjjoae SoKEt. 
*"AdNa Tept per TOVT@V AANos eaTw Aovyos, TOUS be dex 
Oetow appuo Parnas Tis Umodaiveras Sia TO pn Tept 
maytos ayaovd Tous Aoyous eipjcBar, AeyeoOar Se nal 5 

A 95 \ ? @.'% / erg /, \ at 
ev. eldos Ta Kal’ avta Swwkopeva Kai ayaTopeva, Ta Oe 
TOT TOUTOY 7) bUAAKTLKA THS 7) TOV EvaVTIOV K@AU- 


fer the Pythagorean formula (apparently adopted even by 
Speusippus) that ‘ All J - aac , rather than that of 
Plato, that ‘ Goo If our opponents take 


the ground of dis eran ng Be boll ’ into two classes, ac- 
cording as they are (1) Seite for their own sake, (2) 





ent, though not hostile, points 
of view. Aristotle merely says 
that if he had to choose one of 
them, he would rather adopt the 
Pythagorean formula. 

1, ev th ray ayabav ovoroxig] 
guorotxia is literally‘ a stand- 
ing together in a row’ (croixos), 
then a ‘co-ordinate arrangement,’ 
a ‘series’ (L.andS.) Some 
Pythagoreans held that all the 
variety of Existence in the Uni- 
verse might be divided into two 
antithetical or opposed classes, 
and that in ten different ways, 
the one set being the avorotyia 
of Good, the other set the ove- 
rotxia of Evil: in other words, 
they held that the Universe ex- 
hibits everywhere a conflict or 
opposition between Good and 
Evil, and that ten various forms 
of each may be distinguished. 
Among the manifestations of 
Good (ev rh. cvoroxia Tv aya- 


— 


Ov) is found Unity (év); among 


those of Evil is found Multipli- 


city (mAnGos). All that is One 
is Good; all that is multiplex, 
that lacks unity, is Evil. The 
former involves the idea of order, 
the latter of confusion. 

2. Speusippus was Plato’s 
nephew, and his successor as head 
of the Academy, and yet even he 
(kai Swevoirmos) abandoned the 
theory ; which is a strong point 
against it. 

3. tots dé AexOeiow] Aristotle 
now deals with an objection that 
might be taken to his previous 
arguments, that they assume an 
extension of the Ideal theory 
to relative Goods, whereas it was 
meant by its author to apply only 
to absolute Goods. 

5. rovs Adyous apparently 
refers to Plato’ 8 language or area 
ments. xa? év eidos means ‘in 
one class or species’ (Grant). 


CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


23 





9 Toke Sia TavTa Aéeyer Pas Kat TpoTrov Gov. Aijrov ouv 
ote Surtas devour’ ay rayaba, Kal Ta pev xa? avra, 
Aarepa Se Sia TOUT Oh Xwpicavres ouv ato Tov openi- 
pov ta kal aura oxeypoueba el Neyerau KaTa law 

10 ideav. (Kal avra Se rota Bein tis Gv 3 2) boa Kai po- 
voupeva Su@xetat, olov To ppoveiy Kai opay Kai 7Sovai 


II Ei Sé kat Tabor éorl Tov «ad avTa, Tov Tawyabov Noyor 10 


/ 
TIVES Kal TYLA ; 


a ‘ > A | Be / ; 
Tara yap €b Kat ny ado TL SuwmKopev, 
Gpeos trav Kal’ avra ayabay Bein Ths ay. 


‘H oud diANo 


ovdev may THS ideas ; ; WOTE parayov éoTat TO eidos. 


év dmacw avrois TOV auTOV Enpaiver bar Senoer, xabd- 


mép ev xeove Kab pepprdicp Tov THS NevKOTNTOS. 


Tips 


S& xat hpovncews kai ndovns Erepor Kat Siadépovtes ob 


9 desired for their results, and then should limit the application 
of the theory under consideration to the first of these classes, 
to we should ask for some instances of this class. Probably 
intellect, sight, certain pleasures and honours, would be ad- 


mitted as 


desired for their own sake. 


(a) If they are 


not, and if in short nothing but the ‘ Idea’ of Good is admitted 
to be desired for its own sake, then the first of these classes 


is useless, having no objects included under it. 


(B) If they 


are, then supposing them to have one ‘idea’ in common, 
they must have one Definition; but as this is obviously not 


3. dpeAivwy is used as equi- 
valent to ray da ravra flags 

9. pdaraoy eora eidos} 
*The class (viz. that of pled 
as opposed to relative Goods) will 
come to nothing.’ If the Pla- 
tonist maintains that only abso- 
lute Goods have one Idea, and 
then refuses to admit that there 
are any absolute Goods, except 
the one ‘Idea’ of Good, then the 
supposed class of absolute Goods 


to which the ‘Idea’ refers has 
no contents, ‘and is therefore use- 
less. idos (as in § 8) is not here 
to be taken in the technical sense 
of idéa. 

13. €repor xat duadépovres 
x.T.A.] This, if not a direct petitio 
principii, is an off-hand and dog- 
matic way of disposing of the very 
kernel of the whole question, to 
which the opponents would 
doubtless at once demur. 


(6) If asked 
for a theory 
- ourselves, 
we prefer 
to say that 
Goods are 
called by a 
common 
name, by 
analogy. 


12 


13 


12 


13 


Opovupa. . 


24 ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. [BOOK I. 





Aoryou TavTy 7, ayaba. Ovk éotw dpa To aya0ov Kowvay 
Tt Kata piay iSéav. Wye "Ara Tras On AeyeTas ; ov yap 
€OLKE Tois ye amo Tons opeovipors. "AN apa ye TO 
ag EVOS ELVA, 7) Tos: ev aravra ouvrenciv, 4 HadNov 
Kar avanoyiay ; ; @s yap év copay oypus, év rine vous, 
Kal Gro Sn ev ev adKo. "AXN t vows TaUTA pev aderéov 
TO vov" eEaxprBooy yap vmrép auTav adds ay ein piro- 
codias oixetdTepov. “Opoiws Se Kat mept THs eas" eb 


the case, we conclude that there cannot be one ‘ Idea’ even 
of this limited class of Goods. (vi) If asked ourselves to 
account for the application of the one term ‘ Good’ to such a 
variety of objects (which of course cannot be a mere coinci- 
dence), we should suggest that it is in virtue of a certain 
analogy between them, though we cannot now pause to fully 
investigate or justify such a theory. (vii) Finally, such a 


2. mas 8) Aéeyerar;] These 
words represent a supposed at- 
tempt on the part of the Plato- 
nist to shift the burden of 
establishing a theory on his 
opponent. ‘If you reject my 
theory, how do you account 
yourself for the acknowledged 
ard Th 
acciden al 


éx Sudvovas 
intentional 


The last-named abound in every 
language as a means (inter alia) 
of economizing the number of 
words—e.g. ‘foot’ of an animal 
and of a mountain, ‘hand’ of a 
man and of a clock, etc. etc. 
Aristotle here asserts his prefer- 
ence for some such explanation as 


this in reference to the various 


applications of the word ‘ Good.’ 


fact of a unity of name for the 
diverse manifestations of Good?’ 
3. dpovipos] When the 
same word was applied to differ- 
ent objects in more than one 
sense, they were termed déuevupa. 
The following classification of 
éuovupa is implied in the text: 


t i.e. equivocal words, e.g. véw, Gallus, page, etc. 


ap’ évos coming from one source. 
mpos év tending to one result. 
Kar’ avadoyiay by virtue of resemblance or analogy. 


8. dpolws d€ kat rept ris idéas] 
In short, a theory respecting an 
abstract Ideal of good belongs to 
Metaphysics (4\Ans piAocopias), 
and its truth or falsehood is in- 
different to Ethics, which deals 
with the practical well-being 
of Man. We may therefore 
dismiss the subject as far as this 
treatise is concerned. 


CHAP, VI.] 


ARISTO sth ETHICS. 


25 





yap Kan earl & Tl TO Koy ‘earrnryopovpevov ayabor fj i 


ps Keperra Tt avTo xa? avro, O7Aov OS ove av en 


TPAKTOV OVSE KTNTOV avO porrey vov 8é TowobTov Tu ntel- 
14 TA. Taxa 8 To Sofevev av Bédruov elvat wopiterv 
aUvTO Tpos Ta KTNTO, Kab TPAKTA TOV ayabovr otov yap 
mapaderypa TOUT EXOVTES [Gov eicopeba Kat TH Hiv 
15 ayaba, Kay eiddper, emurevgoueba avtov. II [Gavornra 
pev ow & exer Twa 6 Adyos, eouxe Se tails emuaTnuais 
Scapeoveiv" mTaca. yap ayabod Tivos epueuevans Kal TO 
evdees emitntovoa mapanelrova THY poow avroi. 
Kaitou BonOnpa THMAKOUTOV aravtas Tous Teyvitas ay- 


16 voeiy Kat 4d emnreiv ovK eUAoyor. 


‘ 
_“Arropov de Kat Té 


adernOnceras vpavtTns 7) TEKTOV pos THY avTod TéxvnV 


theory as this, whether true or false,\ may be dismissed from’ (7) Js ay 
further consideration in a treatise which is rigidly limited 


the in 


quiry into that which is practica 
14 able by man. And if it be ar the knowledge of t 
abstract Idea of Good will advance us towards the knowledg 


15 of human good, we reply that this argument though plausible 


is unsupported by experience. 






useful to and attain- 


The Sciences, pursuing each 


the knowledge of some special good for man, know nothing of 


16 this abstract ‘Idea’ of Good. 


3. towirdév te (nreira] See 
ii. 1 note. 

6. mapdderypa] ‘model,’ or 
‘exemplar.’ one Aristotle’s 
own argument in ii. 2. Plato 
frequently maintains the practi- 
eal utility of the ‘Idea’ as a 
mapaderypa—e.g. Rep. p. 484 
C, p. 501 B, etc. etc. As a 
question of fact, Plato and Aris- 
totle would of course admit that 
men do not avail themselves of 
these abstract Ideals in prac- 


Still more striking is it that 


tice. As to whether they might 
do it, Aristotle asserts that it 
would be impossible, but Plato 
maintains the reverse, and de- 
clares that all real progress is 
hopeless until this shall be the 
case. 

10. 7d evdees emifnrovoat] 
‘ seeking to supply that which is 
lacking.’ Science is ever seeking 
to supply defects of knowledge, 
Art defects of practical power. 
(See Glossary, s.v. Art, Science.) 


10 


. Tdeal’ on 
ory, if true, 

is not of any 

practical 






: nat el hy 
na 
vw 4 Kos a 
LM h 
eet 2p. 


26 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 1. 





eidas aur Tayabor, 1) TOS larpuKcrepos v7) oTparayt- 
Ke@TEpos éoTat 6 7 iSeav aury TePeapevos, Paiveras 
per yap ovde THY vylevay oUTWS emucKomely 0 tatpos, 
ada ry avOpurov, paddov 8 tows THY Tovde Kal 
exaoTov yap lar pevel. ’ 5 
VII. Kat crepi pev tovrwv emt tocovtov eipnabe 


/ rh kd ates, a: 4 > ‘ te 9 
mwadw & eravedOwpev ert to Sntovpevov ayabov, Ti ToT. 


aa) 


the Arts, with their practical aims, derive no help from it, nor, 
as far as we can see, could they ever do so. 


CHAP. VII.—Construction of the Definition of the Chief Good. 


8§ 1-8.—Certain positive characteristics of the Chief Good 
stated with a view to tts Definition. 
§§ 9-16.—A Definition constructed out of another such — 


characteristic. 


§§ 17-21.—TZhe Definition not to be treated as eibignisl 


cally exact. 


In seek. 1 After these refutations of others we must now endeavour 
buld up ourselves to answer the question, What is the Chief Good? 
tion of 

the Chief 3. ovde tiv tyiccav] Not would bea defence of empiricism 
Good we only does the physician disregard against scientific knowledge. 
(i) Thatit the abstract ‘Idea’ of health, | Oxar. VII.—Here commences 
is tede- but he does not aim at produc- the constructive part of the 
atiatt treatise. 


ing even health in any general 
sense, but the health of the one 
particular individual whom he 
has in hand, This, it must be 
admitted, is captious, Indeed, 
hereand elsewhere inthe Chapter, 
in spite of the profession of § 1, 
Aristotle shows little sympathy 
with, scarcely even fairness to, the 
theory he is criticising. This 
argument, if it provéd-anything, 


Ch. iv. having set forth 
the conflicting theories on thesub- 
ject before us, and chapters v. and 
vi. having been destructive, ¢.e. 
having shown which of these 
theories are not true, or in other 
words, What the Chief Good is 
not, we now proceed to inquire 
What the Chief Good is. The 
chapter naturally falls into three 
divisions—(1) §§ 1-8, (2) §§ 9-16, 


CHAP, VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 27 





ay ein. Paiveras pep yap ado év addy mpager Kat 
TEXU ao Yap ev lar puch kal OTPATI YOY eat Tas 
Aourais opoiws. Ti our éxaorns rayabon ; ; i) ov Xap 
Ta Nourra mparrerau ; ; ToUTO & & lar puch pay dyieva, 
ev oTparnyern 88 vikn, év olxoSopury ny olxia, & addep 5 
5 ano, & anracn be m pagel Kai Tpoatperet TO TéNOS" 
TovToU yap &vexa Ta douras mparrovor TaVTes. Dor 
el Tl TOY TpaKTav amdvTwy éoTi Tédos, TOUT ay ein 
270 mpaxtov ayaor, ci Se mreiw, TadTa. MeraBaiver 


One characteristic of it is this: The good of any art, science, 
action, or purpose, is always the end in each several case, 
however many other points of difference there may be between 


them. So that the will also be the Final 


2 End of action. This however is the same conception as that 
——eE 


yf 


(3) §§ 17-21. [S$ 1-8]—-In this 
part Aristotle enumerates certain 
positive characteristics, or con- 
spicuous qualities, of the Chief 
Good, which any Definition must 
embody, in order, if possible, to 
construct a Definition upon them? 
Three such characteristics are 
suggested, which however prove 
too vague for this purpose. 

In the 2d Division [§§ 9-16] 
another more specific characteris- 
tic is found, upon which Aristotle 
then builds his own Definition of 
Happiness or the Chief Good. 

In the 3d Division [$$ 17-21] 
he renews the protest of ch. iii. 
against demanding mathematical 
exactness in such a Definition. 

This chapter, and especially 
the 2d portion of it, i is one of the 
most: important in the treatise. 
It contains, in fact, the answer 


to the main question with which 
the Book opened. All that fol- 
lows is simply the confirmation 
and defence of the Definition here 
given. 

9. MetaBaivey x.7.r.] ‘By a 
different course then the argu- 
ment has come round to the 
same point,’ viz. the same point 
as in ch. i. The conclusion in 
each case is the identity of the 
Chief Good and the Final End. 
The slightly different courses are 
as follows :—In this passage we 
argue, The ‘good’ and the ‘end’ 
are identical in all individual 
cases, and therefore the Chicf 
Good and the Final End will be 
identical also. Thus éxdorns in 
l. 3 and dmdvrov in 1. 8 are the 
emphatic words. In ch. i. we 
argued, Every action, etc., aims 
at some Good, and therefore the 








_, 4 cannot be final. 


” | 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I. 





PH Se / > 7 8 Ian 
&n 0 AOyos Els TaVTOY adiKTaL. 


Todro § ert paddov 


A / > ‘\ / / SY yo 

3 vacadynoat Teipateov. ’Erret dé whet paiveTat TA Ten, 
e / / </ @ a 

tovrov 5 atpovpeOa twa 8: Erepa, otov mdAovTov 
? \ Ae \ +f e 3 4 / 

GUNOUS Kat OWS Ta Opyava, SijAov WS OVK EOTL TAVTa 


\ 5A / / 
TédEla TO 5 ApltoTov T ENELOV TL PalveTat. 


2 ref / ‘\. aon 4 \ 4 
ECTLV EV TL fOVOY TENELOV, TOUT Av Eln TO EHTOUmEVOY, 


3 \ / ‘ / 4 
464 O€ TALIM, TO TEXELOTATOY TOUTOY. 


Tedevorepov Se 


/ ‘\ ‘J ein “ A 2 ui X “ 
Neyowev TO KAO avto SiwKxToyv Tov bt ETEpoV, KaL TO 
/ > + € ‘ a \ 59 ‘ \ 
pderrore Su ado alperov Tov Kat Kal avTa Kat dia 


oy val \ ‘ “ % “ 
Tov? aipetov, Kat admras 8) Tédevov To Kal avTO 


e S aN \ / x + a ' ? 
5 aipeTov aet Kat pndérrote Sv adXo. Totodtov 8 7 evdal- 
/ : /- > 9 a 4 4 2 
povia pariot eivar Soxetr TavTnv yap aipoupeOa act 
> en N In / > + N \ w Ate mA 
dv avtTny Kat ovdeTrote St ado, Tiny S€ Kal Ndovny 


\ a \ A > ‘ e 4 \ ‘\ > ¢ / 
Kat voUY Kal TacaY apeTny aipovpela prev Kat OL avTa 


\ \ b) / / XA / . bd 
(undevos yap amoBaivovtos édoiped av ExacTov avTay), 


with which we started. We may however further explain 
3 this idea of Finality. Any End which is itself but a means 
to a further End, or indeed which ever can be such a means, 


And hence we obtain this conception of the 


Chief Good, that it is something always desired for_its-own 


5 sake, and never with a view to anything beyond it. 


Obviously, 





/ fet 4 / 
“Dor eb pev 5 


10 


Happiness fulfils this condition, and we can think of nothing 
—— % 


Chief Good is what all things aim 
at, ze. it is the ultimate aim or 
Final End of all things ; and hence 
again the Chief Good and the 
Final End are identical. 

5. We cannot adequately 
translate réAevov, which com- 
bines the meanings of ‘ perfect’ 
and ‘final.’ (See Glossary s. v. 
rédevos.) That the Chief Good 
fulfils this positive condition 
follows from the primary con: 


ception of it given in the opening 
words of the Book, and in the 
beginning of ch. ii. 

ll. rovotrov S€ x.7.A.] Thus 
the steps of the argument are :— 
The Chief Good is reAecdérarov : 
then (after the notion of reAe- 
étns has been expounded) Hap- 
piness is shewn to fulfil this con- 
dition: the result of which is, 
that Happiness, as before, is 
found to constitute the Chief 


| 7 tion. 


CHAP. VII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 29 





aipovpeba Sé Kal THS evdarpovias xapw, Sua TOUT@D | 
drokapBavovres evdalpovnceLy. 
6 Seis aipeiras ‘TovTeD Kaper, ove Shas &¢ ado. 


Tn 8 evdarpoviay ov- 
ai- 


veTat Se Kal €x THS avrapKeias: TO auto oupBaivery TO 


yap TédeLov ayabov avrapKes elvae Soxet. 


Tod avrap- 


KES Deyouer, OuUK avT@ povp 7 Covrt Biov poverny, 
adda Kat yyoveiar. KAL TEKVOLS KAL YUVaLKL Kab OWS TOIS 
Pidous Kab TrONTaLs, eres pucer TOMTLKOS avOparros. 
7 Tovtov be Mymr€os pos TLS" emexretvovrt yap émt Tous 


yovels Kat TOUS aTroyovous Kat TOV ditwv Tous didous 10 


else which does. 


This however will not help us to a clearer 


another characteristic of the Chief Good, viz. that it is entirely 


; 
: 


; 


TAPKECTATOV 


6 Definition of the Chief Good. The same may be said of () It is = 


Self-sufficient, by which we mean that it ‘needs nothing besides 


itself to make life all that we could desire. 


(We must not 


however understand this to mean that it would enable a man 
to be independent of his fellow-men and live happily in isola- 


That would be a spurious self-sufficiency, being 4 


mutilation, not an elevation, of human nature.) Happiness 


Good, but we are not as yet any 
nearer to a Definition of it. In 
§§ 7, 8 similar steps occur. 

4, €x ths avtapkelas] That 
the Chief Good fulfils this con- 
dition as it is defined in § 7 jin., 
follows again from ii. 1. For if 
we desire everything else only 
for the sake of Happiness, the 
possession of it would render all 
such minor desires superfluous : 
we should be ‘ pndevds evdeeis.’ 

5. 1d 8& airapxes éyopev 
k.T.A.] ‘When we use the term 
“ avrapkés,” we do so not in refer- 
ence to a man’s self alone, in the 
case of one living a life of isola- 


tion, but also in reference to his 
parents, etc.’ 

8. hiaes moditixds avOpwros] 
‘Man is by nature a social ani- 
mal.’ Nature intended man for 
society as much as she intended 
him to use two hands or to walk 
on two feet. A man who should 
accustom himself to live out of 
all relation to his fellow-creatures 
would not have gained in real 
independence any more than one 
who should go always on one leg, 
or should use only one hand. 
The error thus protested against 
by Aristotle was conspicuous in 
the teaching of the Cynics. 





—————aw 





30 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [Book 1, 





eis Gmetpov mpoeow. “Adda TodTO pev eloavOls emt- 
oKxeTTTéov, TOS avTapKes Tiemev 0 povoupevov. aipeTov 
move Tov Biov ka pndevos evden Tovodrov Sé Tv evdat~ 

8 poviav otdmeba eivar. "Er. Sé ravtev aiperoraryy, un 
cuvaprOwouperny, ouvaprOwovpevny Sé on hov Os aiperoo- 
Tépav pera TOU edaxiorou Tov ayabar: dmrEpox yap 
ayabav yiverat TO TpooTiOéuevor, ayabav Se To petfov 
aiper@repov ac. Tédevov dn Te haivetas Kat avTapKes 
n evdarpovia, TOV TPaKT@v ovca TE)OS. 

9 “AX tows rH pev evdalpoviay TO apuorov eyew 1 
Spodoyoupever Th paiveras, mrodetra S , vapyeorepov 

10 Ti éotw er AexXOjvar. Taya oy yevorr ay TOUT, & 


again fulfils this condition of Self-sufficiency, but we cannot 
yet advance to a Definition of the f Good. Once more, 
And soit 8 the Chief Good is sui generis. If it were only the chief good 


besuive of a class, the addition’ to it of any other good in the class, 


neris. however small, would make it better, which is inconsistent 
with the supposition that it is itself the Chief Good. Happi- 
ness is then perfectly Final and Self- sufficient, and is the end 
of all human action. ~~ 


(3) But g All this, however true, is too vague to construct a defini- 
ticularly, tion upon. Another consideration may perhaps serve this 


it con- | 
it con- yo purpose. Could we ascertain the proper function of man 


feat 5. py ovvaptOpovperny x.t.A.] be only the principal Good of a 


ofMan’s ‘provided it be not counted in class made up of the Goods A, 

notion, © the same class with other Goods; B,C, D, etc., then A + B, or 
but if it be so counted in,’ etc. even A + Z, is a greater good 
The expression ‘Chief Good,’ by than A alone. Therefore no 
which we are obliged to translate single member of the Class can 
the simple rd dyabdy is mislead- ever be the Chief Good. It must 
ing. taya0ov must be held to besomething swi generis, ina class 
include in itself all other Goods, by itself. 
such as health, wealth, honour, 12. The conception now started, 
etc., in the most perfect degree, that Happiness consists in the 
é.c. the utmost amount of them fulfilment of man’s proper func- 
really desirable. Clearly if A tion (or as we might say, the 


CHAP. VII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 31 





| Anpbecn TO €pyov Tov _avOpwrou. "Dorep yap aunty 
Kai ayadparoroup Kat Taye i rexviry, Kal OXNWS OV early 


epyov TL Kat mpakis, ev T® epye Soxet TaryaGov elvan 


ka To ev; ovTw dokeev a ay Kat avbpare, elrep €or TL 
epryov avrod. Hérepov ouv TEKTOVOS peVv Kal oKUTEWS 
éoTu épya TWa Kal mpagers, avOparou Ss ovdev éorw, 
adn’ dpyov meduccer ; ; 4 wabarep opbarpod Kat XEtpos 
at mobos Kal odes éxaoTOU TOV poptov paiverat T! 
Epyov, ovTw Kat avOpwrov Tapa wavta TavTa Dein Tis 


Oe ‘ a >x oy / ‘ ‘ \ 
12 Gv Epyov tL; Ti ovv Sn TOUT av ein ToTe; TO wev yap 10 


nv Kowov eivas paivetat Kai Ttois putois, Entettar Se 


as man, his Chief Good would surely ‘Consist (as in all 
similar cases) in the perfect fulfilment of that function; and 


this is a more definite conception of it than those already’ 


suggested. We ought perhaps first to show that man, as man, 


11 has such a proper function, and this we should argue (1) from 


the fact that man in every individual character and relation 
of life (e.g. as an artist or any other sort of workman) has a 

definite function, and therefore man simply as man cannot 
be purposeless ; ‘and (2) from the consideration that every 
part of man, the eye, the hand, the foot, etc., has its proper 


12 function, and therefore man as a whole has one also. N ow, 


granting this, it is clear that this function must be something 


purpose of his being, the object 
for which he was created and 
sent into the world), is found 
sufficiently fruitful to form the 
basis of a Definition. 

7. dapyov has precisely its 
etymological force (a-épyor) ‘with- 
out any work.’ Translate ‘has 
no work assigned to him by 
nature.’ 

LL. Qyretrat 8€ rd idtov}] ‘We 
are seeking for that which is 
peculiar to himself.’ This would 


be explained iy Plato’s definition 
of the épyov of anything, viz 
‘that which it either alone, or 
better than anything else, is able 
to perform.’ Hence he says, 
though we might prune a vine 
with a sword, a chisel, or a 
pruning-knife, the operation 
would be so much better per- 
formed with the last instrument 
that we say that it is its épyov. 
It is iéidv tt, something peculi- 
arly appropriate to it. 


aa a err. Cititi(‘iSsSCiCSOSCSCi‘C ;:‘(;;COS mA 


lS ae a A le 


= ~~ 


~ 
—_— 





ya Gn tet 


32 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I. 





TO LOLOV. 
Conv. 


> / 4 ‘\ ‘ \ ? “ 
Agopicteov apa thy Operrrixny Kat avénriKny 
‘Erropevn Se aicOntixn tis av ein, haiverar Se 


\ cd ‘ ,.o@ X i. \ ‘\ / / 
13 Kal AUTN KOWN Kon OTT Kas Bot . Kal TavTl Cam. Aevtre- 


i4 Oeréov __ Mupu@repov yap avrn Soxet ever Bau, 


From this J 


point of 
view we 
may now 
define it 
as 


OF 
= 
na 


AA re" 
>> Wxis évép- 


otal Latte ead 
“ 


14 opposed to, Reason.’ 


Ta én TmpaxruKn TUS TOU hoyov EXOVTOS. 


(Tovrouv S€ To 


HEV WS emumeies oy, To 8 ws eXov Kat 1 dvavoovpevor.) 5 
Arras 8é Kai TauTnS heyouenns: Tv Kat evepryevav 


Ei § 


é€otiv épyov avOpwrov wWwuyns évéepyea Kara hoyov aH 


peculiar to, and characteristic of, man. 


This excludes that 


mere existence which he shares with the animal and vegetable 
world, and also that conscious life (or life endued with sensa- 


3 tion) which is common to the brute creation. 


There remains 


then what we may call a life of action belonging to the rational 


part of our nature ; 


including by the term ‘rational’ that 


which recognises the sway of Reason as well as that which 


exerts Reason. 


operation. 


This being the function of man, we now seek 
the perfection of that function. 


Hence the Chief Good from this point of view 


First it must be in active 


will be ‘An_active condition of the soul guided by, or not 


4. mpakrikz) is easier to explain 
than translate ; ‘ moral,’ ‘ active,’ 
‘practical,’ being in different 
ways misleading. Man is some- 
times said to be the only animal 
that can form a conception of 
actions as distinguished from 
events. mpakTixy 18 co-extensive 
with ‘action’ in the sense here 
indicated. ‘Tis’ implies that 
the expression in the Greek is 
felt to be not quite satisfactory. 

‘Tovrov d€ xt.A.] This dis- 
tinction is more fully explained 
in ch. xiii. Its relevancy here 
has been thought so question- 
able, that some Editors have 


But further, such an active condition 


treated the sentence as an inter- 
polation, though against MS. evi- — 
dence. 

6. kar’ evépyevav] as opposed — 
to kara Svvapw or kal efi. See 
Glossary, p. xlvi., also viii. 9. The 
various steps by which each 
term of the Definition is gained 
should be carefully noted. 

7. et & éeoriv] The apodosiz 
to this ef is found in § 15 iit, 
Td avOpmmuvoyv ayabov x.r.A. We 
are reminded that the sentence 
is still unfinished by the twics 
repeated ei & otro in 1. 6 and 
1. 9 of the next page. 

8. Wuyis is translated ‘soul’ 





CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


ao 





pm avev Ndyou, To 8 avto papev Epyov civar TO yever 
Tovde Kal TOUdE omovdaiou, a@omep eiBapiorod Kab OTTOU- 
Saiov KGapiarov, Kat amas 5 TOUT emt TaVTO, ™poo- 
elias THS Kar dperny VIrEpoxs pos TO epryov" 
(xiPapioroi pev yap TO «ibapitern, arrovoaiov Sé To ev") 5 
—e 8 obras, dy parrov Sé TiBeper ¢ épryov Som Twa, TAv- 
tnv Se ~puyns evépyevav Kat pages peta Aoyou, o7rov- 
Saiov 8 avdpos ev tadta Kai Karas, Exactov § eb 
15 Kara THY oiKelay apeTnY aTroTEneiTar-—et § ovTw, TO aV- 





admits of various degrees of excellence. 


The function of a 


or of an ordinary artist is generically the same, only by 
one it is well performed, and by the other not necessarily so. 


in the Analysis for want of a 
better word (see Glossary 8 v. 
avux7n). It seems to stand here 
as a sort of substitute for ™pak- 
_ ttxy above, because mpaxrixi) (7) 
- must belong to this part of man 
{as Aristotle plainly states in 
viii. 3),in contrast with Opemrixy 
and ala Onrixi (7), which belc belong 
to the body. Similarly Kara 
Adyor corresponds to Tov Adyov 
Exovros above. 

1. r@ yévet] This is the em- 
phatic idea in the sentence. 
‘The work of anyone and of a 

, anyone are the same in 

. the superiority in re- 

sive of ‘excellence being (in the 

latter case) added to the descrip- 

tion of the work. e.g. If the 
‘anyone’ be a musician, ‘to play’ 

in the former case, ‘to play well’ 

in the latter case, would describe 

the work of each. ‘Well’ is the 


15 We must therefore include this condition of excellence in our «ar' dperhy 


bre Kar’ Gpernv which is 
ar alla 

3. 5) = as it obviously is, 
Supply ei again before dm\@s. 

9. oixeia dpery] ‘appropriate 
excellence.’ It should be remem- 
bered that dperi is simply ‘ex- 
cellence,’ though it is most 
frequently applied to a particular 
sort of excellence, viz, moral 
excellence, and so is translated 
Virtue: just as mpagis and mpak- 
rixy come to be similarly re- 
stricted in meaning (see Glossary 
under dper) and mpagis). This 
general meaning of dperi is 
explained by Plato’s Definition, 
that the appropriate excellence 
(oixeia dpery) of anything is that _ 
quality be which it is able to” 
perform its own function well. 
Aristotle’s account of dper? in 
II. vi. 2 should also be referred 
to. 


[BOOK I. 


34 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





Oporwov ayabov »puyns évepyeva yiveTas KaT apeTny, 

€ Se maAelous at dperat, Kata THY apioray Kat ‘TéNECo- 
16 TaThy. "Er 8 € ad Bip reneigp. Mia yap xeadan € eap 
Ov Tole, ouse pia nepa’ ovT@ oe ovde paceipiov Kat 
evdaipova pia npepa ovd OntYOS Xpdvos. 

II epuyeypadbeo ev oov Tayabor Taory" Set yap tows 
VroTuT aca mpatov, 60 % vorEpov avayparyan.  Aokeve 
8 ay raves eivas mpoayayciy nai SvapOpdcav.ta Kanes 


17 


life,’ not necessarily ‘ a completed 
life ;’ or ‘life as a whole,’ though 
not; necessarily ‘a whole life ;’ 
else we get into the difficulty 
raised at the beginning of ch. x. 
‘Can we not call a man happy 
till his life is completed?’ We 
should not describe a man as 
having good spirits, or excellent 
health, unless we had known him 
for a certain time, and had had 
opportunities for observing him 
under various circumstances; in 
fact, till we can judge of his life 
asa whole. Sometimes even afew 
observations enable us to form 
such a judgment, and for prac- 
tical purposes these represent 





+, Definition; and as there are various kinds and degrees of 
aplor —exeellence, we must-also specify the highest excellence. And 
Rs so the Chief Good becomes An active condition of the soul in 
16 accordance with its highest éxcellence.’ One other condition : 
“it must be a permanent settled state, the habit of life, not 
“the accident of a moment. We add then the words ‘in e 
év Bip redely. ig lete life,’ and so our Definition stands thus: Happiness 
- n active condition of the soul in nosordanod “With Tis 
Too much 17 highest excellence in a complete life.’ Let this serve as an 
not, tobe outline sketch at any rate ata our conception of the Chief Good 
expected in 
Satie 3. Bios rédeos] ‘a complete Bios rédevos. So it is a tiecian 


of Happiness. All we need 
is a sufficiently complete period 
of duration to be sure that it is 
a settled habit of life, and nota 
momentary or transient gleam ‘of 
joy. It is a well-known point 
of distinction between ‘ pleasure’ 
and ‘happiness,’ that pleasure ‘is 
perfect at any moment, wheréas 
happiness implies duration and 
permanence. 

7. troruraca is a metaphor 
from sculpture, dvaypayra: from 
painting: but it should be re- 
membered that ancient statues 
were frequently painted. 

8. mwavrdés is emphatic here:and 
in], 3, next page. In Morals, asin 


CHAP. VIL] © ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 35 





¥ os ~ *")<¢ / A 4 
€XOVTA TH Teprypady, Kal 0 Xpovoes T@V ToLoOvTwWY Evpe- 
ee ‘ > \ 9 7] \ oa 
Ts %) cuvepyos ayalos civa. “Oley Kat trav Texvav 
/ e 3 / A ~ A 
yeyovacw ai emidoces* Tavtos yap mpocbcivas To éd- 
18 Xer M A i) Se \ a 4 ‘\ \ 
tIrOV. euvnoOat Sé Kal TOY TPOELPNLEVaY YpH, Kat 
‘ > / ‘ 4 / > d 2 a > 
THY axpiPeay py Opmolws ev arracu emienrely, aAnN ev 5 
AWB X ‘ € / f A.L9 ~ 
EKATTOLS KATA THV VITOKELWEVnY UNHY Kal ETL TOTOUTOY 
2 oo > A a , LES, « t N 
19 eh doov oiKeioy TH wcOodm. Kai yap téxtay Kat yew- 


or Happiness. Time and individual experience will fill in 
further details-in a subject like this, just as they advance our 
18 knowledge of the Arts. We make however two provisos: 
1, Exactness of treatment (as we have already said) must not 
be indiscriminately demanded. 2. The reason, as well as the 
fact, must not in all cases be required. As to the first, let 
us not forget that two considerations limit the amount of 
precision to be required in any case. (1) The nature of the 
subject-matter, of which we have spoken already (iii. 2); and 
19 (2) our immediate object in handling it: as for instance a car- 


the Arts (both being [1] practical, 
and [2] not, like Mathematics, 
exact), every one’s experience may 
contributesomething to their pro- 
gress, and every additional fact 
adds something in confirmation 
of their very principles; and 
moreover, every one is interested 
in their progress, and in the sub- 
jects of which they treat. In 
the exact science of Mathematics, 
on the other hand, though pro- 
gress in the knowledge of factv 
and the efficiency of methods is 
continually being made, nothing 
can ever add to the clear- 
ness and certainty of its funda- 
mental Definitions and Axioms. 
Besides, it is not every one (mav- 
ros) who can understand or 


feel interest in such a subject. 

6. xara THv troKeipevny VAny] 
‘dependent on the subject-mat- 
ter ;’ eg. a model in cork of 
deal could never be finished like 
one in ivory. 

7. oixeioy rj peOddq] ‘suitable 
to the process in hand ;’ e.g. it 
would be possible perhaps to 
make the corner of a deal table 
precisely 90°, butthere would beno 
object gained by such exactness. 
It would not be oixeiov Tp peOdd0. 
Cf. restrictions on discussion of 
Wux7 in c. xiii. §§ 8, 10, 16. 

Both these considerations apply 
to the case of morals. The sub- 
ject-matter does not admit of 
exactness, and the practical pur- 
pose in view does not require it. 


20 MAELO YyiyVNTaL. 


36 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I. 





merpns Suaxpepovras emugnrodar rh opOny- 6 
cd 


pev yap 


ep Soov xpnotwn Tpos TO epyov, O Se Tt éorw ; mote 


qu Ocarns yap tadnOods. 


Tov avtov 8 tpomov Kat év 


a Df / ed > X / a + 
TOLS AANOLS TOLNTEOY, OTTMS PH TA TapEepya TMV EpyoV 


> 5 / Ia x | ee 5 
Ovk araitnréov § ovde Thy aitiay ev 5 


/ / b) 3 lie \ 4 %'' ieee A 
aTacW 0/L0L0s, QNN ikavov ev Tiot TO OTL SevyOjvar 

na @ \ \ \ b) ‘s bs § rd 5 \ 
KANO, OLOV Kat TEpt TAS apKas TO OTL TP@TOV Kat 


penter does not always make the most perfect square even 


20 that the wood admits of, if he is engaged on rough work. As 


to our second proviso, some propositions, ¢.g. certainly first 
principles, are exempt from the necessity of demonstrative 


As to the former, we may com- 
pare Bp. Butler, Analogy, p. 
105 (ed. Angus): ‘ Observations 
of this kind cannot be supposed 
to hold universally in every 
case. It is enough that they 
hold in general.’ 

1, dp6nv| Understand yeviay, 
i.e. a right angle. 

6. rd Gre (the fact that a 
thing is so and so) is constantly 
opposed to 7rd didri (the reason 
why it is so); eg. In Euclid’s 
Axioms and Definitions the fact 
alone is stated (ré 6rz); in his Pro- 
positions the reasons for assert- 
ing the fact are given (r6 dude). 

vo 8 Ort mp@rov Kal dpyq] 
‘The fact is something primary 
and a starting-point.’ It is so 
at any rate in Morals, where the 
Fact that we feel sentiments of 
approbation or disapprobation on 
certain occasions forms the start- 
ing-point of the inquiry. See 
note on iv. 7 (’Apx7 yap 76 dri), 
and Introduction, p. xiv. Trans- 


lation fails to preserve the full 
meaning of dpy7, including 
not only ‘first pric but 
also ‘beginning’ or ‘ i 
point’ (see Glossary). Indeed all 
sciences require to make assump- 
tions independent of demonstra- 
tive proof (as Aristotle points out 
elsewhere), at both the higher 
and the lower ends of the scale 
of knowledge. General prin- 
ciples rise above, and facts of 
observation fall below, the limits 
of such proof; and both are 
sometimes called dpyai. e.g. the 
Mathematician assumes the Axi- 
oms on the one hand, and on the 
other assumes the existence of tri- 
angles, circles, and other figures, 
the properties of which he inves- 
tigates. In the latter case, rd 
Ort mp@rov Kal dpx7 applies. 

7. Axioms or first principles 
rest upon such grounds as the 
universality of their belief, the 
necessity of their belief, and the 
greater certainty attaching to 





CHAP. VIL]  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


37 





TOV dpyav & ai pev érraryoryn Oewpodvras, ai § 
ais Ojces, ai 5 rope TWh, Kae adnrat § adws. Me- 
Tievar Se Tetpatéov éxaoTas 7 Tep’KacW, Kat oTrovda- 
atéov OTrws opicbact Kadas weydAnv yap Exovar pomnv 
pos 7a emopeva. Aoxet yap mrelov 4) Huu Tayros 5 
eivat 7 apy, kat ToANa cupdharvy yiverBar Sv aoe 
Tav Cnroupevov. 


7 
A 
, 


< 
proof, and the primary facts themselves of any science are in 
some sense first principles. Now first principles rest upon 
evidence of different kinds in different cases; and though 


ot demonstratively proved, they must be, each i in its own 
a gn way, fully established and clearly defined. This 
is of the utmost importance, and it is just an instance in which 


‘well begun is half done.’ 


them than to any other principles 
that could be alleged in their 
support (Sir W. Hamilton). If 
any higher principles could be 
found (the necessary condition of 
demonstrative proof), the others 
would ipso facto cease to be first 


1, Cel h.l. probably = 
‘by appeal to experience’: i.e. 
(as VI. iii. 3 seems to show) ‘that 
amount of experience which is 
the condition, not the cause, of 
necessary truths’ (Grant’s note 
Le.): @g. in Mathematics we 
need some experience to compre- 
hend what is meant by straight 
lines, right angles, etc. ; but the 

ipxal, or Axioms relating to 

em, are not (like Physical 
Laws) proved by such experi- 
ence. 

2. aiaOnoe| ‘by perception’ ; 
probably referring to the facts 


of Physics, which are ‘ the truths 
we start from’ (dpyal) in such 
subjects. 
eOiop@ twi] ‘by a kind of 
habituation.” We become so 
familiar by frequent repetition 
with some truths, that by a sort 
of ‘unconscious induction ’ (Grant 
h. 1.) we come to believe them 
as axioms. This is especially 
common in the case of principles 
of conduct. ‘Numberless little 
rules of action and conduct, 
which we could not live without, 
. are learned so insensibly 
and so perfectly as to be mis- 
taken perhaps for instinct, though 
they are the effect of long ex- 
perience and exercise’ (€O:0p0s) 
Butler, Anal. pt. i. ch. v. p. 95 
(ed. Angus). In all these three 
cases, it will be observed, there 
is no demonstrative proof. 
3. Mersévat d¢ reiparéov éxag- 


Certain fa- y 
miliar gene- 
ral beliefs 2 
about Ha’ 
iness 

with our 
Definition ; 
6.9. 


38 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 





VIL. Fxewréov on epi auriis ov povov x TOU CUP 
TmepdcpaTos Kal ef av O Roryos, GXNG Kal ee TOV Reyo- 


peveov mept auriis* TO pev yap ann dei TavTa cuvede 
TH UTAPYOVTA, TH Se pevder tayv Svahevel tarnbes. 


CuaP, VIII.—Other views, popular and philosophical, on the 
subject of Happiness compared with the above Definition. 


We will now compare our Definition with the views held by 
2 others, and test it by the facts of experience. (a) It isa 


tas 7 mepvxaoi) ‘We must 
endeavour to investigate them, 
each in its natural way.’ 
Chapters viii.-xii. form a sort 
of parenthetical section, in which 
Aristotle compares his Definition 
just found with various received 
opinions on the subject, and con- 
siders its bearing upon certain 
popular difficulties and questions 
of the day (esp. ch. ix. x. and 
xi.). His object throughout is 
to show how much there is in 
common between his own theory 
and others, while he asserts the 
superiority of his own. The 
latter consideration justifies anew 
treatment of the subject; the 
former not only conciliates oppo- 
sition, but is itself an argument 
in favour of any new theory on 
the ground explained in § 7. 
This is a truth generally for- 
gotten in controversy. The fol- 
lowing are the contents of the 
five chapters :—ch. viii. Sundry 
popular and philosophical notions 
about Happiness compared with 
Aristotle’s Definition; ch. ix. 


Common views as to the acqui- 
sition of Happiness, on what it 
depends; ch. x. xi. The popular 
difficulty whether a man cannot 
be called happy (as Solon said) 
while still living, with questions 
arising therefrom, considered 
from the point of view of Aris- 
totle’s Definition; ch. xii, The 
relation of Happiness, upon Aris- 
totle’s theory, to another familiar 
classification of Goods. . 

I. éx Tov oupmepdoparos Kal 
e& Sv 6 Adyos] ‘We must not 


only consider this question from 


the point of view of our conclu- 
sion and of our premisses.? We 
had similar expressions in ch. iii. 
geal is 
4. ra bmdpxovra] hl. ‘all 
facts’ from % dmapxew in the sense 
of ‘to exist.’ If a general theory 
is true, all the facts of experience 
in detail must be consistent with 
it. 

5. The words Neveunpéever 
. . « Gyabda state the popular 
opinion which is to be compared 

with Aristotle’s Definition given 


[BOOK 


2N evepnwevav & TOY ayabay tpiyn, Kal TOV pev éeTos 5 


hc eel 
dm— re 


os é 
EE ee ere 


CHAP. VIII. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


39 





Aeyowevav tay Se rept puyny Kat cdya, ra wept uynv 
KuptoTara Néyouev Kat pariora ayabd. Tas Se mpaké- 
es Kab Tas evepyeias Tas YruyiKas Tept rpuyny TiOEuer. 
“Nore Kkadds av Aéyouto Kata ye Tavrnv Thy SéEay, 
Tahara ovcav Kat 6woroyouperny b7o TaV dirocodoww- 5 

3 Tov. “OpOds Se nati dri mpdkes Twes AeyovTar Kai 
i Se ‘ df ‘ a \ \ > a 
evepyelat TO TEédos oUTH yap TaV Tept rvyny ayalar 

/ ‘ 2 a 2 / / a / Wi cS 

4 YiVETAL, Kat OV TOY ExTOS. Zuvader Se TH Noy Kai TO 
ed Ov Kai TO ed mparrew Tov evdaipovar syeddv yap 
evtwia Tus eipntar Kai evrpatia. 

5 Daiverar Se xai ta éervfntovpeva wept thy evdai- 


10 


time-honoured saying of philosophers that all goods are either (a) That 
of mind, body, or estate, and that those of the mind are the ;00d8 be 
highest. On two grounds our Definition may be said to imply the Mind 


this: (1) because it describes Happiness as an active con- 
3 dition of the soul or mind; (2) because ‘activity’ or ‘ moral 
4 action’ itself is not an external but an internal good, (8) (6) That liv- 


Others say that Happiness is living well and doing well. This 49 ag well 
again may be considered to be smbodied in our Definition. ee 


5 ‘To these general theories succeed others which enter more geyeral of 
into detail as to the precise character of Happiness, such that the Popular 


in ch. vii, Tas d€ mpdéeus ... 
ov Tay éxrés state the grounds 
for asserting the Definition to be 
in accordance with that opinion, 
viz. on the strength of the two 


words wWvyx7) and évépyea form- | 


ing parts of it. 

8. r@ Aéyo] the definition in 
the last Chapter, to which also e?- 
pnrav in the next line refers. The 
concurrence of Aristotle’s Defi- 
nition with this popular opinion 
would rest chiefly on the expres- 
sions kar dpetry dpicrny and éy 


Bi@ tedeiw, which form part of 
it 


11. émi{nrovpeva] ‘que requir- 
untur ad beatitudinem’ (Bonitz) ; 
‘the conditions demanded as 
necessary to constitute Happi- 
ness. To say that Virtue or 
Pleasure, etc., constitute Happi- 
ness, as contrasted with the 
two vague and general theories 
already spoken of, answers to 
this description. The former 
view is discussed in §§ 8 and 9, 
the latter in §§ 10-14. 


detail about 
Happiness 
are also, 


under limi- 


tations, in 


accordance 77 exis 


with our 
Definition : 
such as 


(a) That 8 of them. 


congisto br 
irtue : 


40 - ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I. 





ef ; a 
6 poviay arravO vmrapxevy T® Dex Oevre, 


Tois pev yap 


apern, rots 8é ppovnors, Drow 8é codbia TU eivat bo- 
Kel, Tois Se TadTa i) ToUTeOD Tt pe ndoviis _ ovK dvev 
noovns* erepoi 8 Kat THY exTos evernpiay ovum apa dap 


7 Bdvovow. Tovrwy Se 7a Mev TOANOL Kal TaAdaLot deyou- 


ow, Ta be Odtyos Kat evdofou avdpes* ovderepous dé 
TOUT@Y evroyov Stapapravew Tois ddous, aX &y yé Th 4) 


8 Kal Ta WAEloTA KaTOpOoUD. 


Tois ev ovv Neyovet THY 


p) ee? ha / eae . / / 
aperty i) aperty rive, ovv@oos cor 0 Aaryos" Taras 


3 b) 2 
9 yap or 0 KAT aura évepyeta. |" : 


Avadéper Se tows ov 


puxpov év lernoet 1) xprcer TO apurrov vrrodapBavew, 


ka, ev ee h é evepyetg. 


pndev ayabov arrore)elv umd, 


Tay pev yap ew evdexeras 


@ 7 
ovaay, olov T@ KaEvSovTL 


}) Kal GdXws Tes é mkott, Tv 8 evépyeav ovy otov 
P PY UX 


6 it is Virtue, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, or that it cannot 
t without external prosperity. 


Now all these views, 


whether popular or philosophical, are likely to have some 
element of truth in them. We will therefore consider some 


(a) That 


Happiness consists in_ Virtue. 


Without 





going so far as this, Oa Dalston asserts that it amplies 
9 Virtue, and it adds the important condition that that eae 


2. ppdvnors is practical, and 
copia speculative, wisdom. go- 
dia is in fact nearly = philosophy. 
The distinction is fully explained 
by Aristotle in B. VI. These 
two theories are not referred to 
again in the discussion which 
follows here. 

6. ovderépovs] ‘neither of them 
(the many or the philosophers) 
are likely to be entirely at 
fault, but rather to be right in 
some one point at least, or even 
in most points.’ There is no 


error but it contains some germ 
of truth, however distorted or 
obscured. 

11. KTHOEL i xpnoe .. . Ce 
7) evepyeia] See Glos ry, p- xlvi. 
Though at the Olympian games 
there may be better men among 
the spectators than among the 
combatants, yet they are not 
crowned, because their prowess. 
is not proved or exhibited. It 
is latent, it exists Suvdpet and 
not evepyeia. 


Eee i 
; 


CHAP, VIII. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





y 3 ALMA \ Ss I e/ 
Te mpate. yap e& avayKns, Kat ev mpake. “Qowep & 
3 / > ¢ /. > , 
WTriacw oVvyx ob KaAAOTOL Kab LoyUpeTaToL oTeba- 
b) > b) / 4 / a 
vouvTat ad ot aywvitouevot (ToUTMY yap TLWeES ViKaCLV), 
a > al > a 
oUT@ Kal TOV ev TO Bip KadOV KayaOav ob TparToVTES 
> A LDF / + + \ na 
10 opOas emnBoror yiryvovtat.|/ “Eats 5¢ kat 6 Bios avtav 
Ch ta7 me X na A 
Kal avrov novs. To pev yap Hdec0ar Trav apuyiKan, 
/ 3 \ ¢a\ ‘ ‘\ / a 
exaoT@ © eoTiv nov Tmpos 0 AeyeTas hidoTOLOUTOS, ofoy 
vA XN a / / \ fal / ‘ 
immos pev TH hirinT@, Oeapa Se TO hiroGewpe’ Tov 
oN \ , EF OG ate a / \ 
avtov S¢ tTpoTrov Kai Ta Sixata TO HidodiKaiw, Kat Sdws 


SS “a 


Il Ta KaT aperny To dirapero. Tois pev ovv modrois 10 


> ee ee / \ ‘\ ‘ 4 a > al N 
Ta nOea payetat Sia TO ph hvoe ToLadT elvat, Tois SE 


claim 


at Our Ve 





5. §§ 10-12] The emphatic 5. emnBodro| See x. 14 (note). 


10 must be not dormant, but in active exercise. (6) That Hap- (¢) 
piness implies Pleasure. This we agree to, and moreover ¢ 


words are xa@ avrdy (1. 6) and 
ioe (1. 11). The superiority 
of the pleasures derived from Vir- 
tue to other pleasures is argued, 
because (1) the former are 
intrinsic or inherent in the acts 
themselves (1. 5-10), and (2) they 
are natural and not artificial (1. 
10, tol. 3, on next page). But in 
the statement of his conclusion in 
p. 42, 1. 3—5, having repeated 
the words ka@ airds and év éavra, 
Aristotle recurs to his former 
argument, stating it, however, 
more strongly, and then again 
summing up in p. 43, 1. 4. 


6.. Td pev yap "dec0a ray 
Wuxikav| ‘For the feeling of 
pleasure is something internal,’ 
i.@. 16 is not separable from the 
occasion which causes it, as two 
external objects might be sepa- 
rated. The pleasure and the act 
which is its source are separable 
in thought but not in fact (Ady@ 
S00 dyapiota medukdra, as Ar. 
says in xili. 10), Hence the plea- 
sure of Virtuous acts is inherent 
in, and inseparable from, the acts 
themselves. yuyixav (cf. yruxixas, 
§ 2) clearly refers to Wuxijs €vep- 
yeva in the Def. of Happiness. 


That 
implies 
Pleasure ; 


42 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 1. 


fee 
. wan 4 





diroxaros éoriy dea ta ducer ndca. Touadra & at 
Kar aperny mpages, Bote Kal ToUToIs eioly delay Kat 

€) 258 Ia ‘ a A e a ¢ ih 

kal avras. Quvdev dn mpocdeitar rhs ndovas 6 Bios 

Dine am , N 9 ¥ ae ee 
AVTOV WOTEP TEPLaTTTOU TWVOS, ANN EXEL THY NOOVHY EV 

a rn > 

éavt@. IIpos tots cipnwévors yap ovd eotiv aryabos & 


leasures of Virtue, being natural pleasures, never clash or. 
inte ith one another, as our artificial pleasures do; and_ 
further, being both natural, and also, as we just now said, 
inherent in the very actions themselves, there is no need of 
any adventitious pleasure besides (as the theory we are con- 


¥2 





12 


4. mepiarrov] literally ‘ some- 
thing fastened round’; so an 
appendage, a charm, or amulet. 
It here indicates an arbitrary 
reward (which Hegel irreverently 
described as a ‘Trinkgeld’) for 
Virtue. 

exes THY Oovyy ev éavT@] 
This touches upon a very impor- 
tant question in Morals, the rela- 
tion of Virtue to the Pleasure or 
Satisfaction which its practice 
involves. The view in the text 
isadmirably expressed by Seneca: 
‘We do not love Virtue because 
it gives us pleasure, but it gives 
us pleasure because we love it’ 
(Non quia delectat placet, sed 
quia placet delectat) ; and again, 
‘Pleasure is not the motive, but 
the accompaniment of virtuous 
action’ (Non dux sed comes 
voluptas). Again, ‘Honesty is 
the best policy, but he who is 
governed by that maxim is not 
an“ honest man’ (Whately). 
We must carefully distinguish 
between the conscious aim and 
the actual tendency of actions. 


Happiness (according to Aris- 
totle) must be the actual tendency 
of Virtue, but it cannot be its 
conscious aim. In fact, when it 
is the conscious aim, we run the 
risk not only of destroying the 
Virtue of the act, but even of 
losing the Happiness. The plea- 
sure of Virtue is one which can 
only be obtained on the express 
condition of its not being the 
object sought. There are many 
other things which exhibit the 
same phenomenon (see some 
good remarks on this in Kece 
Homo, ch. x. p. 113, 3d ed.) 
Just as in speculation, ‘Wisdom 
is ofttimes nearer when we stoop 
than when we soar,’ so in prac- 
tice, Happiness is best secured 
by those who least consciously 
aim atit. Aristotle discusses at 
length in IIL ix. an apparent 
exception to the statement of the 
text which occurs in the case of 
Courage, the exercise of which is - 
accompanied by pain and loss. 

5. IIpds rots eipnpévors] The 
addition to the former statement 


13 tion. 


CHAP. VIII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


43 





r) pn Xaipeov Tais Kahais mpagerw ovre yap Séeavov 
oudeis av et’ euros Tov pay xaipovra TD Sucavorrparyelv, ovr 
ehev épior Tov aa Xaipovra TAs edevBepiows mpakerw 


13 opoiws be Kal emi TOV adXwv. 
ay elev ai Kat aperny mpagers deta, — 


ayabat ye Kal kanat, Kal 


Ei & otto, Kal’ auras 
“Ada pry Kal 
badora “‘TOUT@Y exaorov, 


evar €p KAN@S Kpivet T epi auTo@v 0 OT ovoatos* Kpiver S 


sidering would imply) to make a virtuous life happy 
need the word therefore be explicitly included in the Defini 
(3) Nor, lastly, must it be forgotten that our concep- 


nor 
efini- 


tion of Happiness, as dependent on Virtue, is such as to 
include, besides the highest kind of Pleasure, also the highest 
degree both of Goodness and Nobleness; all these being 
united in one, and not separated as the opinion under ex- 


amination would imply. That 


of the argument in § 10 consists in 
this: Aristotle said before that 
the Virtuous man loves Virtue, 
and therefore finds pleasure in it. 
He now goes further and says 
that unless a man feels pleasure 
in it he is ipso facto proved not 
to be virtuous at all. This 
would be further illustrated by 
the contrast between cadpav 
and ¢yxparjs (explained above 
in iii. 7) ; for the conduct of the 
latter fails of being strictly Vir- 
tue, because it is accompanied 
with pain and difficulty. See 
also Il. iii, where it is main- 
tained that pleasure accompany- 
ing actions is the test- of the 
formation of the habié of doing 
them. 
- 5. *AdAG pry cal] ‘ But more- 
over they are also.’ This for- 
mula, as usual, introduces the 


this union is real is testified 


answer to a supposed objection, 
or possible misunderstanding. 
It might be thought that plea- 
sure is the exclusive, or at least 
distinctive, characteristic of such 
acts, but this is not the case. 
Thus we have three points of 
superiority claimed for Aristotle’s 
theory of the connexion of Plea- 
sure with Happinessover thecom- 
mon view which we are consider- 
ing. (1) Pleasure is present in 
a higher manner,—it is inherent : 
(2) It is of a higher sort,—it is 
natural, not artificial: (3) It is 
more comprehensive, as it includes 
also rd Kaddv and rd dyafdy as 
fully as rd dv. 

7. orrovdaios] lit. ‘serious’ or fin 
earnest, just as daddos is ‘light 7 
or‘ trifling.” Then the two words 
come to be used respectively for 
morally good and bad. Aristotle 


dic 
= 


external 
prosperity. 


sy OS ELTTO[MeED. 


15 evdapoviav. 


44 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, 





[Book 1, — 





"Apiotov & dpa Kat Kad Maroy Kai HoLoTOV 4 x) : 


evdarpovia, Kat ov Siwpioctat TavTa Kata TO AndaKov 


erri-ypapypar 


KéAXorov 76 Sixatdrarov, | Agorov 8 dyvatvew" 
"Hiétorov 8 répvy’ od Tus 5 pg Td Tuxety, 
% ; 


dmavra yap dmdpxet Taira Tals dpioras evepyelaus: 
ravtas Se, 7) lav ToUT@Y my apiorny, paper elvat THY 


Daiverar o6 Guos Kal TOV exros whisws: 


mpoodeopevm, «abamep elope adivarop yap 4) ov 


16 Sto Ta Kana mparrew axopnyn Tov ovTa. 


TIonXa HEV If 


yap mparrerat, xadamep Se opyaven, Sua pideov Kat 
movrou Kal TOMTURIS Suvapecs:) ¢ evi Se THTOpevoL 
puTraivovet TO paKapLov, otov evryevetias evTeKvias KdA- 


14. by the judgment of the best among men, and also that in 


Happiness this combination is found. The last opinion we shall 


of Happiness. 


15 consider is this:—(c) That external prosperity is a condition 
This we are also disposed to agree to, up to 
16 a certain point, partly because many noble actions cannot be 


performed without means or appliances; and partly because 
(as we have already admitted) the absence of certain con- 


appeals in a similar way to the 
decision of the omovdaios as final 
in IIL. iv. 5, and still more em- 
phatically in X. vi. 5, and to 
the decision of the dpdvipos in 
his Definition of Virtue, II. vi. 
15. (See note in each case.) 

7. piay thy apiorny] Though 
they are all inseparably united 
in Happiness, yet if one be more 
prominent or characteristic than 
the rest we might select it alone 
for the purpose of Definition. 

9. eimoper] viz. v. 6 (riv & 
ouT@ K.T.A.). 


10. axo rov| lit. ‘ unfur- 
nished xeon pees ’—and so 
generally ‘without appliances.’ 
The state provided the chorus 
for dramatic performances. This 
duty (called xopnyia) was one of 
the Aecroupyia: at Athens. (See 
note on IV. ii. 11.) Cf. con- 
versely kexopyynpéevos in x. 15. 
The same statement is more 
fully illustrated in X. vii. 4. 

14. eddaporxds] Observe the 
force of the termination—‘ adapt- 
el for happiness.’ Compare mpax- 
rikos, ‘apt to do,’ in ix, 8. 


i 


‘7 ditions of prosperity is enough to mar Happiness. 


CHAP. IX.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


45 





Rous ov avy yap evdatpovixos 6 THY Weay Tavaicxns 
% Svaoyevns 4) povwrns Kat arexvos, ets § tows Hrrov, 
+ nr 
€ T@ TayKaKot Taldes elev 7) Hirol, 7 ayaOot dvTes 
a 4 s ” 4 a ‘ 
7 t6Ovacw. KaSarrep ovv eitropev, eovxe TrpocdetcOat Kat 
THs ToLavTns evnuepias’ GOev eis TavTO TaTToVow enor 5 
‘\ a 
THY evTUYiay ™ evdatpovia, Erepou Se THY apeTny. 
IX. “OGev wat dropeitar motepov éots pabnrov 7) 


Some have 


even identified Happiness with external prosperity just as 


others have identified it with Virtue. 


It will be seen that we 


cannot go so far as this in either case. 


CHAP, 1X.—Ox what does the acquisition of Happiness depend # 


—_ 


Such being our views as to the connexion of Happiness with Various 
external circumstances and internal gonditions of character, 


4. Some degree then of ex- 
ternal prosperity is demanded on 
two grounds, (1) because it 
assists towards the active exer- 
cise of Virtue. From this point of 
view too much of it is almost as 
great a hindrance as too little, and 
indeed always it is more or less 
a source of danger (as Aristotle 
explains elsewhere, ¢.g. X. viii. 6). 
Compare Bacon on Riches: ‘ As 
the Baggage is to an Army, so 
is Riches to Virtue: it cannot 
be spared or left behind, but it 
hindereth the March.’ (2) The 
other ground is, that the total 
absence of it in important parti- 
culars is obviously enough to 
interfere’ with Happiness. See 
x. 12, where the same two rea- 


sons are repeated (Avmas Te ‘yap 
emipéper k.t.A.). Also ix. 7 (Tay 
dé Aourar x.T.A.). 

7. “O@ev kai «.t.A.] As Hap- 
piness has just been shown to 
imply both Virtue and also ex- 
ternal prosperity in some degree, 
the former consideration would 
imply that its acquisition was in 
our own power (uabnrév, €O.ordr, 
aoxnrov), the latter that it was 
independent of ‘ourselves (kara 
Geiay poipay, dia Tbxnv). Tak- 
ing the latter first, Aristotle 
indicates somewhat hesitatingly 
that Oeia potpa cannot be the 
immediate cause of human Hap- 
piness, apart from all effort or 
conduct of our own. He then 
excludes rixn at once, on the 


causes have 
been sug- 


he ui- 
sition of 
Happiness. 


2 pay i) Kau Sua TUxNY maparyiverat. 


3 Tivo dow Berriarov. 


yr of 2 
is 
eas 


46 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





[BOOK I. 





erate 7) adas Tos aouyrov, } kata twa Oeiav pot- 


Et: yey ob wat 


GAXo TL éott Oeav Sapna avOparos, eUoyov Kas THD 
evdaipoviay Oedcdorov civas, Kat pamora Top avOpo- , 


"ArXa TOUTO yey tows addays 


av ein oKxerpews olKeLdTEpOr, paiveras Se Kav eb pm 
Ocomepmras eori ara Se aperny kad TWa padnow 4 | 
donnow Tmaparyiveral, Tov Oeotatay eivat TO yap THS 
apetns GOrov Kai Tédos ApicTtov eivar haiveras Kat Ociov — 


it is natural to inquire upon what its acquisition depends :— 
whether it be on learning; on moral, or other, training; on 


Divine dispensation ; or on chance. 


The best ‘of all human 


goods is certainly the most likely of all to be the gift of 
Providence 3 Heaven; and whether thus given directly, or through the 
medium of instruction or discipline, to be of all human things ~ 


ground that it is clearly better 
that the Chief Good should not 
depend on chance. ents 
are then adduced in favour of 
considering Virtuous action as the 
main cause, or at least as an 
indispensable condition, of Hap- 
piness. 

1, pabnrov refers to intellectual 
teaching; <€@:ordv to moral 
training:; aoknrov to any sort of 
ges or practice. 

5. Gdns créwvews] ie. it is a 
question rather for Theology 
than Ethics. The Science of 
Ethics only notes the observed 
fact that Happiness depends in 
different degrees both on our own 
efforts and on external circum- 
stances. It leaves to Theology 
the question whether theories of 


‘Natural Laws’ or ‘Special Pro- 
vidence’ will best explain the 
facts. 

6. ¢i pn Ocdmepmros . . . TeV 


Oevorarwy| The intervention of © 


natural laws does not exclude 
Divine agency, which, having 
first established the laws, works 
through them as means. ‘If He 
thunder by Law, the thunder is 
yet His Voice’ (Tennyson). 

This paragraph seems added 
to conciliate religious prejudices, — 
which might be shocked by the 
bare statement that Happiness 
is secured by our own efforts, to 
the apparent exclusion of Divine 
help. It need be none the less 
a gift of God, though He wills 
only to ‘help those who help — 
themselves,’ 

< 








ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


CHAP. IX.] 47 





47l Kal paKd, Em & av Kak TrohvKowov™ Suvarov 
yap umrap t Tois pa memnpaj.evous ™ pos aperny 
5 Sua Tuvos Ioews Kai eripercias. Ei § éotiv obre 


Berri H Sva L FOXxNY evdaipoveiv, ehoyov € exew obras, 
elmep Th KATO guow, @S olov Te Kadota EXeW, ouTw 5 

6 mepuner. “Opoiws Se Kai Ta xara TéexVnV Kat maoay 

airiay, Kal t paduora KaTa vy dpiorny. To Se peiyoroy 

Kal KaAMOTOV emitpepat TOXD diay TAmpmpenes ay en. 

7 Suppaves 8 éoti Ka éx Tob Aoyou TO Enrobpevor 
: elpnTat yap »puyis évépryeva Kar apeTny mod tis. Tov 10 


4the most divine. It is moreover something within the reach 
of all, if it be sought after, or at least of all who are not in- 
5 capacitated for Virtue. Chance at any rate we may exclude Happiness 
from the inquiry at once, if it is better, as it most clearly cannot do- 
6 is, that this greatest prize should depend on our own efforts enfe: 


rather than on chance. 


We argue for some such view as this, 


it is obvi- 
ously bet- 


because (1) our Definition implies something of this sort, ter’ that st 
7 when it describes Happiness as an active condition in accord- tion to our 


1. Ei & dy kat rodvcowor]) 
*It would also be within common 
reach,’—a consideration in favour 
of supposing Happiness to be in 
some degree at least the result 
of our own exertions (which 
Aristotle has rather hinted at 
than stated directly as yet, in the 
words «i pr) Oedmepmros x.7.X.), 

—‘for every one can obtain it 

those incapacitated, ete.’ 

7. airia in this context refers 
to any sort of conscious or inten- 
tional causation as contrasted 


apiom™ aitia seems to be 
Nature (¢icis 1. 5), which 
would convey to a Greek a 
notion similar to that of Provi- 


dence with us. See Glossary on 
Oeds and givors, and compare 
a similar argument to this in 
ii. 1, and note there. The argu- 
ment in this passage appears to 
be : Nature does all for the best ; 
for indeed in like manner (éy0/as) 
every art and every intelligent 
cause does its best, whatever 
that may be; and therefore a 
fortiori Nature, the First of 
Causes, above all others, does 
what is best; its best being of 
course the absolutely best. 

10. xar’ dperiy] It is taken 
for granted here and elsewhere 
that Virtue depends on our own 
efforts, 


own efforts. 
That this 
is so is al- 


ready virtu 
ally Implied sai 


casita: 
















48 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK I, 





‘\ a 3 n \ ‘ ¢ / > a ‘\ \ 
de Aourrav ayabav Ta pev vrrapyew avaryKaiov, Ta Se 
S \ _f / 3 a ec , 
8 cuvepya Kat xYpnoiwa méeduKev opyavixas. “Opodoyou- 
\ > HK Py] \ > > N 
peva Sé TavT ay ein Kal TOS eV apy TO yap THS 
¥ > 7 e/ \ / 
TONTLKHS TéhOS AploTov éTiOeuev, avTn Se mrELoTHY 
b 4 ‘\ b ‘ ‘\ 
ETLLENELAY TTOLELTAL TOU TroLOUS Twas Kal ayabous Tous} 
/ a \ ‘ a b 
Q TOALTAS TroLnoaL Kal TpaKTLKOUS TOV Kad@V. Eixotas 
5 Sf a >f ef 4 of. n , Jar 
ovv ovte Bovy ovte tmmov ovTe adAXo Tov Cwowv ovdEev 
4 / Ia \ > A e/ 
evdalpov Aeyomev’ OVdeY yap aUTaY OloY Te KOLYOYHCAL 
4 > / \ 4 ‘\ ‘ : See: Ia 
10 TovauTns Eevepyeias. Ata TavTnv dé THY aLTiay ovdEe Tals 


ance with Excellence or Virtue, though we do not deny the 
necessity of other tO as aids and instruments even towards 


(2) in our 8 that excellence. (2) Our original conception of the Chi 
cofouetion 00d as the End of the Science of Social Life points i 
of Hthical Same direction, the primary object of that 


Science: 





—— 


language of 3 
men, 10 sense) either to the lower animals or to children, both being 


1. Nowra] i.e. Goods other than 
Virtue just mentioned. These it 
is true are not wholly under our 
control. Observe the same two 
grounds as before (viii. 15, 16) 
for the need of some measure of 
external Goods. 

3. Tois ev apn] viz. ii. 5. 

4. Hence zrodurixyn has a wider 
sense than the ‘science of go- 
vernment,’ because it aims at 
making good men, as well as 
good citizens. See note on xiii. 3. 
The point of the argument here 
is that qoXucriky aims at securing 
Happiness through the means of 
Virtuous conduct and character, 
and this implies that the acqui- 


sition of Happiness depends 
mainly on ourselves, 

7. If it sound strange to say 
that neither the lower animals 
nor children can be called happy, 
we must remember the full 
meaning attached to the term in 
the Definition of ch. vii., and not 
be misled by the popular appli- 
cation of the word ‘happy’ in 





English. See further, X. vi. 8 ' 


(note). 


9. rowavtns] viz. mpaxtiKns . 


Tv kad@y from I, 6. 

ovde traits] ‘not even a child,’ 
ThisAs-a stronger case than that 
of #he lower animals just cited, 
because a child has Happiness év 


CHAP. X.] 


ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. 


49 





evdaiuav cori" ouT@ yap TPAKTLKOS TOV TOLOUT@Y ova 
THY HALKLaY" ot be Neryopevor dua Tv énmrida paxapt- 
Govrar. Aet yap, adomep elmopen, Kab aperis Teheias Kab 
iI Riou TeRetou. TIonXai yap peraBonat ryivovrat Kab TaV- 
TolaL TUYaL KaTa Tov Biov, Kat evdéxerar Tov bador 
evOnvodvra peyanaus ouppopais mepuTec ety eri ympes, 
xabarep é év Tois Tpauois Tept TIpsdpov pueveras: Tov 
Se Tovavrais xXpnedpevou TUXALS Kal TeMeUTHCAVTA GONI- 


ws ovdels evdarpoviter. 


> 
X. Ildrepov ody ovd addov ovdeva avOpwrav evdas- 


characterized by incapacity for Virtuous practice,—the former 
tter temporarily: for both Virtue and Happi- 


absolutely, the 


iI ness are imperfect unless exhibited in ‘a complete life’; the 


I 


changes and chances to which life is exposed being so many 


and so various. 


CuHaps. X. XI.—What zs the relation of Happiness to the vary- 


ing fortunes of life, especially in reference to a well-known 


dictum of Solon’s. 


10 


Hence arises the question, Must we (as Solon used to say) Solon’s dic- 
wait till we see the end of a man’s life before we can call him ™™ 


Suvdpec though not év éevepyela 
(See Biency, p. xliv.), and hence 
dia tiv edwida paxapifovra, 
whereas a brute has it not i in any 
sense, either Suvdyer or évepyeia. 
Cuaps. X. and XI.—The men- 
tion of Bios réXexos at the end of 
the last Chapter, and the state- 
ment made in reference to it, 
suggests the popular question 
said to have been first raised by 
Solon, ‘Can we not call a man 
happy till his life is completed 2’ 
In §§ 1-5 Aristotle points out 


D 


the difficulties involved in every 
solution or interpretation of this 
question, especially as it cannot 
be separated from the wider 
question of the condition of the 
departed. In § 6 he returns to 
the consideration of the dictum 
of Solon, proposing afterwards to 
apply its solution (gained by the 
help of his own theory of Happi- 
ness) to that of the wider ques- 
tion just mentioned. It is so 
applied in ch. xi, 

10. od8 adXov ovdéval i.e. even 


tum stated. 


50 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK I. 





povicréoy Eos a av fn, Kara DY) ohwvar Sé xXpeay TENS 6 opay ; ; 

2 Ei Se 8) Kat Oeréov obras, dpa ye Kat EoTW evdaipeov 
Tore emevdav array 5 i) TobTo ye TavTEenos aromoy, 
Gdrws Te Kal Tous Aéyovow mpi évepryetay Twa THY 
3 evdatpoviay ; et Se wi) Aeyouev Tov TeOvedTa evdaipova, 
pnde Serv TOUTO Bovrerar, adr ore THVIKaTTA ay TIS 
daparés paxapicever avOporoy 4 OS exT0$ non TOD KaK@V 
OvTa Kal TOV SuotuxmMarer, & exel pep Kab TOOT appic- 
Barnoiv Twa" Ooket yap elval TL 7? TeOveaTt Kat kaKoy 


Kal ayaov, ebmrep Kat TO Sours 72) aicBavopevp Se, otov 10 


TYLA Kal ayia Kab TeKVOV Kal OWS arroryovey ev- 
4 mpatiat te kat Svotvyia. °Amopiav Sé kal TadTa 


2 happy? Those who say this mean, ezther that he is happy when 


dead—which is absurd, especially if happiness consists in ac- 


tivity (evépyeva) as our Definition asserts, and indeed Solon pro- 


It involves 3 bably never meant this ;—or that we can then safely apply the 
question term ‘happy’ to him, as being now beyond the reach of trouble. 


Hee ou,  Butare we so sure that he i is beyond its reach? Donot the for- 


deadinrefer- tunes of the family or friends that he has left behind affect him 
ence to the 


living,which + still ? But this again opens another difficulty. If we suppose 

is full of dif- 

ficulties. any other than 6 ) Tprapexats Euy- been considered a happy man 
opais mepimecav. This might even if he had never discovered 
be thought an exceptional case, his incestuous marriage, but had 
and so the question is put, ‘Can gone on till death in ‘happy’ 
we not then call even any ordi- ignorance of it. His ‘ignorance’ 
nary man happy while he lives, would not have been ‘bliss’ from 
by reason of the changes and the Greek point of view. This 


chances of life ?’ at least is assumed in the text, 
9. Soxet] ‘It is supposed,’ and the argument drawn from it 
see note on iii. 2. is, that it is equally natural to 


Soxet yap «.7.A.] ‘It is suppose that the happiness of a 
thought that both good and evil dead man, even though he be 


may occur to the dead, if indeed unconscious, is marred by misfor- — 


they can to the living without tunes occurring to his family on 
his being conscious of it.’ Cidi- earth. Aristotle however is ony 
pus for instance would not have stating a popular belief. 





CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 51 





, \ / 4 , / \ 
Tapexe’ TO yap pakapiws BeBiwxote wexpt ynpws Kab 
{ / ‘ / 2 / ‘ a 
TEAEUTNCAVTL KATA NOYOY EvdeyeTaL TOANAS peTaBoNas 

/ \ ‘ > / \ ‘ ») b aN. > 
ocupPaivew Tept TOUS EKYOVOUS, Kat TOUS LEV AUTOV aya- 
‘ al / A > %*/ ‘\ ? 
ous civas kai tvyeiv Biov tov Kat akiav, tous 8 && 
> / ro 4 a > / ‘ ‘ 
evaytias. Andov 9 Ott Kat Tois aTooTHACL TPOS TOUS 
a ee” To 3 INs tS / ey] \ 
5 yovels TrayTodaTa@s eyelv avtous evdexeTat. ~ATomrov Sy 
/ > x ? /-  < ‘“ \ / 
yivorT Gy, 6 cuppeTaBadros Kat 0 TeOvEews Kat yivotTO 
CaN ‘\ > / /. § 4 7 \ A “ 
OTE pev evdaimav twadw 8 adios. ~“AtoTroy dé Kat TO 
\ af , a \ aA ? / 
pndev pnd emi twa xpovov ovvixvetoOar Ta TOY ExryoveV 
a a > > 9 / EGE , > 
6 Tos yovevow. AXXN Erravitéov ETL TO TPOTEpOY aTro- 
/ / ‘ xX / ‘\ ‘ a > 4 
pnev taxa yap av OewpnOein Kat To viv emi&nrovpevov 


that they do affect him, then it would seem that the happiness 
of a complete life may be marred after death, and that even 
5 the dead may change from happiness to misery and vice versd 


5 


with the fluctuating fortunes of their descendants on earth. ~ 
And yet on the other hand, it is very hard to suppose that 


these do not affect the dead at all. How then are we to escape 
6 from this concourse of difficulties? Perhaps this large ques- 
tion concerning the condition of the dead, into which we have 
wandered, may best be solved by first giving an answer to the 
simpler one,— Was Solon right in saying we must never call a 


2. xara Adyov] ‘accordingly.’ rate be exempt from the difii- 
A quasi-mathematical expression culty felt by Solon. 


= ‘in proportion.’ 

5. Kal Tois dmoornpace K.T.A.] 
‘also in their several degrees of 
removal (i.e. in their several gene- 
rations) it is possible for them to 
be related in every variety of way 
to their progenitors,’ ic. some 
giving them pleasure and others 
pain. 

6. dromov] This is ‘out of 
place,’ because even the dead 
(kal 6 reOveds) would not at this 


8. drorov] Why this is ‘out 
of place’ is more fully explained 
in xi. 1. It would be Aiav ddidov 
kat tais dd6£as évaytiov. Notice 
here and elsewhere Aristotle’s 
respect for popular feelings and 
beliefs. 

10. The mpérepov amopnbev is 
the dictum of Solon, xp7 7d 
TéXos épav. The rd viv émifyrov- 
pevoy is the relation of the dead 
to the fortunes of their friends, 


Solon’s ques- 
tion however 
should be 
solved first. 


Ha pag 
Ww. is 
most stable, 






52 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK L | 





7 6& exeivoy ro) on TO TéXos 0 opay dee aut TOTe pasapiter 1 
exaarov 0 ovy os ovra paxaptov GAN ore TpoTepov Hv, mas 
Ovi aromon, el 6T éoTw evdaipar, pn adn Betcera Kar. 
avTov TO Umdpyov, Sia TO py Botner Bau TOUS covras | 
evdarpovitew Sua Tas peraBonas, Kat Sua TO povipor Tl 
Thy evdatpoviay dein pevat Kal pndapeos evperaBonor, 
Tas 5é TOXAS Tohhanis avakuknreto Oat mept TOUS auTous ; 

8 o7)dov yap @sS él cuvancodovboinwer Tals TUYaLs, TOV 
auTov evdaipova Ka Tddw aOdsov cpotpev TONNAKIS, | 
NAMAINEOVTA TVA TOV evdaiwova aropaivorres Kat ca- 1 

9 Opas iSpupevor. “H TO mer Tas Tox AIS émraxonoubety 
ovdapmas opOor ; ov yap év TaUTaLS TO ED i) KAKO, anna 
mpoodetrau TOUT@Y 0 avOporrwvos Bios, xabarep elrrapen, 
Kvplat 8 eicly al Kar apeTny évepyeras THS che 


7 man happy while still living? Now surely if we can ever 
say with truth that a man has been happy, it must have been 
possible at some time or another to say that he zs happy. 

8 The supposed difficulty in doing so is that Happiness is most 

9 stable, and the chances of Fortune most variable. The solu- 
tion is obvious. These chances ought never to be made the 
test of Happiness at all. The fact is that external prosperity, 
however necessary a condition of Happiness (and this we have 
amply admitted before), cannot be its cause. We say again, 
as we said in our Definition, that Virtuous Actions are the 
true cause of Happiness, as Vicious actions are of misery. 


which question arose out of 13,14. Observe the contrast be- 
attempts to explain that dictum. tween rpoo detrar=‘ has further 

4, 5. dia three times repeated need of’ (i.¢. this is nota primary 
is somewhat awkward. It will condition of Happiness) and xv- 
be seen that the first Ova explains pra elol= =they ‘test’ or ‘deter. 


_ pay GAnOcicerar: the second and mine.’ Compare nrg 
third explain ré pr) BovrAerOa viii. 15, and mpoo8eiodat in 
evdaspovi fer, 17 and iv. 7, 


Nn RR oh 


CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 53 

oa Be éevavtiat Tod evavTiov. Maprupei 3¢ +O Aoyp «at 
TO vo Svazropn bev. Tepi oudev yap obras dmapyer Tay 
avOpamiver & epyov BeBardrys @S Tept Tas évepyetas tas 
Kat apeTny Hoviporepat yap Kat Tap emuoTn wav auras 
Soxodow elvat. Tovrwv § avrev ai | TysoTaraL povo- 5 
potatar Sua TO pddtcTa Kal cuveyéotata Katatny ev 
avtais ToUs paxaptous: TOUTO yap oLKev air ie TOU py 

UI ryeyveo Gan qmept aura b AjOny. ‘Lrapéer 8y TO Cnrovpevov 
7 evdaiporr, Kak éortat bua Biov TowovTos dei yap v 


padvora mavrov ) mpager Kal Bewpnoer Ta Kar aperiy, 10 
kal Tas TUYaS oioes KdANMLCTA Kal TavTy TavT@s €L- 





10 “ak the truth of that Definition in this respect, the very dif- whereas 
ty that has now arisen bears witness. It is the recognised the eal : 
stability of Happiness that makes us so cautious in our appli- testy, 
Sn of the term. But what is there so stable as Virtuous is in fact 
action? Not intellectual knowledge. This may be forgotten. [itt any." 
But active Virtue vi nominis must be in continual practice, thing else. 
and is thus necessarily permanent and stable, and the more so 
1 as it exists in its noblest forms and highest degree in perfect 


Happiness. How then will a man who thus lives stand in 


. T@ Ady] ‘our Definition,’ 

teh nase ae asserts Happiness to be 
kat’ dpérnv. The present diffi- 
culty (rd viv dcaropnOev) turns 
upon the cated believed 
stability of iciinces which 
makes us reluctant to apply the 
name where change may come. 
But this stability is intelligible 
if Happiness depends on Virtue, 
as our Definition asserts, be- 
cause Virtuous practice is more 
stable than an else, as the 
reasons now to be adduced suffi- 
ciently prove. Thus the difficulty 


itself is a support to the Defini- 
tion. 

4-8. This may suggest one 
reason among others why 
‘Knowledge (emiorijpa) shall 
vanish away, but charity (évép- 
yeu Kar dperiy) never faileth.’ 

5. Tovrwy de avTay] is ‘ of 
Virtues in active exercise,’ evep- 
yev@v kar’ dperi) i. 

8. rd Cnrovpevor] ‘the quality 
we are seeking for,’ viz. stability. 

10. Happiness being according 
to the Definition xar’ dperqy 


apiorny 


54 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I, 





A vd > e 2 a 2 ‘ \ 4 ¥ 
peEXOS GY wS adnOas ayalos Kal TeETpaYywVOS ave 
na ‘\ 
12 dyou. IIodrav Se yuwouevor cata toxny Kat Suade- 
povrav peyeber Kal puKPOTNTL, TA LEV KPa TOV evTU- 
\ a 
xnav, opoiws Se Kat Tov avTiKeyevov, SHov ws 
> nie ‘ A a \ ‘ /. \ ‘ 
ov Trove pony ths Cons, Ta Se pweyada Kal TONKA, 
\ / 
yuyvopeva jev ev, waKapLatepov Tov Biov momeet (Kat 
yap avTa cuverrixocpel mépuKer, Kal ] XpHols avTav 
Kady Kal orrovdala yiyvetat), avarradwv Sé cupBaivovta 
OriBer Kai AupaiveTat TO paKapvov" AUTas TE yap érri- 
/ he / i ee / / \ ‘ 
déper Kai ewrrodier TrodnNais evepyelais. ~Opwws Sé Kat 
3 4 / ‘ ‘ > \ / > 
év TouTols Suadaprrel TO KaOV, eTreOay hépyn TIS Ev- 
/. > 
KONWS TOANAS Kal meyadas atuxias, py S’ avadynotar, 


13 GANG yevvadas Ov Kal peyarorvyos. Et 8 eioiv ai 


2s / A A , ¥ IAN A 
evepyevar Kupiat THS Cans, KaOarrep evtroper, ovdels av 


How then 12 relation to the gifts of Fortune? If they be small, whether 
good or bad, they will not affect the balance of his life. If 
they be great, and also good, they will naturally add a lustre 
to his happiness; but if evil, they will mar it, inflict on him 


does the 
irtuo 


man stand 
related to 
the changes 
of fortune ? 


pain, and impede his activity in virtue. 


Still the very great- 


ness of such troubles affords scope for nobleness of character, 
when they are keenly felt and yet complacently endured. 


l. rerpdyavos avev vdyou) 


‘a cube without flaw,’—a mathe- 
matical metaphor to express per- 
fection. Squares, cubes, circles, 
spheres (i.e. ‘regular’ figures and 
solids), are familiar metaphors to 
express perfection in various 
languages. 

7. avra] ‘of themselves.’ This 
parenthesis is explained by viii. 
15. For the converse statement 
in L. 8 [avdradw S€ cvpBaivovra 


13 Hence we conclude that if (as we have said) Virtue and Vice 


‘ 


OriBer kal Avpaiverat x.7.A.] see 
viii. 16. 

9. Auras te yap xT.A.] See 
these two reasons expounded in 
viii. 15, 16 (note). 

11. edxddAws] Contrast dicxo- 
Aos in IV. vi. 9. ° 

12. dv dvadynoiay| Such was 
theview of theStoics. Aristotle on 
the contrary maintains that natu- 
ral feelings, though under control, 
are not to be crushed oreradicated. 

A 





nee SR ea ak eee 4 tte ie ee 


CHAP, X.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 55 





yevorro TOY paKxaptov aO dos" ovdérrore yap mpager 7a 
ponte Kab para. Tov ap os adn bas ayabov Kat 
evppova macas olopea Tas TOXas EVTYNLOVOS Pepewn, 
Kal &k Tov UmapyovTov ael Ta Kadota Tparreww, 
Kabarep Kat oTparnyov ayabov tT mapovre oTparorede 5 
xpno Fa TONEpLK@TATA, Kal CKUTOTOLOV éx TOV Sob evra 
oKUTOY KaAMoTOV vrroonpa Tovey" TOV aurov Se TpoTov 

14 Kal TOUS GXous Texviras dmavras. Ei é ovTws, aONu08 
poev ovderrore ryevour’ av o evdaipon, ov py paKapwos 
ye, av TT piapixais TUX aus TEpUTETD. Ovdée 8) trovKiros 10 
ye Kat evjpetaBonos: oure yap ex ™7S evdaipovias Koy 
Onoerat padios, ovd vo TOV TUXevTOV aruynparov 
GAN wo peyarov KQt TOANOD, €K TE TOV TOLOUTWY OUK 


alone determine the happiness or misery of life, external cir- 
cumstances (which in all cases the virtuous man will make the 
14 best of, like a good general) can never altogether destroy 
Happiness and change it into misery, though we do not pre- 
tend that they will not in some degree affect it. We conclude 
further (and this was another of the difficulties raised at the 
beginning of the chapter), that the happy man is not easily 


In no case 

is he easily 

9. Notice the contrast be- fectly happy even while being pret a be 
tween evdaiper and paxdpios, the broken on the wheel. Aristotle them. 


latter being the higher state ; 
though the distinction is by no 
means always maintained. The 
words ‘happiness’ and ‘felicity’ 
respectively are the best English 
equivalents, and in Latin ‘ felix’ 
and ‘beatus.’? ‘The happy man 
could never become wretched, 
though he would not be in a 
state of perfect felicity if he fell 
into troubles like those of Priam.’ 
The Stoics would say that he 
could be. They maintained that 
the virtuous man would be per- 


says that external circumstances 
however great or various can 
never constitute either happiness 
or misery, but they can make 
the difference of greater or less 
degrees of either one or the other. 
Virtue and Vice alone have 
power to constitute these states. 
To regand external goods as the 
cause of Happiness would be 
like giving the lyre the credit of 
a brilliant musical performance. 
(See Pol. IV. (VIL) xiii. 8.) 


\ 


\ 


\ 


Solon’s 
question 
may now be 
answered, 
We can call 
@ man still 


living 
‘happy.’ 


How far 
then is the 
condition of 
the dead 


56 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, 


[BOOK L — 





ay yevouro may evdaipov € év Ody xpare, arn elrep, 
év Troha TWh Kal Teele, peydhov Kal Kad@v ev avTe 


15 ryevdjuevos emnBonras. Ti ovv K@NvEL eyew evdaipova . 
TOV Kar a dperiy Tedelav evepyoovra. 3 Kab Tots exTOS wya~ 


Bois ixavas Kexopnynvevor, 7) TOV TUXvTa Xpovoy — 
ana réhevov Biov ; 4) mpoaberéov Kal Buocdpevoy oUTw 


Kai TEAEUTHTOVTG, KaTa Aoyor; errevo 70 péerXov adhaves 
mpi, TY evdarpoviay be Tes Kar Tédevop riBcpev 


16 mavey Tavs 3 ; Ei 6 ouTa, parapious Epovmev TOD 


tcbarreew ots Umapyet Kat vmaptet Ta MaNOERe panapt- | 


ous & avOparrovs. 


XI. Kai rept pev rovrwr ert tocodrov Simpicbw Tas 


_ moved; and that as it will take a great deal to mar happiness, 
* g0 it will take a great deal to restore it if once disturbed. 


15 Finally then we ask, granted the conditions of a virtue, 
a sufficient supply of external goods, and bo ese for an 


adequate duration of time, why may we not call a man happy 
while he still lives? Some may desire that in view of the 
uncertainty of the future, and the perfect finality of happiness, 
we should add, provided such a life be crowned by a fitting 
16 death. Still it must be remembered that in calling men happy, 
we of course mean only happy as mortal men can be. 

Cuap. XI.—Now we can return to the solution of the other 


3. enmnBodos] (eri, Bdadro) 
‘having hit upon.’ €v avdr@, viz. 
xpove. 

9. Thus then the question 
raised by Solon is answered. We 
can call men happy while still 
alive, but happy as men, and 
not as gods; being as men 
still liable to the dangers inci- 
dent to humanity; and this 
being understood, we need not 
explicitly add ‘kai Biwmodpevor 


ovtm «.t.A.’ (lL 6), when we 
apply the term ‘happy,’ any more 
than when we apply the terms 
‘healthy,’ ‘rich,’ ‘wise,’ ete. ; 
any of which conditions are 
similarly liable to the ‘possi- 
bility of disturbance. ra Nex- 
VN hey Po three ng 15, oe 
spec at the beginning 
viz. Virtue, External Goods in 
sufficiency, and Stability. 

Crap. XI.—In this Chapter 








CHAP. XI.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


’ : ° 


57 





Se Trav aroydvey THYas Kai TaV ditwv drravTMV TO weEV 
pndorvody oupParreo Gat Aiav Gpidov paiveras Kal Tals 
Sofas € évavtiov: moddav Se Kai mavroias exdvrov dia- 
— dopas Tay oupBaworrer, Kal TOV pev PAaNOV GUVIK- 


oped 


5 rev & % YTTOV,; Kal & E€XaO TOV jev Svaupeiv Ueulk 


pov Kai am épavrov paiverau, xa0orov Se Nex Gen Kai 
3 Tome Tax, av icavos EXO. Ei &n, xaOdrep Kat tev / Trept 


avrov aTuynuaTrov Ta pev exer TL BpiOos Kat pony 


viz. whether the happiness of the dead can be altered 
ay the yy ial of the living. To suppose the dead wholly 


etondied by these fortunes seems cold, and runs counter to 


2 received beliefs. ‘To estimate accurately the various degrees 
of influence exercised by such occurrences great and small 
would be endless. This then may serve as a general solution. 
3 —In life itself, different circumstances affect us in very different 


Aristotle returns to the question 
of the condition of the dead in 
relation to the fortunes of the 
at He applies to its solu- 
tion (as he promised in x. 6) the 
results arrived at in reference 
to Solon’s problem thus ;—if the 
fortunes of life are no obstacle 
to our calling a man happy while 
still alive and still exposed to 
their full force, a fortiori they 
cannot seriously interfere with 
the happiness of the dead who 
are removed from their immedi- 
ate influence. 

7, to L 8 next page. Ei 81 . 
Gyrikewevov] The sentence | is 
| e) complicated. Two 

conditions are stated :—(1) If 
misfortunes even in this life differ 
in degree when they concern 
ourselves, and similarly when 


they concern our friends (ei y 
. - . amavras); (2) If absence 
from the actual scene of their 
occurrence in this world, and a 
fortiori if removal to another 
world altogether, dull their effect 
upon us (diapéper . . . mparrec- 
Oa); then the result (the apodo- 
sis of the sentence) is,—These 
points, and especially the latter 
(ravrny tiv dSvahopay), must be 
taken into consideration (cvAXo- 
yioréov 57) in determining the 
question before us. Unless in- 
deed we go further still, and make 
the question not one of degree 
but of fact, te. not How far are 
the dead affected? but Are they 
affected even at all? (uaddov be 
tows 7d StaropeioOa K.r.A.). TO 
Siarropeto Oa = ‘the utter doubt 
and wacertainty.’ 


ati 


58 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 





pos Tov Biov, ra o chapporépors & €OLKEV, OUTM KaL TA 


4. TWept TOUS didous opotws aravtas, Svaéper dé ray 
Talay éxacrov rept Covras i TehevThgaVTas oupBai- 4 
vew TOAV MaAXov 7) TA Trapavopa Kat Sewa mpoimapxew : 

5 &v Tals Tparypdiaus i) mparrer Oat, oUANoyLoT ev 87 Kal 
TavTny Thy Svahopay, wadrov § tows To Siamropetobas 
rept Tous KeKpmeoTas el TuvoS ayabod Kotvovovew r) Tov § 
aT UKE pevoY couxe yap eK TOTO él Kat Svixvetras mpos | 
avrous orvoby, eT ayabloy ele Touvavrioy, adaupdv Te 


Kat puuKpov y amas 7 v7) exetvous elvat, et Se pn, Tooobray 


Ye Kal TOLOUTOY HaTE pn) ToLELy EVdaipovas TOUS MH OVTAS 
‘ \ of 5) a ‘ / /- 
6 pnde Tous ovtas adaipeioOat TO waKkapwov. ZyupPadreo- 
‘ S / a / ¢ ? / ; 
Oar ev ovv Tt paivoytat Tos KeKunKoow at evTrpakiat 
a e / \ \ ec / A \-# 
Tov dhirwv, opoiws Se Kal ai dvompakiat, TovavTa Se 
\ ‘a / / \ 2 / ee / 
Kat THAKAUTA WOTE MITE TOUS EVdAimovaAS pn EeVdAaipovas |} 


an a Me! A 7 § / 
TOLELY [LNT ANNO TMV TOLOVTM@Y MOE. 


degrees, when they concern ourselves, and naturally also when 

4 they concern our friends. After our death, such circumstances, 
being acted on another stage, must affect us infinitely less. 

5 We must then make full allowance for this difference, even 
supposing we grant the general question that they do affect us 

6 somewhat. 
by such occurrences, if at all, only slightly, and certainly not 
to such a degree as to change Happiness into Misery, or 
vice versa. 


5. The lines in Hor. A. P. to the two conditions respectively 


[BOOK I, | 


Hence we conclude that the dead are influenced - 


180-2 will occur to every one :— 


Segnius irritant animos demissa peraures 
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fideli- 
bus, et quae 
Ipse sibi tradit spectator. 
(See Supplementary Notes.) 
10. 9 dadGs 7} exeivors | ‘ Hither 
in itself, or to them.’ Referring 


in § 3 and 4. The influence of 
these occurrences, if they do 
reach the dead, must be trifling 








. ees - 
on A Ti ih a 


anyhow, either in itself (as ex- 3 


plained in § 3), or at least trifling 


in the effect produced upon the — 


dead (as explained in § 4). 


i / 
Tov SpopuKov Kab TOV Gdwv ExacToY TS Toy TWA Te- 


CHAP. XII.] 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, 


59 





XII. Avopiopever i Se TOUT@Y emioneyripeba qept THs 
evdarpovias morepa Toy ETALVETOV ETD 7) Hadov TOV 
Topiov" SnNov yap | ott Tav ye Suvdpeov ouK éoru, 
2 Paiverat 87 may TO emalveTov 7 TroLov Tb eivat Kal 
Tos Th Tas eye erauveta Bau: TOV yap Sixavov Ka tov 5 
avdpetov Ka dws TOV ayabor Kal vy dperqy erawoo- 
pev Sia Tas mpagers Kal TH Epa Kal TOV ioxupoV Kat 


CHAP. XII.—Comparison of another popular theory with 
Aristotle's Definition. 


One more popular division of Goods calls for comparison Goods are 


with our theory, before we proceed. It is commonly said that 


sometimes 
said to 


Goods are potential or actual ; the former may be good, the be bles 
latter must be. Further, ‘ actual’ Goods are said to be.either tr praise. 


objects of praise, or objects of admiration, as being beyond worthy, or 


le. 


praise. It may be asked then under which of these three 
classes does our conception of the Chief Good or Happiness 
2 fall. Obviously not under the first. Nor yet under the our con- 


second, viz. objects of praise. Praise is only applied to things ¢gb4icn of 
would bring 
it under the 


CuaAp. XII. contains the last are potentially but not neces- last of these. 


of the popular opinions and 
questions to which Aristotle ad- 
justs his theory (see note. at 
beginni of ch. viii). This 
opinion is, that Good things may 
be divided into Suvdpeis, émat- 
vera, and trivia. The question 
is, To which class does the Chief 
Good in Aristotle’s conception 
of it belong ? 

3. TYpi@v) things on which we 
bestow tip, a much higher 
tribute than ¢ emawos, a8 18 ex- 
_ plained by IV. iii. 10. 

dvvdpewy] i.e. things which 


sarily good, their character de- 
pending on the use made of 
them. Aristotle gives as in- 
stances elsewhere, power, riches, 
beauty, strength. Compare what 
was said in iii. 3. That Happi- 
ness is not of this class needs 
no proof. 

4. t@ mody Tt x.T.X.] literally 
‘from possessing a certain charac- 
ter and, bearing a certain relation 
to something else.’ In other 
words, all praise is relative (dr 
dvacbopiis) as Aristotle says in 
§ 3. 


60 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK 1. 





gunevar Kai exe mos mpos aya0dv TL Kat orovdacov. 
3 Ajdov Se rovTo Kai ex Tov Tept Tors Oeodrs erator 
yérolor yap aivovtar mpos juas avacepopmevot, TOTO 
Se cup Baiver dia To yiverOar Tous eraivous 8: dvado- 


4 pas, @omep ebrapen. 


5 > AX ec ¥ 4 
Ei & éotiv 6 errawos tev ToLtov- 


tov, Sjrov bru TaY apioTtev ove EoTw €rawwos, GANA 
acl ; ‘ / \ / / \ 
petlov rt ai Bértvov, KaOarrep Kai haiverat Tovs Te yap 
Oeovs paxapivouer nai evdarpovitouer, Kat Tdv avdpav 
parapilou fo 


Tous Oevoratous paxapitomer. 


c / \ \ a > 
Opoiws Sé Kat TOV aya- 


n In A! \ ‘ ? / > a 4 \ 
Gav ovdeis yap tHv evdatpoviay ematvet Kabatep To 
; >. , \ 

Sixavov, GAN ws Oeorepov te kai Béedrtiov paxapier 


5 Aoxet Se Kai EvSofos xadds cuvnyophnoa: mept TOY apic- 


in reference to their results, and because they are well adapted 
3 to produce these results. Hence it is applied to justice, 
courage, strength, etc. Hence also we cannot employ the 
term ‘praise,’ involving this notion of commendation, to the 
4 Gods, nor is it applicable to the highest goods, which are not 
desired for their results, but for themselves; nor consequently 
5 can it be applied to Happiness. When Eudoxus claimed that 


2. €mawos involves the idea of 
commendation. In this sense it 
is clear we cannot ‘praise’ the 
Deity. 

6. dnAov Gri x.7.r.] Té praise is 
always applied with a view to re- 
sults, and if results are necessarily 
higher than the actions or means 
which lead to them (see i. 2), 
then there must be something 
better than praise to apply to 
the results themselves. For we 
must suppose some results to 
be final (otherwise mpédevow ova 
ye els dretpoy ii. 1), and these 
at any rate cannot ex hyp. be 
subjects for praise. 


8. Observe the distinction 
between paxapia and evdaipovia, 
‘felicity’ and ‘happiness.’ See 
x. 14 (note). long to 
the Gods, the former only in rare 
instances to men. 

9. “Opoiws dé x.r.A.] The 
same remark applies to the best 
among good things. "“Ayabay is 
in the gen. after some superl. 
understood from rovs Oevordrous, 
perhaps the word Oe:drara itself, 
as it is so applied in ix. 3. 


12. xadkas ov joa] ‘to 
have put in a good claim for the 
first place.” He was right in 


supposing that the fact of praise 





10 





ee eS ee eee eee 


— 


——— 


CHAP, x1]  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 61 





telwoy TH ndovy To yap pn eratwweicOar Tov ayalev 
ovcay pnvuew eto STL KpEiTTOV éoTL TOY émraweTar, 
tovodTov & eivas Tov Oeov Kai Taryabov Tpos Tabra ‘yap 
6 Kas Tara avadéper Gat. ‘0 per yap érrawvos THs aperiis 
TpaKTuKot yap Tov KAN@V GTO TaUTyS® Ta S ¢ eyempeat TOV 
epyov opotas Kau TOD capa uedy Kab TOV puxucan. 
7 ‘Adda TavTa pe tows olxevorepov eEaxprBodv TOUS 
Tept Ta eyKopia Temovnuevors, july Se Syrov ex Tov 
eipnuevav OTL éoTiv 1) evdalpovia TOY Timiov Kal Te- 
8 retwv. “Eouce 8 ovtws eye Kat Sia To elvar apyn: 10 
TaUTNS yap “ap Ta Noa TavTa TavTEs TpaTToper, 


Pleasure was the Chief Good because though good it was not 
praised, as being above praise, the principle at least of his ar- 
6 gument was sound. ‘ Praise’ then is peculiarly appropriate to 
virtuous habits, in consideration of the results to which they 
lead, just as ‘pahegyric’ is appropriate to great deeds. But these 
7 refinements of language are carrying us too far. « We decide 
then that Happiness belongs to the third class mentioned 
8 above, viz. things admirable, and this we might have at once 


not being applied to some ac- 
knowledged good indicated a 
high degree of excellence: but 
wrong in supposing that only 
God and the Chief Good (1. 3) 
corresponded to that description. 

5. Thus eyka@ poy belongs to 
noble acts; éawos to virtuous 
habits, which result from, and 
tend to reproduce, such ‘acts ; 
pakaptopos to Happiness, which 


results again from those virtuous 


habits. 


5. mpaxtikot yap] This reason 
* oe by the first words 
5 

10. apx7] This sense of the 


word is a little unusual. It is 
here almost the same as réAos, 
just as in English we can speak 
indifferently of a primary or an 
ultimate principle in the same 
sense. The ultimate motive is 
also the primary motive of an 
action. If we desire money with 
a view to obtain a certain luxury, 
that luxury is the ultimate, and 
also the primary, motive for the 
effort to procure money, (See 
Glossary, 0. dpxn). “Apxy is 
in fact here equivaient to ‘final 
cause.’ (See Glossary, s.v. Tae 
Four Causes.) 


62 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK I. 





TH apyny Sé Kai TO altiov Tov aya0ay Timov Te Kar 
etov TiBepev. Da } 
XII. ‘Erret 32 core * eiBaryovla Yunis evépryeud THs 

kar aperny TenElay, Tept Gperiis emia KeTrTEOV" Taxa yap 
ovTws av BéeATiov Kal Trept THS evdarpovias Oewpyoatper. 5 


= 


inferred from the consideration of its being an ultimate prin- 
ciple of action, not chosen for its results, but itself the motive 
and result for which all else is chosen. 


CuaP. XIII.—Commencement of the elucidation of the several 
terms in the Definition of Happiness, and especially of the 
word Soul (vxn). 


The Defi- 1 We now proceed to a detailed analysis of our Definition of 
nition of . . ‘ . ° 

Happiness Happiness. Happiness was said to involve the highest degree 
ee ig of Virtue. We cannot therefore fully understand Happiness 
() of the without a complete investigation of Virtue. We premise one 
nature 0 ; 
Virtue, 


Cuap. XIIT.—It is worth while 
now to review the position we 
have reached. Chaps. i—iii were 
introductory ; ch. iv—vi criticised 
the principal existing theories 
about Happiness; ch. vii. con- 
structed a new Definition of Hap- 
piness, which, if accepted, would 
close the treatise at once with 
aQ.E.D. All that follows now 
is the defence of that Definition. 
Ch. viii—xii contrast it with the 
principal received opinions on 
the same subject, in order to 
claim as much accordance with 
them as possible. Ch. xiii. com- 
mences a more formal analysis 
of the Definition itself. Two 
words in that Definition require 
special elucidation, aper; and 


vouxn- vvx7 is explained, as far 
as is practically necessary, in 
this chapter. It is found to con- 
tain two parts at any rate which 
are capable of degrees of excel- 
lence (dpery), Viz. an appetitive 
and a rational part. The excel- 
lence of the former is Moral 
(nO@cxy dpern). The excellence 
of the latter is Intellectual (d:a- 
vontiki) apetn). These two kinds 
of excellence are discussed at 
length, the former in Bks. II— 
¥.; the latter i in Bk. VI. 

3. éorly i evdaipovia . . . 
redeiav] This is simply a re- 
capitulation of the Definition in 
ch. vii. omitting only ‘ev Bip 
redei@.’ 


CHAP. xu]  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 63 





a ‘\ Xo ¢ > >. £ “ \ 4 
2 Aone: Se kai 0 Kat adnOevay qodTLKOS rept TaUTHV 
/. A 4. \ \ / b 
partota terovncbat' BovreTat yap Tovs ToNtTas aya- 
\ a \ a / ¢ / / \ 
3 Oous Toeiy Kat TOY vopwv vInKoovs. TIapaderypa Se 
4 BA \ a \ / 
TouT@v éyowev Tous Kpntav cat Aaxedaipoviwy vopo- 
. / » e/ a / a Oa La 
4 Oéras, Kai et Tives ETEPOL TOLOUTOL yeyevnvTat. Eu dé ths 
7 th ee / / / / > x ¢ 
TONMTLKNS EoTL 7 oKEWIS aUTN, SHAOV OTL yEevoLT ay 7 
/ A ‘ 3 > A / \ > A 
5 Sntnow Kata THv e& apyns mpoaipecw. LIepi -aperns 
OR / > / / \ \ > \ 
de emioxerrtéov avOpwrivys Onrov 6Tu Kat yap Tayabov 
> / 3 A \ \ > / > / 
avOpamuvov eCntovpev Kai THY evdatpoviay avOpwrivny. 
> 7 ‘\ / > / > ‘\ A } 
6 Aperny Se reyouev avOpwTrivny, ov THY TOU cwpaToS 
>. .. ‘\ A A \ ‘\ > / \ A 
adha THY THS ruyns’ Kal THY evdaipoviay Se >Wuyns 
5) 4 / ] \ nA ¢ + A A 
7 evepyevay reyouev. Ei dé tavl otras eyes, Sirov Ore 
Shee x In / \ \ XN 4 N 
Set TOV TONTLKOY ELOéVaL THS Ta TrEpL YruYNY, WoTrEp KaL 


2 or two remarks. (1) As both the true theory and highest | 

3 practice of the Science of Social Life aims at the attainment 

4 of Virtue, we are strictly within the limits laid down at the 

5 outset of this inquiry (2) It is human not ideal Virtue and and conse. 
6 Happiness which we are investigating, and as these both belong {ffrroatore 


not to the Body but to the Soul, the nature of the Soul must of the Soul 
7 also be expounded. And this also comes within the scope of 





4. Kpyra@v Kal Aaxedaipovior] 
These political systems are 
selected for praise here and else- 
where, because beyond all others 
they attempted to regulate by 
legislation all the details of the 
private morality, the domestic 
life, the personal expenses, etc., 
of the citizens; regarding their 
character not only as citizens, but 
as men, see I. ix. 8, II. i. 5, etc. 
Contrast with this the tendency 
of modern legislation, which is 
_ not to interfere with private 

‘morality except so far as the 


— 


interests of society are compro- 
mised by it. eg. No modern 
state punishes drunkenness, un- 
less it be public and disorderly. 
‘Good government’ (says Buckle) 
‘is often inversely to its “ ear- 
nestness ” and the amount of its 
interference.’ 

7. kara thy é& apxijs 1 po- 
aipeow] viz. I. ii. 9, 7 peOddos 
ToovT@y ecierat modTiKn TIS 
ovga. 

9. dvOpamwoyr] 
limitation see note on ii. 1. 
also vi. 13. 


On this 
Cf. 


both how- 

ever within 
the practical wil 
limits which 


we have 


already im- 


posed on 
ourselves. 


commonly 
divided into 
a Rational 


64 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK I. — 





Tov opOarpous Oeparevoovra Kea Tay TOL, Kat paddav F 


bow Tope@répa Kai Bedriev ” TONITE UCN, OKs | 
Tey Si var piv ob Xaptevres TONNE mparywarebovra 7 Tept 


8 THY TOD coparos YVOTLW. 


Ocapyréov &n Kat TO TOM 4 


ToKRD Tept Vuxinss Oewpyréov Se TOUTOOD Xapoy, Kar ep 
Soov ikavas exel T pos Ta Enrovpevar TO yap emt m)etov 
eEaxpyBoov épywdeorepov t tows éoTl TOV T POKELpLEVODY. | 


9 Aeyeras Sé Tépi auriis Kat ev TOUS efwrepurois Aoryous 
apKovvres eve, Kat _XpnaTéop avrois. 
10 GAoyor avrns eivat, TO Se NOyoV exyov. 


Oiov to yey 
Tatra Sé wore- 


pov Subpiorae nabanrep Ta Tob ca@paros pOpla Kab Tay 
TO pEpioron, 1) 7? hoy Svo é eoriy ax@puora TrepuKora, | 

. | 
KaQamep ev TH Tepibepela TO KUPTOV Kab TO KOLAOY, 


9 light upon the subject of Virtue. 
ordinary popular treatises will suffice. 


8 the Science of Social Life, provided the inquiry be confined 
ithin the limits of what is practically necessary to throw — 


For our present object the 
We there find it stated 


that the Soul consists of two parts, a rational part and an — 
The Soul is 10 irrational part. (Whether these parts be literally separate, like — 
the limbs of the body, or separate in thought only, like the 
concave and convex sides of a curve\\is indifferent for our 


1, After way oépa under- 
stand again the words ‘ dei eidévat 
wos. As the Oculist must study 
also to some extent the condi- 
tions of health of the whole body, 
so must the social philosopher 
acquaint himself in some degree 
with the whole YX? though his 
own practice is limited to a por- 
tion of it. 

3. xaplevres] ‘accomplished.’ 
Opp. to of moAXol in iv. 2, and 
somewhat similarly in v. 4. 


8. éEwrepixds means what is — 
adapted for the world outside — 
(ea), €owrepixds what is adapted 
for the inner (€o@) circle of — 
philosophic students. Hence — 
‘exoteric’ ‘ esoteric’ 
‘popular’ and ‘scientific’ meth- — 
ods respectively. Some have © 
supposed of ef@repixol Adyor to — 
refer to a division of Aristotle’s 
own works. It is more probable, — 
however, that they denote ordi- — 
nary popular treatises, 


refer to — 





ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


CHAP, XIII. ] 65 





LI oudev Siahéper [pos TO mapov. Tov adoyou Se To pev 
core KOWw® Kab PuTiKe, Neyo be 70 aitvov TOU Tpéper- 
Gat Ka avfec bau THY ToLaurqy yap Svvapy wis 
ns ev dract TOIS _Tpedopevors Bein Tis Gv Kat &v 
TOUS eu Bpvors, 7 auray 8é TavTqy Kau év Tois Tehelows" 5 
12 evdoywrTepov yap i adAnv twa. Tavrns pev ovv Kou 
TUS apery Kai ouK avOparivn paiverar Soxet yap ev 
Tos Urvows evepyeivy adioTa TO popLoy TOUTO Kai 7 
Sivapis atrn, 6 8 ayabos Kai Kaos Hxvota Siddnror 
wal trvov, Bev haciv ovdev Svadepev To Hutov Tov 
13 Biov TOUS evdaipovas TOV aO rico. ZrvpBaiver S€ TovTo 
eiKoTws" apyia yap éoTw 6 imvos THS vuxns 7 Neyeras 
orovdaia Kat pavhn, aD | et pr Kara, pour pov Stixvodv- 
Tat Ties TOV Kujoeoy, Kab TavTy Berio yiveras Ta 
14 pavrdcpara TOV ervey A TOV TUXOVTOD. "Ara 15 
Tept pev TOUT@Y Ads, Kal TO OpeTiKoY éaréov, éerrevd) 


f 


tI nt purpose. 1. Let us first consider the ¢rrational part.— () The 
(a) One portion of this is the source of nutriment and growth tian , 
which is found wherever there is life, in all creatures, and twofold, 

__ even in plants, in the foetus as well as in the full-grown animal. (oy luding— 

[2 There can be no specially human Virtue in this part. In fact source o 

3 it acts with most vigour in sleep, when good and bad men ond griwiale 


4 differ not at all, or else in a manner which is of no conse- 


4. wuxi7js] Observe the wide 
use of Wvy7, which makes it so 
difficult a word to translate. 
We should scarcely regard the 
‘soul’ as the seat of physical 
life, dsrwth, and nutriment. 
(See Glossary on yvy7.) 

5. There is no difference in 
that which is the source of growth 
and nutrition in the embryo and 
in the full-grown animal. Tf there 


were, when did the change occur ? 
Aristotle insists upon this iden- 
tity in order to show that this part 
of our nature is out of all relation 
to Virtue, Moral or Intellectual 
(see § 14), as there can of course 
be nothing of the kind in the em- 
bryo. This absence of change or 


‘progress cannot be asserted of 


the other two parts of the yvxn, 
the Appetitive and the Rational. 


66 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK Ll, - 





A 9 a 9 a 4 4 4 at 
15 THs avOpamuens aperis apotpov mepucev, “Eovwe Se — 
Kai arn Tis hues THs vox Goryos elvat, perexoura ; 


pevron 7) Aoyou. Tov yap eyeparois Kab axparous TOV 


Aoyov ea THs puxns TO Aayov yor erawodper" opbds | 
yap Kab emi To Beknora Taparanet: paiverar S & q 


avrois Kal aXXo TL mapa Tov Noryov TrepVrcos, o poageraut 


16 Te Kal ayTureiver TO oye. “Arexvas yap Kadamep Ta 
maparehupeva TOU oaparos opie eis Ta Sefea T pod : 
poupeveoy Kovijras Touvavrioy els 7a apuorepa Tapacpépe- ] 
Tat, wat emt THS Wuxis obras" emt Tavavria yap aw 1 
Oppal TOV axparév. “AN ev TOS TOMATL pev opapev 4 
TO Trapapepopwevor, emt be THs yuxis ouy op@pev, 
"Iows o ovder HTTOV Kat ev ™ vox vopLoreo elvat Tt 
Tapa Tov Noryor, eVaVTLOULEVOY TOUT Kab avriBaivor. — q 

17 [Ids & & ETEPOV, ‘ovdev Svaéper. Adyou Sé Kat TovTo 1 


(8) the 5 quence to our present inquiry. .(8) There is however another _ 


appetites 

and desires, division of the irrational part, which seems to partake of reason — 
vitiyand 2 some degree. ‘This is evidenced by the phenomena of — 
in some Continence and Incontinence, terms which we technically — 


sense 


itoual. apply to cases where either right or wrong is done after a — 
conscious inward struggle. This struggle occurs between 
Reason and something opposed to Reason. In the continent — 
man we applaud the triumph of Reason. In the incontinent — 
man, though Reason directs one course, there is something in © 


16 him which causes him to do the reverse, just as a paralysed — 


limb refuses to obey the control of the Will. We conclude — 
therefore from this that there is something in the Soul distinct — 
17 from Reason (though in what precise way distinct we need — 


1. dvOpamuns dperns] to 6. GAo te K.T.A.] ‘We find — 


throw light upon that being the another law in our members, ~ 


sole object of this inquiry warring against the law of our q 


about uxt. See § 8. mind’ (Rom. vii. 23). 

3. eykpatovs Kal adkparous] 15. Adyou 8€\Kai rovro cM) 
See the precise meaning of these Otherwise it could not even o 
terms explained in note on iii. 7. pose Reason, as it does in the ¢ 


4 





ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 67 


_ CHAP. XIII.] 





paiveras HETEXELY, domep elmopey mewlapyet your, T® 
oyp TO TOU éyxparots. "Ere 8 it bows evnowmrepav éort 


To Tod cwdpovos Kat av®peiov TavTa yap opopeovel T® 
8 hoyp. veTat 1 Kal TO Goyov Surrov. To pev yap | 
puTiKoy ovdapds Kotvover Adyou, 70 ny emBupnTeKov 5 
wat dhews OpexTuKov perexer TOS, D KaThKooY or 
avTov Kat meibapyucdy. Obit 8 Kat Tov Tatpos Kat 


not determine) which i is thus able to oppose Reason. Yet since 
in the case of Continence, and still more in that of perfect 
Self-control, it harmonizes with Reason, it might be thought 
itself to share in Reason and so to belong to the Rational part 
of the Soul. However the irrational part (which we are still 
considering) is at any rate twofold, viz.—(1) The source of, 


oo 


physical life, nutriment, and growth. 
part, the passions and the desires. 


of the dxparis, much less could 
it side with Reason as it does in 
the éykparijs (1. 2), or become as 
it iar merged in Reason, as it 
is in the capo» (1. 3). If then 
the Appetitive part were purely 
Irrational it could not oppose 
Reason; if it were purely 
Rational it would not do so. 

5. ovdayas xoworei] The 
nutritive portion has no relation 
whatever to Reason. It can 
neither oppose it, nor obey it. 
*No man by taking thought can 
add a cubit to his stature.’ The 
appetitive part, however, has 
some relation to Reason, because 
it can ‘by taking thought’ be 
checked and regulated. 

7. ovrw 8) «7.A.] The ex- 
planation seems to be this: The 
words Adyov éxew have two dif- 
ferent senses in Greek : — 


(2) The appetitive 
The former division is 


(1) To possess reason ; or, to 
have understanding of (as, e.g. of 
Mathematics) ; 

(2) To pay regard to (as we 
do to admonitions of parents or 
friends). 

If we confine ourselves to the 
strict sense of (1), then the Appe- 
titive part belongs clearly to the 
irrational division (G\oyov pépos) 
of the Soul. 

If we use the term loosely so 
as to include (2), then we may 
regard the Appetitive part as 
Adyov € €XoV, because it can ‘ pay 
regard to’ Reason, and so in 
some sense shares in it. But the 
expression Adyoy €xew must be 
employed in a different sense in 
the case of the Appetites, and in 
that of the Reason. Compare 
what Aristotle says of a Slave 
(Pol. I. v. 9) xowwvet Adyou Ta 


58 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK I. 





tov pidov paper exe Aoyov, Kat oux Gomep TOY 
pabnparinen, "Ore Sé meiOerat TOS vo Deoryou 70 : 
adoyov, pnvuer Kat % voubernots al TATG emeripnats. 
19 Te Kat mapacdnors. Ei 8e xpn Ka ToUTo pavas doyou 
EXEL”, Surrov & coral at TO hoyov Eyov, TO pev Kuptos 5 
Kai ev avT@, TO 8 @ @omep ToD TaTpos aKOvoTUKOY Th. 
20 Avopigeras Sé Kat yy apern KaTa THY Siapopay ' TavTny 
eyouen yap aura Tas pev SuavonTucas, Tas 6e noua, F 


wholly irrational, the latter only partially so, bédatise it ‘is at 
any rate amenable to Reason. 


Hence (2) 19 2. Let us now consider the rational part.—Here we have 

part also § simply to determine the degree of strictness with which we — 
waxed ss =~ -~«sWill use the word ‘rational.’ If we use it so as to include 
stage vo the partially-rational appetttes, then this part of the Soul 
tites should © may be considered as twofold, viz—(a) The Reason itself; — 
ferred toi, (8) The appetitive part. Thus the assignment of the appeti- | 


tive part to the Rational or to the Irrational division of the — 
Soul is a question of words, or of arrangement merely. . 
coke 20. Now to apply this to the question it was intended to elucidate, 


division ee wovrov ore aicOdverOa adda we assign the Appetites. The 
Rationaland 7 éyew. He addsthat the lower main point is that, in either case, 
ye th animals (like rd durixdy in the we recognise the three distinct 
fold division text here) ovd€ Adyou aigOdvera. parts urixdy, émtOvpntiKoy, o- 
i ale: The result is, that it becomes to yuorixdv. The following scheme — 
leetual and some extent a question of words will exhibit the two methods of — 
Moral. to which of the two divisions of arrangement by which this result 
the Soul, Rational or Irrational, ne be reached :— 
L ! (i) wholly adoy . 7d pas a 
sry? ju, peri: {G2 recaths nat ae - To emdupyTiKey, — 
Aéyor Exov pépos . To AoporiKéy, 
a. GAoyov sépos . Td purixdy. 
s 2 q 
WY 5 fr son eirteahi) | 98 elo, 
ree tos ea bo per 
8 We speak of Intellectual equally for both. (See Glossary, 


Excellences and Moral Virtues. 


8.v. apeTn.) 
In Greek dpery could be used 





CHAP, XIII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


69 





/ \ ‘ 7 conga ay ay ‘ 
codiav pev Kat ovvecw Kat dpovnow. Svavontixas, 
/ ‘ ‘ 4 5) , a: 
erevOepioTnta Sé Kal cwppocuvnv, AOikas. Aéyovres 
a »¥ > / “ & 
yap Tept Tov nous ov rEyouev OTL coos 7 ouvETOS 
A , > A ‘\ X “ “ 
GAN St Tpaos ) cwodppwr, evraiwovpev Se Kat Tov codov 
‘ A ed. ‘\ \ > > 
Kata thy ew tov éEewv Se tas eT aveTas,, aperas 
Nevyopev. 


viz. the nature of Virtue. ' The part of the Soul relating to 
nutriment, etc., has nothing to do with Virtue, as we have 
already seen. The perfection of the purely Rational part 
gives rise to Intellectual Virtues or Excellences, e.g. Wisdom, 
Prudence, Intelligence. The perfection of the Appetitive part 
gives rise to Moral Virtues, such as Gentleness, Liberality; 


Self-restraint. 


The term ‘ Virtue’ we apply to any perma- 


rent state or habit which is praiseworthy. 


1. dpdyvnois is inadequately 
_ translated by ‘Prudence,’ which 
indicates more or less a Moral 
Virtue. Itis explained in B. VL. 
to be the intellectual element 
of right judgment which is es- 
sential to all moral virtue: ‘es- 
sential,’ because mere blind 
‘earnestness’ without a reason- 
able exercise of judgment is not 
Virtue: or (as Dr. Johnson 
phrased it) ‘intellectual imbe- 
cility is no excuse for moral per- 
versity.’ Aristotle thinks that 
we are bound to have ‘a right 
judgment in all things,’ and 
would have no sympathy with 
‘imbevile virtue.’ In B. IV. he 
frequently insists on the necessity 
of applying intellectual judgment 
to the details of moral action (e.g. 


esp. in weyadompereta, evrpareXia, 
etc.). For proof that dpdryyats 
itself is an Intellectual and not 
a Moral quality, see Supplemen- 
tary Notes, h.l. 

5. xara tiv e&wv] ‘in reference 
to his state,’ i.e, if his wisdom is 
a settled state or habit. 

Thus the essential or funda- 
mental difference between In- 
tellectual and Moral excellence 
is, that they belong to different 
parts of the Soul; the former 
being the perfection of the 
Rational, and the latter of the 
Appetitive, part. Upon this 
follows a practical difference in 
the manner of their acquisition 
or cultivation, which is pointed 
out in the beginning of the next 
Book. 


Excellence, 
in that it is 
not innate : 
because— 


IL 


A % e 9 A & a 
l. Aurris 8€ THs aperns ovens, THS pev SvavoyTiKHs 
o ‘\ > A ¢ ‘ ‘\ 4 a > / 
THs Se HOES, n mev StavonTiKH TO TELOV Ex OLaTKAaAIAS 
‘ 
eyes Kal THY yeverw Kat THY avénow, SioTEp ewmetpias 
a : “ 
SeitaL Kal ‘“povou; » © 7OvKn €& eOous TépuyiveTat, oOev 
‘ A A 
Kal ToUVOMA eoynKE MIKPOV TrapeKKAivoy amo Tod eOous. 


CHAP. 1.—Moral Virtue ts not implanted tn us by Nature. 


Ir is an essential difference between Intellectual Excellence 
and Moral Virtue, that the former is acquired and developed 
mainly by instruction, and the latter (as its name in Greek 


indicates) by practice. 


1. See note at the beginning 
of I. xiii. for the connexion of 
the argument. The divisions of 
Wvx7 led us to a corresponding 
division of dpery into Moral and 
Intellectual (I. xiii. 20). These 
further exhibit an essential dif- 
ference in the mode of their 
acquisition, which is first posi- 
tively stated, and after this 
statement, the subject of Intel- 
lectual Excellence is tacitly 
dropped (to be resumed in B. VL.), 
and the discussion proceeds to 
establish the assertion just made 
so far as it relates to Moral 
Virtue, viz. that it is not im- 
planted in us by nature. 


Dismissing the former, we. proceed 


2. r6 wieiov] ‘for the most 
part.’ This qualification is 
meant to allow for the excep- 
tional case of great natural 
genius. 

5. This etymological argument 
is of course untranslatable. 
€Oos (Lat. mos) is a habit or cus- 
tom. 700s (Lat. mores) is 
character which is the result of 
habits. The value of this and 
similar arguments, such as that 


derived from the practice of men . 
in legislation in § 5 and IIL v. 


7, is simply this:—They show 


‘the general belief of mankind as 


reflected in language, but they 
do not prove that the belief in 


a _ i 


— as a 





eo eee 
my 


CHAP. L] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 71 





2 "BE ou a SHrov Gre ovdepia TOV nO wey aperay gue 
mpi eyyiveras oubev yap Tap duce ovTwv Gdos 
eOiterat, otov 6 os dice Kato Pepopevos ove ay 
Ova Bein civen pepeo Gar, ovd a ay pupedsers auTov bik 
Tis ave pimray, ovdé TO Tip KaTw, OVS GAXo ovdey Tov 5 

3 ads mepuKareov aus ay er Bein. Our apa pices 
oure mapa iow éyyivovras at dperal, GAG mepuKoct 
pev npiv Séfacbar avras, réederovpevors Se Sia Tov 


2 to prove the important point involved in the latter, that 

no Moral Virtue is implanied by Nature. (1 Nothing (1) It can 
fixed by Nature can be altered by practice. No amount }° His 
of practice will make a stone rise, or fire burn downwards. 
But our moral habits can be so altered, and therefore 

3 they are not implanted by Nature. The same argument 
proves that as they are not formed dy Nature, so they 
are not formed against Nature. Nature gives us moral 
capacities ; we ourselves by practice develope moral habits. 


question is necessarily true ; 
though, as we read in L[. viii. 7, 
such consensus is not likely to 
be altogether at fault. Other 
instances will be found in v. 4 
(the distinction between xuveio Gar 
and Staxcio Oar), III. ii. 17 (mpoai- 
it ITL. xii. 5 and 6 (axodavia), 
ii. 1 (ueyadompéresa). 
t is essential, 


a if Moral Virtue be im- 


planted by nature, and not 
acquired by practice, the Science 
. Ethics has no raison d’étre as 


ical Science. See § 7, 


a practi 
: ovdey ay ee Tod bdafovros, ahha 


mavres Gy eyiyvovro dyabot #j 
kakol, and the pov 

of the yu} (émOupnrixdy pépos) 
would be as much out of our 
control as the Nutritive and 


vital functions (Opemtixdy kat ai- 
Enrixov), see L, xiii. 

6. implies an inference 
from the preceding. It is clear 
that this same argument proves 
Virtue not to be contrary to 
nature; because if nature had 
decided the question positively 
or negatively, it would be 
equally out of our power to alter 
her decision. Thus we are 
neither ‘ predestined’ to Virtue, 
nor ‘reprobated’ to vice, accor- 
ding to Aristotle. At the same 
time he would not of course deny 
that some have more tendency 
to virtue or to vice than others. 

7. mepuxdot and reAcrouper- 
os both agree with piv, which 
is dat. after éyyivovra. Cf. Pope, 
‘ Nature its mother, habit is its nurse.’ 


(2) Its ex- 

istence does 
not precede 
its exercise 
in practice. 


(3) Practical 
legislation 

proceeds on 
the assump- 
tion that 

Moral Virtue 
is not innate. 


4 €Oovs. 


wr 


6 aya0n havrns. 





72 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK II. 





"Ett doa pev dioes juiv mapayiverat, tas Sv- 
vapers ToUTwY mpoTepov KopitoueOa, Yotepov Se Tas 
evepryetas arrodisoper. “Orrep ent TOV aicOncewy ofhov 
ov yap ék TOU moNAdKIs Loelv 4} y TONMGICOS axodoat Tas 
ai Ojoes eraBopev, aXN avaTranu - EXOUTES expo 5B 
peda, ov XPNTapevor EoXoper. Tas oa apetas dap Ba- 
vOHEY evepynoavres TpoTEpoy, aorep Kat ert Tov Gov 
TeXvev" a yap Sei palovras roveiv, Tara, Trovoupres 
pavOavopev, otov oixodopobvres oixoSepor ‘yivovrat Kal 
xibapiforres «Bapirrai. Otre de Kab Ta pev Sixava 10 
TpaTTovTEs Sixavoe ywvopweba, Ta Se cadpova cappoves, 
7a © avopeia avopetor. Maprupet dé Kal TO ryevopevor 

ev Tals TOAECLW" Ob yap vowoberas Tous ToATas e6¢- 
Covtes TroLovow ayabous, Kal TO per Bovhnua TavTOos 
vopobérou TOUT éotiv, boot 8e BN €0 avTo Tovovow 15 
dpaptavovory, Kal Suaxpéper TOUT Trohereta, mohurelas 
"Ett ék Tov avtov Kat Sia Tov avTo@V 


4 (2) In the case of natural faculties (e.g. the senses), we have 


5 rately, Courage by acting bravely and so on. 


6 that Moral Virtue is to be acquired by practice. 


them before we use them. In the case of Moral Virtues (as 
in artistic skill), we develope them by use, i.e. by trying to 
practise them: e.g. Temperance is acquired by acting tempe- 
(3) The action 
of legislators bears witness to the general belief of mankind 
(4) While 


7. tav ad\Xov texvor] Virtue 


_is often regarded by Plato and 


Aristotle as a kind of Art (e.g. 
iii. 10, iv. 3, vi. 9). 

14. rd BovAnpa «.T.A.] 
note on I. xiii. 3. 

17. ék trav avToy kat dia rar 
avrav] ‘from the same causes 
and by the same means.’ The 
argument is, that Natural phe- 
nomena differ from Moral phe- 


See 


nomena in that, in the former 
case, the antecedents being the 
same, the consequents are always 


_the same, whereas in Moral phe- 


nomena, from the same antece- 
dents, so far as outward cir- 
cumstances go, opposite results 
follow. This difference then 
must arise from something con- 
tributed by the moral agent 
himself. 


CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


73 





Ka yiveras Taca ape Kat pOeiperas, Opotes be Kat 
TEXYN EK yap TOU xubapiter Kal ob ayabot Kat ob Kaxor 
yivovtat KiOapiatai. “Avddoyov Se Kaus ot olxoSoqoL Kal 
ol Nowtrot mares: ex ev yap Tov ev oixodopeiy arya0ot 

. otxoddpor & écovtat, ex Se TOU KaKas Kaxol. Ei yap uy 5 
obras cixey, ovdev ay edu TOU didafovros, adda, mavres 
ay éyivovro aryaboi H) KaKol. Otro oy Kat emt TOV 
dperéy exer mparrovres yap Ta ev Tous ouvaddarypact 
TOIS Tpos Tous avOparrous yropeBa ob pev Sixavou ot Se 
aStKol, mparrovres Sé Ta ev Tois SELvols kat eOuLouevot 
doBeicbar 7 Oappeiv ot pev avdpeior ot Se Secdou. 
‘Opoios Se Ka Ta Tept Tas emvOupias exet Kai Ta Tept 
Tas opyas ot pev yap cadpoves Kal maou ryivovTat, ot 
& aKkoracto Kat opyidot, ot pev €x TOD ovTact ev a 
TOUS avaotpéper Bas, ot Sé €x TOU ovT@oL. Kai évi 8 

8 Ady@ €x TOY Ouoiwy evepyeav ai EFes yivovtat. Av 


in nature the same causes invariably produce the same results, (4) Out of 


in the case of Moral Habits, as in the Arts, the same circum- ‘¢sameci» 
stances and courses of action produce opposite results; t.¢, are, devel- 
they produce both good artists and bad, just men and unjust, site results 
7 brave men and cowards. This difference of results then must ® ,fespert 
be due to a difference zm ourselves, in fact to the different Virtue and 
ways in which different people act under the same circum- 
stances. In short, as are our acis, so are the habits which 


8 spring from them. Hence it is “important what sort of acts 


10 


15 





7. éyivovro is emphatic:— should become easier we cannot 


‘every one would have been born 
@ good or bad craftsman,’ and so 
all apprenticeship and practice 
would have been useless. 

16. ‘All habits have their 
origin in courses of action similar 
to themselves.’ Habits are 
simply the result of repeated 
acts. Why acts from repetition 


say. What is the precise change 
that has taken place in us when 
(¢.g.) the laborious acts of spell- 
ing out each word have grown 
into the easy habit of reading 
we cannot explain. We really 
know little more of the pheno- 
mena of the formation of habits 
than Aristotle here states; as 2 


a4 ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. [Book it 





Set Tas évepyeias Trosas amodidovar' KaTa yap Tas TOU 
tov Svapopas axorovOodcw ai es. Ov pixpov ovv 
Svadépes TO oTws 4 odTwS evOUs ex vewv ebiterOat, 
GNG Tapmorv, parrov Se To Trav. 

a / 

1 IL ’Evei ovv 4 rapotdca mpaypateia ov Oewpias evena & 

? v4 e mw > \ 7a? I%AHRA #3 e 
eoTW WoTrEep at adrat (ov yap W cldapey Ti ETT N 
we become familiar with from earliest youth; for to the 


character of the resulting habits it makes simnlv all the dif- 
ference in the world. 


CuaP. I].—Some general characteristics of such Habits as 
are Virtuous. 


_ Virtuous 


Virtuous 1 In a practical treatise like ours we at once follow up what 
freon othe, has now been proved by asking, What is the definite character 
in being in 

with ‘Hickt ‘fact, all habits grow from the of Virtue to that of L. vii. 1-8, in 
Reason : repetition of acts similar to the investigation of the Defini- 


themselves. 

époiwy] There is no contradic- 
tion between this and the state- 
ment in § 6 init., viz. That simi- 
lar acts produce opposite results. 
Acts and circumstances may be 
externally the same and yet very 


' different to different people. And 


it is on the latter consideration, 
viz. their relation to the indi- 
vidual doing them, that their 
influence on resulting habits 
depends. eg. A subscription of 
precisely the same amount would 


_be liberal in one man and mean 


’ in another. Thus the same act 


has a tendency to form a habit of 
liberality in the one case, and of 
stinginess in the other. 

Cap. IL—This Chapter holds 
a somewhat similar position in 
the investigation of a Definition 


tion of Happiness. Aristotle 
feels his way towards a Defini- 
tion in each case by first laying © 
down certain broad and general 
characteristics of the thing to be 
defined. Two such are arrived at 
in this Chapter. Next, Chapters 
iii, and iv. consider questions 
arising out of the statements here 
made. Then Chapters v. and vi. 
contain the systematic construc- 
tion of the Definition of dpern, 
and. so far may be compared with 
the formal construction of the 
Definition of Happiness in I. vii. 
9-16. 

6. ai a@AAa]} Either ‘the rest 
of treatises on this subject,’—it 
being a complaint of Aristotle’s 
elsewhere that this is a general 
fault of the systems of his time 


(rav xpnowev Stapaptravove. 


CHAP. a 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


75 





apern oxerropeba, adn’ iv ayabot yevapmeba, & ere oudey 


av qv Opedos avris); avaryeaiov éort onerpac bau Ta mept 
Tas mpaters, TOS mpaxréoy auTas’ avras yap elo ebpua 
Kab Tov movas yeveabas Tas eFeus, rabarrep eipyiaper. 
2To wey ody kata Tov opOov doryor mparrewy Kowvov kat 
jroKeicOw, pnOncerar 8 Borepov mepi avtod, Kat Ti 
éorw 6 opbos Aoyos, Kat més exet ™pos Tas adas 


3 aperas. 


’Exeivo Se mpodioponroryetc Ben, & Ott Was O Tepl 


TOV parton doyos Tome Kat ouK axpiBas opether re- 
ryeaOau, aomep Kal Kar apyas ebrropev Ste Kata Thy 10 
DAnv ot Adyou arrauTnTéor Ta S ev Tals Tpakeat Kal Ta 
4 Ia € ‘ 4 oA Jar x We , 
TULPEPOVTA OVOEV ETTNKOS EYEL, WaTTEP OVOE TA VYLELVA. 
4 + a / 4 Tay e ‘ 

4 Tovovtov § dvros Tod xaborov ROyou, ETL LAAAOV O TrEpt 


of actions, and, by consequence, of habits, which determine 
a them as Virtuous? We can at once say that they must be in 
accordance with right reason, but that is vague, and we must 
hereafter explain what right reason is, and what is its relation to 
3 the Moral Virtues. But though we admit this to be too vague we 
must at the same time renew our protest against demanding any 

4 thing like mathematical precision in such a subject as this, espe- 


‘ they fail of being practical’)— or 
else, ‘ treatises on other subjects’ 
than morals, which may perhaps 
have a right to be theoretical and 
independent of practice. 

2. avris prob. oxéwews under- 

from oxertduela, or mpay- 

parelas, or possibly aperis in 
the sense of Virtue in theory, 
pogo from practice. 

4. xa@azep cipjxaper] see esp 
§ 7 (fn.) of fo Eiaplor (evi 8h 
Ady@ k.7.A.), mpagers here being 

equivalent to évepyeiac in the 
passage quoted. Thus més in 
L 3 is uke emai are to 


f 


do the acts, so that the habits 
desired may follow. 

6. tmoxeicOw] ‘ Let it be taken 
for granted.” Compare the 
somewhat similar way in which 
reXetdrns and avrdpxeia are put 
aside in I, vii. as vague, though 
real, characteristics of Happiness. 

vorepov «.T.r.] This will be 
found in B. VL., but the subject is 
touched upon in ch. vi. of this 
Book, where see the Definition 
of Virtue, and see also note on L 
xii. 20. 

10. kar’ dpyds eiroper x.r.A.] 
For explanations of this see L 


Sooner noe 
A ‘on 


ey 

Pv a 
St ’ 
ae 
, 


a 


>” 


4) oe ~ 
hr we Beet, iio D . 
Ce Es. ae 
w@ 
-“ esr icy ut 
eh Wa 
wT V2 


ost, 
“= 


“a 
% 


‘ 


moderation : 


76 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK II. 





a G vA f > oS 2 / DA X e-u% 
Tov Kal Exacta Noyos ovK exer TaKpLBEs* OUTE yap VTrO 

/ A @ iim / 2 5 / / § a 4 
Teyynv ov vio Tapayyediav ovdeuiay Timtel, Set 

by \ Abe \ , ‘\ ‘ ‘ ‘ 
AUTOUS GEL TOUS TPATTOVTAS TA TPOS TOV KALPOV TKOTFELD, 
f yee Ge. S b ] a 4 \ A ra) 
WOTTEP KAL ETL THS LATPLENS EXEL KaL THS KUBEpYHTLKHS. 


> \ / ¥ A / / 
5 AdAa Kaitep OvTOS ToLoOVTOUV TOU TapovTOS Noyou Tret- 5 


/ 9 a / 
6 paréov BonOetv. IIparov ovv rovto Oewpntéov, Ott Ta 
A / ah / ue a / 
TolavTa TréepuKEV VTFO Evdelas Kal UTEepBorrs POeiper Ban, 
‘\ 5 nr a a / 
(Seo yap virep tav adavav Tois pavepois papTupiols 
3 a 3 4 
ypnolat) woTeEp emt THS LoxUOS Kal THS UyLelas Opapev" 


/ \ /. / 2. 
Ta Te yap vTepBaddovTa yupvacia Kai Ta EddEiTrOVTA 10 


5 cially in matters of detail. With this proviso we may now make 
two general statements which hold good of Virtuous Habits. 


6 Both are suggested by the analogy of bodily habits, such as ~ 


re, 
bo 
as 
4h 
‘<= 


health and strength. (i) The first is:—Eacess and defect are. — 


ere ae 


injurious, moderation is beneficial, to the formation of such habits. 
This is true of bodily health in reference to the amount of 


vii. 17, etc, also (and esp. in 
reference to the words of L 10, 
p. 75) see I. iii, 2-4, 

2. mapayyedia] ‘ body of 
rules.’ avrovs in the next line 
is of course emphatic. 

8. det yap «.t.A.] This is the 
clue to the line of thought pur- 
sued in this Chapter. It is the 
analogy existing between the Body 
and Soul in respect of their habits 
or acquired capacities, In ch. vi., 
where the formal Definition of 
Virtue is investigated, the argu- 
ment proceeds from another 


analogy, viz. that existing be- 


tween Virtue and Art. The 
words in the parenthesis express 
very well the principle of what 
is generally called ‘the Argu- 
ment from Analogy.’ eg. In 


Butler’s ‘ Analogy’ the ‘@avepa’ 
are the obvious arrangements of 
the Natural world, the ‘ddavn’ 
the arrangements of the Moral 
world, as indicated to us by 
Religion, Natural or Revealed. 
The point of similarity is that 
the arrangements in both cases 
proceed from the same Author, 
and the ‘Argument from Ana- 
logy’ is, that they are therefore 
likely to resemble one another. 
So in the present passage the 

avepa are bodily habits, the 
apavn habits of the Soul: the 
point of similarity that they are 
parts of the same complex Being: 
and the ‘Argument from Ana- 
logy’ is that they are likely to 
resemble one another in their 
nature and growth. 


CHAP, IL] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


77 





/ ‘ P) ‘ e / \ A a ‘ \ We / 
POeiper THY toxyuv, Omolws S€ KaL TA TOTA Kal Ta oLTia 
‘ 
Thelw Kal ehaTTo ywopeva POciper THY UyleLav, Ta Se 
a / 
7 ovppetpa Kal Toes Kat avéer Kai cwter. Ovtas ovv 
A r oe * 4 \ > / 4 \ as +. 
Kab emt swppoourys Kat avdpeias exes Kab TOY addov 
dperav- rf Te yap mavra pevryov Kab poBovpevos Kab 
pndev & DIropeveoy Sevhos ylverat, & Te pndev OWS poBov- 
pevos GANG Tpos Tavta Badifwv Opacis. “Opoiws Sé 
kal 6 pev Taons ndoviis arrodavov Kab pndepias amrexo- 
pevos akddacTos, 6 Se Tacas pedyor, @oTEp ob arypoi- 
Kol, avai Ontos tis hOciperat yap ” coppootyy Kal Dy 
avipeia wre Tis UTepBorHs Kal THS edreirrews, Uo Sé 
= / / > > > tA ¢ / 
8rns pecotntos owlerar. AAA ov povoy at yeveoels 
‘ € Ig / ‘ e \ > rn + a! ». rel Wok,” 
Kat at avénoes Kat at POopar ex TOV avT@Y Kal UTFO 
Ta auTov yivovras, ana Kal at evépryerat €v TOS avToIs 
évovras’ Kal 14P, ert TOV addoov TOV pavepwrépeor 
ovT@s Exel, olov emi THs ioxvos" ryiverat yp éx Tov 15 
TOAAHY Tpogny AapBavew Kai ToAdovs Tdvous UTopE- 


7 food, drink, and exercise; and so it is of Temperance in 
respect of pleasure, and of Courage in respect of fear, and 
similarly of other Virtues, in respect of the subject-matter 

8 with which each is concerned. (ii) Our second point is :— (2) when 
Virtuous habits when formed reproduce the acts by which formed, they 


aay were formed ormed. Bodily habits suggest this law also: e.g. Bape 
ength is gained by taking food and exercise, and when 


which form 
them, 


9. dypoixor] perhaps ‘ascetics,’ 
or ‘* boors,’ with probable ref. to 
the Cynics. dyvaiaOnrdés tis, ‘A 
sort of insensible man.’ Tis is a 
kind of apology for the term ‘in- 
sensible,’ because, as stated else- 
where, such phenomenon scarcely 
exists. See vii. 3 and ITT. xi, 7. 

12. ov pévov al yevécets x.7.d.] 


Observe that the former charac- 
teristic of Virtuous Habits had 
reference to their formation and 
growth (yevéoets kal avéqoecs), 
the present characteristic has 
reference to their operation 
(evépyecat) when formed. 

14. davepwr épwr] is explained 
‘by the parenthesis in § 6 above. 


78 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK II. 





9 vew, Kat pduora Swvarau TavTa Tovely 0 b boxupds. Oita 
8 é exe Kat emt TOV dperwv" eK Te yap TOU améexer Bat 
TaV ndovaV yvdpeba oodpoves, Kat ryevomevor padvora 


I 


9 gained enables us to take more food and exercise. 


A habditis I 
formed 
whenever 
we do the 
acts related 
to it with 
pleasure. 


Suvaweba améxea Ba aurav. 


“Omotws Se wat emi Tis 


avdpeias" eOZopevor yap kar adpovetv Tav poBepav Kat 
UTOmEevely aVTa yovdueba avdpeior Kat yevouevor paduora 
Surncopueda v Drropevelw ta poPepa. 

IIL. Snpeiov Se Set roreicbas tov Sewv thy emt- 


So Tem- 


perance is acquired by resisting pleasure, and when acquired 


exhibits itself in the resistance of pleasure. 


Courage and other Virtues. 


Similarly of 


CHAP. II].—TZhe test of the formation of Habits ts the pleasure 
or pain by which acts are accompanied. 


We can judge at once whether a habit is already formed 
or is only in process of formation, by the pleasure or pain 


Cuap. IIl.—If the statement 
at the end of the last Chapter be 
true, how can we tell when a 
habit is formed? If we become 
brave by doing brave acts, and 
when we have become brave we 
still do brave acts, how are we 
to know whether our brave acts 
are tending to form the habit, or 
are results of the formed habit? 
Are they in the relation of cause 
or effect to the habit of bravery, 
and when do they pass the’ line 
from cause to effect? The 
answer is simple. If the acts 
are done with pain and difficulty 
the habit is not yet formed, If 
they are done with pleasure and 
ease they are the result of a 
habit already formed. When 


then we feel pleasure in doing 
any act, if it be a right act we 
have formed a habit of Virtue, 
if a wrong act we have formed a 
habit of Vice. When we do any 
act, right or wrong, with pain or 
without pleasure, we have not 
yet formed a habit either Vir- 
tuous or Vicious in that respect. 
It would thus appear that Moral 
Virtue is an affair of pleasure and 
pain: that Virtue and Vice may 
be resolved into a question of 
feeling pleasure and pain when 
we ought. And so after § 1 the 
discussion proceeds upon this text 


as it were, the immediate question 


with which the Chapter opened 
having been sufficiently answered. 
8. mroreicOai] the middle voice 


238 


CHAP. I1.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


79 





propery v ndoviy 7 Aomny Tos épryous r} pep yap ame- 
xomevos TOV capa vedy ndovav Kat avT@ TOUT! xaipeov 
cadpay, 6 S ax Oewevos dohaoros, Kak oO pep vTro- 
pevov Ta Sewa Kat yaipwy 7) pn AvTovpevds ye 
avbpeios, 0 de humroupevos Serds. ITepi n8ovas yap 5 
Kai dimras éotiv ) HOU aperir Oia ev yap TH 
joomy ta daira mparTouer, Sia Se rv dumqy Tey 


2 Kaday a 


mexowela. Au wo Set iixOat mos evOus éx vee, 


@s 0 Tndran prow, WoTE xaipew Te Kab AuTrevo Gas ois 


3 der 7 yap op0y mavdela avrn éoriv. 


"Ex 8 «4 aperat 


ea mepi mpakeus Kat man, TavTt Se mabe eau wary 
mpate. metas ndovn Kai aw, Kat Sua tour ay ein 7 


respectively by which the acts related to the habit are accom- 
nied. From this it would seem that Moral Virtue may be 
Resorthed d as feeling pleasure and pain when 1 we ought. That Thus Virtue \ 


is 80 we how proceed to prove at length.- 


she tem 





—(i) It is pleasure 


ence moral education consists in the due regula- 


3 tion of the feelings of pleasure and pain. 


All virtue is 


(ii) 


concerned with the management of our actions and feelings, | 
and every action and every feeling is necessarily accompanied: “8° / 


means ‘to consider,’ i.e. to make 
in one’s own mind. 

3. dxédAaoros and dehds are 
rather loosely used here in con- 
trast with capper and dvdpeios. 
They imply strictly speaking the 
formation of a habit of the oppo- 
site kind, i.e. a state in which 
acts of intemperance or cowar- 
dice are done with ease and 
pleasure. The adxddacros (see 
note on I. iii. 7) does not restrain 
himself even dyOdpevos. Per- 


haps, however, axoAaoros is here 
used from the point of view of 
Ill. xi. 5, 6, where Aristotle 
states that the adxdédAacros is 
pained by the mere absence of 
pleasure, 

1]. wavti b€ wae x.7.A.] For 
this statement as far as wa6n are 
concerned see the Definition of 
man in ch. v. GAos ois emera 
750v7) 7) Avan, * Whatever is fol- 
lowed by pleasure or pain.’ 


10 


and Vice 


depend on 


us to wrong, and pain which deters us from what our-relation | 
and Pain, | 


as may be 


~/ 


shown bya \ 


variety of 


5, 6 place. 


80 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK 11. 





3 ‘\ Ne ‘\ ‘\ 7 
4 apeTn Tept mOovas kat duTras. 


~ 


XX 
Mrviover de kat ai Ko- 


hacets syvopeva Sia TOUTED’ larpetau yap TIVES ELOY, 
ai Se iarpetau bua TOV evavtiov medpuKact yiver Oa. 
5 ‘Er, ws Kal Tony elroper, TAT apuyns ees, op 
olay medune yiver Bar xeipov kat Bertiov, Tos TaUTa 
Kal TeEpi Tavra 77 guow € exer be’ ndovas Se Kat dbmras 
dadror yivovrat, TO SiaKkew tavtas Kai devyew, % as 
pa Set 7) Gre ov Set 7) as ov Set Fj ooayas . addws bro 
TOU heyou Suopiveras Ta TOLGUTAL Au v0 Kaul opiCovras Tas 
dperas amrabeias Twas Kai npepias ouK ev de, OTL amas 
Aéyovew, GAN’ oux ws Ses Kai ws ov Sei, wal Gre, Kal 


6 doa GAXa mpooTiPeTa. 


4 by pleasure or pain. 


‘Yrroxevrar dpa 1) apern eivar 7 


(iii) The infliction of punishment by 


means of pain (all remedies being through the medium of 
contraries) proves that it is intended to remedy an excess of 
pleasure: in other words, that vice consists in pleasure out of 





(iv) As we saw in ‘ch. ik .. whatever promotes or hinders 


the formation of a Virtuous habit is the sphere of its operation 
when formed. Now Moral habits are formed (not, as some 
suppose, by indifference to pleasure and pain, but) by feeling 


2. dua rovrwy| ‘by means of 
these,’ viz. pleasure and pain, 
though the latter only is strictly 
speaking referred to. The use 
of dia with the accus. = ‘ because 
of’ must not be confused with 
this. It occurs just below in 1. 6. 

On xéAaors see note III. v. 7. 

4, mpdrepov] viz. in c. ii. § 8. 

10. amaGeias tiwas Kai npepias | 
The Cynics and Stoics held this 
view. Cf. Pope, Hssay on Man, 
ii. 101 :— 

Theiry yee aed: pfid as in a frost. 


12. trdxerrat Gpa k.t.X. |‘ Virtue 


therefore is established to be,’ 
etc. This seems to close the 
discussion, but Aristotle adds 
three supplementary arguments, 

i) dperi) 7» Toavtn| This col- 
location of article, adjective, 
and substantive always denotes 
an epithet added emphatically, — 
or by way of limitation, to the 
substantive. Transl. ‘ Virtue, 
at least Virtue of this kind,’ i.e. 
Moral Virtue (76:xy dpery), for 
the statement here made would 
not be true of dvavonrixy dpern. 
Compare a similar limitation in 
vi. 10. 


CHAP. HI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 81 





“rowavry epi ndovas Kat AVTFTAaS TOV Bedriorow T paKT LK, 
7 » de KaKia TouvavTiov. Tevorro S av ply Kal & TOUT@V 
pavepov ore rept TOV auTav. Tpvow yep ovT@V TOV 
eis Tas aipéces Kai Tpidy Tov eis Tas puyas, Karoo 


cuppépovtos nO€os, Kat _Tpuay Tov evavTion, _atax pov 


SRE HO dumnpov, mept maura. ev TavTa 0 aryabos 
Bartixas € EOTLW, O 8e KGKOS GpapryriKes, padorTa be 


re TH ndovny” Keown Te yap arn Tos cous, kau 
Tact Tous bro 7p aipeow Tmapaxonouder: Kat ap ' TO 
‘8 xadov Ka TO cupepepov nou paiverar. "Ett 8 ex vyriov 10 
Tacw npiy owvrédpamras: 810 xarerov arrorpiyyac Bat 
toiTo To ma0os eyKeypwopevov TH Bip. Kavovitowev 


pleasure and pain when we ought. Hence the exercise of 
Moral habits when formed (i.e. of Moral Virtue) will be ex- 
hibited in feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. In the 
case of Vicious habits this just relation to pleasure and pain 
7 is reversed. We may further add the following arguments: 
—(v) We choose things because they are either good, useful, 
or pleasant. We avoid things because they are either bad, 
harmful, or painful. Now though Virtue goes right and Vice 
goes wrong in all these motives, yet this is pre-eminently the 
ease in to pleasure and pain, which in some sense in- 
8 clude all the other motives. (vi) Regarded as feelings pleasure 


oC 


3. Observe the position of the 
articles, making rpiéy the predi- 
cate. ‘The inducements for 
choosing being three in number, 
and the inducements for avoid- 
ing also three.’ 

9. mace Trois td x.r.A.] 
‘accompanies all the motives 
which come under the head of 
choice.’ For both the ‘good’ and 
the ‘ useful’ are also * pleasant.’ 
In III. ix, 2-5, the argument im- 


plies that 76 caddy is a kind, and 
indeed a mostexalted kind, of 780. 

12. Observe the antithesis be- 
tween TouTo To maGos and kai 
tas mpdfeus,—mdOn and mpdgers 
being, as we were reminded in 
§ 3, the sphere of the operation 
of “Moral Virtue. Also xal ras 
mpages=‘even our actions,’ or 
‘our actions also,’ the continual 
presence of pleasure and pain as 


regulating action, being at first 


82 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IL 





Sé Kal Tas mpagers, ob pev paddov o & TTOV, ndovi 


9 Kal ug. Ava TobT ouv avaryKaion evan mept TavTa 


10 €U i) KAKOS YaLpew Kat AvTreic bau. 


Tl 


9 degrees, with all of us. 


vy Twacav Tparyparetav ov yap puepov eis TAS mpagers 
"Ere Se xaremarrepov 
ndovy payer bat i) Oupe, xabamep dno ‘Hpakhevros, 
mp 6e TO ) adem abrepov ael Kai TeX ryiveras Kal, i aperny 
Kab yap TO &v b Bédruov € ev Toure. “Qote wai Sua ToUTO 
Tepl doves Kat hurras wae " Tpayparera Kab Th apeTy 
kai TH TOM TUK" O pev yap ev TovToLS ypapevos ayabos 
coral, 0 be Kaos kanos. 

‘On pev oby éoTiv n apern Tepe mBovas Kai durras, 
Kal OTL & ov yiverau, vTro Tourey kat avgerau Kat ei 
perau pr ooauTas ryevopeveny, kat Ste e& wv éeyéveTo, 
Tept TavTa Kat evepryel, cipnodw. 


and pain have been more ingrained into our lives, so to speak, 
by familiarity than any others; and regarded as motives jor 
action also they are constantly present, though in varying 
With them therefore our whole 


10 treatise must be concerned. (vii) Finally, nothing is so hard 


II 


to contend with as pleasure; nothing is therefore more meri- 
torious, and consequently more virtuous, than to bring pleasure 
and pain under due control. 

On all these grounds therefore we argue that Moral Virtue 


consists in the proper regulation of the feelings of pleasure 
and pain. : 


sight less obvious than the fact 
of our constant susceptibility to 
them as mere feelings. 

5. Heraclitus was an Ionian 
philosopher who flourished at 


Ephesus about 150 years before 
Aristotle. 

6. mepi d€ TO xaderore 
This principle is again pre 
Aristotle in IIL ix. 2, 1V, £8 9 


CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. 83 





1 IV. "Aropyoee & ay tis Tas Neyouen Ste Set Ta pev 
Sixaa Tparrovras Suxatous yivec Oar, Ta ée ca@ppova 
oappovas: el yap mpaTrouat Ta. Sixava kat Ta ca@ppova, 
non eat Sixauoe kat aadpoves, aomep ei Ta Ypampar vid 

2 Kat Ta povo Ka, ypamparucot Kat povorKot. “H oud ext 5 
TOV TeXvav obras exer 5 : evdéxerat yap YpappariKcov Tt 
mroujoat Kab amo TUXNS ka adQov vrroPepevor. Tore 
ouv éorat Ypapparunes, éav kat _Ypapparicey To Trownon 
Kar YPapparoKds” TOUTO 8 cor 70 Kara Tv & avT@ 

3 Yeapparveny. "Ere ovd 6 epovey eoTW emt TOV Texvav 10 
Kat To dperav- Ta pep yap Umo TOV TexXVaV yiwWdpeva 
TO eb Exel EV UUTOIS, apKEL CVV TATA TMS ExoVTA yeEVE- 


CHAP. 1V.— Explanation of the apparent paradox that we 
become just by doing just actions. 


1_ Another difficulty is suggested by the last statement made It may be) 
in ch. ii. How can we become just by doing just acts? Are 90d, If we 


do just acts 
we not just already if we do them, as (mutatis mutandis) is are we not 


herefore 


the case in the ] practice 0 of the Arts? To this we answer— just men, 


2 (1) This is not so in the case of the Arts: (2) Even if it even as we 
were, the Arts are not a parallel case. (1) It is not so in the ir art ro. 
artistl 


Arts.— Unless an artist understands the principles of his art yor. 


3 for himself, he is not properly speaking an artist. (2) 
are not a parallel case.—The Artistic Excellence of any 
work depends simply on the quality of the thing produced. Arts 


ks? 
The We reply— 
(1) It is not 
ye in the 


(2) The Arts 
are not a 


In either case he S*ictly 


Cuap. IV,—This Chapter dis- 
cusses another difficulty arising 
out of the statement at the end 
of ch. ii, ‘that virtuous habits 
when formed reproduce the acts 
by which they were formed.’ 

6. In the Arts a beginner may 
go right by chance, or by follow- 
ing mechanically the directions 


of his master. 


el 


is not yet an artist. Or again, case, . 


one may argue logically and yet 
not be a logician. 

12. rd ed Eyer €v avrois] A 
work of art as such must be 
judged by its own merits. It is 
not affected by thecircumstances, 
disadvantages, etc., of the artist. 


84 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK II. 





cba Ta Se Kata tas dperas yevopeva OvK éav aura 
Tos EXD: Suxaios 7) cwhpovas mparreral, anna Kal av 
0 mparroy TOS ex@v mparry, ™porov pev éav eidas, 
ener éay Tpoapovpevos, Kat Mpoaspoupevos ov aura, 
To 6e Tpitov Kab éay BeBaiws Kau aperaxinras exeov 
parry. Tatra Se ™pos per 70 Tas a\das Téxvas exew 
ov ouvapilwerrat, Tq auro 70 eidévat* ™pos be TO Tas 
aperas 70 per eidévas puoxpov #) ovdev ¢ lover, Ta 8 adXa 
ov puKpov adda TO may Suvatas, & aTrep ex TOU mohhans 
4 mpatrew Ta Sikava Kat sw@ppova trepiyiverat. 
ouv Tpaypwata Sixaia Kal oa@ppova Aé€yeTaL, OTav 7H TOL- 


But in Moral Excellence we further require in the agent him- 
Special con- self, (a) Knowledge of what he is doing. (8) Deliberate 


fares to choice so to act, and moreover a pure and disinterested choice. 


constitute (y) Resolute and unflinching purpose. Of these conditions 
moral, Lnéwladae is of the least weight, while it is the first and only 


requisite in the case of the Arts. The two latter conditions, on 
the other hand, are everything, and they can only be secured 
4 by often doing acts of justice, temperance, ete. Hence neither 
to actions nor to individuals can the terms ‘just,’ ete., be 


1. So Pope (Moral Essays) :— 


Not always actions show the man: wefind 
Who does akindnessis not therefore kind. 

6. Tatra d€ «r.A.] The 
artistic or technical merit of a 
work of art is not affected by the 
motive of the artist, whether 
good or bad, eg. whether his 
work may have been done with 
a religious or charitable purpose, 
or from jealousy or spite. In 
judging of a moral act, such 
- considerations would be all-im- 
portant. 

7. With mpds dé rd ras dpe- 
ras supply ¢yeww from 1. 6. 


8. Knowledge, though an 
essential requisite, of itself ad- 
vances us but little in the way 
of virtuous character. This is 
explained by §§ 5 and 6 below. 
See also ii. 1. 


Ta pev 1 


ra & dAda] te. the other con- 
ditions mentioned, viz. deliberate — 


choice and unflinching purpose. 
10. mparrev is the emphatic 


word. See § 1, above. Also 
apaypara pev Sixaa (just acts) in — 
the next line stand in contrast 
with Sixaos dé (just character) 


in the following clause. 


—— Oe eee 


——————— a 


ne 


CHAP. IV. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. ; 85 





attra ola av o Sixavos a 0 oappav mpatecer Sixatos ée 
Ka ca@dpov eoriy Ux o ravra mparren, aha Kai 0 
ouTw mparrov os ob Sixatoe Kal ob oadpoves mparrovow. 
5 Ev ouv héyeraw ort ex Tov dixava mparrew © Sixacos 
yiverat kal €x ToD Ta ooppova O cappar ex de tov 5 
en mparrew Tabra ovdeis Gy ovde peddajcreve yeveabat 
6 ayabes. ‘AWW of WodAol TavTa pev ov mparrovow, 
emt 68 Tov Aoyov KaTapevryovres otovrat prrocogeiv 
Kat ovTws éaecOas orrovdaior, Ouowdv TL TroLodyTes TOIS 
Kapvovar, ot Tov taTpov axovovat MeV ETLLENS, TOL 
over S oubley TOV TpooTarropevany. “Dowep ovv ovd 
éxeivor Cy eEover 70 capa oTw Oeparevduevot, ovd 
ovror THY Yuyny oUTM fidocopovrtes. 


strictly applied, unless there be, beside the outward act, the 
inward spirit and purpose of the formed habit in the doing of 
§ it. We were right then in saying that only by doing just acts Above all, 


6 can we become just. Mere theories of Virtue without practice ee 


can no more form virtuous habits, than physicians’ res escrip- nig m 
tions if not followed can restore health. And yet this truth useless. 


is very commonly forgotten. 


7. This is well expressed by 
Bp. Butler, Anal. ch. v. (p. 91 
Angus’s ed.), ‘Habits of the 
mind seem to be produced by 
repeated acts, as well as habits 
of the body. And in like 
manner as habits belonging to 
the body are produced by exter- 
nal acts, so habits of the mind 
are produced by the exertion of 
inward practical principles, i.e. 
by carrying them into act, or 
acting upon them. ..... 
But going over the theory of vir- 
tue in one’s thoughts, talking 


well, and drawing fine pictures 
of it; this is so far from neces- 
sarily or certainly conducing to 
form a habit of it in him who 
thus employs himself, that it 
may harden the mind in a con- 
trary course, and render it 
gradually more insensible to all 
moral considerations.’ 

8. rov Adyoy (in contrast with 
ov mparrovot) means theory as 
opposed to practice. 

13. prrovopodrres] The word 
diAocodpia in Greek has a much 
wider significance than that 


86 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Il. 





x X A 43 > ‘ / 
1 V. Mera ¢ tadra ti eotw y apern oxerrtéeov. “Erret 
9 \ 2 a A , , 3 SN / , 
ov Ta eV TH uy ywoueva Tpia EoTl, Waly, Suvapets, 


CHaP. V.—TZhe Genus of Virtue determined. 


Allattri- 1 We have now to investigate the formal Definition of Virtue, 
SoulGucua. and first, in natural order, to determine its Genus. ~ It is. 


ing therefore evidently connected with the soul and not with the body. 
ue) are wh Lo hi aba ba DC 


either 46x, : 
a” or which ‘Philosophy’ would con- and*then narrow that class by 
ag vey tous. In the absence of adding qualities or conditions till 


any revealed Religion, and the it becomes co-extensive with the 
admitted inadequacy of the thing to be defined; or we may 
popularly received system of exclude one by one such members 
Religion, Philosophy would toa of the class as are obviously be- 
thinking Greek supply to some side our purpose. e.g. In this 
extent the place of Religion. To Chapter to define Virtue Aris- 
it alone he could look not only totle takes the wide Genus ra ev 
for theories of morality, but for +7 yvy7—and since all attributes 
practical rules for the guidance of the soul may be divided into 
of life. Thus when Plato speaks dn, Suvdpuers, and efes, and as 
of men €6e dvev pidogopias dpe- Virtue cannot (for reasons as- 
Tis perewnddres (Rep. p. 619), signed) be either mdOos or duva- 
he would convey nearly the same jus, we thus obtain efis as the 
notion, as if we should say ‘men proper Genus of Virtue. (2) The 
who have lived a life of morality other method of ‘hunting’ for 
without religion.’ a Definition is to take a number 
Cap, V.— We now commence of concrete instances in which 
the formal construction of the the quality to be defined is 
Definition of Virtue. And as all found, and then ascertain what 
Logical Definition consists in it is which they have in common. 
assigning the Genus and the eg. On this plan Aristotle’s 
Differentia, we first ascertain the course would have been to take 
Genus of Virtue (ri éorw) in ch. the several virtues and find what 
v., and then its Differentia (roiéy they have in common in the 
rt) inch. vii Nowthereare two midst of their various distinc- 
ways in which we may hunt (@np- tions and individual peculiarities, 
evew) for a Definition, according and that common element would 
to Aristotle. (1) We may take a account for their being called by 
wide Genus or class which issure the common name Virtue, and 
to include the object to be would in fact constitute the 
defined besides a good deal more, Definition of Virtue, 


CHAP. V.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


87 





# ¥ e 3 , iA . , \ 
2 &£eus, rourwy av te ein 9 apeTn. Aéyw Se abn pev 
> / > Ae / fa] / 6 / ‘ 
erOupuiar, opyny, ghoBor, pacos, d ovoyv, xXapar, di- 
‘ A e/ 
Nav, picos, mébov, Grov, Edeov, Srws ois eretar 7Sovn 
4, roan, Svvapers Sé nal’ as TwaOntiKot TovTWY reyoueDa, 
otov Kal as Svvarot opyvcOnvat 7) AVTNOHVaL 7) EdXejoal, 5 
ed; ‘ é > bs / 4 > x a @ 
ébeus Se nal’ as mpos Ta TaOn exyopuev ev 4) KAKO, otov 
”~ ‘\ a 
mpos To opyicOnvat, eb pev ohodpas 1 avewpévas, 
a ‘ \ 
Kakas eyomuev, ci Se pécws, ev. ‘Opoiws Se Kai mpos 
> , \ aL 3 2 \ on? ¢ 2 Gi ee 
3 TaAAa. ITla0n pev ovv ove etoiv ovl ai aperai, ovd 
¢ / ¢/ 3 / ‘ ‘ , a xX 
ai Kakiat, OTL ov eyoueOa Kata Ta TAOy oTroVdaios 7) 
SBN? M5 73 ELEY Eeras | , , 
dado, ata Se Tas apeTas 7) Tas KaKlas Aeyoueba, Kab 
ef ‘ ‘ \ / : Sh ay 4 +7 / 
6TL KaTa pev Ta TAOH oVT eTratvovpela, ovTE ~reyoucla 
Be a > a - / San en. 9 / 
(ov yap emaveiras 6 poBovpevos ovde 6 opyi&dpevos, 
Io’ ey \'.4 a > / > > ¢ A \ 
ovoe Tat O AmTAAS Opyitdwevos GAN’ 6 TAS), KATA 


Se Tas aperas Kat tas Kaxias erawwoupeba 7) ~reyoueba, 15 


Now all attributes of the soul are either emotions, capabilities, 
2 or habits. ‘ Emotions’ are any affections of the soul accom- 
panied by pleasure or pain. ‘Capabilities’ simply render us 
‘capable’ of being so affected. ‘ Habits’ are the permanent 
relations in which we stand to such affections, which may be 
either good or bad relations, depending on the manner or 
degree in which we allow ourselves to be affected by them. 
31. Virtue is not an Emotion, because—(a) We do not apply 
the terms right, wrong, praise, blame, to Emotions per se, as 


Having de- 
fined 7a6n, 
Suvap.ets, 
éfeus, We 
can show 
that 


Virtue is 
not md@os, 


6. ééis is not exactly equiva- 
lent to ‘habit,’ by which it is 
conventionally translated. It is 
rather ‘state’ or ‘settled condi- 
tion.’ €yew meant originally to 
‘hold on’ or ‘keep on’ (hence 
such phrases as dripdoas ¢yet, 
éxeaOai tivos), and so géis was ‘a 
holding on.’ e.g. is rév étAwv 
‘an armed state or condition.’ 


Hence Aristotle’s Definition Z£e.s 
kal ds €xopev x.T.A. 

7. dvewmevas] ‘remissly,’ i.e. in 
defect, opp. to ogodpas, in ex- 
cess. This fault in respect of 
anger is criticised in IV. v. 5, 6. 
It is possible to take dvespévas as 
in IIL. v. 10=‘dissolutely,’ but 
this would repeat, rather than 
oppose, ocpodpas 


nor dvvames. 5 ii, Virtue is not a mere ‘ 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK 11. 





4° Er opybopeba pev Kai poBovpeba dmpoapéros, ai 8 


dperat Tpoatpécers TWES #) ovK avev T poaupécews. TIpos 


Se TouToUs Kara per Ta man xweio as AeyopeOa, Kata 


Se ras apetas Kal Tas Kaxias ov xweirBae adna Bianei- 


5 c0ai tras. 


aryabot heyoueba 7) Suvacbat macyxe 


w amas ouTe Kani, 


our’ erauvoupeda ouTe peyopeba. Kai ére Svvaroi pev 
éopev ducer, ayabor Se 7) Kaxol ov ywopueba duce e- 


4, we obviously do apply them to virtue and vice. (8) There 
is no deliberate choice in Emotions, as we have already stated 


(ch. iv.) that there is in Virtue. 
‘moved’ by our Emotions, but ‘ disposed” by virtue and F168; 

age implies-a 
apability, because—(a) The argu- 
ment above as to the application of praise, blame, etc., 


and this difference of len 


(y) ‘We are sai 
~of fact. 


lies 


to Capabilities as well as to Emotions. (8) Capabilities come 


1. dmpoatpérws] =‘ without pur- 
pose,’ ‘spontaneously.’ The ob- 
jects corresponding to particular 
passions or emotions being pre- 
sent, the emotion must be felt 
(though not necessarily encour- 
aged or indulged), as necessarily 
as heat must be felt on approach- 
ing a fire. Noreason or delibera- 
tion can prevent this. 

Compare Butler’s Analogy, pt. 
i. ch. v. (p. 98, ed. Angus). ‘The 
principle of Virtue can neither 
excite them (viz. such affections) 
nor prevent their being excited. 
On the contrary, they are natu- 
rally felt when the objects of 
them are present to the mind, 
not only before all consideration 
whether they can be obtained by 
lawful means, but after it is 


found they cannot. For the 
natural ik of affection con- 
tinue so.’ .. And again, ‘Par- 
ticular propensions (by which 
name Butler describes such affec- 
tions) from their very nature 
must be felt, the objects of them 
being present ’ (p. 100). 

2. mpoatpécets] The authority 
for this statement at present is 
iv. 3. It is afterwards embodied 
in the formal Definition of Vir- 
tue in vi. 15. 

4. ov xweioOa GdAda draxei- 
cal Not ‘moved’ but ‘dis- 
posed.’ The latter word implying 
a@ more permanent affection. 
The distinction being made in 
language is a proof that such a 
distinction is commonly believed 
to exist. See note on i. 1. 


to be - 


Ava tadra Se ovde Suvdpers cio" ovre yap 5 


- ee ee = 











CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE’'S ETHICS, 


39 





6 mopey Se Tept TOUTOU mporepoy. Ei ov pare Ta0n eioiv 
ai aperai pare duvapers, Aetrreras eEeus auras clvat 
I VI “O TL pev oov eat Tp yever n dpern, elpyrau" der 
Se pa povov ovres eimeiy, ore eis, andra Kai Troia THs. 
2 ‘Pyréov ou Ort Tao a PET ov ay D apern, auto Te ev 5 
V QMOTENL, Kal TO epryov auTov ev aTrodidwow, oiov » 
Tov obO0arpov apern Tov te OOarpov omovdaiov aovet 
Kai To épyov avtod* TH yap 700 odOadpod apern ed 
by nature, Virtue does not, ay we have fully proved in ch. i. 


6 ill. Hence we argue that if Virtue is neither an Emotion nor Therefore 


a Capability it must be a Habit. Virtue is 





CHAP. V1.—TZhe differentia of Virtue determined, and thus its 
‘8 Definition arrived at. 








Cnap. VI.—In this Chapter 
Aristotle discovers what sort of 
a Habit Virtue is, as follows. 
First he lays down the broad 
peers conception that Excel- 
ence (dper}) of any kind perfects 
the work of that of which it is 
the Excellence (§$ 1-3). Next 
he asks, In what then consists 
the perfection of Man’s works? 
(§ 4). Having noted that all 
things capable of division at all 
can be taken in excess, defect, 
or moderation, he states that the 
perfecting of all human work, 
scientific, artistic, and therefore 
still Tore, moral, consists in 
securing the mean or moderate 


of Excel- 


amount (neither too much nor Jencegene- 
too little) of that with which it perfecting 


has to deal (§§ 5-9). 
explains that this is true only of 
Moral and not of Intellectual 
Excellence (§§ 10-13). After 
another argument pointing to the 
same conclusion derived from 
there being in all cases only one 
right and many wrong courses 
(§ 14), the formal Definition of 
Virtue is enunciated (§ 15), and 
the Chapter concludes with 
removing two possible miscon- 
ceptions of, or objections to, 
the theory that all Virtue is a 
‘mean’ state (§§ 16, etc.), 


He then 22y work. 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


90 [BOOK Il. 





peels. e / e a @ > x. @ 4 
opayev. Opotws n Tov immov apeTn imToy TE oTrOU- 
vad \ b] \ a \ 2 “ > 
datov Tove Kat ayabov Spapyew Kat eveyKety TOV emt- 

/ \ a \ / 3 ‘ a) >: = 
3 Barnv Kal petvat Tous qondepiovs. Ei dn tovr ent 
/ x \ an ? / > aR GR 
TAVTOV OUTWS EXEL, KAL N TOU avOpwirov apeTH evn av 
e/ 9,9 @ r) \ o / \ 999 @ o 
e&is ah ns ayablos avlpwros yivetar Kat ab NS ev TO 
¢ a »+S b / ~ \ a3» 4 \ 
4 €avTov epyov amodwoe. IIws Se Toit eotat, non meV 
Te ” \ \ @ x N oN , 
elpjkapev, eT SE Kal WO eoTat havepov, eav Oewpn- 
/ b \ e 4 > a b \ ‘ 
CWMEV Toa TIS EoTiV 0 vats auTns. Ev mavti oy 
n ‘\ a + a “ ‘ a S S 
ouveyet Kat SiaipeT@ eoTt AaBeEelv TO ev TWAELOV, TO 
¥. \ 7 N a ’ 9. Sie Is 
éhattov, To 8 icov, Kal TavTa 7) KaT avTO TO Tpaypa, 
s\ ‘ e aA “ 5 SYA 4 e A ‘ -rX / 
 Tpos nas’ TOS Loov pecov TL UTTEepBoANS Kat EdAeEL- 
/ \ o XN / / ‘ od 
5 eos. Aéyw Se Tov pev mpayyatos pecov TO toov 
3 its peculiar function to be well performed. Hence Moral 


Virtue (ze. human Excellence) will perfect human nature 
and cause the proper function of human nature to be well 





4 performed. How this will be has been already hinted at (in 
ch. il.) from the analogy existing between the functions of the 
body of man and of his soul and of their respective Excel- 
lences, but we now proceed to discuss the question on more 


Whenever general principles. In everything which is capable of divi- 
cmeresofa 8100 at all, whatever be the nature of the connexion of its 
thingare parts, we can have an excessive, a defective, and a just amount. 
Se llezce ‘Chese amounts may be taken either absolutely or relatively, 
ae in and the just amount is always a mean in respect of the 
ameanor éxcess and defect, z.e. it lies somewhere between them. An 
modern? 5 ‘absolute’ -mean then is that which is precisely half-way 
end that 
seiation to 4, xat marks the conclusion or gravel. In either case it is 
Stetiean of the argument. possible to take varying amounts 


9. Evvexis is applied to that 
whose parts are continuous or 
in close connexion, eg. a stick 
or stone ; dvarperds to that whose 
parts are not so connected, eg. a 
heap of stones, a handful of sand 


of the things in question. An- 
other interpretation explains Euy- 
ex7s of geometrical magnitudes, 
line, figure, etce.; Stauperds of 
arithmetical numbers. 


CHAP, VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 9g! 





ame xov ag éxarr pov TOV aepaoy, orep éorly ey na 
TAaUTOV TACW, TpOs mpas Se 6 pare mreovadter pare 
6 edXeitret. Tovro ny ouy, év, ovde TavTOD TAC, oLov & 
Ta Sexa TOANG TA be duo oheya, 7a eg pecan apBavover 
KATA TO mparypa” low yap dmrepexet TE Kab Umepexerat, 5 
rouTo Se péoov cori Kare THY ray apiOpnruxny ay avadoyiay.. Saas 
7 To Se mpos pas ouy, ovT@ dayrréov" ov yap el tT) ddxa 
povai payeiv ToNU dvo Se odeyor, 0 aheirrns ef pvias 
mpoorager €oTL yap lows Kal TOUTO TOV T? Ampouevep 
n odiryor Mirou pe yap odyor, T@ Se  apxopere TOV 
8 yupvaciov TOND. ‘Opoteos emt Spopov Kad ; mans. Oita 
57 Tas ema] LaV THY vrrepBodmy pev at TH ENdewpiy 
devyet, To Se péoov Entei nal todP aipeitar, wécov Sé 
9 ov TO TOU TpaypyaTos adda TO Tpos Huds. Ei 8) waca 


between a given excess and a given defect, and is therefore 
. 7 always the same and easily found in every case. By a 
‘relative mean’ we indicate that intermediate amount teiweun 
excess and defect which is best for us ; z.e. the mean relative 
to our interest and advantage. This is of course sometimes 
more and sometimes less than the ‘absolute mean,’ and is 
. 9 different for different persons. Now when we say that every ‘his is ob- 


practical science places the perfection of its work in its being Vously ** 
artistic or 
scientific 


vellous strength many traditions work. 





6.  dpiOuntixny  dvadoyiar] 


Arithmetic progression or pro- 
portion: «e. when each term 
differs from the preceding by a 
constant quantity. Consequently 
the absolute or arithmetic mean 
between two quantities is found 
by adding them together and 
dividing by 2. 

10. Milo was a celebrated 
athlete of Crotona, a sort of 
Greek Samson, of whose mar- 


were preserved, 

14. Ei 87 waoa x.r.d.] Observe 
that the argument now depends 
ontheanalogy between Virtue and 
the Arts or practical Sciences, i.e. 
between the work of man as a 
Moral agent, and the work of man 
as an Artistic or Scientific agent: 
and the inference is that what 
constitutes excellence in one sort 
of work (Artistic) will also consti- 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


92 [BOOK It. 





erto THN obre 70 epryov ev emurenel, pos TO pecov | 
Brérovea Kat eis TOUTO ayovoa Ta epya (ev eloBacw 
emihelyetv Tois &v exovow Epyyous Ore ovr agehely ory 
ovre mpocbeivar, ws THS mev UTrepBodHs Kal THS EAAEi- 
‘pews POerpovons TO ev, THs Se pecornTos awtovens); 
a aryabot TEXVOT OL, @S Aéyoper, pos TouTo Pné- 
TrovTes epyatovrar, 7 7 8 a dpern) maons TEXNS axpiBeorepa 
Kat dpeivev early, @omep | Kai 7) duos, TOU péoov av ein 
10 oroXaoTLKy. Aeyo dé qv nOvuny air yap éort Tepl 
wadn Kat mpages, € Se TOUTOUS éorw vmepBohn Kab 


wpis Kai TO pwécov. Olov nat doBnOjqvar Kai Oap- 


neither excessive nor defective, but in due moderation, .it_is 
this relative mean that is always intended. And since then 
to attain to this relative mean is the end of every art or 
practical science, much more will it be so in the pre-eminent 


oe practical science of morals. Therefore it will be the charac- 
Moral Ex- — teristic feature of Moral Virtue that it perfects the work of 
cellence or 

Virtue. man by aiming at a relative mean (in other words, at modera- 


This applies 10 tion) in all that it is concerned with. Moral Virtue, be it 
observed (for all this does not apply to Intellectual Excellence), 


Recellonce 
only, not to 
Intellectual. 


tute excellence in the other sort 


comes within the general case 
of work (Moral). This analogy 


upon which the whole argument 


must be carefully distinguished 
from that between the body and 
the soul of man in ii. 5-7. 

8. domep kai y vows] ie, 
Virtue is better than Art, just as 
Nature also is better than Art. 
Virtue is often regarded by Plato 
and Aristotle as a species of art, 
as has been noticed before, and 
indeed as its most perfect exem- 
plification. 

9. The argument only applies 
to 70x) apern, because it alone 


is based (see § 4, ev wavri x.r.X.), 
as being concerned with some- 
thing (viz. way and mpdéets) 
admitting of excess, mean, and 
defect. Such is clearly not the 
case in regard to Intellectual 
Excellence. That this is so with 
adOn is proved in §§ 10 and 11, 
and similarly (énotws) it is as- 
serted of mpdfers in § 12. maddy 
and mpd€eis are again thus united 
as forming the groundwork of 
Virtue in § 16 and also in iii. 3, 


’ 


CHAP. V1.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


93 





pioar Kat embyuhoas Kal opyeaOivat Kal ehefioa Kat 
dros noOivas Ka t humnOijvas € EOTL Kat paddov kat arrov, 
{1 Kea apxporepa ouk eu To 8 & ore Seb Kat ed’ ois Kai ™pos 
ous kai ov évexa Kat ws Sel, pécov Te Kai aptorov, rep 
[2 éoTl THS aperis. “Opoias ée Kal Tept Tas mpagers € eoru 5 
drepBomyj Kal EXDewypus kal 79 péaov. ‘HS a apery Tept 
awabn Kat mpagers € éaTiv, &V ois 7) yey bmrepBorn dyapra- 
vera Kal 7 Edrenprus peyerat, To Se péoov erawelrae 
13 Kal karopOovran TavTa S audo THS apetns. M earns 
TUS dpa éotiv ” ape", OTOXATTLKN v6 ouca TOU peécou. 10 
14° Ere To mev duapraveww TONAAY OS éoruv (ro yap KAKOV 
Tov ametpov, ws ot IIvOayopevo eixafov, To §& ayabov 
Tov memepacpevov), To Se KxatopOodv povayas S10 Kai 
for Moral Virtue has for its object emotions and actions, both 
12 0f which admit of excess, defect, and moderation. This 
moderation will consist in a due regulation of time, occasions, 
objects, motives, manner, etc., in regard to emotions and 
actions; and such regulation of emotions and actions is con- 


, 14 fessedly a characteristic of Virtue. Once more, it is possible That wrong 


to go wrong in many ways, right in one way only: just as we Hight ison, 


may miss a mark in any and every direction and can hit it points 


e same 
9. ratra duo} viz. both rally. The doctrine quoted in °clusion. 
praise and success (€zacveirat kal 


the text isaspecimen. All that 
KaTO ) are characteristics is infinite (involving the notion 
of indefinite) is bad ; the finite 
is good. Aristotle’s inference 
from this, that right lies inter- 
mediate to the various courses of 
wrong, somewhat resembles the 
argument which is called the 
‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’ 
in Mathematics, as it is applied, 
e.g. to establish what is called the 
firs; Law of Motion. See fur- 
ther, note on I. vi. 7. 


of Virtue, as they have just been 
shown to-be of moderation 
(yécor). Compare émep éori i THs 
aperns above inl. 4, where dep 
similarly refers to excellence 
(aptcrov) as being a characteris- 
tic of virtue. 

12, The Pythagoreans ex- 
pressed their teaching on Moral 
and other subjects by mathe- 
matical metaphors, which how- 
ever have been often taken lite- 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK U. 


94 





“ \ e/ AX ‘\ ‘ e/ ‘ ‘ > al 
TO ev padtoy To Se YaXeTrOV, PadloY EY TO aTrOTUXELW 
a a X \ “ 3 a X ‘ a 3 
TOU oKoTrOU, YadeTrov Se TO EemiTvxelV. Kat dia Tavr 
9 a ‘ / ence X ¢€ a 
ovv THS meV KaKlas 7 UTepBody Kab 7 edreris, THS O 
aperns 9 wecdrns 
éoOXoi pev yap ardds, wavrodamis 5é KaKol, — 5 
13 "Eotw apa 7 apeTn ef is TpoaLpeTeKn, €V [LeCOTNTL 
only in one direction, which lies in the middle of all the wrong 
directions. From this also we should infer that Virtue always 
consists in a mean or intermediate state, with related Vices 
on both sides of it, in the direction of Excess and in the direc- 
tion of Defect. 


Hence we define Virtue as“ A Habit, involving delibe- 


DEFINITION J 5 
OF VIRTUE, 


6. This Definition of Virtue is 
only second in importance to the 
Definition of Happiness in I. vii. 
The student should carefully note 
the significance of every term in 
the Definition and why it. is 
added to it. eis is fully ex- 
plained in ch. v. mpoaiperixy is 
added on the strength of what 
was said in iv. 3. év peodrnre 
tT mpos jnpas is the main point 
established in the present Chap- 
ter. apiopéevn Ady@ is necessary 
because the ‘mean,’ being relative, 
does not admit of being calcu- 
lated by an arithmetical formula 
(§ 6 above and viii. 5, 6), and 
therefore its varying standard 
must be determined by Reason 
from time to time. (This accords 
with the statement that all Vir- 
tue. is kara Tov dpOdy Aédyor in 
ii. 2.) Finally os ay 6. ppdvipos 
dpiceey is added, because . it 
might be asked, Where is Reason 


(which is an abstract term) prac- 
tically to be found? How shall 
we be able to consult Reason as 
to the determination of this rela- 
tive mean? And so finally we 
explain that we mean Reason as 
embodied in the man of recog- 
nised practical common sense. 
There may perhaps be another 
motive for this last addition. 
Suppose the authority of Reason 
is claimed by different men for 
opposite courses. (Suppl. Note.) 
Now though this may often 
happen in minor matters (ch. ix.), 
yet if it be allowed without re- 
striction, it would lead to every 
one doing what is ‘right in his 
own eyes,’ and the denial of any 
absolute difference between right 
and wrong: just as the Sophists 


in Aristotle’s day said, ‘What- — 


ever any man thinks to be right 
is right to him, and there is no 
other: standard.’ The remedy 


CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


95 





s A ‘ tc oa e / / » ee, ta ¢€ , 
Ovoca TH TPOS HAS, wplopEern OY Kal @ av Oo dpo- 
/ / \ nr a 

16 vipos opicevev. Mecorns S¢ S00 Kaxiav, THs pev Kal 
. - ‘ oS Se > ra \ A A ‘ 
vmepBodny THS O€ KaT EXELL" Kal ETL TO TAS [EV 
ar: / . § e /. a / 4 fe 
edreitrewy tas 8 vrepBadrrew Tov Séovtos ev Te ToIs 
ae : ar > eet / ‘ sy b) ‘ A / Q 
maleot Kab ev Tals Tpakeot, THY 8 apEeTHY TO MécoY Kal 

Xv ” 

17 evpioxew Kat aipeicOa Avo xata pev THv ovolav Kat 
ae , ‘ 98 9 / /, > ¢ 
TOV oyov TOV TL qv civat Aeyovra HécoTNS eoTLW 7 
rate purpose, conforming to the relative mean, which is de- 
ae d by reason, and as the man of practical common 

16 sense would determine it.’ On either side of this mean, in 

17 Excess or in Defect, lies Vice. Two possible misconceptions 


must be anticipated: (I) It must not be supposed that, if 


Virtue is a mean state, it is a state of mediocrity, or of a 
moderate amount of good. _ It is only when considered in 


then against these eccentrici- 
ties or aberrations of Reason is 
to be found by appealing to the 
Reason of the man of recognised 
ical common sense. (Cf. I. 
viii. 13 and note there.) It may 
be taken as the embodiment of 
the .general reason of mankind, 
unbiassed by considerations of 
individual interests. 
J _ 1. a@piopévy] There seems no 
doubt this should be dpicpevy, 
agreeing with peodrnt, and 
not, as is usually written, wpi- 
pevn. It is the mean (yecdrns), 
not the habit (é£is), which 
has to be determined by Rea- 
son, as is explained in the last 
note. 

6. In order to comprehend 
what follows, it is necessary to 
understand clearly that — the 
material (ra6n cal mpa€ers, emo- 
tions and actions) in the various 


degrees of which (i.e. excess, 
mean, or defect) Virtue and Vice 
consist must be in itself neither 
good nor bad, but absolutely 
indifferent. That this is so in 
the case of ma6n was explained 
in v. 3. eg. anger, pleasure, 
fear, etc., are neither good nor 
bad in themselves, but only in the 
degree in which they are in- 
dulged. If such ‘ material’ were 
in itself good (as the first mis- 
conception assumes), we could 
not have too much (excess) of it ; 
if bad (as the second assumes), 
we could not have foo little 
(defect) of it. In either case 
‘moderation’ or a ‘mean’ amount 
would be out of the question. 
(See Supplementary Note.) 

7. tov Adyov Tov Ti hy eivat 
Aéyovra may be thus ex- 
plained :— 

(1.) rd eivac (or eivas simply) 


5 


Two supple- 
mentary ex- 
planations. 
(1) Virtue is 
not a mean 
or moderate 
amount of 
good. 


96 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK It. 





18 apern, Kat dé TO dpiarov Kal TO ev auporns. Ou wae 
6 emidexeras mpagis ovde mav mabos v7 peodrnta: 
eva yap evdus ovepacrat ouverdnppeva pera TNS pav- 
horqros, otov emixaupekaxta, avanrxvvr ia, pOoves, Kat 
em TOY mpagewy pouxeca, KOTN, avdpopovia: mavra 6 
yap TadTa Kai Ta ToLadTa AéyeTat TO avTa pavdra elvas, 
GAN ovy at vmepBoral avrav ovd at edreirvers. Ove 
eoTW ovv ovdémoTe TEpt aUTa KaTOpOOdY, GAN det dpap- 
Tavew" ovd eats TO cu H pM eU EPL Ta TOLAUTA ev TO 
itself and in the abstract that Virtue is a ‘mean.’ Considered 
in a special aspect and in reference to a special standard, 
viz. that of Excellence or Goodness, it is no longer a mean 
but extreme, z.e. it includes not a moderate, but the greatest 

(2) Not all 18 possible, amount of good. (2) Conversely it must not be 


ngderation thought that because Virtue consists in moderation that a 
mean or moderate amount of anything is good simply beeause 


it is moderate. 


means the ‘essence’ (i.e. the sim- 
plest form, or notion, of the exist- 
ence) of anything, 

(2) ri nv eivac=* what was the 
essence of anything ? ? 

(3) rd. ri-hv-eivar=‘ the what 
the essence [of anything] was’; or 
‘that which the essence wan’; 3 or 
in other words again, ‘the essence’ 
[of anything]. 

(4) rov Adyov roy ri-fv-eivas 
Aeyovra, ‘ the definition stating 
the essence’ ; i.e. the ‘ essential’ 
or ‘logical’ Definition of any- 
thing : quite literally ‘the Defini- 
tion which says what [the] 
essence [of a thing] was.’ Thus 
the whole expression is nearly 
equivalent to ovcia occurring just 
before, which also means the 


In respect of things essentially bad the right 


‘being’ or ‘essence’ of anything, 
‘easentia’ being the exact Latin 
equivalent of ovcta. 

It remains to explain qv and 
not é€ors being used. This is 
done to indicate that the Essence 
of a thing is prior to the exist- 
ence of the thing itself. e.g. Be- 
fore any individual man existed 
the essence of man, é.e. humanity, 
or the ideas constituting human- 
ity, existed as the type after 
which man was created, just as 
the idea of a house exists on paper 
or in the architect’s mind before 
the house itself is built. 

(3. evOvs avdparrat ovverknp- 
peva %.7.A.] ‘involve the notion 
of badness the moment they are 
named.’ 


CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 97 





nr \ \ e YA >. > ¢ an QA A 
nw Sei Kal OTe Kal ws povyevely, GAN aTAGS TO TroLELY 
A 4 , 2 / e/ qX9 A 
19 OTLOUY TOvTwY dyapTave EoTtiv. “Opotov ovv To akvodv 
\ eM S n \ , . 9 / 
Kai Tept TO adiKely Kat Sethaivety Kal aKkoNacTaively 
/ Ne ‘ \ ere 4 \ 
elvat pecoTnta Kat vTepBodny Kai EhrefpiW" EoTaL yap 
ed e A N >; / / Ve 
oUTw ye umepBoAns Kal EAdEinpews pecoTns Kat vTep- 5 
A e » ‘ / / \ 
20 Borns vmepBory Kai Edrevis edreirews. “Dowep Se 
4 \ > / ? y e ‘ \ 
acappoovvns Kat avopeias ovK eativ vmepBodn Kai 
\ »s 4 95 / 5A e¢ * Ia 
Ehrenris Sia TO pécov eivai TwsS AKpov, OUTS oVvdE 
Ses , Iart eC ‘ \ »¥. we aS 
ExelVOY peTOTNS oVde UITepBoAyn Kal EAXrEMPIS, GAN ws 
xX / e , ¥ Se \ A @ ¢ A 
av TpaTTnTaL apapTaveras OAwS yap ov vmepBorzs 10 
\ / y 4 ¥ / ¢ ‘ 
kal ehreinpews peadTys eat, oUTE wecoTHTOS UrEepBody 
‘ 
Kal edrewbus. 
a ot a ‘ , / b ‘ 
tr VIL Jet S¢ tovTo wn povov KaSorov réyeoOa, aAXa 
~~ “ d > / > ‘\ val ‘\ ‘ 
Kat Tos Kal exacta edapyoTTew' ev yap TOS TrEpt Tas 


amount is no longer a mean or moderate amount, but the least 
19 rat amount or rather none at all. If a thing is in itself 
ad, it is already, according to our theory, in excess or in 
defect, and therefore we cannot again have excess mean and 
20 defect of it. If it is itself good, it is, according to our theory, 
already a mean, and therefore we cannot again have excess 
mean and defect of it. 


Cuap. VII.—A Zadle or Catalogue of Virtues with their 
related Vices. 


1 In order to prove that our Definition holds good of all the tist ot 
Virtues in detail, we proceed to classify them, shewing the Vivtues 
in detail. 
8. mas] ‘in some sense,’i.e.as of this Definition of Virtue, by 
is explained in §17 jin., Virtue if showing it to apply in the case 
regarded in its special relation to of every individual Virtue in 
the standard of excellence is an detail. This is clearly expressed 
extreme and not a mean. again in § 11, pyréov ody x.tT.d. 
Cuar. VII.—Aristotle’s plan With a view to this it is neces- 
now is to prove the correctness sary to have an exhaustive Cata- 


i. Courage. 2 


98 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK IL 





mpagers daoyous ot pep «aborov Koworepot elow, ob 8 
em pépous adn Ouverrepov mept yap Ta Kab’ éxacTa a 


mpagers, Séov 8 emi ‘TrovTwy ouppoveiy. 


TavTa €K THS Siaypacpijs. 


Anriéov ou 
Tlepi pev oop poBous kal 


Adppn av8peta pecotns: tav & umepBadhévrev ° per 5 
7H apoBia avavupos (woddd 8 éotiv avovupa), 6d ev 


subject-matter in reference to which each Virtue is a mean 
state, together with its related Vices of excess and defect. 
Arranging them in the order of—1. Excess, 2. Mean, 3. 
Defect, we haye—i. In reference to Confidence. and Fear 


logue of the Virtues. This is 
therefore given in the present 
Chapter, and it forms a sort of 
‘Table of Contents’ for the dis- 
cussion which follows to the end 
of Bk. IV.; though the actual 
order here indicated is not 
always observed. 

2. dAnOiwarepor= ‘more real,’ 
not to be confused with drnbéc- 
repar=‘ more true.’ 

4. dvaypapjs] the table or 
catalogue. This will be found 
in an Appendix at the end of 
this Book, together with a note 
on the probable principle of 
classification upon which it is 
constructed. 

Tlepi PéBovs kat Gappy] Observe 
that in each case Aristotle first 
lays down the morally-indifferent 
(i.e. neither good nor bad in 
itself, see note on vi. 17) subject- 
matter, upon the excess, defect, 
or mean amount, of which the 
related Virtue and Vices in each 
case depend. Observe further 
that this subject-matter is in 
several cases described by a pair 


of words converse to one another, 
e.g. Confidence and Fear, Plea- 
sure and Pain, Giving and 
Receiving, etc. Now of either 
member of these pairs we may 
have excess, mean, or defect, and 
therefore theoretically there 
would be éwo Virtues, each with 
two related Vices, belonging to 
each pair. But as excess of con- 
fidence is much the same as defect 
of fear,and vice-versd, (and similar- 
ly in the case of the other pairs), 
the subdivision in each case is a 
needless refinement, like the dis- 
tinction between D# and Eb com- 
monly in Music. Hence itis only 
carried out in two cases, viz, 
Courage and Liberality, and no 
stress is laid upon it in the fuller 
discussion of Bks. JIL. and IV. 

6. mok\Aa & €oriv avevupal It 
must often be the case that re- 
finements of theory are not of 
sufficient practical importance to 
be represented by distinct words 
in common language, ¢.g. though 
in theory excess of confidence 
(év r@ Oappeiv trepBadrew) and 


CHAP. VIL]  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 99 





TO Oappetv dmepBadroov Opacvs, 6 Se TH pev poBeioGas 

3 varepBaddov Tm? 8e Papper éNNelTr@V beuhds. IT ept 
ndovas dé Kat démras ov Tdoas, Hrrov dé Kat rept Tas 
AOTrAS, METOTNS pep oodpoovrn, drepBonm 8 aKodaoian 
’Edelrovtes be Tept Tas ndovas ov Taye yivovrau 5 
Sudmrep ovd ovoparos TeTUXTKATW ovd ob Touodrot, 

4 €ctocay Sé avaic nro. Tlepi 8¢ Seow XPNMaroov Kab 
rv peaorns pev eevdepiarns, drepBony Sé wal €d~ 
Newhis adowtia Kal avedevbepia. “Evavtias 8 éavtais 
tmepBaddover Kal éedreiToVew 6 pev yap aowrTos év 10 
pev mpoecer vmepBadrer, ev Se Ampper edreirer, 6 & 
avenevOepos ev wev Amppes vaepBarre, ev Se mpoéces 

5 eAreirer. Nov pev ovv TUT@ Kai emi Kehadaiw déyo- 
PeV, apKovpevo. avT@ TovT@’ Yartepov Se axptBeaTepov 

6 mepi avtav SiopicOncerar. epi S¢ ta ypnwata Kai 15 


oy the former)—(1) Rashness, (2) Courage, (3) Cowar- 

3dice. ii. In reference to Pleasure and Pain (especially the ii. Temper- 
former)—(1) Intemperance, (2) Temperance, (8) Insensi- “"® 

, 5 tiveness, if indeed such a state exists, iii, In reference to a ‘Liberal- 
giving and receiving Money (especially the former)—(1) Pro- ' 

6 digality, (2) Liberality, (3) Sordidness. iv. In reference to mag 


deficiency of fear (€v r@ HoBeic- 

Oat éddeimew) are distinct, yet 
practically the result of both is the 
same, viz. rashness, and so this one 
word serves for both cases. It 
should also be noticed that some 
languages possess refinements of 
this kind which others have not ; 
and indeed it is seldom that any 
one word (in such cases as we are 
considering) in one language has 
its precise equivalent, meaning 
neither more nor less, in another 
language. (See Introd. p. xxxvi.). 


3. od wdoas] This limitation 
is fully explained i in HI. x. 

irrov S€ Kat epi ras Avmas] 
This is explained by III. xi. 5. 

7. dvaic@nrot] ‘insensible,’ or 
perhaps ‘insensitive,’ the latter 
reproducing not only the mean- 
ing of the Greek word, but also 
the somewhat unfamiliar char- 
acter which Aristotle admits 
it to have. 

ddouv Kai Anyi] That the for- 
mer however is much more im- 
portant is shown in [V. i. 6-11. 


10o ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK II. 








X ‘ / e \ XN \ 
yap peyarorperns Stadéper edevdepiou O pev yap Trept 
peydda, 6 Se rept puxpa), vmepBorn Se amreipoKadia Kat 
Bavavoia, edrewfis Se puxpomperea: Svadépover & 

2 a \ ‘ , A os ‘oF 
aiiras' Tov Tmept Thy édevOepiornta, 17H Se Svadépovew, 5 

7 Uarepov pnOnceras. Ilept Sé tyuny Kat aripiav peoorns | 
| 


Gdraw Siabéoes cist, peodrns pev peyadomperea (6 : 


pev peyarovyia, vmepBorn Se yauvorns Tis Neyouern, 
8 erreurs Se puKxporpvyia ws 8 Eedeyouwey every. mpos 
THY meyadoTpEemevay THY EdevOEpioTNTa, Tept juKpa Sia-— 
dépovoay, ovTas eyes TIS Kal Tpos THY meyahoYuyiar, 
Wealth on a large scale—(1) Vulgar Display, (2) Magnifi- 
7 cence, (8) Paltriness. v. In reference to honour and dis- 
‘honour on a grand scale—(1) Vaingloriousness, (2) High- 


vi, Laud- 8,9 mindedness, (3) Littlemindedness. vi. In reference to the — 
bition. «Same in ordinary matters language supplies us only with the 
| 
| 


v. High- 
mindedness 


bition. 
terms ‘Ambition’ and ‘Ambitious’ on the one hand, and 
‘Want of Ambition’ and ‘ Unambitious’ on the other. As 


1. GAa S:abécers] The dis- 
tinction between Liberality and 
Magnificence, and between High- 
mindedness and Laudable Ambi- 
tion respectively, derives its 
value partly from the political or 
social aspect in which the Vir- 
tues were regarded by Greek 
philosophers. Socially the dif- 
ference is considerable; morally 
(in the proper sense of the word, 
i.e. in reference to the character 
of the agent), the difference, 
though not perhaps wholly unreal, 
is less important. The term é:a- 
Oeots is here used as equivalent 
to €&is, though it is sometimes 
distinguished from it as indicat- 
ing a disposition or tendency 
only, in contrast with a formed 


habit (é£:s), ¢.g.., eyxpdreva is a 
d:decrs related to cappocivy as 
a e&s (see note I. iii: 7). 

3. dmetpoxadia] ‘bad taste ;’ 
literally ‘inexperience of what is 
beautiful.’ Bavavcia=Badvavoia 
(from Bavvos a forge and ati to 
burn), ‘the practice of a mechani- 
cal art,’ and hence ‘vulgarity’ 
generally. (Liddell and Scott.) 

7. Translate ‘As we said 
that Liberality was related to 
Magnificence, differing from it in 
that it is on a small scale, so 
also there is a certain Virtue 
related to Highmindedness, the 


latter being concerned with 


great honours, while the Virtue 
in question deals with small 
honours.’ 


we _— 


OO EE EE 


CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTZE’S ETHICS. IOI 





mept Topay oucay peyadny, aurn Tept piKpav ovoa ort 
yap as det opeyer Oat TUNS Kal padNov 1 Set Kat HTTOV, 
Aéyerar S 6 per brrepBaddov Tais opeGecr PidoTLW0sS, O 
& edetTrov apidor p08, 6 Se peoos aveovepos. ’ Avave- 
po Se kat ai diabéces, may 7 TOU Pidoripov puro- 
tiia. “Ober emidixdfovrar ot axpos THS eons ywpas. 
Kat tpeis Se gore pev Gre Tov wécov hidoriov Kadovdpev 
éore & dre apihoripor, Kal Corti Ste pev emawvoo ev 
9 Tov pidoripor, eats & 6 ore TOV agidortpov. Ava tiva & 
airiav TOUTO TOLOdper; ev TOIS efjs pnOnoerau viv Se 
Tept TOV NoLTaOY NeyopeV KATA TOV vpniynevov TpoTrov. 
10 Ear. S¢ Kai mept opynv vmepBorn Kal edrewpis Kal 
pecdrns, axyedov S¢ avavipwv dvTwy avTdv, Tov pécov 
™paov Aéryovres THY LeTOTHTG mpaornTa Kadeooper TOY 
o a axpav 0 pey drrepBadhoov opyidos é core, 7 Se Kania 15 
opyidorns, 08 eARetrrav aopryntos TUS, ” 8 EXDerypus 
11 aopynoia. Eioi Sé nai adrav T PELs MecOTNTES, eyouvoat 


10 


however excess and defect are thus recognised there must 
clearly be a mean state, though, in the absence of a settled 
name, either of the above pairs of terms are, according to 
10 circumstances, applied to it. vii. In reference to the regula- vii. Meek- 
tion of the Temper—(1) Passionateness, (2) Meekness, (3) ** 
Impassionateness (if there be such a word to describe a 


11 State which rarely exists). Three Virtues follow relating to Three Baoiel 
Virtues 


5. dvabécers| ‘The habits as 
well as the individual characters 
corresponding are nameless ; (or, 
the abstract as well as the con- 
crete terms are nameless)—ex- 
cept the term “ambition,” cor- 
responding with “ ambitious ”.’ 
Similarly in English we have no 
word ‘ eamabitien to correspond 
with ‘ unambitious,’ 


6. emi in Composition has a 
reciprocal force, e.g. éraporBadis, 
erripaxia (offensive and defensive 
alliance) (see Suppl. Note), ete. 

10. of rois €&ns pnOnocera] See 
IV. iv. 

16. Morr Tis] A sort of 
‘impassionate’ man. ‘tis’ as it 
were apologizes for the uncouth- 
ness of the term employed : as it 


ye 


12 


13 





102 | ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [poox 1. 





tna 


per TWA Spordrnra Tos aXhnnas, Srapépoverat S ah- 
dor Tact pev yap eiot mept hoyoow Kat mpakewv 
Kowvoviay, Suagepovar be ore ”) pev éore meph rons 
TO €v avtots, at Sé wept To Hdd TovTov Se TO pay é ev 
mada, 70 5 ev mace TOUS KATH TOV Bio. ‘Pyréov ov 5 
Kab rept ToUT@D, iva patho karidoper & Ore ep meow % U7 
peootns erawerov, Tra 8 axpa ovt op0a ovT emawera 
ahha apexTa. "Ears pev ouv eat Tovro@D Ta Thelw 
aveove pa Treuparéov 8, worep Kat emt Toy adNeov, 


auTous ovoparorovety cadnveras &verev Kal Too ebrap- 1 


axonovOnrov. ITlept pev obv To adnOes 6 ev peoos 
arnOns tu, Kat » perdtns adnOeia reyeoOw, 4 Se 
Tpoorroinats 7 pe emt TO petCov andatoveta Kab 6 éyov 
auTny arate, n Se ent 70 EXaTTov € elpaoveta Kal epov. 
IIepi 68 76 ndv TO per év mrawdug 6 6 pev pesos evtpdrre- 1 
hos Kab ” S.dbeors evTpamrehia, 18 darepBonn Baporoxia 
Kat Oo ov aura Baporoxos, 68 ednebrov arypoiKos 
TiS Kal y ees aypourta. Tepi Se 70. Aovrrov nov TO eV 
To Bim 0 pev ws Set Hous dv, pidos, Kal H wecorTns didia, 


our conduct im and towards Society—and here we must 
apologize for having to employ somewhat inadequate names 


viii, Truth- 12 to describe our meaning. viii. As regards Truth—(1) Boast- 


fulness. 


13 


fulness, (2) Truthfulness, (3) Self-Depreciation. ix As 
regards pleasantness in times of relaxation—(1) Buffoonery, 
(2) Geniality, (8) Boorishness. x. As regards general 


does elsewhere for its inadequacy, 14. eipwveia = dissimulatio, 
when it does not express the i.e. a concealment of what you 
precise shade of meaning desired: are; dAafoveia=simulatio, i.e. a 
e.g. xavvdrns tis in § 7, aAnOns pretéhsion to what you are not. — 
ris in § 12, dypoixds res in § 13, elpwveia is a difficult word to 
dyaicénrés ris in ii. 7. translate; see further note on 
4, €v avrois] te. ev Adyos IV. vii. 3. 
kal mpageow. 19. pidos and dudia are not to 





ES oe ee = ee ee 


EEE = —— 


CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 103 





68 bmepBarnon, et pev ovdevos Evexa, dpeonos, ea 8 
adereias Ths avtod, (rab, 68 édXelrav Kal ev Tacw 

(4 andns Stcepis as Kal S0aKOXOS. Ect 88 Kal ev TOIs < 
maPhpact kai Tept Ta abn pecornres’ 1 yap 
aidas apery per OUK cor, erawvelrar Se Kai 6 aiSrpav. 5 
Kai yap éy TovTous 6 pev evyerat peoos, 68 vrepBar- 
AwV, OF 6 KaTaTAHE, 6 TavTa aidovpevos- 6 6 8 e\Xeirav 


pleasantness of demeanour—(1) Obsequiousness, degenerat- 
into Sycophancy if it be adopted to serve our own inter- 
14 ests, (2) Friendliness, (3) Churlishness. We add two condi- Two im 
tions, which, though not so much settled habits as occasionally &* ety Vit ” 


aroused feelings, are yet virtuous and praiseworthy as com- viz, 


be translated ‘friend’ and 
‘friendship,’ but ‘friendly’ and 
‘friendliness.’ The character de- 
scribed is that of a man who 
naturally ‘gets on’ with every 
one he comes into contact with ; 
one who naturally attracts every 
one, just as the ‘churl’ men- 
tioned presently is one who 
naturally repels every one. 

1. ovdevds Evexa] ‘ Obsequi- 
ousness’ is spontaneous and 
natural to the character in which 
it is displayed, and so may be in 
Some sense sincere. ‘Flattery’ 
is put on, and is adopted to 
serve a man’s own interests and 
advancement, and therefore is 
necessarily insincere. 

4. Sense of Shame and Indigna- 
tion are notin the fullest sense Vir- 
tues, for two reasons ;—(1) They 
are themselves occasional Feel- 
ings (rd6y) rather than perma- 
nent States (e£e1s) in relation to 
the Feelings. This is more fully 


expressed in IV. ix. 1. A per- 
manent State, either of Shame for 
our own wrong doings or of In- 
dignation at the success of others, 
would be in no sense desirable. 
(2) Because they cannot exist 
unless there has been previous 
wrong-doing on the part of our- 
selves or others. Hence they are 
only virtuous on this condition, é& 
trobécews, as Aristotle himself 
expresses it in IV. ix. 7. 

On the other hand two reasons 
are given in the text why they 
are in some sense Virtues ;—(1) 
They are objects of praise, and 
this is an indication of Virtue as 
we have seen in the concluding 
words of B. L, also in I. xii. 6 
and II. vi. 12 (see note). (2) 
The phenomena of excess, mean, 
and defect, are exhibited in 
these two cases, as well as in 
those already considered (kat yap 
év Tovrots x.7.A. 1: 6). 


xi. Sense 


of Shame. 


Finally, 


xiii. Justice 


104 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK IL 





4) 0 unde Gras avaicyuvtos: 6 5é pécos aidywov. Ne- 


15 peats Se perdrns bOdvov Kat errixarperarias. | Eict 


\ 


it," / Xe ‘\ ‘ 2%, al , n 

Tepl AvITNY Kal NOovnY Tas ETt ToOLs cupPBaivovaL TOS 
\ a 3 

Téhas ywomevas' 6 ev yap ve“eonTiKOS AuTEsTaL emt 


Tols avatins ev mparrovow, 6 Se POovepos wrepBadrov 5 


a elk A a e 3 / a 
TOUTOV €Tl TAGL NUTTELT at, Oo & ETT LY ALPEKAKOS TOGOUTOV 


2. / n 4 ‘ / ) \ x 
16 ehrelTret TOU AvTrELTOaL WoTE Kat YalpeW. “ANNA TeEpL 


‘\ / > tf ‘ + ‘\ ‘\ 
Mev ToUTMY Kal addoOt Katpos eotar epi Se SiKato- 


pared with their opposites: viz. xi. In reference to shame felt 
f at our own conduct—(1) Excessive Bashfulness, (2) Sense of 
xo” 15 Shame, (3) Shamelessness. xii. In reference to indignation 
felt at the success, deserved or undeserved, of Ec 

y> 


16 Envy, (2) Resentment, (8) Malevolence. 


xiii. Fina 


initsseveral Justice is a word of such various meanings that we must 


types 


6. rovroy] viz. Toy veweonriKdy. 

6 dé emtxatpéxaxos k.T.A.] This 
account of éemyaipexaxia is very 
confused. (1) There is no real, 
but only a verbal, opposition 
between grieving at the pros- 
perity of others (hOdvos) and 
rejoicing at the misfortunes of 
others (emtxatpexaxia). These 
two habits are related like those 
which arise from excess of confi- 
dence or defect of fear, which 
are not really two but one, and 
are called by the common name 
Opactrns, as was explained in 
§ 2. (2) The mean (véueots) con- 
sisting in grieving at the pros- 
perity of others, when it is 
undeserved, and the excess 
(pOdvos) in grieving at the pros- 
perity of others in all cases, 
whether deserved or undeserved, 
—the defect ought to consist in 
never grieving at the prosperity 


of others in any case, but in 


either rejoicing at it or being 
indifferent to it. But in order 
to make any sense of the words 
as they stand, we must under- 
stand with yaipew in l. 7 emt 
TOs KAK@S TpaTrovew or some 
similar words, about which 
nothing has been said or im- 
plied. (See Suppl. Notes.) 

8. GAAob xatpos e€ora] On 
referring to the end of B. IV. it 
will be seen that the subject of 
véyeots is not referred to in the 
fuller discussions which follow. 


Otherwise the confusion of the — 


present passage would probably 
have been corrected in some way. 

Stxacoovrn is a difficult word 
to translate. 
‘justice’ in the limited sense 
(though even this, as Aristotle 
shows in Bk. V., is used in two 
or three distinct applications), 





eS ee 


It not only means . 


. 
* 
? 


ee 











CHAP. VIII.] 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 





ous, érrel ovy das AéyeTal, pera TadTa SveAdpevos 
mept éxaTépas epotwev Tas pecoTnTEs etow: [opoiws dé 
Kal Tept TOY NoyeKav apeTar]. 

VIIL. Tpidv Sé Siabecewv ovedy, S00 pev Kaxiav, THS 
pev nal wrepBorny Ths Se Kat’ Errenfuv, pds 8 aperhs 5 
THS MECOTNTOS, TATAL Tacals GVTIKEWWTAaL THs’ at pev 


‘ 4 \ an / ee /. 5 / 2) & 
yap aKpaL Kat TH MEoNn Kal aAANAAIS EvaYTiaL ELoL?, 


¢e 


n 


\ / ah) a </ \ \ 7 ‘ \ \ 
2 oe Eon TALS AKpals’ WOTTEP Yap TO LOOV TPOS MEV TO 


hereafter distinguish them, and then show of each kind separ- 


ately how the law of the mean is applicable to it. 


The dis- 


cussion on Intellectual Excellence will follow after that. 


Cuap. VIII.— The nature and degrees of the opposition existing 
between Virtues and the Vices related to them. 


Excess, mean, and defect are all opposed to one another in The oppo- 
2 various degrees. Compared with the excess, the mean appears 


but it has also the general sense 
of ‘uprightness’ or ‘righteous- 
ness,’ divested of the religious or 
theological savour attaching to 
these words. In this applica- 
tion, Aristotle in Bk. V. describes 
it as ovAAnBdnv waca dpern, ic. 
Virtue in the aggregate. Bk. V. 
is occupied with distinguishing 
and defining these several senses 
of dikavocvvn, and, as is promised 
here, showing how to each of 
them separately the law of the 
“mean’ is applicable in different 
ways. 

2. dpoiws x.7.X.] The words 
in brackets are probably interpo- 
lated by some copyist who 
thought it.might be well to give 
the contents of Bk. VI., as well 
as those of Bks. IV. and V. 


; ‘105- Q 


sition of 
the two 
extremes 


The objections to them are: ‘er se is 


(1) dpoiws is not true; for the 
Intellectual Excellences are in no 
sense ‘mean’ states, and Aris- 
totle never suggests or attempts 
to prove anything of the kind 
(see note on vi. 10). (2) Aris- 
totle never speaks of Aoyixal 
dperat in this sense, but always of 
Siavontixal aperal, e.g. see I. xiii. 
20, II. i. 1, etc. If we retain the 
words we must attach a very 
loose sense to duoiws and trans- 
late—‘ similarly we shall speak 
about the Intellectual Excel- 
lences also :’ infact understand- 
ing €povpev only, and not épotvpev 
TOs peadtnrés eiow. 

Cuap. ViII.—The fact that 
Virtue is a relative and not an 
absolute mean (i.e. not always 


greater than 
that of either 
of them to 
th 


6 mean. 


The mean “4 
om 

es eo th the interval between them is greater in actual distance, as we 

free ye ines Might say; and partly because sometimes one extreme appears 


defect. 






















106 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 11, 





éharrop peior; Tpos 6e To pelCov @aTTov, OUTHS at 
péoar éFeus ™pos pev Tas eretpers dmepBadnovot, mpos 
Sé Tas virepBodas edretTrovaw, € ey Te TOUS mabeor Kat 
Tais mpakeow. ‘O yap avdpeios mpos per Tov Setdov 
Opasus haiverar, pos 8é Tov Opacdv Sethos* Opolws Se. 
Ka o oappev [pos pev Tov avateOnrov axdhacros, | 
mos 8e TOV adhacroy avatoOnros, 6 68 ehevO epios ™pos 
ev Tov avenebBepov dowros, qT pos 8e TOV dowrov ave- 
3 AevOepos. Au 10 Ka arrwbobvras TOV peoov ob ax pou 
éxdTepos ™mpos éxairepor, Kal KadOvEL TOV avdpeiov 6 6 pev 
Seiros Opacuy, 6 Se Opacus Sevhov, Kal emt TOV addov 
4 avanoyov. Otre 8 VT URELLEVOOY aNd ous TOUTOVs 
meteov evavTLorns éorl TOUS aK pows ™ pos Gna 7 pos 
TO pécor" Troppwrépe yap TavTa adeorntey adda ov i 
TOU pécou, aomep TO peya TOU [uKpoU kai 76 px pov Tou 
5 perydnov 7 1 aucbeo Tov Loov. ‘Er Tpos pev TO pero eviows 
AKpows OmovoTns Tis haivetas, ws TH OpacdTyTe Tpos THY 


in defect; compared with the defect, it appears in excess. 
3 A man who is in either extreme, reserving to himself the title 
of the mean, applies to the true mean the name of the ex- 
4 treme opposite to his own. Obviously however the opposition 
between the extremes (excess and defect) is greater than that 
between the mean and either of them ;—partly because the 


half-way between the extremes 
to which it is related) implies 
that it will sometimes be nearer 
to one extreme than the other, 
and hence that the degrees of its 
opposition to them will differ in 
different cases. The main re- 
sults of this chapter are ;—(1) 
There is a greater opposition 


between the extremes inter se 
than between either of them and 
the mean. (2) Sometimes the 
excess and sometimes the defect 
is more opposed to the mean. (3) 
The degree of this divergence 
may depend either upon the 
nature of the case or upon our 
own dispositions in reference to 16, 











CHAP. vi]  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 107 





drdpeian, | Kal Th aooria pos. Tv erevBepidrn ras rots Se 
Gx pois TpOS BAAN reborn avopoworns. Ta de weiorrov 
améxovra GXdIOV € evavria opikovrat, dore a HaXov 

6 évaytia Ta mhelov amexovra. TI pos 8¢ 76 peéaov avTiKevTaL 
paNXov eb ov per 7 EXReniprs, éb av de 7 darepBonn, 5 
otov mane? pev Ov 1) Opacirns vrrepBodn oben, aNN 
 Seidta EXrEWpis ovca, a) Se coppootvy ovy u avat- 
ocbnowa evdeva ovea, GAN 4 akoNacia drepBony oben. 

7 Ava Sto & airias ToUTO oupBaiver, péav Mev THD e€ 
avtov Tov mparyarros* TO ‘yap eyyvrepoy elvan Kal 
Opordrepov To &repov akpov TO poy, ov TOUTO ana 
TouvayTiov avritiewev Harnov, otov eel | OpoLorepov 
civat Soxet TH avdpeia 7 Opacitns Kal éyyuTepov, avo- 


10 


to have a sort of affinity with the mean, whereas extremes 
inter se are radically opposed. Thus Rashness (excess) is 
more akin to Courage than Cowardice (defect) is, and so on. 
6 This natural affinity to the mean of sometimes the excess and This may 


7 sometimes the defect, depends on two causes :—i. The nature {opt on. 


of things.—Some faults would be universally allowed to be i. The nature . 


2. ta d€ mdeioroy améxovra 
K.T.A.] ‘Things which differ 
most widely are defined to be 
contraries.’ It will be under- 
stood that we are speaking of 

falling under the same 

class (é.« é. meioroy dméxovra év 
ad avT@ yéver as Aristotle else- 
ere more fully expresses it). 
All opposition or contrariety 
implies some degree of similarity. 
Otherwise Rashness for example 
might be thought to differ more 
from (say) Meanness, than from 
Cowardice: 

9. The twofold grounds of 

opposition between Extremes and 


the Mean explained in §§ 7 and 
8 suggest the first two of 
the practical rules for attaining 
the mean given in the next 
Chapter. 

10. Practical applications of 
this principle will be found in the 
discussion of Liberality (IV. i. 
31, 44), Highmindedness (IV. iii. 
37), and Meekness (IV. v. 12). 
In the first two cases, as in that 
of Courage, the defect is more 
opposed than the excess to the 
mean. In the case of Meekness, 
as in that of Temperance, it is 
the reverse, (See Supplementary 
Note.) 


’ 
E 
' 
bs 
. 


108 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK 11. 





povorepov & % Seidia, tavTny paddov avtuTiOeyer" Ta 
yap améyovta Tréiov Tod pécov evavTiwTtepa SoKes elvas 
8 Mia per obv aitia airy, é€ avtod Tod rpdypyaros, érépa 
Se e€ nudv avtdv' mpos & yap avTol waddov medvKa- 
pe THs, Ta’Ta paddov évavtia TO péow alverat. 
Ofov avrot paddov medvxapev mpos tas Hdovas, dio 
evxatdaopol écpev adAdov mpos akoaciav # mpos Koo= 
puornta. Tatr obv waddov évaytia Néyomuev, pos & 7 
érridoais paddov yiverar’ Kat Sia TovTO 4 aKodNacia 
uTepBory ovca evavTiwTépa ett TH cwppoovy. ) 
1 IX."Or pev obv éotiv 7 apern 7 70uKn ecorns, Kat 
‘errors on the right side,’ and therefore nearer the mean. 


ii. Our own dispositions—If our natural bent or inclina-— 
tion is to one extreme rather than the other, then that extreme © 


ii. Our own 8 
dispositions 







d inclina- 
tions, appears more opposed to the mean than the other. Its indul- 
gence would carry us further from the Virtuous mean than 
would the practice of the opposite extreme. 

Cua. 1X.—The difficulty of Virtue—Practical rules for attain- 
ing the Virtuous Mean—The liberty of private judgment 
in points of detail. 

Difficulty 1 The various points now established concerning Virtue 
w) ue, 


4. é& jpav airéy] This fol- out in this section. Conversely 


lows because virtue is a relative 
mean (év peodrnte TH mpos Has). 
Theories of the most absolute 
morality (see Introd. p. xxi.) 
must allow some variation in its 
application to practical details. 
Within certain limits what is 
right for one man is not neces- 
sarily right for another. The 
fallacy of Casuistry is that it ig- 
nores the considerations pointed 


it might be said that theories 
which make moral distinctions 
purely relative err in overlooking 
the considerations of § 7. 

9. émidocts] lit. ‘increase’ or 
‘addition,’ hence, probably, 
‘bias’ or ‘inclination.’ 

Cuap. IX.—Another result 
from the mean in Virtue being 
relative and dependent on cir- 
cumstances, and also from the 








CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 109 





Tas, Kat Orb peoorns Sv0 KaKiBy, THS per «a UrrepBo- 
Mav ths Se Kar’ eNrewpur, Kab ore ToLabTn éore bia TO 
oroXaoT LUM) TOU pécou elvas Tov év Tobs mabea Kea Tals 
mpageow, ixavas elpyrat. Au Lo Kat epyov earth omou- 
Satov eivau’ ev cxdorp yap TO pécov raBeiv é epryov, oiov 5 
eindov TO pécov Ov TaVvTos ana. ToD elS0TO0s. Otro Se 
Kal 70 pev opyecOfivat TmavTos Kai padior, Kai 70 Sovva 
dpryiptov Kai Saravijoar TO se @ Kal Scov Kat Gre Kat 
ov évena Kall Os, ouKere mavros ob8e pa dior Scorep 70 
e) Kal omdviov Kat émaivetov Kal Kadov. Avo Set Tov 10 
otoyatowevov Tov uécov mpaTov pev amroxywpely Tov 
BaAXov évaytiov, Kabarep Kai » Kadvipa rapasvet 
TovTou pev Kamrvov kal Kipatos exrds eepye 
vija" 
TOV yap ax pov TO pep eoTW dpaptwdorepor, To 8 iy 15 
4 TOV" émel ovv TOU pécov Tuxely aKpas xareror, Kara 
‘Tov Sevrepov pact TOU Ta edaxyuora ayrrréoy Tey 
‘Kak@v’ TovTO 8 éotat pddioTa ToUTOY Tov TpOTroY oY 


2 plainly show that it is difficult to become Virtuous, and a 
complicated matter to attain me accurate mean. ‘Three Three Rules 

3 practical rules are obvious. i. Avoid the extreme most inovan'' 
4 opposed to the mean in the sections of things. If we must Rulei. 


err, it is at any rate best to choose the lesser of two evils. 


varying degrees of opposition be- 
tween it and its related Vices 
explained in the last Chapter, is 
that it is hard to hit the exact 
mean in all cases. Hence (1) 
practical rules for this purpose 
are suggested, and (2) the right 
of individual liberty of action 
within certain moderate limits is 
maintained. 


12. Kav] There is a slip 
of memory here, Advice similar 
to this was given to Ulysses by 
Circe (Od. xii. 108). The actual 
words, however, occur in the sub- 
sequent admonition of Ulysses to 
his pilot (Od. xii. 219). 

17. devrepos Thos corresponds 
to our expression ‘a second-best 
course,’ or a ‘ pis-aller.’ 


Rule ii. 


Rule iii, 6 test of this inclination. 


6 ToLoucty. 


IIo 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, 


[BOOK 1. 





déyopen. FKomeiv Se Set Tos a Kal avror aimee 


5 eo pen" arrow yap mpos ana mrepvuapey. Toro oy 


eorat ryucpipuav ex TIS ndoviis Ka THs. omens THS. ywvo- 


pens Tepl nmas. 


Eis tovvavtiov & é éaurous adéhucwy 


Set: wroAv yap amayayortes ToD duaptavew eis TO wero 
ef d e \ / a 74. ¥ A 
n&owev, Gtrep ob Ta Suectpaypeva Tav Evrwv opOovyTes 


Rviity ‘ 
Ev wavti 8¢ paduocta dudaxtéov TO Hdv. Kab 


\ ¢e / > ‘ In / / Me 8 ¢ 
THY nOoVHYY ov yap adéKacToL Kpivouev avTnv. ~Orrep 
9 € / +f ‘\ N ¢ / aA 
ovv ob Snuoyépovtes errafov mpos thv Edevgv, tovTo 

A a A ‘ ? A XN 
Set mradeiv Kat jwas Tmpos THY NoovnY, Kal ev TacL THY 

> 

exeivov emideyely hwovnv' oUTw yap auTHV amoTeEuT~- 


ii. Avoid the extreme to which our natural inclination 


5 tends. The pleasure we derive from actions affords a simple 
ii. Beware above all of allowing the 


pleasure of actions -to bias our judgment respecting them. 


1, avrot] Thus for example 
although as a general rule the 
Virtue of Courage would be 
gained rather by acts of Rashness 
than by acts of Cowardice, yet 
there may be fearless and hot- 
brained persons who would arrive 
at it best by acts of what 
would seem to them cowardice. 
Again, in order to arrive at the 
just mean in the way of spend- 
ing money (€AevOepid77s) this rule 
would. probably direct a Scotch- 
man to aim at prodigality (dcw- 
ria), but an Irishman to practise 
what he would consider sordid- 
ness (aveAevGepia). This second 
rule would recognise each man’s 
‘besetting sin’; or, by.a change 
of metaphor, would take account 
of his ‘ personal equation.’ 

8. ddexacrot] from déxatw (and 
this from dexas, a body of ten), 


= decuriare, to tamper with the 
‘decuriz,’ and so generally ‘to 
bribe.” ddéxacro: therefore= 
‘impartial,’ literally ‘ unbribed.’ 

9. Snpoyépovres] The refer- 
ence is to J1. iii. 158 :-— 

“* On Tlion’s 

Sat ar sage chiefs and councillors of 
Halen 1 they saw, as to the tower she 


ang, tis no marvel, one to other said, 


The valiant Trojans and well-greaved 


Greeks 
For beeaity such as this should long en- — 


ure 
The toils of war; for goddess-like she — 


seems ; 
And yet, despite her beauty, let her go, 
Nor bring on us and on our sons a 

curse.”—Lord Derby's Translation. 


Similarly, says Aristotle, we © 
must dismiss pleasure from our — 
consideration, while we are de- — 
liberating, else unbiassed judg- 
ment will be out of the question. 





CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 11I 





pevot iyrrov. dpaprnopeba. Tair ov TrovoUvTEs, ws ev 
Kepanratep elrrety, paduora Sumoopeba Tov peoov Tuy 
navel. Xarerov 8 ts LOWS TOUTO, Kal padoor’ ev Tots 
xa cxaoroy" ov yap pgdtov Scopicae TOS Kai Tiaw Kab 
emt Trotous Kal TOTO xpavor opyvoréoy" Kai yap nyets 
ore pev TOUS éehNelrrovtas é errauvoupey Kai Tpaovs haper, 
ore Se TOUS Xaheraivovras avdpaders amoKxahobvTes. 
(AN 0 pev puuKpov TOU ev mrapexBaiven ov speyeras, 
our emt TO pahdov OUT emt TO iTTov, 0 be mEov" OUTOS 
yap ou  NavOaver, ‘O Se peXpL Tivos Kai ert Tooov yer- 
TOS Ov pa dSvov TO oye agopicar oude yap adXo ovdev 
TOV aicOnrév Ta be TOLAUTA ev Tous Kal & eKAOTO, Kat 
ev TH aicOnoe 7 Kpicws. To pev apa tocodto Snrot 
Srey peon eis ev Tacw érawerH, arrokrive Se Set 
OTe pev emt THv UTepBodnv, OTe S emt THY edrEL' 15 
oUT@ yap pacTa Tov pécoU Kai TOD ev TevEopEOa. 


10 











The observance of such practical rules will enable us, roughly sight varia. 
, to attain the Virtuous mean. And, after all, smail rary per 

deviations from the ideal mean are not important, nor is it toindividua! 

easy to say when they become so. In such matters of detail °°" 

much must be left to the decision of individual judgment. 

Indeed the surest way of attaining the mean in practice is to 

allow such liberty. 


4, What follows is another English, as when we say ‘That 


illustration of the often repeated 
caution in Bk. L., that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to reduce 
Morals to a rigid or mathemati- 
cal precision, for ‘ Virtue itself 
turns Vice, being misapplied’ 
(Shakespeare). See esp. § 9 just 
below dzroxNivew dé Sei x.7.X. 

13. aig@nows has no technical 
meaning hére, such as Moral 








Sense. It resembles rather the 
popular use of the word in 


must be left to each man’s own 
“sense” to decide.’ See further 
note on IV. v. 13. 

14. Observe the word dei. 
Though the mean is always in 
theory the best, yet in order to 
attain it practically, it sometimes 
becomes a duty (dct) to aim at 
something in excess or defect of 
it. See viii. 8 (note), and § 5 of 
this Chapter. 


[BOOK II. 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


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TIA ‘0 ‘J] ‘G NI OL GUAMTATA SHOIA INV SHALYIA {0 AAVOIVEVH HY, 








113 


ow 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





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ITI. 


I Tijs aperijs &n rept man TE xa mpageus ovons, Kah 
 €mt ev ToIs éxovolous erraivey Kat poyav Yywouevan, — 


Cuap, I.— Valuivasy, Lnvoluntary, Mixed and Non- Volun- | 
tary Actions CASEIN MEN ER and discussed. | 


if Phe discussion of the difference between Voluntary and — 
Involuntary actions is important (1) -in reference to the — i 


Recalling the Definition of 
Virtue in II. vi. 17 (e&us mpoat- 
perexi) ev peoornte ovoa TH mpos 

nas apo pery Ady@ Kal @s dy 6 
Ppdvipos dpicetev), we shall ob- 
tain the clue to the plan of what 
follows to the end of Bk. VI., the 
whole of which portion of the 
treatise consists of the illustra- 
tion of this Definition in detail. 

(1) €&us—This was sufficiently 
explained in IT. v. 

(2) «mpoatpercxy —This has 
been rather assumed than proved 
as yet (see II. iv. 3 and v. 4, 
etc. ). Consequently the nature 
of mpoaipeois is now discussed 
at length in its relation to Moral 
action, ch, i—v. 

(3) év peodrynte odoa tH mpos 
nuas—This point is next proved 


, 


of each of the Virtues in the list 
given in IL. vii. in detail, from — 
III. vi. to end of IV., 
of dixaocdvy in each of its — 
various senses (for which see II. 


Vii. 16) i in Bk. V. : ; 
(4) apiopery . plo a 
The intellectual powers y which — 


the variable relative mean is to — 
be determined form the subject 
of Bk. VI., and this completes the — 
discussion of the various terms — 
in the Definition of Virtue. 
The discussion of ‘ mpoalpeots or ‘” 
Deliberate Choice is appr q 
by determining first the more 
comprehensive notion of volun- — 
tariness ; since all that is delibe- — 
rately chosen must of course be 
Voluntary, though not vice vero 
(see ii. 16). The contents of the” 





: 
: 
| 
; 





CHAP. I.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


II5 





~ ap’ ‘\ A > / / Pee Se \ Xv, 4 
emt S€ ToOis akovciols cuyyvapns, eviote SE Kat EXEoU, 


me 4 %. 2 4 > A ” & n 
TO EKOVOLOY KAL AKOVGOLOY AVAYKALOVY LOWS Siopio at ToL 


b 3 A / ‘ \ a 
Tept apeTns emoKxotrovel, xpnoiov Se Kat Tots vopmo- 
4 ‘ \ / nr at 
2 Oerodct mpos Te Tas Tyas Kal Tas KoAacELS. Aoxel Se 
: Bef S o/_ x 5,2 Y / ie \ 
3 axovowa civar Ta Bia % Sv ayvoray ywopeva. Biaov 8¢ 
@e? \ 4 > > @ \ }- 
ov a eEwbev, TolavTn ovca ev n pndev cuuBar- 
7 ° a 
Retas 0 TpaTTwY 7) 6 TacxwV, oloy EL TVEDUA Kopioas 
¥ / Z dr): 5) 5 \ / 
4 70t }) avOpwrot Kvpioe ovTes. “Oca dé Sia poor pee- 
/ a / / ? / 
Cover Kaxav mparreras 4) Sia Kadov TL, olov eb TUpavVOS 


verdict we pronounce upon them, whether it be one of praise, 
blame, pardon, or pity; and (2) from the social or political 
point of view, to which we have often referred. Briefly then 
Involuntary acts are those done under compulsion or through 


ignorance. 


? 


We will speak of these in order. 


5 


Involunta 
acts defin 

as acts due to 
compulsion 
orignorance. 


i, Compulsion occurswhen our actions are entirely determined i. Involun- 


of other men. 


y some external cause, such as a storm or the superior strength 
There are also cases of Moral compulsion, 2.e. 


when we do something in itself undesirable under the fear of 


first five Chapters are briefly as 
follows :— 

i, A general distinction be- 
tween Voluntary and Involun- 
tary Actions, together with the 
intermediate classes of ‘ Mixed’ 
(if the compulsion [Bia] is incom- 
plete), and ‘Non-Voluntary’ (if 
the ignorance [ayvo.a] is avoid- 
able, or the act not regretted). 

ii, Deliberate Choice is com- 
pounded of an element of impulse 
and an element of judgment. 

iii. The relation of Deliberate 
Choice to Deliberation (BovAev- 
ais), 2.¢, to the element of judg- 
ment in ch. ii. 

iv, Its relation to Desire or 


from com- 


ulsion. 
§§ 8—12). 
This ma 


be Physical 


Moral. 


Wish (SovAnois), which it pre- The latter 
supposes, i.e. to the element of gives rise to 


impulse in ch, ii. 

v. A digression to refute the 
view held by Plato and others 
that Vice is involuntary, while 
Virtue is voluntary. 

3. Observe the frequent recur- 
rence to the social point of view 
indicated at the commencement 
in I. ii. 8, weOodos modurixy tis 
ovea, and see Introd. p. xxxi. 

4, xdAaous is punishment with 
a view to reformation (see note 
on v. 7), and so is naturally put 
in contrast with ripn, reward for 
the sake of encouragement. 

6. dpxn] the originating or 


ed Acts, 


acts are 
voluntary 
vo 

than in- 
voluntary, 


5) éxovota. 


6 aaravtes ob voor & 


116 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK TIt. 





tpoordrror aioxpov TU mpage KUptOS ov ryoueeoy Kat 
TEKVOV, Kat mpagarvros poev catowro, 7) mpagavros Cy 
anoOvna Korey, appusBirnow ¢ VEL morepop dxovovd éorw 


Towdrov Sé tt cup Paiver Ka mept Tas €v 


Tots yYerpaoww exBords* dmrads pev yap ovdels arro- | 
Baadrerar Exov, eri cornpia 8 avtov Kat Tav hovrav — 


OVTES. 


mM \ ‘N 9 te. e ; . 
LKTAL [EV OV ELOLV Ab TOL- 


a A / 2." € oe € \ 
avrat mpates, eoikact S€ paddOV EKOUGLOIS* aLpEeTat 
, 3 / vA , . ‘\ de XO A / J 
yap €tot TOTEe OTE TpaTrTovTaL, TO de TéNOS THS Mmpakews 
\ / > \ Se 7 ‘ \ Aad 4 

Kata Tov KatpoV EoTIY Kal TO éXovotoY on Kat TO akov- | 


Ctov, Ore mparret, Reereov. 





II parret be é éxov' Kar yap 


n apxy Tov Kively Ta opyaviKd wepn ev Tals Tovatiraws 4 
9 a 
mpagerw ev auTe cori’ ov S ev wUTe 1 apy er 


aUvT@ Kat TO Tparrew Kab pon. 


“Exovova 87 Ta TOUAUTA, . 


amas § tows axovova’ ovdels yap av EXovtro Kal’ avTo 1 


6 some greater evil, or the hope of some greater good. But — 


such actions are, so to speak, mixed, being neither purely 
Such mixed yoluntary nor purely involuntary. They are rather voluntary — 
however, (1) because they are deliberately chosen at the 
moment of performance ; and (2) because it is always physi- 


motive cause of the action: 
[ speaking technically, the Efficient 
, Cause (see Glossary p. xlvii.). 

9. rd dé rédos Kt.A.] The 
object or motive of an act 
is to be determined in reference 
to the time of its performance ; 
so (67) whether the action were 
voluntary or involuntary is 
‘to be determined in reference 
to the moment of action. If 
ion je ea motive determined 

action then, the. action 
wget must have been volui- 
y, @nd that fact cannot 





at 


be altered by regrets or after- 
thoughts when the danger is 
past. That such is the case in 
the actions we are considering is — 
evident, because the Movement — 
of the limbs at least is perfectly 
free at the moment of action 
(see 1. 12). 
12. opyavika pépn| the limbs 
which Py ptr HX, the 
performance of the act. | 
15. dhs] i.e. simply or abs- 
tractedly, ie. considered apart 
from surrounding cirenmstances. 





CHAP, 1.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 117 





7 TOV TOLOUTOOY oudev. "Emi tats mpageos 8e Tals ToLau- 
ad éviore Kal erramodvTat, Grav aioxpev TL i) Aumnpov 
dmropevon.y aytt peryanov Ka Karo" ay & avaradw, 
peyovras Ta yap aioxwo® v virowervas emi pndevi KaN@ 

7) perpie pavrov. "Er éviows & errawwos pev ov yiverau, 5 
wun ©, drav Sua Towaira mpaéy Tis & pr Sel, & 
tv avOpwrivny dvaw vmepreiver Kai pndeis dv vrropet- 

8 va. “Ena tows OUK éorw avarynac Ofvan, ada 
parrov amoSaveréov rabovtt Ta deworara: wai yap Tov 
Eupurisou’ ‘Adepatova yedova paiveras Ta avaykdcavra 10 

9 pnt poKTovncan. "Eote be xarerrov eviore Siaxpivat Totov 
avti moiov aiperéov Kab TL avTL Tivos v vrropever or, ére 

| be Xarerwrepov eupetvar Tos yvoobciow’ os yap emt 
TO Tow éort Ta pev mpoadoxapeva humnpa, as avary- 
Katovtat aioypa, Oey errawor Kai Yroryou yivovtas mept 15 


8 cally in our power to abstain from them. Their moral and their 
character is various. We praise, blame, or make allowance moral char: 


9 for them, according to circumstances ; but it is impossible to with ofrcum 





1. Regarded in their moral 
aspect these mixed actions fall 
into three classes, (Note, it is 
due to their mixed character, and 
so far as they have an element 
of voluntariness about them, that 
ae admit of a moral aspect at 

) 

(1) Praise is accorded, when 
something painful or humiliating 
(aisxpov) is endured from a 
noble motive, eg. the case of 
martyrdom, and the legends of 
= Regulus, Lady Godiva, 


wen Blame, when shame or dis- 
grace is accepted without ade- 


quate reason, e.g. the conduct of 
a traitor who betrays his country 
or friends to secure his own re- 
lease from prison. 

(3) Allowance is made, when 
the pain or danger is such as 
to overstrain (imepreive:) human 
endurance, ¢.g. confessions or 
revelations wrung out by torture. 
Aristotle adds that there are 
some acts so disgraceful that no 
torture could secure allowance 
for them, e.9J. matricide. 

ll. ra dvayxdoavra pnt poKro- 
vnoat] viz. histather Amphiaraus’s 
injunctions to do so, under pain 
of his displeasure. 


118 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Ii, 





‘ b / , 
10 Tous avarynaaevras i pm. 
"H amas per, OT0T ay % aitia év TOS eKTOS p Kai O 


I 


— 


mparroy pide oupBardyras ; ; 


Ta én, TOUd paréoy Biawa ; ; 


“A be «a aura pay 


axovoud ert, vov Se Kat att TavOE aipera, Kal 1) apy 
ev Te | Mparrovrt, wa avTa ev akovotd cort, viv Se 


Kat avtt Tovde éxovcta. 


Marxov § éorxev éxoveious* 


¢€ \ / > > 7 
ai yap mpagers ev Tous «al exact, Taira 8 éxovova. 
Tota 8 a avTt ToLwY aiperéov, ov padvov amrosouvas' Tron- 


hat ‘yap Siaopat elow ev TOIS nal & éxaoTa. 


Ei &€ THs 


Ta NOea Kal Ta Kana pain Biava elvat (avarynatfew yap 1 
éw ovra), wavta ay €in avT@ Biavar ToUTo@Y yap yapi 
TAVTES mara mparrovow. Kai ol pe" Bia Kai aKovres 


Avirnpas, ob Se Sia TO HOU Kat Kadov peO sDovies 
Notov &) TO aitiacOa Ta exTOos, GANA pH avTov evOn- 


19 lay down any general rules on such a subject. 


Te- 


We reserve 


‘ then the term Involuntary for cases of physical compulsion. 


The violent I 4 


pleasure of 


actionsisin . 


no case to be 
considered 
as asource of 
compulsion 
which can 
excuse them. 


Under no circumstances, however, must the violent desire 


' for what is pleasurable or honourable be regarded as caus- — 


ing such compulsion as would make an act involuntary, for 
(1) This would make all our actions compulsory, and so ~ 
would prove too much; (2) Such actions are pleasurable, — 


while compulsion is painful. 


The fault really rests with those 


who allow themselves to be so easily ‘ compelled,’ who wish to ¥ 


escape the responsibility of their bad actions and yet retain ~ 


10. No emphasis is to be laid on 
ra kaa here, because practically, 
no one does argue against the 
voluntariness of noble acts on 
the ground that the intense plea- 
sure to be derived from them 
forces uson. (This is clear from 
the concluding words of this ch., 
and also from ch. v.) Logically, 
however, the higher pleasure of 


sd kaddv and the lower pleasure 


of 7d 760 stand on the same ~ 
footing, so far as they affect the — 


voluntariness or involuntariness — 


of actions. Indeed,as Ar. argued 
in II. iii. '7 (fin.), ro kaAdy aS aMO0- 
tive for action is in some sense ~ 
included under rd 750. This — 
reference also illustrates what 
follows, rodrwy yap yap K.T.d. 





CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


119 









parov evra vio TOD ToLOUT@P, Kal TOV per KaN@V éavror, 
12 Tov © aicxpav Ta noea. “Eowxe & TO Biavov elvat ov 
efwbev 1) apn, pmdev ovpBar)opevor ° Tob Brac Bévros. 

0 dé wa cryvoway ouy éxovovov pev amav erry, aKkov- 
ovov dé TO eriAvTrOV Kal ev peTapenreia’ 6 yap Oe a aryvovay 5 
mpagas oTLobv, pndev Se duaxepaivey ert 7H mpaget, 
EKOV pev ov TET aXe, 6 ye Kan bet, oud avd axwr, py 
Aurovpevds ee Tod &n Se aryvova 0 per ev perapenece 
ae Soxei, 0 0 be a METAMENOMEVOS, ETrEL Erepos, éoTo 
ovy éxav emet yap Siadéper, BéATLoY dvoua exeww tdz0V. 
"Erepov 8 éovxe kai To St ayvovay mpartew Tov ayvo- 


13 


14 


2 credit for their good ones. We therefore define a compulsory 
act to be one caused by some external force to which the 
oe himself contributes nothing. 

3 i. The other cause of involuntary actions was said to be i. Tuvolun- 
Bicasnee This statement must be guarded by two condi- through 
tions :—(1) First there must be subsequent sorrow for the act egret 
done in ignorance: else it cannot be considered as really two con- 
involuntary. Still as we cannot exactly say that it was aonnedt 
voluntary, we shall for convenience sake describe such actions 1. subse- 


5 as non-voluntary. (2) Ignorance must not extend to the qentregret. 
Ce 
m 


5. émidvrovy] Compare Jean 
Paul, ‘Joyful remembrances of 
wrong actions are their half 
repetitions, as repentant remem- 
brances of good ones are their 
half abolitions.’ 

10. As another illustration of 
the difference between involun- 
tary and non-voluntary, Aristotle 
elsewhere states that the action 
of the heart is involuntary, that 
of respiration non-voluntary : 
the former is entirely beyond our 
control, the latter not so. 

1l. Observe that the expres- 


sions, @yvoia Tov } cuppeporros, 7 1 facts, not of 


kabdhov dyvoia, cyvoua ev Ti mpo- 
aipevet, ayvoovvra roveiy, are all 
equivalent, and are opposed to 
9 xa@ éxacta ayvoia and to 6 
irom mov. The former is 
ignorance in the major premiss, 
or the general principle ; ; the 
latter ignorance in the minor 
premiss, or the particular appli- 
cation of the general principle. 


The drift of the passage seems to. 


be to show that ignorance does 
not make an action involuntary 
unless the ignorance itself is in- 


ples. 


120 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, [BOOK III 









\ 4 , / 3 > 
ora Trove o yap peOvov 7) opyfomevos ov Soxel Sv 
A / b \ , a > / ‘) Ia’ 
ayvolay TpaTTEL, AAG Ova TL TOV ELPNMEVOV, OVK ELO@S 
Se >. 8.3 a >] rl ‘\ S a ¢ ‘\ a a 

€ aA ayvoov. “Aryvoel pev ovv Tas 0 woxOnpos & Set 
4 \ @ > / \ ‘ ‘ 4 / 
TPATTEW KAL OV APEKTEOY, Kal Oia THY TOLAUTHY awapTiav 
of A \ / a‘ > 4 / 
15 GOdLKOL Kat OAS KaKol yivovtar. To 8 aKxovovov Bovrerat 
/ > + > ae. / > \ b] 
Eyer Oat ovK el TIS ayVOoEL TO TULHEpoV" OV Yap H EV TH 
/ + IA are / >. \ 
TPOALPETEL AYVOLA ALTLA TOU AKOUViOV AAAG THS 
/ 2 € / \ / 4 b > 
pias, ovd 7 Kaborov (apeyovrar yap Sia ye TavTny) arr 
/ 2 @ \ X, a A > / 
n Kal Exacra, ev ois Kat Tmept & 7 mpakis* ev TOUTOLS — 
\ \ \ / ‘ 4 > a 
yap Kal éheos Kal cuyyvopm? Oo yap TOUTwY TL ayvoov 1 
b / / 7 > > a / } ee 
16 axovoiws mpatte. ~Iaws ovv ov yelpov dvopicat ava, 
/ \ / > \ / ‘\ \ / \ \ / > / 
TiVa Kat TOCA EoTL, TiS TE ON KAL Ti KAL MEPL TL EV TiVE 
4 Df \ “ / @ > , \ / 
mparret, eviote SE Kal TiVL, OLoV Opyave, Kal EveKa TiVOS, 


principles of conduct, but only to the details, or acts: else a 
drunkard or a passionate man, or indeed any one who does 
wrong, might plead ignorance in some sense, and hence in- 
voluntariness. Therefore, for the sake of distinction again, 
we shall say that one who acts in ignorance of the general 
principles of conduct, or of what is befitting, or in ignorance 
affecting the deliberate choice of his actions, acts ‘ zgnorantly,’ 
16 but not ‘ through ignorance,’ nor involuntarily. But one who 
acts in ignorance of some of the details or circumstances 
accompanying his action, we shall say acts ‘through ignor- 
ance,’ and involuntarily. e.g. Ignorance of ‘fact’ or of 


voluntary. Ifthe ignorance could 
have been avoided at the outset, 
the agent is fully responsible for 
it, and also for all and any con- 
sequences that it may lead to. 

2. dia re rev eipnuevar] i.e. 
peOn or dpy7 understood from 
peOvav 7H dpy:Cdpuevos. 

12. mepi ri H ev rin refers to 
the object upon which or whom 
the act takes place, eg. a man 


slaying his son or his father 
in battle unwittingly, The 
murder of Laius in ignorance did — 
not make (£dipus, morally 
speaking, a parricide, 

13. Evexa tivos (like ob vera in 
§ 18) has not its usual meaning 
of ‘motive’ (of which ignorance _ 
would be out of the question), 
but that of ‘tendency,’ as the 
examples show. 





18 maniac could be ignorant. 


CHAP. I.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


12t 





17 otov gwrnpias, Kat Tas, otov npepa i) opodpa. “Aravra 


pev our TavTa ovdels a av dryvonjcese pa paLvouevos, oiprov 
S a as ovde TOV Tpatrovta: TOS yap éavtov ye; “O Se 
mparrel, aryvoncevey ay Tis, toy Aéyoures pac éK- 
TEGEL auTovs, }) ove eidevar Ott améppyta 1, aomep 
Aiaxtnos Ta puaTuKca, i) deiEau Bovdopevos adeivan, @S 
6 TOV warameNrqy. OinBein 8 a ay THs Kat TOV vio qToXe- 
pov elvas worep 7) Meporn, nai eaharpdcbas To Nedoy- 
xopevov Sopu, i) Tov ibov eigonpw elvau’ Kat emt 
corny micas amoxteivar av’ Kat GiEas Bovdopevos, 


18 aomep ot axpoxerprbopevor, mardgeuer a av. 
/ 


Tlepi travra 


> 4 
87) TadTa THs ayvolas ovons ev ois 7 Tpakis, 0 TOUT@V 
5] / ¥ a / \ /- ? 
TL ayvonoas axwy SoKxet TeTpaxéval, Kal padioTa EV 
, / n > @ e 
Tos KuplwTaros* KupioTata 8 elvar Sones ev ols 7 


‘detail’ may apply to the agent, the act itself, the object, 


17 the instrument, the tendency, or the manner of the act. 


Of 


all of these at once, and especially of the first, none but a 


But ignorance of one or more of 


such details, and especially of the object or of the tendency 
of the act, may well occur, and cause the act to be an in- 


4, otoy k.t.A.] ‘as men in con- 
versation say that they made a 
slip (‘let the cat out of the bag’), 
or else that they did not know 
that it was any secret.’ These are 
of course two different excuses, 
either of which would illustrate 
what is meant by ignorance of 
the act itself. So also would the 
other case mentioned, viz. when 
@ gun goes off accidentally and 
kills some one. 

8. eoparpio bat Td Aedoyxo- 
pévov Odpu] ‘believing the conn 
to be rounded at the end when 


it was actually pointed,’ .¢. like 
a foil with a button for fencing. 

9. xiconpw] pumice-stone, 
and therefore not likely to hurt 
any one. This illustrates ignor- 
ance of the instrument, 

él owtnpia| ‘ with a view to 
save ;’ e.g. if William Tell had hit 
his son, when aiming at the apple. 
(In ref. to &vexa tivos above.) 

ll. dkpoxeipifduevor| ‘ spar- 
ring.’ This example explains 
ignorance of the manner or de- 
gree of force of an act (ds, oter 
npepa 7) opddpa, § 16). 


122 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK III. 





“ \ @ 4 \ Q ‘ 4 
19 mpagis Kal ov evexa. Tob 67) Kara Thy TowaUTAD ayvoway 
dxovtov Neryomevou ere Set TH Tpakw AuTnpav eivas 
Kat év perapeneta. 
Sa n 4 \ > + XX 2 4 

"Ovros § akovoiov Tov Big | Kat 8 ayvouwy, TO €KOU- 
ovo SaGevey a ay elvat ov 1) apn ev are elder ta Kal’ 5 
21 éxaora év ols 1) mpagis. et Tos yap ov KaNaS AEyeTaL 
22 axovovs elvan 7a Sia Ovo 7 H Ov emBupiay. IIpérrov 

jev yap ovdev Tt Toy adNwov Covey éxoucis mpaget, 
23 ovd ob maides* era TOTEpOV ovdey € éxovolws Tparrowev 

TOY Sv emiBupiay kat Oupov, } Ta Kana pev éxoua ts 10 

Ta 8 aicxpa akovaiws; 7) yéedotov évos ye aitiov ovTos; 

+ eZ \ > 4 / @ oe: MIA 
24 aToTrov 5€ tows TO akovota davar wv Set opeyerOar 


20 


19 voluntary one ‘through ignorance’; provided always that 
subsequent sorrow attends the discovery of what has been 
thus done through ignorance. 

Having now explained the nature of both kinds of involun- 
tary actions, we may define Voluntary acts conversely to be 
‘those originating from the agent himself, he having a full 
knowledge of the circumstances under which he is acting.’ 
rguments 21 This definition must be defended against the false view (which 
ae nots it in fact condemns) that acts done from anger or desire are 


ntary 20 
sts defi ned. 


hat acts 

one involuntary, though originating in the agent himself. (1) They 
ngeror 22 are not so, because all the acts of the lower animals and 
rong we 23 even children would then be involuntary. (2) Take this 
‘oluntary. dilemma :—Lither it is meant that all acts of anger and desire 


are involuntary, or that the bad ones are involuntary and the 
good voluntary. The latter supposition is absurd, because 
the motive cause (anger and desire) is the same in both cases. 
24 The former is absurd because there are occasions when we 


6. “Iows yap] The force of involuntary actions, are rightly 


ap is to indicate that the fol- 
lowing class of actions (viz. ra 
did Oupdv H 80 emiOvpiav), which 
are intentionally excluded by 
the Definition just given from 


so excluded. (See Suppl. Notes.) 

12. dei is of course the empha- 
tic word. The sense of ‘duty 
excludes the notion of involun- 
tariness. If we ‘ought’ to do 





ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


CHAP. I.] 123 





Aa at RA. / s /# ,. 3 nn a @ 

Sei Se ai opyitec Oar eri Tice Kat eTriOvpely Twar, olov 
/ ° 4 \ s > 7 
25 vyltelas Kal pabnoews. Aoxel Se Ta wev akovota AUTTNpA 
\ ae / / ‘ / / 

26 civas, ta Se Kat ertOvpiav ndca. “Ere Se ti diadépes 
hi ey: 3 a. ees ov fh Ouuov a * 

T® akovow elvab Ta KaTa oyropov H Ovpov dwapTy 


27 Oevra; deveTa pev yap audw, Soxet Se ovy Hrrov 5 


5 A Ne- K / e ‘\ / A 

avOpworixa eivat ta adoya wan. At Se mpakes Tod 

> / } Pn” A A > / »” . 4 

avOparrov amo Oupov Kai eriOupias. “Atorrov Sy To 

/ > 7 sy 
TUeval aKkovola TaUTa. 
/ ‘\ A c / A a 93> 4 
1 IL. Atwpiopevor Se tov te Exovoiov Kat Tov axovciov, 


ought to feel anger and desire, and there can be no ‘ought’ in 

25 the case if we are then involuntary agents. (8) The actions 
we are considering are done with pleasure, whereas involun- 

26 tariness necessarily involves pain. (4) If wrong acts 
done deliberately are voluntary, and those done through anger 
and desire involuntary, how is it that, making no difference, 
we feel that we are to avoid the one as well as the other? 

27 And passion and reason being equally essential parts of human 
nature, and springs of human action, it is absurd to attempt 
this distinction between the acts which result from them. 


Cup, I1.—Deliberate Choice (mpoaipeots) ts compounded of an 
element of impulse and an element of judgment. 


t This explanation of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ clears 
2 the way for the discussion of Deliberate Choice, which obvi- 


anything it is clearly a voluntary 
act to do it. 

3. ti Suapeper «7.A.] The 
words T@ dxovoua eivar belong in 
sense to ‘rd kata Oupdv duaprn- 
6évra’ only. What difference is 
there between deliberate errors 
and errors of passion from the 
fact of the latter being (as it is 
argued) involuntary, since we 


ought to avoid both kinds of 
error? If one class were volun- 
tary and the other involuntary, 
we should not have the same 
feeling about avoiding them 
both. 

6. ra Goya mdOn] i.e. ra Kare 
Oupov 7 isd siles as opposed te 
Ta Kata Aoyiopdr. 

Cuap. Il.—The object of this 


po titan ih 
of mpoaipecis 
introduced. 


i Itisnot 3 ously is a particular case of voluntary action. 


sob an 
because— 


1) It is not 
e same as 
Desire. 


yy 
3 Ov. 


Tau 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Ir. 





mepl mMpoatpeaews erretar SueAOciv' oixevorarev yap elvas 


a a 3 a A A \ y / a 
Soxel TH apeTH Kat waddov Ta On Kpivew Tov I 
c / x e , ‘ / 3 ao \ 
2 ‘H mpoatpecits Sn exovatoy pev paiverat, ov Tavtov oe, 


OV. 


>. ee / “ ce 4 fr \ ‘ e \ 
GAN emi TA€OV TO ExovCLOY' TOU EV yap éKoVaioU Kal 
maives Kab TaAXKa boa Kowwvel, Tpoapécews 8 ov, Kat 
ta ekaidvns éxovara pev Neyomer, KATA mpoaipeow & 


Oi Se A€yovtes auTHv eriOupiav 7 Ovpov 4 Bov- 


Anow 74 Twa Sokav ovK éoixacw opOds reyew. Ov yap 


i. Some con- 


sider deliberate choice to be a matter of impulse. If go, it 


. must be either Desire, Spirit, or Wish, this being admitted 


as a complete list of our Impulses. (1) It is not the same as 
Desire, beeause—(a) Irrational animals have desires but do 


chapter is to establish the com- 


pound character of mpoaipecis or 


deliberate choice, as consisting 
of an element of impulse and an 
element of judgment. This is 
done by proving that it is not 
identical with any sort of im- 
pulse singly, or of judgment 
singly. If it were identical with 
impulse, it must be either desire, 
spirit, or wish (these being as- 
sumed as an exhaustive classifi- 
cation of impulse (épegis), as 
Aristotle elsewhere (De An. II. 
iii, 2) explains). That it is not 
any of these, is shown in §§ 3—9. 
If it were identical with judg- 
ment (dé&a), or the expression of 
an opinion merely, it must be 
either judgment generally (6£a 
dvs), or judgment when ex- 
ercised in a certain sphere, viz. 
matters of practical interest (86£a 
res). That this is not so is 


shewn in §§ 10—15. I¢ is then 
affirmed to be a choice resulting 
from deliberation, thus combin- 
ing both impulse and judgm 

1, oixerdrarov yap] ‘1t (viz. 
pea ae appears to be very 

osely connected with Virtue, 
and to be a better test of moral 
character than actions.’ The 
question whether the intention 
or the outward act is more im- 
portant in morals is again re- 
ferred to, X. viii. 5. 

6. ra e£aidyns] Acts done ‘ on 
the spur of the moment.’ 

7. The principal difference be- 
tween émOupia (for which ‘de- 
sire’ is too wide, and * appetite ’ 
too narrow) and BovAnots, or 
‘wish,’ is that Fiat is in 


connexion with a body, while — 


BovAnors is not. <A spirit could 
experience BovXAnots, but not 


enGupla. 





nap, 11] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


125 





Kowov %) Tpodipeots Kal TdV adoyov, eTiOvuia Se Kat 
/ © Oe an » > ee. XN , 

4 Oupos. Kai 6 axparns em Oupav pev pater, Mpowt- 

povpevos § ov 6 eyxparns 8 avarradw mpoarpotpevos 


5 uv, eribypév 8 of 


Kai mpoaipéces pev émriOupia 


évavriodrat, ertOupia 8 eriOvpia ov. Kai 4 wev éri- 
Oupia Hd€os Kar érridbrou, 1) Tpoaipects 8 ovTE AvTNpOU 
6 ov Hd€05. Ovpos 8 ers hrrov Hevota yap Ta dua Ov- 


‘ on i / ; a 
7 mov KaTa Tpoaiperw civar Soxel. 


"ArAra pny ovde 


4 / / 
Bovrnois ye, Kaitrep ovveyyus dawopevor tpoaipects 
a 3 4 / + / 
WEY yap OvK Eats TOY advVaTwY, Kal el TIS hain Tpoal- 
‘4 4. ? 
petcOa, Soxoin dv HriBv0s civarr Bovrnows 8 eoti Tov 


not act with deliberate choice. 
(b) The incontinent act in accordance with 


4 Spirit also.) 


(This argument applies to 


their desires, but against their deliberate choice; the con- 


5 tinent, vice versa. 


c) Desire is not opposed to desire, but 


to something else, viz. deliberate choice, which checks or’ 


resists it. 


6 painful, but deliberate choice is not. 
pirit, for impetuous actions are the very 


(d) Desire is limited to what is pleasurable and 


(2) Still less can it be 
last we should 


7 deseripe as done through deliberate choice. (8) It is not the 


_ game as Wish, though not very dissimilar to it. 


(a) We may 


wish for impossibilities, but we cannot deliberately choose 


4, The third argument seems 
to rest on the notion (found also 
in Plato) that conflict or opposi- 
tion can only occur between two 
different parts of our constitu- 
tion, @g. between desire and 
reason, between impulse and re- 
solution, etc., but that no de- 
partment, whether that of reason 
or desire, or any other, can be 
‘divided against itself.’ In fact, 
it follows from the ‘law of con- 
tradiction ’ that nothing can do 
or suffer contraries at the same 


time in reference to the same 
part of itself, etc. A similar 
argument was employed in I. 
xiii. 15, etc., to show the dis- 
tinctness of the appetitive and 
rational parts of the soul. Also 
it should be remembered that 
émOupia (as was explained above), 
like ‘appetite,’ implies a physi- 
cal or bodily affection, such as 
thirst, hunger, etc., of which the 
statement in the text is clearly 
true. 
7. Por Ovpos see Suppl. Notes 


2) nor , 
pirit ; 


Ra 


126 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III. 





8 advvdroy, olov abavacias. Kai bev Bovryois ott 
Kal Tept Ta pndap.iors &? avrod mpaxGevra ay, oloy 
Droxpuray TWA vnc i) abr ay mpoaupelrar be Ta 
TOLAUTA ovdels, GAN boa overat yeverOar av &¢ avrob. 
9”Ert & 4 pev Bovrnow Tod tédous éott paddov, H Se 
Mpoaipecis TOV Tpos TO TEXOS, oLov vytaiverw Bovropeba, 
mpoaipovpeba Se 8: av wyravodper, Kat evdaipovelv 


10 elvau. 


Bovrcpeba wev Ka paper, mpoatpovpeba ée Aeryew ou 


dpywote dws yap coucev yi Tpoaipecis mepi Ta ep mei 


Ovbe on Soka ay evn 7 pev yap Sofa Soxet rept 


Tava eivat, Kal oudev HTTOV Tept 7a aidia Kat Ta adv- 
vata ta ep nuivr Kat TO rpevdel Kat adyOet Svarpetras, 
a a / ‘ / 
ov TO KaK@ Kat ayabe, 7 m poaipeois be ToUTOUS Had Rov. 
"i / > 
11 Orws pev ovv So&n TavTov tows ovde reve ovdeis. AAX 


8 them, (b) We may wish for things which, though not im- 


9 possible, are out of our own power. 
Hence deliberate choice is no 


i Tis isnot 10 sort of impulse singly. ii. Secondly, it is not judgment, or 
ya 


udgment 
oropinion, _ 
either gene- 
rally, 


or limited II 
to the 

sphere of 
morals and 
practice. . 


deliberate choice to means. 


expression of opinion, merely. 


(c) Wish refers to ends, 


(a) Judgment or opinion may 


be on all subjects, whether in our power or out of it. (6) The 
excellence, or the reverse, of judgment consists in its being 
true or false to fact; that of deliberate choice in its being 
morally good or bad. It might however be thought to be 


» 1. a€avacias] ‘ exemption from 
death,’ This, like vi. 6 (see note), 
is an allusion of too passing a 
kind to bear on the question of 
Aristotle’s belief in a future 
state. 

8. xal gapev] ‘we use the 
expression wish to be happy ;’— 
an appeal to common language. 

10. 8d&a here stands for an 
intellectual decision, the mere 
pronouncing of an opinion as to a 


fact, apart from any impulse or 
desire for action. Though it 
would be hardly supposed that 
mpoaipeois could be identical 
with this generally (§ 11), yet it 
might be thought identical with 
such an expression of opinion on 
practical or moral subjects. This 


is the 6é&a tis or particular ap- — 


plication of opinion referred to 
in §§ 11, ete. 





E 


[3 re 


CHAP. II.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


127 





In / ee, - 5) a a , 
Ovdé Tiss TH yap MpoarpetcOas Tayala 7 TA KaKa TroLOL 
Sek e ‘\ / ¥ \ 7 ‘ 
12 Tives ecpev, tT Se Sokakew ov. Kai mwpoapovpeba pev 
a rn n > 
haBeiv } huyeiv 4 Te Tav ToLovTwr, So€dLopev Se Te eoTev 
rn tal a bE] 
}) tive cvpdépes } ras* AaBeiv & 4 duyeiv ov mavu 


13 Sofdfouer, Kai 1 uev mpoaipeois érasvettas Te elvan ov 


Sef wadrov } TO OpOas, 7) Se Sofa TO ws adnOas. Kai 
mpoaspovpela pev & padiota topev ayaba dvta, Soka- 


14 Couev Se & ov trav toper. 


eo 8 > ec ea, 
Aoxovct Te ovxX ob avToL 


mpoaipeto0ai Te apiota Kar Sokdfew, adWN evior So€afeuw 


15 ev Gpewor, Sia Kaxiav 8 aipeicOas ovy & Sei. 


Ei 


\ / A / a 
de TT pOyLverT: at Sef a TS TT poatpeT EWS h TapaKonoviei, 

Sa / 5 ] a \ n > ae > 
ovoev Svadeper OU TOUTO yap OKOTT OULED, aXXr €t TAVTOV 


simply an expression of opinion on subjects practical or moral. 
This is not the case, for (a) Character is formed by deliberate 
choice of good and evil, not by opinions on such subjects. 
12 ee Choice relates to pursuing or avoiding, opinion 


tes to questions of fact. 


(c) The excellence of deliberate 


choice depends on its direction to right objects; that of 


Opinion on its correctness in fact. 


(d) We deliberately choose 


what we know or feel sure about; we form opinions irrespec- 


14 tive of knowledge or certainty. 


(e) Excellence of deliberate 


choice and of opinion are not always united in the same per- 


t5 sons, e.g. the incontinent. 


Whether correct opinion pre- 


cedes or accompanies deliberate choice is unimportant, we 


4. AaBeivy 7 vycivy] another 
appeal to the usage of language. 
. We do not speak of forming an 
opinion to pursue or avoid, but 
of forming a resolution or choice 
to do so. 

6. 7 is ‘or,’ not ‘than,’ as may 
be inferred from what was said 
in § 10, just above. — 

9. voi] precisely the case of 


the incontinent (dxpareis). See 
§ 4 above. 

ll. Aristotle here notices, 
without discussing, the interest- 
ing question whether correct 
views (Sd£a) precede good reso- 
lutions (poaipects), or vice versd ; 
whether right knowledge usually 
leads to right practice, or right 
practice to right knowledge. 


ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. 


128 [BOOK II. 





16 éory Son tii. Ti ovv } rotev tv éoriv, émedn Tov 
elpnpeeveay ovbey ; Exovovov pev 57 paivetar, To & éxod- 
17 ctov ov may mpoaipetov. ’°AXN apa ye To mpoBEBou- 
Nevpevoy ; 1) Yap mpoaipeots joera Aovyou Kal Siavotas. 
t . a ¥ \ y ¢ . ae 
Trocnpaivew § eotxe Kai tovvoya ws dy mpd Erépov 
aipeTov. 
1 ILI. Bovnevovra: 88 worepa rept ravrwv, Kat Trav Bov- 
2 NevTOY eoTID, i) Tept évlov ovKh tore Bourn ; NexTéov & 
tows Bovdevtov ov>~y wirep ov BovrNevoalT av Tis HALOLOS 
3 7) masvomevos, GAN vrep Ov 6 vody éyov. epi S¢ trav 1 
aidiov ovdels Bovdeverat, olov mepl Tov Kdcpov # THs 
/ ee 6 ae EE, 2 ? ote 
4 SlapeTpov Kal THS TAEvpas, OTL aovppeTpor. “ANN ovdE 
16 only maintain that they are not identical. We have then ad- 
vanced thus far. Deliberate choice is voluntary and some- 


17 thing more. In fact, as the name indicates, it is ‘a choice 
following upon deliberation.’ 


CuaP. IlI.—The proper objects of Deliberation (Bobhevers). 


Proper 1,2 We now inquire what are the proper objects for deliberation, 
orp which is, as we have seen, the first stage in deliberate choice. 
liberation 3 (1) Negatively, we do not deliberate about (a) Things eternal 


ii 4 and immutable; (4) Things changeable, which change accord- 


5. Thus the compound char- 
acter of deliberate choice is 
established, choice implying an 
element of impulse, deliberation 
an element of intellect or judg- 
ment. 

Cuap. III.—Deliberate Choice 
having been shown in the last 
chapter to consist in choice after 
deliberation, we now inquire (1) 
what are the proper objects and 
limits of deliberation, and (2) 


how its objects are related to, or 

distinguished from, those of the 

compound, deliberate choice ? 
12. dtaperpov «.t.A.] We do 


not deliberate about the incom- — 


mensurability of the side and 
diameter of a square, because we 
cannot alter it. The diameter= 


the side x V2, and as V2 can- 


not be exactly found, the dia- 
meter and side are incOmmensur- 
able. 








CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 129 





\ a > 4 Hag ty \ aX / v3 
Tept TOV Ev KWWNoEL, aet Oe KATA TavTA yWwopEevar, eT 
9 - Re 54 \ , 8 4 : eZ +. @ 
e& avaykns etre Kal duoc 7 Sid Twa aitiav GdAXn», olov 
nr > ] a A n y+. 
5 TpoTav Kai avaton@v. Ovde mept THY GAXoTE GAXas, 
aA Wie \ \ n > A 
olov av>ypav Kat ouBpwv. Ovde rept Tav aro THyns, 
e.37 2 A \ a 
6 otov Onoavpod evpecews. “ANN ovde Tepi Tov avOpo- 
a , @ XN / oA / 
TUOV TAVT@V, Olov TAS av SxvOat aptota TroNTEvOWTO 
\ / / \ / 
ovdeis Aaxedaipovioy Bovreverar. Ov yap yevour ay 
4 27% > ¢ / ‘\ a > 
7 touTwy ovbev St nuav. BovrgevopeOa dé repi tav edb 
en na An ‘\ Y 2 / 4 ‘ 
nev TpaxTov TadTa o€ Kal EoTL ova. AiTia yap 


5 ing to a fixed law; (c) Things changeable, which change 
according to no discoverable law; (d@) Things depending on 
6 pure chance where there can be no law; (e) In short anything 
whatever which is not in our own power. (2) Positively, we 
7 do deliberate (a) about things in our own power; and each 


3. tporav] ‘solstices.’ The 
accent shows that it comes from 
Tpom, not Tpdrros. 


9. atria yap Soxovor x.T.A.] 
This must be considered as a 
oon classification of causes 
amiliar to his hearers (such 
current opinions being often 
introduced, as we have seen, 
by the verb Sdoxeiv—see note 
on I. iii. 2), rather than one for 
which Aristotle would hold him- 
self responsible. 

With this proviso, we may 
suppose the classification to have 
originated from the observation 
that causes naturally distin- 
guished themselves as either ir- 
rational or rational. The former 
were further divided into dicis, 
dvaykn, Tvxn, perhaps on some 
such notion as the following :— 

i, Some phenomena, varying 


within fixed limits, seem to imply 
the existence of law, yet tem- 
pered, as it were, by some power 
behind it (vous), regulating and 
modifying its applications: e.g. 
The relations between seed and 
crop ; the variations of hot, cold, 
wet or dry seasons, subject to 
the invariable distinction be- 
tween the seasons themselves ; 
the preservation of the species in 
the reproduction of animals, not- 
withstanding endless minor dif- 
ferences in the individuals. Such 
operations would probably be as- 
signed to Nature (pvais). 

ii. Some events seem to recur 
under a law invariable and in- 
violable, as if it worked itself 
mechanically: ¢g. The rising 
and setting of the sun, the suc- 
cession of summer and winter, 
day and night. Such phenomena 


130 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III. 





Soxodow eivat puors Kal avayKn Kat TOXM, ert dé vous 


Kat wal To Ov avOparrou. 


8 Bovnevovras Tept TOY 8: avTov _TPAKTOY. 


Tov & avOparray éxaorou 


Kai mept 


pev Tas axprBeis | Kal avraprers TOV eT Lorn MOD OUK éaTt 
Bound, otov Tepe ‘Ypappuarrosy (ov yap Suorakoper TOS 5 
ypamr €or") aNN 6 doa yivera Se perv, pr dcavras 3 
act, mept TouT@v Bovnevopeda, otov Tépt TOV KATO ia- 
Tpueny Kal XPNBATLOTUCNY, Kab Trept xuBepyyrueny panr~ 
9 Rov 7) yupvactinny, dow Hrrov SinkpiBwras, Kar Ere Tepe 


man about what is in his own power; (6) about the practical — 
8 arts and about some sciences, though not all (the amount of — 
9 deliberation being in inverse proportion to their precision), and, — 


would appear to be caused by 
Necessity (avdykn). 

iii. In other cases no law or 
reason or method can be traced 
by us in the sequence of events, 
e.g. a ‘windfall,’ or a ‘ godsend,’ 
as we term it, or the production 
of ‘monsters.’ Such occurrences 
would be referred to Chance 
(rin). Anaxagoras in fact de- 
fined TUX to be ddndos airia 
avOparivy oyiop@. Compare 
Pope, ‘All chance (is) direction 
which thou canst not see.’ 

It is scarcely necessary to 
point out that such distinctions 
are unphilosophical, being Liable 
to disturbance upon every addi- 
tion to-our physical knowledge. 
(For Aristotle’s own view of 
vats see Glossary p. liv.) 

The class of rational causes is 
subdivided into vods and may rd 
d:’ dvOpa@rov. The former appa- 
rently refers to Intelligence or 
Design as displayed in the physi- 



















cal world, which in a modern 
system would be described as 
Providence, or, still more 
sonally, as God. may ro Be dy- 
O@porov includes all results 
brought about by human agency. © 
This last group alone falls within — 
the sphere of Deliberation. 
4. émiornpav] The word is used 
loosely for knowledge generally, 
including arts, for strictly speak- 
ing it would "follow from what 
is said throughout the Chapter 





strictly speaking not with Sci- 
ences but Arts only (see Glossary, — 
Art and Science). The instan 
given by Aristotle of such emo- 
Thpat as we do deliberate about, 
viz. larpuKn, kuBepyntixn, Xpnyua- 
TLOTLKT), ATE 2 evidently i in tha st rict 
sense not emLoTH pat but réyvat. 
dxpiBeis Kal avrapkeis] aKpt- 
Bys means ‘accurate’ or ‘fF 


CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 131 





a A / a ‘ \ . Qa , 
TaV Ro”Tav opoiws, -adrov Se Kal Tept Tas Téxvas } 
> 4 ” . \ w7% , 
Tas emloTnuas’ paddov yap epi avtas SioTaloper. 
4 ‘\ b val e ie” ‘ ‘N In 4 ‘ 
>To BovrevecOar Se ev Tots ws emt TO TrOAV, adnros Se 
b] / + e bd / 4. ‘ 
TOs aTroBnoeTat, Kat ev ois adiopiaTov. ZyupPRovnrovs Se 
/ ? ‘ Na ? a ¢ a ? 
TaparapPavouev eis TA peyada, amioTovyTes nuiv av- 5 
a ¢€ ? e tad § a / fA} Ss > \ 
Tois WS ovy Lkavols Svayvavat. BovdevopeOa 5 ov rept 
a a b > \ a ‘ \ > ¥ ‘ 
TOV TEN@V AANA TEPt TOV TpOs Ta TEAH. OuTeE yap 
> ‘ / ey / ¥ e7 > / 
tatpos PovAEveTar el VYLacEL, OUTE PNTWP EL TELE, 
+ “ > > / / Ia an a 
OUTE TONTLKOS el EVVOMiaY TroLNoEL, OVdE TOV AoLTTaY 
> \ ; aA ‘ “‘ na 
ovdeis Trepl ToD TéXous’ GAXNa Oéuevor TO TédXoS TO Tas 10 
‘ an A x / . 
Kat Sta Tivwey éotat oKoTrovat, Kai Sia Trevovev pev 
/ / ‘ / a ‘ /. b 
dhaivopevov yiverOar Sia Tivos pacta Kat KaANOTA ETr- 
A - vy Ss, 5 / a \ 4 
aKoTrovct, Sv évos 8 emiteNovpevov Tas Sia TovTOU 
4 2s A § ‘ / / xX en, é ee. pre S an 
€oTat KaKelvo Sia Tivos, ews Gv EMOwowy ETL TO TP@TOV 
” A? fade Ba ¥ ars ene / 
GiTLOV, 0 EV TH EUpeTEL EaYaTOV ETL’ 0 yap BovdEvO- 
+ a ee. 4 “ ? / / 
pevos €oike Entety Kal avadvew TOV eLlpnwévoy TpoTroV 


15 


speaking generally, more in reference to arts than sciences, 
ere being naturally more generalities and uncertainties in the 
former; (c) about means and not about ends. In short the Analysis of 
process of deliberation is this :—Some end is set up which we oping. 
desire to attain to. We consider the means by which it can be tion. 
‘reached; and if there are several, which will be the easiest and 
best means. Having by choice or necessity settled upon some 
one means; we then consider how this means can be secured, 


cise,’ ‘not subject to variations 
or uncertainties ;’ avrapxys ‘inde- 
pendent of éxternal circumstances 
or conditions.’ e.g. The sciences 
of Anatomy, Harmonics, Geo- 
logy are not avrapxeis in this 
sense, because each implies some 
special object-matter as the very 
condition of its existence as a 


science. Geometry would be 
avrapkys as postulating nothing 
but the existence of space and 
figure; Arithmetic still more so 
as implying only the notions of 
succession and number. 

14, mp@rov air.oy] the first link 
in the chain of causation leading 
to the result desired. 


12 means in our own power. 


132 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK IIL 





12 domep Sudypanya. | | Cabveras S 7) pev cnrnots ov Taca 
elvan Bovrevors, olov ay padnpariKat, a 8é Bovrevous 
mara oarnots, Kab TO eoxarov ev TH avanrioer ™parroy 
13 elvas ev TH “yevearet.) Kay pev aduvare € evTbXoow, agi- 
oTAaVTAl, otov el XpnpaTav det, TavTa Se yy otov Te] 


rropicOnvar eav dé Suvarov paivyrat, ey 


eyXepovar mpar- 


rew. Avvata Se a 8¢ quar yevat av Ta yap dia TOV 


and so on as long as may be necessary, until we arrive at some — 


This last step in the deliberation 


is the first in the practical effort of securing the end desired. 
If some necessary means prove impossible to secure, thes 


13 deliberation ceases and the project is abandoned. If on the 
other hand the means prove feasible, then too deliberation 


1. Somep Sidypappa] like a 
geometrical figure. We might 
take for an instance Eucl. i. 11. 
It is desired to draw a perpen- 
dicular to a given line from a 
given point in the line (Aéyevor 
TéXos TI). 

(1) Asking ourselves what 
conditions will secure this (ras 
kat dia tivev €ora), we observe 
that making the adjacent angles 
equal would do so. 


F 








A D P E B 


(2) Next, how can we make 
the adjacent angles equal (és 
dia trovray €ora)? By causing 
them to be parts of two triangles 


either with two sides and the 
included angles equal (Prop. 4), 
or with all three sides oqnala 
(Prop. 8). 

. (3) Choosing the latter as pre- 
ferable (dua mAcrdveav per awo-— 
pevov Oia Tivos paora k.T.A.), how 
can we secure a triangle with 
equal sides (kakeivo Oia rivos)? 
We see this to be in our power 
by taking any points in AB, viz. 
D and E, equidistant from BR 
erecting on DE an equilateral 
triangle DFE (by Prop. 1) and 
joining FP. 

The problem being thus 
brought back to steps within our 
power (Eos dy €\Owow éni rd 
up@rov atrioy), our investigation 
is at an end (év rp etpécer Eoxa- 
Tov €oTt), and we at once pr 
with the construction of the Pro- 
position as given by Euclid, 
thus ‘ €oXarov ev TH dvahicen’ 
comes ‘ spa@rov év Th yeveret.’ 























CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 133 





14, pidov by npev Tos éoTiv’ 1. yap apxn év piv. Zayrei- 
Tat 6 6 ore pev Ta opyava, | ore S 7 xpeca aura" opoiws 
be Kal év TOUS AoLTrOis OTE pev Sv ov, ore Se Tas i} bua 

15 Tivos. ”Eouxe On, KaBarrep elpy Tat, av perros elvat apxy 
TOV mpageoy Se Bourn mept id auTp | MPAKT OD, ai 5 

6 be mpagers addoov evena. Ove av ov ein Bovdeurov 
70 TENOS ana 7a ™pos Ta TEM. Ovdse 8) Ta Kal 
éxaora, olov & Aptos ToUTO } méreTTaL ws Sel aiaOn- 
oEWS yap TaUTA. Ei Se aet Bovrevoerau, els dareipov 

7 NEEL. Bovdeurov Se kai ™ poauperov 70 avro, may ado- 10 
puauevov non TO Tpoaperov" TO yap ex THs Bovvjs - 
mpoxpibev mpoauperov corw. II averau yap exaotos on 
Tov TOs mpager, & oray els @UTOV avaryaryy TH apxny, Kal 
avTov els TO aryoupevor" TOUTO yap 70 T poaipovpevor. 

8 Aijrov be TOUTO ka ee TOV dpxaiav TONTELOD, (as 15 
“Opmpos éuspetro: of yap Bacideis & mpoddowTo avny- 


[4 ceases and action begins. Sometimes deliberation seeks to 
[5 discover instruments, sometimes the way to employ them (in 
all cases implying, as we have maintained before, that a man 
is the originating cause of his actions about which he delibe- 
16 rates), and it is concerned with means and not with ends; nor 
finally does it deal with questions of fact, which are matters 
of observation. Deliberation cannot of course be prolonged 
indefinitely, but must be terminated by decision or choice of we can now 


ig means. The object of Deliberation and of Deliberate Choice distinguish 
Deliberatior 


and Delibe 


4. €orxe 87] The process of rate Choice. 


deliberation affords another proof 
that man is the originating cause 
of his actions. 


14. mpoatpovpevor is of course 
middle and not passive; ‘that 
which chooses.’ 

16. The kings determine upon 


5. ai b€ mpates DAov Srena 
Aristotle is of course speaking of 
such actions only as form sub- 
jects of deliberation, 


action, the people carry it out 
without further deliberation. So 
when mpoaipeots or TO ™ poatpou- 
pevoy which leads (rd jyyotpevor) 


134 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III, 





a / \ A q 
19 yeArov TH Snuy. "“Ovtos Sé Tov mpoarperov BovAevTod — 
5 ral a 9 6 x + 
OpeKTou Tov eh nuly, Kal) Mpoaipects av ein Bov- 


20 


20 


The proper I 


objects of 
Wish 
(BovAnors) 
have been 
thought to 
be either 
what is 
really good 
or whatever 
pro temp. 
appears 
good. 


Neutixn dpekis Tov eb nuiv éx Tod BovNevoacat yap 


/ ] / ‘ / 
KpivavTes opeyouela Kata TtHv Bordevow. | 
€ \ > / / | ee \ \ ale 
H ev ov rpoaipecis tur eipno0a, Kat rept Trova & 
> \ ‘ \ 
EOTL, Kal OTL TOV TpOS TA TENN | 
\ / ef \ pie 
IV. ‘H S¢ Bovrnots dru wev Tod TédAous éoTiv eLpNnTat, 
an \ \ 5 an \ an / ’ 
Soxet dé Tots pev ayabov civar, Trois Se Tou hawopevov — 


are therefore the same, except that the latter is already re- 


solved upon as the result of the deliberation. 


When the — 


choice is made, the deliberation ceases. 
Thus we define deliberate choice to be ‘a choice following 
upon deliberation of something in our power.’ — 


CHAP. 1V.— The proper objects of Wish (Botdnors). 
As we should not deliberate about means, unless we had 


first conceived of some end as desirable, we next inquire into 


the nature of that faculty, viz. ‘wish’ or ‘ desire,’ which sets — 


_ ‘in this little kingdom, man,’ has 
made its decision, deliberation is 
‘over and action succeeds. 


1, BovXevrot dpexrod] This 
recalls the compound character 
of mpoaipeots described in ch. ii., 
BovAevrod indicating the intellec- 
tual, and dpexrod the impulsive, 
element of the compound pro- 
cess. 

Cuap. IV.—In this Chapter 
we inquire into the nature of the 
faculty which sets up the end’ in 
the first instance as desirable, 
with a view to which end delibe- 
ration (BotAevors) discusses the 
means, and . deliberate choice 
(rpoaipecis) decides upon them. 


In other words we ask what are 
the proper objects of wish (Bov- 
Anots)? Thus every deliberate — 
act implies the three stages Bov- — 
Anows, BovAevors, and mpoaipeots. 
See Glossary, s.v. mpoaipeais. 
This Chapter contains a criti- 
cism of the two extreme theories, 
(1) that the objects of wish are 
things really good, and so, ulti- 
mately, the Absolute or Chief 
Good (Plato) ; (2) that they are 
any things that appear at the time 
good (the Sophists), andalsoasolu- 
tion of the question by Aristotle — 
upon an intermediate ground, — 
since the former th contra- — 
dicts facts, and the latter, feelings, 





cHaP. Iv.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


2 ayabod. 2 ypBaiver Se Tois pev TO Boudrov Tayaov 
Aéyouat [) iva Bovdqrov 0 0 Bovrerar 6 O pH opAas ai- 
povpevos Ji yap éoraL Bovdnrov, Kat ayabov' ay 8, 

3 & t oUTaS € ETUXEs KaKov), TOUS 8 av To pawvopevor ayabov 
70 Boudyrov Aeyouss pn eivas gucet Bovdnror, aX 5 
exdor@ 70 Soxovy" aArro & adr paiveras, Kat el oUTMS 
4 ETUXE, Tavavtia. Ei be 8 TavTa pi) apéonet, dpa ga- 
Téov amas bev Kau Kat adnbeay Bovdnrov eivat Taya- 
ov, éxdorp dé To pawopevor ; TO pev ouv orovdaip 
TO Kar adnBevav elvat, T@ Se gary TO TUXOP, aomep 10 
Kal emt TOV CWLATwY TOS pe ev Sraretpevors v Uric 
éoTt Ta Kat adnGevav ToLavTa ovTa, ToIs § érwocots 
e ¢ / \ \ \ / \ \ \ 
érepa. “Opoiws dé Kai mixpa Kai yAvKEea Kat Ocppa Kat 

/ A a ». e nr \ d 
Bapéa kai tov adrwv Exacta’ 6 orovdaios yap éxacTa 


135 





2 such ends before us. ‘Two views present themselves :—i. That 
the objects of desire are really good. ii. That they are what- 
ever may appear to each individual to be good. We object 
to the first, that it contradicts facts, as men obviously do desire 

3 what is bad; and to the second, that it seems to deny that 

4 onal 7 objects per se desirable, and vice vers*. The truth under cer- 

that as whea we speak of things being wholesome {ain limita. 

ce so oe we mean wholesome to those whose bodies are in a former is 
healthy state, so also when we speak of things being desirable, ""* 
we mean such things as are objects of desire to those whose | 
minds are well regulated. Thus we escape both the above objec- 
tions: we maintain that there are things naturally and per se 


1. rayaOsv] The Chief Good 10. domep cai x.t.A.]_ Aris- 


was, according to Plato, the ulti- 

mate object of all wish or desire, 

because all that was good in any 

lower objects was derived from, 

and limited to, their participation 

(on gum Good, See note on 
iv. 3. 


totle’s had ae is, that all rela- 
tive terms whatsoever present the 
same difficulty, if we are to take 
account of individual exceptions 
and abnormal circumstances. 

14, ozmovdaios] See note on 
I. viii. 13. 





136 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





Kpiver opOas, Kat ev éxdorois TadnOes avT@ haiveratr. 

5 Ka? éxdorny ydp ew tua éott Kada Kal ndea, Kat 
Siaheper mreiotov icws 6 orrovdaios Te Tadnbes ev 
ExdoTots Opay, WoTrep KavaVv Kal weTpov avTov av. Tois 
modnois 5¢ 7) amrarn Sia thy ySovnv éouxe yiverOar ov & 

6 yap ovca ayabov gaiverar. Aipovvtar ovy To Hdv OS 
ayalov, thy Sé AVTHY ws KaKoV hevyoucw. 

1 V.”Ovros 8) Bovdnrou pév Tod Tédous, BovdevTaov Se 


[BOOK III. 
| 
: 
| 


5 desirable, and that in the midst of the aberrations and per- 
versions of individual men, who simply follow pleasure and ~ 

6 avoid pain, the desires of the good man are an index to us of 
what is thus naturally and per se desirable, 


CHAP. V.—A refutation of the theory that Virtue ts voluntary, 
but Vice involuntary. 


ot aT iss 1 Now we have seen that the choice of means to a given end 


are equally jg*both voluntary and a matter of deliberate choice, conse- 
voluntary. : 


1. radnbés aira aiverar] 
Thus the real standard is an ab- 
solute and not a relative one. 
The ozovdaios does not fix the 
standard, but his known con- 
formity to the standard enables 
us to use him as a substitute 
for it. Similarly it is not the 
barometer but the pressure of 
the atmosphere which regulates 
the weather; the barometer is 
only a convenient index of the 
phenomena which it does not 
itself influence. It is in this 
restricted sense, therefore, that 
the omovdaios is said in 1. 4 to 
be xavoy Kat pérpov Tov adnOois. 
Compare, ‘He that is spiritual 
judgeth all things.’ 

Cuap. V.—Aristotle concludes 


this part of his subject with a 
sort of supplementary Chapter to 
refute a theory which, owing to 
Plato’s advocacy, had obtained 
considerable prominence, viz. 
that Virtue is voluntary but Vice 
involuntary. The theory seems 
to have arisen thus :— In all cases 
of right or wrong action where a 
conscious struggle takes place, 
the two alternatives are pre- 
sented to us, present pleasure 
involving future pain and 

or present pain (of self-denial) 
with subsequent pleasure and 
satisfaction. Thus it becomes a 
matter for calculation, Is the 
present pleasure so great as to 
counterbalance the future pain? 
Is it so great as to make it worth 





CHAP. V.] 


ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. 


137 





Kai TpoatpeTov TOV ™pos TO TEDOS, ai epi TavTa ™pa- 


Eeus Kara mpoaiperw ay elev Kai éxovatol, 


Ai be TOV 


dperév evépryetat epi tavta. “Eq mpiy 8e Kab u dpe”, 


omolws 8e Kai 7 Kania. 


"Ev ols ap ep ni TO mpar- 


yy, ai 70 pr mparrewv, kat év ols TO pry kat TO vat? 
@OT & TO TpaTTEL Kadov dv éf nyiv éori, Kal TO pH 


quently the practice of Virtue involving (as we have seen) a 
deliberate choice of means must be voluntary, and so likewise 


We maintain must Vice be voluntary. 


while to risk the consequences ? 
If a man decides that it is, and 
does wrong accordingly, he has 
simply (it is argued) made a mis- 
take in his calculation, he has 
committed an error of judgment 
merely, and all wrong-doing, 
since it arises out of such a mis- 
take, is therefore involuntary. 
No one ever deliberately chooses 
anything but what at the time 
appears to him the better choice 
(ro 8€ réhos ris mpd£ews Kara Tov 
v €or as we read in i. 6), 
what is more, he cannot 
help its so appearing to him 
(see § 17 of this Chapter) any 
more than he can help an object’s 
appearing red or green to him. 
Thus when a man chooses the 
right he chooses knowingly and 
voluntarily for the best: when 
he chooses the wrong he chooses 
it still under a mistaken impres- 
sion that he is choosing for the 
best: he acts under an illusion 
and therefore involuntarily. 
There seem to be four main 
arguments in the Chapter :— 
(1) §§ 2—4. An argumentum ad 


This latter point being 


hominem against the position of 
those half-necessitarians who 
maintain that though Vice is 
involuntary, Virtue is voluntary. 

(2) §§ 5—16. Against the more 
logical and thorough-going neces- 
sitarians who argue that all our 
actions, virtuous as well as vici- 
ous, are merely the necessary 
result of causes and circum- 
stances external to ourselves, 

(3) §§ 17, 18. Against the 
principal argument by which the 
half-necessitarians § supported 
their position. 

(4) §§ 19, 20. Against a mo- 
dified form of the same argu- 
ment. 

i rept Tavra in 11 obviously 
refers to ‘ means’ (ra mpos 7d Teé- 
dos). mept ratra in L 3 must 
have the same reference, and the 
argument is, that as the exercise 
of Virtue involves the choice of 
means, it must be voluntary. 
This, however, is generally ad- 
mitted, and the purpose of the 
Chapter is rather to show that 
the same inference applies to 
Vice, 
















138 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK It. 





, DO! RSG th + > \ s\ \ Y x ‘ , 
TpaTtTew Ep ply EOTAL ALOXYPOV OV, KaL EL TO  TPAT- 
% SW eee a es , p) “aay aaa 
Tel KANOV OV Eh NLL, Kal TO TPaTTELY aLaxXpOV OV Ed 
e¢ on b] Dy 208 CLA X \ / \ \ 3 \ 
3 nui. Eid ef nutv ta Kada Tpattew Kat Ta aloxpa, 
€ / \ \ “ XN , r ‘ > r 
Guolws S& Kal TO pn TparTelv, TovTO 8 Hv TO ayabois 
\ ane Fe ea oy ~ , \ / 
Kat KAKOLS cival, Eb Huy apa TO ETTLELKEOL Kat Pavhows 
‘ \ / e 
4 evar. To dé réeyew ws 


3 \ PR 5" \ 39) / 
ovdels ExOY TovNpds Ovd’ GKwV paKap, 


y+ \ \ a \ >. a /, ‘ ‘ 
ouxe TO ev vpevdet TO S adnOet* paxaplos pev yap 
. Ins *¥ ¢ gs / BOONE EN n A 
5 ovdels axav, 7 Sé woxOnpia exovowov. “H tois ye vov 
>] / > / \ “ + > / 
elpnwevors aupisBntntéov, Kat Tov avOpwrov ov pareoy 


disputed, we prove it as follows :—i. If it is in our own power — 


i, ‘ That 

Virtueis © to act, it must also be in our own power not to act (else our 

voluntary . nga J ? 

and Viee -, action was not really in our power but was compulsory), and 
u . 3 . . . 

related,» ~—> «vice versa. Now if acting (or not acting) in any case be 


(§$2—4). 3 4 right, the reverse would be wrong. Consequently if to do 
right is in our power, so also is to do wrong: in a word, if 





cohiet nad 5 Virtue is voluntary, so is Vice. ii. If, in order to escape 
fion ‘That ‘this conclusion, it be denied outright that man is himself the 
our actions : 
originate in | 
causes be- 4, fv = ‘this was admitted to words, that we are not free and 
ort J constitute our being good or bad.’ responsible agents at all. His 
refuted ayabois kai kakois isin attraction first argument against it consists 
(3§ 5—16) with éd jpiv. See another in- in what is called ‘shifting the 


stance of #v thus used in viii. 14. 

9. rots ye viv eipnuevors refers 
to the previous conclusions about 
the voluntary nature of BovAev- 
ois and mpoaipecis, with the 
assertion of which this Chapter 
opens. 

Aristotle now turns to the 
more thorough-going and more 
logical position that all our 
actions, good and bad alike, are 
the necessary result of our condi- 
tion and circumstances ; in other 















burden of proof.’ It is not for 
those who accept, but for those 
who deny, what is prima facie 
true, to bring arguments in sup- 
port of their position. The 
prima facie truth in this case is 
that man himself originates his 
own acts, and until some other 
origin for them can be proved, 
we have a right, without further 
argument, to maintain that he 
does so originate them. Hence 
daivera is emphatic. 






CHAP. V.] ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 139 





BN 5 I gr ‘ a , ef ‘ 

apynv civat ovde yeryntny Tav mpakewy womrep Kat 

, > aX A / \ ae om 

6 rexvav. Et dé tavta paiveras, Kat pn exoper eis addas 

b +. 6] A ‘ \ 2,2? ¢€ A 2 \ irs ee. 

apxYas avayayew Tapa Tas ep Hpi, WY Kal at apyat ev 

3 >,°> otek; 7 4 5 4 

7 Hpi, Kal auTa eb npiv Kat Exovota. Tovtous 8 éouKxe 

a \ 3oa/ ot Sei ee > ae > a a 
paptupetcOar Kat wWia vf exactov Kat vT avTay Tov 5 

/ ‘ \ a ‘ 

vopolerav’ Kodalovet yap Kat TiLMpovYTaL Tous SpavTas 

> ie. ‘ ‘Fp > + @ ‘ pt che 
poxOnpa, doo. pm Bia 7H Si ayvotav Hs fn avToé atTiot, 

\ X ‘ / a ¢ ‘ \ 
Tous O€ TA KANG TPATTOVTAS TLL@CLVY, WS TOUS MEV TTpO- 
/ ‘ ‘\ 4 / c/ BO Digs 
tTpewovtes tous 5€ KwArvoorvtes. Kaitou doa pnt ed 
ia. 6 2 \ 4 / Ia / / 

nuiv ett, unO éxovora, ovdeis mpotpéTeTar Tparre, 
€ Ja xX Vf xX ‘ A ‘ / xX 
@S ovdeV TPO Epyou oy TO TreicOnvat ph OeppaiverOan 7 
tal a 7. a\.e A fa) 4 i, bs X 
anyew 7) Tewnhnv 7) GAN oTwbiv Tav ToLovTwY: ovOEv yap 
2 , Sees \ ‘ > > > a 
nTTov Trevoouela avta. Kai yap en’ avt@ T@ ayvoetv 


10 


6 originating cause of his acts either good or bad, (1) we reply q)by throw- 
that it rests with those who deny what is to all appearance the #78 the _ 
case to suggest some other cause, and if they cannot, we infer proofon the 
without further proof that a man does originate his acts, and °PPOmen* 

7 if so, that they are voluntary. (2) We appeal to the universal (2) By ap- 

_ practice of mankind in private and in public life, which by the practice 

rewards and punishments encourages to virtuous, and dis- i mankine 

_ courages from vicious, acts. This proves at least that man- Virtue and 


kind generally consider both virtuous and vicious acts to be Vice. 
$in our power. (3) So far are mankind at large from regard- (3) By show- 
ing how they 
punish igno- 


6. kéAaows and ripwpia differ rance itself 


4. The second and third argu- 
in that xéAacis is punishment ! avoidable 


ments consist in an appeal to the 


: 
: 


universal practice and belief of 
mankind. This further strength- 
ens the assertion made by daive- 
tat as explained in the last note, 
and serves to show that the oppo- 
nents fly in the face not only of 
what is prima facie true, but also 
of what is universally believed and 
acted upon, (See Supplementary 
Notes.) 


for the sake of him who suffers 
it, that he may reform: tipwpia 
is punishment for the sake of 
him who inflicts it, that he may 
be revenged. The idea of the 
former is ‘ chastisement,’ that of 
the latter, ‘ vengeance.’ 

13. xat yap] ‘and what is 
more:’ introducing a still more 
cogent proof. 


tr 


9 


~~ 


140 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IIL. 





, 38 + 9 a A > / @ a 
KoNalovol, Eav alTios civat SoKn THS ayvoLas, OLov TOUS 

4 & A oe / e Q b ) x 3 >, A v4 
pefvover Suda TH eTrUTipia’ 7) ‘Yap apy ev avrg Ku- 
ptos yap Tou wy pebvaOjvat, TOUTO & airvov THs ary- 
voias. Kai TOUS ayvoobyrds Th TOV &V TOS vopous, & Set 
9 eriorac bat Kab yn Xader a €OTls Kodagovaw. “Opoiws 
6e at ev TOUS addons, 6oa 80 apenevav a aryvoeiy Soxovcw, 
os én’ avTois oy TO pn aryvoeiv Tov yap emypedn Oijvas 
10 xupior. °AAN tows TowovT as eat wore pn erruueh- 
Ojvar. ° Adda TOU ToLovTOUS yevecOas avToL aiTior CavTES 


> / \ aA 2/7 Wor. , a \ 
AVELLEVOS, KAL TOU GOLKOUS 4 AKONATTOUS eval, ob pev 1 


KaKoupyouvTes, ob Sé év méToLs Kat ToS TOLOUTOLS Sta- 
yovTes* ab yap Tept cxaora evepryevan TOLOUTOUS Towov- 
11 ov. Tovro Sé SiAov €x TOV peheTovToy mpos nUTuvouY 
12 aryooviay i) mpagey Siaredovat yap evepyoovres. To pev 


ing ignorance as rendering Vice involuntary and therefore 
excusable, that they even punish for ignorance tiself, when- 
ever it is such as could have been avoided. e.g. (a) Double 
penalties for offences committed in drunkenness. (6) Punish- 
ments for not knowing an offence to be forbidden by the law. © 
FO (c) Or for any other sort of careless ignorance. (d) Or even 
for ignorance through incapacity if the incapacity be the 
result of previous Vice; for single acts repeated form perma- 
T2 nent habits. Hvery one who is not a downright idiot must know 
*3 this much from daily experience, and it cannot avail to say 
14 that he did not wish it to be so in his case: nor does it follow 


1. rois peOvovor x.t.A.] a law facti non nocet. R 

of Pittacus of Mytilene. 12. ai yap mepi x.r.A.] § Actions 
4. Compare the maxim ‘Ig- of any kind make us similar in 

noratio juris nocet, ignoratio character.’ See II. ii. 8. 








> 
ou ayvoeiv OTL eK TOU evepyetv Tept exacta a ers 1 
13 yivovrau, KOpLon avatcOnrov./ "Ett § a&Noryov TOV aoi- 
A \ y, oo 5 A \. 9 / 
Kovvta pn BovrecOar adtKov civas 7 TOV AKONATTALVOYTA 
ee ,) \ A a / : ? @ 
14 aKko\acTov. Hv S€ pn ayvoov tis mpatte e& wv 











CHAP. V.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 141 





€orat Gd.xos, éxaoy aBixos ay ein, ov pny édv ye Bou- 
Agra, adios @ ov mavoerat Kat eoTat Siazos* ovde yap 
0 voor av byes. Kat €b OUTWS ETUXeY, EKWV VOCE, ax pa- 
TOS Brorevoy | Kat amel0av TOUS iarpois. Tore ev ov 
ev auT@ pr vooeiv, Tpoeperep 8 ovkeru, @omep oud 5 
apevre rédov ér avtov Suvarov avadaPeiv aXN’ Spoos 
er avT@ 70 Banetv Kat pirpac: n yap apxn en avTe. 
Otre 83 at TO adie Kab TO aKodaorep e& apyijs pep 
eEnv ToLOUTOUS pr yeveo bau, 810 éxovTes tot" ryevope- 
ig vous & ovKere eGeors pr eval. Ov povoy ° ai TS 10 
auyns Kania éxovavot elo, GXN eviows Kat al Tov 
Topatos, ols Kab emiTiaper Tols pev yap Sia hvow 
aisypois ovdels emutyua, Tois Se 8’ ayupvaciay Kat 
apédevay. ‘Opoiws S€ Kai Trept acbeverav Kat mpocty 
ovbeis yap av oveidiceve TUPA@ pice 7 i) x vooou 7) éx 15 
mhayyns, andra padNov eherjoa T® & oivophuyias 7 i) 
6 addns axodacias mas av ervrypnoat. Pav on mept TO 
cOua Kakiov at éf piv eritipavrar, at Se wh eb hytv 


that he can arrest the formation of the habit at any step after 
the first. The first steps of moral, as often of physical, disease 
are voluntary, and though its progress soon passes out of our 
power, yet as we are responsible for its beginning, we are also 
5 answerable for all that it afterwards becomes. (e) The same 
remarks apply to bodily defects, which we pity if of natural 
or accidental growth, but visit with reproach if traceable to 
6 neglect, excess, or any other avoidable causes, and we may 
} reasonably suppose that defects of body and of soul are blamed 
on the same principle, viz. when men believe them to be 


1. ov pi édv ye x...) ‘It thrown away his health’ (Grant). 
does not however follow that if,’ mpoéoOa: is the word used for 
ete. squandering money in IV. i, 

5. mpoewevo] ‘When he has ete. 





feces 
“7 


iii. The argu- I 
ment ‘ that 7 
we are not re- 
sponsible for 
the impressions 
which external 
objects make 
upon us, nor 
therefore for 
acting accord- 
’ is re- 
(1) by denyin, 
its truth ; . 
(2) by showing 

t it proves 
too much, as 
it applies to 
Virtue as well 
as Vice, 


142 ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. [BOOK III, 





¥ 3 ef OE Me. Wan eRe a) / a 
ov. Eu ovta, kat emi Toy GAXwv ai eriTipoOpevaL TOV 
a 9,3 CA KX 9 > / / od , : 
Kkakiov eb nu ay ciev. Eu dé tis Neyou Ort aves 
ee A 4 b a a ‘\ 4 3 
epievtat Tov havopuevov ayabov, THs dé havtacias ov 
4 3 > ie al c/ / ? a ‘ ‘ 
Kuptol, ANA OTrOLOS moO EKacTOS EOTL, TOLOUTO Kal TO 
: / 7 A 3 XN ¢€ a A 
Téhos aiveTas avT@' eb pev ovv eKxacTos €avT@ THS 5 
ef. / b 4 5) 4 X n / 4 
eLews €OTL TWS ALTLOS, Kal THS PhavTacias eoTaL Tas 
2 dyed. + p ] \ ‘\ > \ 258 + A X 
autos aitios’ es Sé pm, ovlels avT@ aiTios TOU KaKa 
a >. XN > A a / ‘ 
Tout, ANA St ayvotay TOU TédOUS TAavTA TPATTEL, Ola 
“s 77 ¢ a a A ¥ ¢ \ 
TOUTWY OLOMEVOS AUT@ TO aptoTov ececOar’ n Se TOU 


voluntary. iii. It is sometimes argued, ‘ We all desire what 
appears to us good, and we are not responsible for the appear- 
ance presented, or impression made upon us, by external 
objects.’ To this we reply (1) that if we are responsible for 
our general condition, we must be so in some sense for the 


impression which things make upon us, for this depends upon 
our condition to a great extent; (2) if we are not so respon- 
sible, then all that our opponents say is true: we are not 


2. ef dé rus x.7.A.] The argu- 
ment now returns to the first 
class of opponents who maintain 
that Virtue is voluntary and Vice 
involuntary, and it attacks the 
favourite argument on which 
they mainly relied. This was 
explained in the note at the 
commencement of this Chapter. 

3. dayracia here has its ori- 
ginal signification of ‘appear- 
ance,’ and is little more than a 
repetition of datvopévov just 
before. 

5. Observe the alternatives e/ 
pevoow... ef dé py. Thecon- 
sequences following on the latter 
supposition are enumerated as 
far as the end of § 17, and the 
results of those consequences as 


bearing on the argument in hand 
are introduced by ei 8) ratr 
€oTiy adnO7 in § 18. 

6. e&vs has the simple meaning 
of ‘state’ or ‘condition.’ The 
impression which things make 
on us, morally as well as physi- 
cally, depends very much on our 
condition, and for this we are in 
some degree (as) responsible. 
Compare Butler : ‘When we say 
that men are misled by external 
circumstances of temptation, it 
cannot but be understood that 
there is somewhat within them- 
selves to render those circum- 
stances temptations, or to render 
them susceptible of impressions 
from them’ (Anal. p. 78, ed. 
Angus). 





CHAP. V.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 143 





¥ 2 3 , b ‘ A at 
Tedous edecis ove avOaiperos, adda ivar Set waotep 
4 + 2 “ A ‘ ‘ ae, 4 > 
ow eyovTa, 9 KplWel KAN@S Kat TO KaT adyJeav aya- 
ae f \ ¥ Sn Se n mi , 
Gov aipnoerar’ Kat eotw evpuns @ TOUTO Kaas Trédu- 
“ ‘ / \ /. Xa H Ee 
KEV’ TO Yap MeyLoTOV Kat KAaAOTOY, Kal 0 Trap ETépoU 
A @/ a ‘ A >. > a y¥ A 
pn otov te AaBety pynde palety, adr otov edu, ToLovTov 
d/. ‘\ “‘ -) ‘\ “ a aA / e / 
E£El, KAL TO EV KAL TO KAA@S TOUTO TedvKEVaL 7 TEdELE 
us 4 ita ¥ er 2 at si a ee a 
Kat adnOwn ay ein evdvia. Et Sy tavt eotiv adnOn, 
/ A Td ‘ ” / ¥ e 4 3 a 
TL MANNOV N APETH THS KAKlAaS EoTaL EKOoVaLOV ; apo 
‘ / > a a a a ‘ 4 
yap opmoiws, To ayale Kai TO KaK@, TO TédOS duce 7} 
e / / \ ”“ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ “a 3 
oTwodnmote paivetat Kai KeiTat, Ta dé NoLTTa TpOS TOUT 
3 / / e 4 y y Seu 
avaepovres Tpattovew oTwadymote. Eire &n To Tédos 
‘ 4 MR / e / > f be b) 
pn puce exact haivetas olovdnrote, adAa TL Kai Trap 


responsible if we do wrong; the choice of the ends at.which 
we aim depends on our nature and constitution, not on our- 
selves; and a right tendency in this respect will constitute the 
8 highest perfection of natural gifts. But all this applies just 
as much to the choice of good ends as of bad ones. It removes 
the credit of our good acts as well as the blame of our bad 
acts. Ina word, it proves Virtue to be as involuntary as Vice. 
9 iv. It is a slight modification of the last argument to maintain 


1. duvac is emphatic. ‘One 
must be born with, as it were, a 
sense of sight by which,’ etc. If 
a man is born colour-blind he 
cannot help seeing things differ- 
- ently from other people; he is 
not master of the appearance 
presented to him (r7s dhavracias 
ov Kupios). So, it is argued by 
the opponents, moral, like physi- 
cal, impressions depend on purely 
natural causes beyond our control. 

4, To yap péyiorov x.T.A.] 
Understand éori. ‘For it is 
that which is greatestand noblest, 
and that which none can (yu?) 


receive or learn from another, 
but as it is born with him so 
he will always have it. We 
might also understand é¢ye: or 
efer before rd péyiorov, and so 
avoid the change of nominative 
in the above rendering. 

11. Eire 5;)introduces Aristotle’s 
own view; cire rd pey (in 1. 1, 
p. 144) that of the opponents, 
which he proceeds to refute ; 
ovev Frrov, the apodosis to both 
suppositions. 

12. map’ adrév] ‘depending on 
himself.’ Arnold (note on Thue. 
i. 141. 9) compares the English 


iv 
m 


5 


144 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK III. 





> , > By . \ x lad ‘\ a 
QUTOV ECTL, ELTE TO peV TEAOS hiaLKOY, TO Se TA Nowra 
, e , ‘ a ‘oe Ta Sa 
MPATTELY EKOVTLWS TOV GTroVdaloY NH apeTH EKOUVTLOV 
9 9 AX e \ e / ¢€ / xX / e / 
EoTW, OVE NTTOV Kal ) KAKia EKOVGLOV GV ElN* OMO0LWS 
\ s ee , » 3 e N > / 
yap Kal TO KaK@ VTrapyel TO St avTov ev Tals Tpakect 
\ P] ND a > 9 ed / ¢e 4 
20 Kat eb pn ev TO TEeAeL. Ei ovv, worrep Aé€yeTal, EKxov- 
ff in? e 3 / ‘\ ‘ id / / 
clot Elo ab apeTai (Kat yap TOY efewv TUVAITLOL Tas 
> 4 > \ a / 9 > / 
AUTOL éopEV, Kal TH ToloL Tives elvaL TO TEAOS TOLOVOE 
, i Llp / ere ie XK 9 . / , 
Wepeba), Kal al KaKiaL ExovctoL Ay EiEv" OmoLWs yap. 
\ 3 \ A 5) a ¥ € , 
21 OlVN [EV OUY TEL TOV ApET@Y ELPNTAL Hiv TO TE 
, / ef , / 5) \ go i yd @ 
yéVvos TUT@, OTL METOTHTES ELLY, KaL OTL EEEIS, UD WY 
\ i “ 
Te yivovTat, OTL TOVTMY TpaKTiKal Kat Ka? avTas, Kat 
c PT eek \ e 4 ‘\ ce ¢ XK e. oe NF 
OTL eh HUY Kal EKOVoLOL, Kal OVTwS ws av 0 opOos 
x / 0 ten O ? e / Se e 42 € / / 
22 Aoyos mpootaty. Ovyx opmoiws de at mpagkers exovorol 
voluntaryin that while the end (or the appearance of things to us as desir- 


egal able) is fixed for us by natural causes, whether it be good or 
ifwoarenot bad, yet that there is scope for the voluntariness of Virtue in 


roti equally voluntary. Our position is now proved, that if Virtue 
to Vice. is voluntary so also is Vice voluntary. 

“ees The point we have now reached is this :—We have asserted 
tin ~SC*é‘<«é«W ites to: be meen states; we have shown how they are 


formed, and that they are in our own power and voluntary, 
22 and under the guidance of reason. The states or habits it is 


vulgarism ‘along of himself.’ 7. t@ qovi ries eivat x.T.A.] 

Cf. vi. 11. mapa tiv éeureipiav ‘The condition in which we are 

‘depending on their experience.’ regulates the character of the 
1. dvorxdy] ‘ fixed by nature.’ end which we set before us.’ 

Ta Aouad ‘all the rest,’ ie. the 8. dpoims yap] 8c. Exovor, 

means to the end. ‘they are on the same footing.’ . 
6. cvvairvot] ‘ partly responsible 10. id’ Gv re yiyvovra]) This 

for.’ Notice that Aristotle ad- refers to such passages as IL. i. 6; 

mits that our habits are to II. ii. 8, ete. 

some extent the result of causes § 11. rovrwy mpaxrixal caf av- 

over which we have no control. ras] Explained by IL. ii. 8. 


— 








; 
. 
i 


I 


ip | 


2 detail, we commence with Courage. 
described as a mean state in regard to Fear and Confidence. ; 


CHAP. VI.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


145 





eiot Kal at ees Tov pev yap Tpdkewy an’ apyns péexpe 
Tov TédOUS KUpiot oper, eidores Ta «al éxacTa, TOD 
eFecov Se THs apxis, Kal &xacta Se 7 mpda beats ov 
opipos, Borep € emt TOV appootar arn’ or ep’ 1 pev 
HV ovUT@S F un ovTH xXpicacdar, “Sua 4 TovTO éxovotot. 

VL. ’AvaraBovtes 8n epi éxacrns, eiTmper Tives eiot 


‘ \ al ~ a d 
Kal Tept Toa Ka Tas" apa 5 
2 elon. Kai T™pP@Tov Tépt i avdpetas. 


4 A \ ’ 
ETTAL Orjov | Kat Toca 
"Ort pep ouv pecorns 


éoTi Tept poBous Kat Adppn, non pavepov yeyevaras’ 
poBovpeba & Sidov o OTL Ta oBepa: tadta § éotiv ws 10 


dmdas eireiy kana So Kab Tov hoBov dpifovtas mpoo- 


true are not voluntary in the same sense as the single acts 
which form them. As however their beginnings, though not 
the subsequent stages of their growth, are in our own power, 
the habits themselves are really in our own power. 


CHAP. VI.—The proper sphere and objects of Courage. 


Proceeding now to the consideration of the Virtues in 


This we have already 


Fear may be defined as the anticipation of Evil of any kind, 


Cuar. VL—We now return 
to a discussion of the Virtues in 
detail as given in the (presumed) 
exhaustive Catalogue of IL. vii., 
in order to show how the law 
of the relative mean is applicable 
to every Virtue in detail, and 
so to justify its prominent posi- 
tion in our Definition of Virtue 
as a whole. 

The discussion of Courage 
occupies four Chapters, of which 
the subjects are as follows :— 


vi. The proper sphere and ob- 
jects of Courage. 

vii. Courage considered as a 
mean state, and in reference to 
its motive, together with the re- 
lated Excess and Defect. 

vili. The distinction between 
genuine and spurious Courage, 
of which latter five types are 
described. 

ix. Courage, though involving 
pain and loss, is no exception to 
the rule that all Virtue has 
pleasure in itself. 


K 


Courage, 
though it 

8, speaking 
generally, a 
due modera- 
tidn of fear, 
does not xe- 
late to all 
objects of 
foar, 


146 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK. IIL. 





3 Soxiay Kaxov. DoBovucba pev ovv Tavta Ta KaKd, OLov 
adoEian, meviay, vooor, aguhiav, Oavaror aN ov Tept 
Tavra SoKet 6 0 avpeios eivav evita, yap kat Set go ei 
o0au Kat Kanon, TO Se en aioxpor, otov aofiar } per 
yap hoBovpevos emveens Kar aidnwor, 6 6 Se py poBov- 

4 LEVOS avaloxvvros. Aeyeras 8 v0 Twp avBpeios Kata 
peTadopav’ exet yap Tt Gpotov TO avdpeiy” adoBos 
ydp Tis Kal 6 0 avdpetos. IT eviav 8 i Lows ov Set poBei- 
obas ovde vdcov, ovd das 6 Soa pn amo Kaxlas pnde Oe 
QUTOV. “AN ovd 6 Tept TavTa apoBos av8peios. Aé- 
youev Se Kat tovTov Kal opoudratar & €VLOL yap. év Tous 
TonemiKois KwvSuvors Sethot dvres EedevOepiot eioL Kat 

% , b) ‘ 3 a 4 Ia ‘ 

5 ™pos Xpnyaray amoBohay evdaposs eyovow. Ovde oy 
el TUS UBpw Tept i matoas ka yuvaiKka poPetras 4 bOovov 
“Te TOV ToLovT@Y, Seithds eaTW" OVS e& / Gappet pedov 

6 pacruyovcbat, avdpeios. /Tlept jola ov Tov doBepav 
© avdpeios ; 4) Trept Ta peytoTa ; ovbeis yap UIropeveTi- 
KaTepos Tov Sewav. BoBepwtaroy 8 6 Odvaros mépas 


3 but we speak of Courage in reference to some only of the 
4 Objects of fear. 
5 having no fear of disgrace, poverty, sickness, insults to 
himself or his friends, envy, or even bodily chastisement. 
6 Though the term Courage may sometimes be applied to 
these cases, yet, strictly speaking, it has reference only to the 


e.g. We do not call a man courageous for 


16. paoriyotc Ga] Probably 
in allusion to slaves or criminals 
making a show of indifference 
when about to be flogged. This 
Aristotle would regard not as 
bravery but bravado. It would 
notinvolve GXki) or KaNov. (§ 12.) 

17. After dmopeverixdorepos 


supply 7 6 6 mept Ta weyiora aofos. 
18. mépas yap] This passage is 


sometimes quoted as a proof that 
Aristotle had no belief in any 
sort of life after death. He 
seems however here to be 
speaking popularly in reference 
to the circumstances and pro- 
spects of ordinary life, and 
therefore the e cannot 
fairly be pressed into the above 
controversy. 


10 


15 


4 


j 


CHAR, VI] ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. eae 





yap, Kat alate ba To TéOveate Soxet our ayabov oure 

7 KaKov eivau. Aogeve 8 a ay ovde Tept Oavarov Tov ev 
Tavti oO avdpeios eivat, otov et ev OadrartTn 4) ev vooous. 
8°Ev tiow ou ; $ 1) ev TOUS KaddoToIS § Towoutot dé ot 

ev Tokyo ev peyiore yap Kal Kaddiore edove. 5 

9 ‘Oponroyor Se TouToUs clot Kal at Tiwar ai ev Tals TOXEGt 
1c Kat Tapa TOUS povapxors. Kupios 5 déyour” av avdpetos 
0 Tepl Tov Kadov Oavatov adens, Kai doa Oavarov € €TrL- 

| pépet vroyula ova’ ToLavT a Se padiora Ta Kara ToXe- 

I: pov. Ov pay aXe Kab év Gararry Kal €v vooous adens 10 
0 avdpeios, oux ovTw ée ws ot Oardrrvor ob pev yap 
ameyvakact THY coTnpiay Kab TOV Oavarov Tov ToLvoUTOV 
Suaxepaivovow, ot Se evenmibes el evo Tape TH eurretpiay. 

2 Apa dé Kat avdpifovTar ev ois EoTiV ANKN 7) KAOV TO aTrO- 
Oaveiv: év tais tovavtais Se pOopais ovOérepov wrapyet. 15 
greatest of dangers, and such, from its absolute finality, is 


7 Death. But we limit Courage still further to death of a noble put only to 


8 kind (excluding, ¢.g. death in shipwreck or disease), in fact, ‘he seatest. 
10 strictly speaking, to death (and circumstances which threaten and especi- 
death) in war, for this is admitted to be the noblest of all */ytoteath 
11 deaths. Of course the brave man will be brave in all the 
other cases that we have mentioned, but in its strict applica- . 
tion Courage is limited to death and danger in war, and cases 


where there is some service or some glory to be gained by death. 


9. tmdyuos is literally ‘ under 
the hand’ (yviov), and so 
‘handy,’ or ‘near at hand.’ It 
is otherwise explained as = 

‘sudden.’ In that case comp. 
vii. 15, (See Suppl. Notes.) 

11. of pev = of avSpeior, of Se 
=oi Oadartior. The courage of 
sailors -is often due to the fami- 
liarity of experience, On this 
kind of courage see further viii. 


6,9. The courage of the truly 
bravemanisshownin that, though 
he despairs of safety and hates 
the notion of such an inglorious 
death, still he will meet it with- 
out flinching. 

14. avdpifovras] ‘they also 
play the man,’ or ‘actively display 
courage.’ On the force of the 
middle voice cf. note on dvOpwrev- 
evOau in X. viii. 6. There seems 


; 


ys) in 
ts objects, 
legrees, and 
Slated by is 
egulated 
Reason ann 
timulated 


yy desire for 


he ideally 
10ble (7d 


adv), 
§§ 1—6.) 


| 


2 ‘O Se awd peios avénT ners Os avOpeoros. 


4 Ta pn hoBepa was toadta hoPetcbar. 


5 Oappanéa. 


I 


5 all the other virtues) the ideally noble. 


¢ 
148 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III. 





VIL. To Se hoBepov ov tact pay TO auto, Nervyowev 8é 
TL Kab omeép avOporov. Tovro pev ouv TavTt poBepov TO 
ye vouv exovrt, 7a 6e Kar avOporoy Suapéper peyeber 
Kat T@ paNAov Kal HTTOV" opotas Se Kal Ta Oapparéa. 


pev ou Kal Ta TOLaUT a, ws det Se Kal os 6 hoyos vTro- 
evel, TOU KaXOU vena’ TOUTO yap TENOS TIS aperis. 
3 “Eott Sé pahrov Kat HTTOv TAUTA poBeroPat, Kal &tt 


Tiverat Se tev 


5 nf e ‘\ 4 > ray e \ vA > e a e \ 
apaptiav n HEV OTL ov ei, n O€ Ort OVX @s det, ” b¢ 
Ort ovy OTe, 7 To Tey TowouTeN” _poiws Se Kab mept Ta 


‘O per ouv a bet Kal ov evexa Drropeveov Kal 
4 " 
poBovpevos, Kat ws Set Kat Gre, ouoiws Sé¢ Kat Oappar, 


Cuap. VII.—Courage considered as a mean state, with its 
related excess and defect. 


The objects of terror and its degree differ with different indi- 
viduals, though some things there are which no human being 
2 in his right senses could regard without terror. Within these 
limits of human endurance the truly brave man is unshaken ; 


3,4 his confidence as well as his fears, in respect of their objects, 


degrees, and occasions (in all of which points error is possible), 
being regulated by Reason, and his motive being always (as in 


to bea sort of a fortiori compari- 
son of xai avdpifovra: with the 
more passive condition ddens éore 
in the last section. Observe also 
that some force is due to the con- 
nexion both in etymology and 
thought between dvdpifopa: and 
avdpeia. 

év ois éorw dAxy] Either 
‘where there is opportunity for 
the display of prowess :’ or (as 


Such are the charac- 


in the analysis) ‘some defence or 
security for others,’ which is 
the case in war when a man dies 
to defend his country: in fact 
=BonOeva, as elsewhere in Aris- 
totle. 


PoPyoerae 5 


10 





5. as avOparos] 1.¢. ‘oftthin 


human limits, as far as a man 
can be. Cf. paxapious de avOpe- 
Tous in I. x. 16, and the note on 
as addafov in IV. vii. 11, 


CHAP. VII. | ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


149 





+ a. > Xf ‘ Sc x e , , 

avopelos* Kat agiav yap, Kat ws avo doyos, Tacxet 
6 cai mparret 6 avdpeios. Tédos 5¢ maons évepyeias éoti 

. EE. SE he thant a / Ve? / , 
To Kata Thy ééw. Kaito avdpeip de 7 avdpeta xadov. 
a “ A X ef A df A 
Towvrov &) Kai To Tédos* (dpitera yap exactTov To 
réret). Kandod 87 evexa 6 avdpetos vrropever Kat mparret 
a Q ‘\ > / a , / e \ hw 
7 Ta Kata Thy avopeiav. Tov 8 virepBaddovtav o pev TH 
apoBia avavupos (eipnras & nyiv ev Tols mpotepov Ort 

4 3 ae ” 5A / bbe. 
TOANG EoTW avavupa), ein 8 av Tis poawvopuevos 4) avad- 
ynrtos, eb unbev hoBoiro, pyre ceucwov pnTe TA KUMaTa, 
6 teristics of Courage. And not only the formed habit, but also 
each individual act of Courage, will be guided by this one 


motive, the attainment of the ideally noble. 
7  Nowboth confidence and fear admit of excess. Excess of fear- The Excess 
lessness (if we may so speak) 7.e. a total absence of fear under 


2. The following points should 

be noticed in explaining this 
difficult section. (1) There isa 
marked opposition between évép- 
yera (act) and fis (habit) on 
which the argument turns. 
Compare LV. ii. 6 for a similar 
antithesis and somewhat similar 
argument. (2) dpi{erat yap exac- 
Tov T@ TéAce is a parenthetical 
argument (or prosyllogism) sup- 
porting one of the premisses of 
the main syllogism. The main 
argument is :— 
‘The end of the formed habit 
(7d Kara tiv ew (rédos)) is 
also the end of each indivi- 
dual act (mdons évepyeias). 
To kadov is the end of the 
formed habit of Courage 
(rovovtov 81) Kat Td Tédos). 
Therefore it is the end of 
each act of Courage (xaAov 
Lb) evexa k.7.A.). 





The parenthesis supports the 
minor premiss thus :— 
(That which characterizes any- 
thing is its end (dpitera 
EkaoTov T@ TEhEt). m4 KaXov 
characterizes the habit of 
4 Courage (r@ avdpeip 7 av- 
Speia xaddv). Therefore rd 
xadov is the end of the habit 
of Courage (rovotvrov 87 7d 
| —s- Teo). 

6. The complication of the 
extremes here is rather confus- 
ing. In theory four (viz. Excess 
of Confidence, Defect of Confi- 
dence, Excess of Timidity, Defect 
of Timidity), in fact they reduce 
totwo. For Excess of Confidence 
and Defect of Timidity are the 
same, and constitute Rashness ; 
while Defect of Confidence and 
Excess of Timidity are also 
identical, and constitute Coward- 
ice. See further, note on IL. vii. 2, 





5 


and Defect 
are Rash- 
ness and 
Cowardice. 
(8$ 7—12.) 


150 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IIL. 





, \ ‘ 4 \ a a 
xabamep pact TOUS Kenrrovs. ‘O dé ta Oappetv wrep- 
nr at 
8 Baddow Tept Ta poBepa Opacts. Aoxet Sé kat adatov 
eivat O Opacus Kat T poomounroKos av®peias. ‘Qs ovv 
exeivos Tept 7a poBepa éyel, OUTS OUTOS Bovrerau 
9 paiver bar ev ois ovv Svvarat, popecrau. Avo Kat eioiv 
ot TOANOL avTdav OpacvdeiAou ev TOUTOLS yap Opacvve- 
. “ 3 ¢e / e \ a a 
10 pevos Ta hoBepa ovy viropevovow. “O Se to hoBeicOat 
e y , \ St eee A Oc ? a 
urepBarrwv Sethoss Kat yap & pn Set Kat @s ov el, 
\ , ‘ a b] a - ee b) / \ 
Kat TavTa Ta ToLavTa aKonovlet avt@. “Enneitrev Se 
\ a a 3 a - 9 a 4 a 
Kat T@ Oappeiv’ arr ev ais AvTTALS UTrepBaddrov MAA- 
/ 2 4 / , 
11 Aov Katadavys cot. Avoedmis Sy Tis 6 Setdos' TavTaA 
‘ a ¢ > a > / “ ‘ 
yap oBeira. ‘O 8 avdpetos evavtiws: To yap Oap- 
A > \ DN a JA eae N 
12 pecv eveAmidos. Tlept tavra pév ovv éotiv 6 te Sethos 
\ ¢ \ A ke oe n , ¥ N 
Kat 6 Opacus Kat 6 avdpetos, Siaddpws 8 eyovot mpos 
3 4 € \ ‘ ¢ /. ‘\ / € \ 
auTa’ ol wev yap umepBaddovot Kal é€dXelTrovew, 6 Sé 


all circumstances, exists rather in idea than in fact. Excess of 

8 confidence gives rise to the extreme of Rashness. The Rash 
man has also a tendency to swagger, and he makes an ostenta- 
tion of Courage. To secure the reputation of Courage, for which 

he is anxious, he imitates its external signs as far as he can. 

9 In real danger however such characters are often found want- 
10 ing. Excess of timidity (which implies defect of confidence) 
gives rise to the other extreme of Cowardice, which is mani- 

11 fested by over-sensitiveness to pain and by despondency. 
12 Thus Rashness, Cowardice, and Courage relate to the same 
objects and circumstances; but Rashness and Cowardice 
manifest excess and defect, while Courage is a mean state, 
respecting them. We might add that before the danger comes 


& éxeivos, t.€. ‘dvBpeios. ovTos, év rovrots | 7.¢. év ots Suvavrat. 

ie. & Op aovs. 9. ‘The coward is also defi- 

rhe dparitedoi] Falstaff would cient in confidence, but his char- 
be a familiar example. See espe- acter is more usually displayed 
cially Henry IV., Part I. Act ii. by an excessive sensibility to 
Se. 4; Act v. Sc. 4, etc. . pain” Of. x. 1 (fin), xu 5. 7 


jun 


1 


0 


5 


43 


43 


CHAP. VII. ] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


151 





peéows exer Kat ws Sel Kat ot pep paceis mporrereis, Kab 
Rovropevor ™po TOV xuvduver, € ev avrois oy agioravrat, 
ot & av8peior € ev Tois épryous o€ets, ™porepov S 7 MOUXLOt. 
Kadamep ov elpn Tat, n } avdpeia pecorns € €OTL Tept Oap- 
paréa kab poRepa, € ev ois elpyrat, | Kal Ott KaNOV aipeirat 


Kal UTropevel, ho OTL aio ‘pov TO pen 


To 8 aroOvjcKew 


the Rash are eager, the Brave are calm; im the danger the 
Brave are full of energy, the Rash fall away altogether. 
It will follow from what we have said that Suicide is an Suicide is 


act of Cowardice rather than of Courage. 


1. Tacitus (Hist. i. 68) de- 
scribes the Helvetii in very simi- 
lar wordsas being ‘ante discrimen 
feroces, in periculo pavidi,’ and 
(in Hist. i. 84) he generalizes, as 
Aristotle does in this passage, 
‘Fortissimus in ipso discrimine 
exercitus qui ante discrimen 
quietissimus.’ Compare the well- 
known description in Homer, J/. 


iii. 1-9, of the Greek host advanc- 


ing in silence to the battle. 

5. év ols eipnra] in reference 
to the limitations introduced in 
ch. vi. 

kat Ort Kady x.t.A.] ‘And it 
chooses and endures them (viz. 
poBepa), because it is honourable 
todo so.’ On this point see § 6. 

6. The views of the ancients 
on Suicide (mixed up as the ques- 
tion must be with that of the 
nature of the Soul, Death, and a 
Future State) were very different 
from our own. It was allowed 
and even advocated by men of 
the highest moral character, and 
of great philosophical reputation, 
especially by the Stoics., 


For the Suicide 


Those who condemned it did 
so generally on one or other of 
these three grounds :— 

(1) On political grounds. Sui- 
cide deprived the state of services 
which it had a right to claim. 
Aristotle urges this in V. xi. 1-3. 
The Stoics admitted that Suicide 
was wrong when this result 
could be shown to be involved in 
it. Hadrian regarded the suicide 
of a Roman soldier as equivalent 
to desertion. 

(2) On the ground that it was 
an act of cowardice, as Aristotle 
argues in this passage. So 
Seneca, ‘It is folly to die for fear 
of death,’ and Ovid :— 


Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere 
vitam ; 
Fortiter ille facit qui miser esse potest. 


(3) Less seldom on the usual 
modern ground that it amounts 
to an abandonment of a post of 
duty in which God has placed 
us. This was the point of view 
of Plato (see Phedo, etc.) and 
his successors, also of Pythagoras 
(Cie. de Senect. xx. § 73), who 


5 


rather a 
case of 


Cowardice 


than of 
Courage, 


152 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [Book m1. 





/ / a . > > , 
pevyovra meviay t Epwra Te AvIrnpoY ovK avOpeion, 
a ” / ‘ / 
GNA paddov Seidov' padakia yap TO hevyew Ta emi- 
yee St ce / ‘ , f 
Tova, Kat ovx Ott KadoV Urropevelr, GANG hevryov KaKOD. 
¥ \ > a 
1 VIIL *Eors ev ovv 9 avdpeia tovovrov Tt, Neyovrat 
\ X or ‘ / / a \ e 
O€ Kat ETEpal KATA TrEVTE TPOTTOUS, TPMTV pev 1) WOM- 5 
4 4 ' 
TUT pddtoTa yap eouxers Soxovas yap vmropevew TOUS 
/ a 2 a 
Kwovvous ob ToNiTa Sia Ta eK TOV Vopwv erriTimia Kal 
BP / \ 4 A , \ ‘ a 5] , 
2 TQ oveion Kat Ova Tas Tyas. Kat dia rovro avdpeorarot 
a 2 ® e \ ‘ . Aw a 
Soxovow civas Tap ois ot Seidot aTiysoL Kab ob avdpetoL 
y / \ ,@ “ 
evtiot. Towovrous de xat° Opmpos rrovet, otov Tov Ato- } 
pnonv Kat tov” Exropa. 
TlovAvidyas pot mpOros eAeyyenv dvabjoe 
/ 
kat Acounons, 


"Exrop ydép more djoe évt Tpdero’ dyopetuv 
© Tudeidns im’ épeio,” 1 








faces death not because it is noble, but because he regards 
death as a less evil than that from which he seeks to escape. 


CHAP. VIII.—Sfurious forms of Courage described. 





Fivespuri- r In contrast with genuine Courage now described, there 
ous forms « g e 6 ,e + . 

of Courage are five spurious forms which must be distinguished from it, 
ml fom t+ The courage of compulsion, which may perhaps be called 
i Fear of 2 ‘Social’ courage, because it arises from fear of society. Its 
Thispaybe nobler type is that which is due to fear of loss of character, 
due toeither or of the good opinion of those among whom we live, or even 
oalaee 3 to the influence of the rewards and punishments by which 


‘forbids a man to desert his post 
without the order of his com- 
mander, who is God.’ 

(Several other quotations 
from ancient moralists will be 
found in Lecky, Hist. Hur. 
Morals, i. p. 223, etc.) 


3. tropever] Understand Ody- 
arov from the general sense of the 
context. See vi. 12. | 

15. The whole line runs, J7, 
viii, 149: 

Tudetins bn’ éueto hoBevdmevos txero vias. 

Thus the Courage of Dio- 


CHAP, VIII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


153 





3 ‘Dpotwras 6 auTn padvora 72 ™porepov etpmuevn, Ort 
8&0 aperny ryiverau’ &¢ aid® yap Ka bua Kaov opeEwv 
4 (Tupms yap) Kab guy oveidous, aicx pou ovtos. Tatas 
av TUS Kat Tous vo TOV dpxovTav avayxatopevous 
eis Tauro xepous S dow ov é aide ana, Sia poBov 5 
avo Spat, Kab pevryovres ou TO aioxpov adda TO Av- 
mnpov avarykatovot yap ob KUptolr, @oTrep O° Extwp 
ov be Ke’ eyov: dardvevde pays TTUTTOVTA vOHTw, 
ov ot 1 ap eooeirar upon KvVvaS. ae } -\ 
5 Ka ob Mpoorarrovres Kay avaxopact TUTTOVTES “70 10 
auto Sp@ct, Kal of Tpo TaY Tadpwv Kal TOY ToLOVTwY 
Tapatatrovres* Travres yap avayxatovow. Act & ov Sv 
6 avaryxny aydpeiov eivat, aAN OTe Kadov. Aoxel Se Kat 
3 civil society encourages Bravery, and thus, the motive being 
noble, in some cases this type approximates very nearly to 
4 the genuine virtue. A baser form may be seen in the courage or physical 


5 of troops who are driven to battle with the lash, or drawn up ™P™siOm 
6 in positions where retreat is impossible. 


mede is represented as due to 
the fear that Hector would tri- 
umph over him, if defeated. 
Conversely to the case in the 
text it has been said, ‘ Perfect 
Courage is doing without wit- 
nesses all that one could do if 
the world were spectators’ (La 
Rochefoucauld, Maz. 216). 

1. Aristotle here touches 
_upon a question of the greatest 
“interest in moral science, How far 
does a system of rewards and 
punishments destroy the charac- 
ter of Virtue by reducing it to a 
calculation of self-interest? It 
depends greatly on the character 
of the rewards and punishments 


themselves. If they consist in 
physical pleasure or pain, no 
true virtue can be developed by 
them. If however they be 
themselves moral (e.g. testimony 
of a good conscience, dread of 
shame or self-reproach, etc.), the 
stimulus to action which they 
afford is but a form of the love 
of Virtue and hatred of Vice in 
themselves. The case described 
in § 3 would illustrate the latter 
case, that in §§ 4 and 5 the 
former. 

10. rvmrovtes] e.g. as Herodo- 
tus (vii. 223) says was the case 
with the Persian soldiers at the 
invasion of Greece. 





2. The courage of ii. Experi- 
ence, 


7,0 





154 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IIL. 





¢ °? fh toe \ @¢@ > / bg —— 
1 €uTrElpla N Tepl Exacta avopela Tis elvatt BOev Kat 
6 Soxpa anOn € , i nV avopel Tor 
Awoxparys nin emoatnuny eivar rh avOpeiav. Tot- 
oUToL Oe AAXNOL pev EV ANAoIS, EV TOIS TONEMLKOIS O OL 
a a ‘ 9 ‘ ‘ a / 
oTpatw@tay Soxet yap eivat ToAAa KEeva TOD TroEMoU, 
a /- / @ / %, a 
a MadoTAa TUVEewpaKacw ovTOL aivovtar bn avdpeEtor, 
ef > »f ¢ + @r ?% a x. 
OTL OUK LoacLV ol adoL Oia Eotw. Lita mouoat Kat 
% a 7. 4 > a > 4 rd 
pn Tabet padiota Svvavtas ex THS Ewmerpias, Suvapevor 


experience, which Socrates thought the truest type of Courage. 
Experience enables soldiers, for example, so to estimate the — 
real danger that they are not alarmed by circumstances that 


would terrify the inexperienced. Thus experience as it were © 


l.  €umeipia 4 mept Exacta] 
‘Experience in any special sub- 
jects.’ This is further explained 
by rocovrot (i.e. €usetpor) GAdou 
ev GAAos inl, 3. Aristotle shows 
that experience cannot constitute 
courage—for if the danger be 
unreal, experience, which tells 
us that it is so, takes away the 
sphere for the exercise of cour- 
age (§§ 7, 8) ; while if the danger 
be real, experience, which reveals 
this, tends to make cowards of 
those who know it (§ 9). 

2. Socrates defines Courage (in 
Plat. Rep. p. 429) as ‘the power 
of preserving in danger the right 
opinion as to what is to be feared 
and what is not.’ Or again in 
the Protagoras, ‘Courage is the 
knowledge of what is terrible 
and what is not,’ 7 codia ray 
Sewav kat py Sewadv dyvdpeia 
éoTiv. 

4, modXa keva TOU TOAEpOV] 1.¢. 
many dangers in war. are unreal, 
e.g. the ferocious aspect and 


savage cries of barbarians, which ~ 
are most alarming to the inexpe- 
rienced, but which make no im- 
pression on the veteran. It was — 
said that at the commencement — 
of the war between France and ~ 
Prussia, there were served out 
to the young German troops pic- 
tures of the Turcos and their 
mode of fighting, in order to 
give them that éumeipia which 
would render them proof against 
such terrors. Another reading ~ 
is cava, ie. there are many 
‘surprises’ in war; but this evi- 
dently spoils the sense, 

5. aivovrat 84 avdpeior k.7.A.] 
This would be further illustrated 
by the example introduced in vi. 
11. The indifference of sailors 
in an ordinary gale is regarded . 
by a landsman as courage (drt 
ovK tcacw of Gddot old eoTw), 
whereas in truth their éume:pia 
reveals that there is no danger, 
and therefore no occasion for 
courage. 





CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 155 





xpnobas Tols Omhots Kat ToLavTa exovTEs OTrola ay ei 


‘Dorep ovv avoTAos @TMGpHEVoL payovTat Kat aOAnTab 
Wiorais" Kat yap év Tols TOLOUTOLS arydow oux ob ay- 
Speidrarot paxyporrarot low, GAN ob pddoTa loxvov- 
Tes Kal Ta copara dpiora € eXOvTES. Oi otpatidrar Se 
Seiroi yivovrau, orav Dmepreivy 0 Kivduvos Kab Aetrovrat 
TOUS mrnbect Kab Tals TmapacKevais® TPOTOL yap pev- 
youer, Ta Sé jwodTiKa pevovra. amobuncKet, & omrep Kame 
7) ‘Eppaig cuvepn. Tots pev yap aicxpov TO Pevyew 
Kai O Aavaros THS ToLavTns cwrnpias aiperarepos: ot Se 
Kat e& apyns exivdvvevov @s KpetTTOUS OVTES, yvoVTES SE 
devyouct, Tov Odvatov wadrov tod aicypod hoBovpevor: 


puts a weapon into their hands which others have not, and 
hence their courage. There is however another aspect of 
this. Experience sometimes points out the real magnitude 
of a danger which makes little impression on those who are 
inexperienced, and. so sometimes veterans shrink back when 
raw levies press on. Thus courage which rests on the know- 
ledge that the danger is small becomes cowardice when the 
danger is known to be great. This therefore is not true 





9. ra modttrixa nearly re- by it. It is experience which 


sembled our militia as distin- 
guished from regular troops. It 
is not quite clear to what event 
reference is made in the text. It 
is easy, however, to suppose that 
veterans would be much more 
sensitive (say) to a flank move- 
ment on the part of the enemy, 
or to a threatening of their com- 
munications, than inexperienced 
troops would be, and would thus 
be more likely to be disorganized 


makes doctors proverbially the 
most desponding patients, be- 
cause they understand what 
symptoms portend. 

The following recent occur- 
rence seems in point: ‘The 
troops who behaved worst in this 
affair (a skirmish near Paris) 
were the regulars, Zouaves, who 
fled like deer. The Gardes Mo- 
biles stood their ground’ (Paris 
letter, Sept. 23, 1870). 


Kab ™pos TO ToUno ab Kat ™pos TO pr mage KpaTeor de 


iii. 
Spirit 





156  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BooK 11 





al b] ra) % b 
1006 avdpeios ov TowovTos- Kai tov Oupov 8 emt 


Il éyepow Kat oppayy. Oi pev ov _avepeiot bea TO KaXO 


X X / e A AN a fal tal 
_Tpos TOV KLVOvVOV oppav, ovGeyv Trav Sewav T POOpWVTA, 


12 d¢ Sua THv emiOupiav Todwnpa Todra Spaow. Ou dy 


10,11 Courage. 38. The courage of high spirit.—lt is true that the 


12 is a stimulus to courage. But they are not identical, else 


















avdpeiay émihepovow: avdpeiot yap eivat Soxodos Kat 
ob Sua Oupov aomep Ta Onpia émt Tovs tpwocavtas de- 
pepevot, Ort Kat ob avepeior Oupoeideis: LTNTLKWTATOD 
yap 6 Oupos mpos Tous Kuvdvvous, dOev kar “Opmpos 


aGévos euBare Ovud 


Kab 

peévos kat Ovpov éyerpe 
Kat 

Spud 8 ava pivas pévos 
Kab 


efevev atpo." 


mavra yap Ta TOLAUTa ounce onpaivery TV ToD Oupo ) 


mparrovow, © o be _Gupos ouvepyet avTois* Ta Onpia 6 3 
Sua dog bua yap TO mryyhvar 7 Dy) poBeiobar, é emt éav 
ye ev UAH 7, n ev éhev 7, Ov T poo épxovrau. Ov 8 éorw 
avipeia Sua TO UT adyndovos Kat Ovpod e&ehavvomeva 


RUA ap dK ¢ + > n 5 rn * 
Tel OUTM YE KAV OL OVOL avOpEtoL Elev TrEWaVTES* TUT- 

/ \ > LAY ae A \ e \ 
TOMEVOL Yap OVK adioTaVYTaL THS Vous" Kat ob MoLYoL 


3 > a a 9 / a ? - 

eoTw avopera ta Sv adynoovos 7 Oupod e&ehavvopeva 
“ “ / / 4 ¢ ‘\ “ 

mpos Tov Kivduvov. Pvoiwwtatn 8 éowxev ) Sua Tov 


courageous are high-spirited, and that the outward signs of 
courage and high spirit are similar, and also that high spirit” 


4. irnrixos] ‘ apt to advance,’ 24. dvoikwrdrny] ‘more purely ‘ 
connected with eijut (tbo) through physical than other sorts 
the verbal iréov, Courage.’ 


CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. "187 





Oupov eivas, Kat mpochaBovoa mpoaipeow Kat TO ov 
eveKa avipeia evar. Kai ot avO parrot 57 opyrbopevor 
pev adyoion, | Tepeeopovpevor & Hdovrat: ot be Sua Tavra 
paxdpevor paxepor ev, OvK avdpeiot Sé: ov yap Sia TO 
KaNOV oud ai ws 0 hoxyos, adda bua To Taos Tapa \a- 5 
cuv & & exouct Tle Ovde 8 ob evenmrides OvTES ay- 
Spetou Sua yap TO ToNNAKIS Kal ToNAOUS vEvURm eva 
appodow ev Tols Kwouvors. Tlapepovoe Se, dre apcpeo 
Oapparéorr adrX ob pev avdpeios Sia Ta mpoespnucva 
Oapparéo, ot Se Sia To ovecOae Kpeitrous civay Kat 10 
pnOev ay rabeiv. Tovovrov Sé mowter Kal ot weOvaKo- 
pevou eve des yap yivovrau. "Orav Se avrois pn 
oupBn Toavra, pevyovow" avSpetou 8 4 mv Ta poBepa 
avOparra & ovTa Kal pawopeva Umopevew, STL Kadov Kau 
aioxpov TO pn. Mo Kat av8pevorépou Soxei iva TO 15 
ev Tos aigvBious poBous apoBov Kat ardpaxov elvas 

H év Tois ™podm)ous" cero eFews yap padrov M ore 

ov €K TapacKevis’ Ta Tpohavy pev yap Kav eK 


some of the lower animals, or men of violent passions, would 
afford the highest examples of courage. High spirit appears 
to be the natural substratum of courage, and requires only 
deliberate choice and a right motive to transform it from mere 
pugnacity to true courage. 4. The courage of a sanguine iv. Sanguine 
disposition.—This results from a confident belief in success ; “SPs 
in other words, from a belief that there is no serious danger 
to fear. A drunken man exhibits this sort of courage. It 
fails when danger appears contrary to expectation. Hence 


11. rotodrov 6€ mrotodct x.T.A.] 
This would be an _ instance 
of what is sometimes called 
‘Dutch courage.’ Falstaff’s en- 
comium on ‘Sherris’ as the 
source of Courage in Henry IV. 


Part II. Act iv. Sc. 3, may be 
quoted, under the influence of 
which ‘ the heart great and puffed 
up... doth any deed of cour- 
age ; and this valour comes of 
sherris.’ 


158 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Il, 





Aoyio pov Kal Noyou TIS Tpo€dorro, Ta 6 eEaipuns Kata 
16 vy cw. "Avdpeto. S€ haivovta. Kat ob ayvoodvTes, 
2 , > r) 
Kat eloly ov moppw Ttav evedTidwv, yelpous 8 dom ~ 
I¢-/ Ja Sf 3 a 4 X\ \ / / 
afiwpa ovdev eyouow, exeivot Se. Alo Kat pevovot 
/ / 3 a e/ ed 

TWa xpovov' ot & HTaTnpEvol, eav yvaow OTL ETEpoV 
A , 9 » q 
i) UmomTevcwat, hevyoucw Omep ob Apyetor emafov — 
, a / e / ce XN @ 
17 WepimecovTes Tos Aakwow ws Sixvwviow. Ot te On ~ 
b] a y+ tas A > a q 
avopetot eipnvTat Trotol Tues, Kat ob SoKodYTES avOpEloL. 

\ > / > 3 
I Ix Tlepi Bdppn be Kal poBous ” avdpea ovod OU — 
opotes rept appoo € éoTiv, GAda  PaAQOY 1 Tept Ta poBepar : 
0 yap €v, TovToLs ardp anges ka Tept tau? ws Seb 
EXov av8peios ” padrov 7 up 0 Tept Ta Oapparéa. To 5 
Ta AUTNpPA UITOMEVELY, WS elontat, avdpetot réyornass ) 


sudden dangers are a better test of real courage than those ~ 
y.Jg00 which are foreseen. 5. Zhe courage of ignorance.—This — 
16, 17 form, which results from ignorance of the existence of danger, — 
is not unlike the last mentioned, but is inferior to it as not — 
implying any self-reliance. Such courage vanishes at once if © 
the ignorance on which it depends is dispelled. | 





Cuap. 1X.—How can the exercise of Courage, which involves 
pain and loss, have a‘ pleasure in ttself’ ? 


Thus Courage is a due regulation of confidence and fear, - 


Courage [I 
Sjects or Ut more especially of the latter, because Courage implies — 


4. a€iwpal ‘self-reliance,’ lite- 
rally ‘estimate of themselves.’ 
The sanguine rely so strongly 
upon, the estimate which they 
have formed of their own prow- 
ess or good fortune, that they 
can face danger in the strength 
which it gives them. 

6. Omep of Apyetou k.t.A.] This 


incident is described by Xeno- 
phon (Hell. iv. 10). The Argives — 
attacked with contemptuousbold- _ 
ness certain Spartans whom they _ 
mistook for Sicyonians owing to 


the Spartans having assumed 


some Sicyonian armour. The : 
Argives fled at once on the dis- 
covery of their mistake. 2 





- 


CHAP, IX.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


159 





‘ a 2 e 3 / ‘ / > al 
2 40 Kat emihurrov " avdpeia, Kab Sucatons ETTALVELT AL” 
| ade wT epov yap Ta AvIrnpa Drrowevey, 4 TOY ndéwv 


y 


3 TO ou evera ous 









4 3 aura, ore Kanov Ho 


améxer Bat. 


Ov pny ada dofeuev a ay civat TO Kata 


THY av8peiay TENOS 80, v vm TOY KUKA@ © apaviter ar, 
Olov Kay TOlS yUmVYLKOIS @y@ot yiveTar Tols yap TUKTALS 5 
A he sak @ ed c / \ e \ 
TO pev Tédos Hou, Ov eveKa, 0 orepavos Kat ab Tipal, 
To de rumrec bat adyewon, éb €LTTEp xadprwas, Kat humnpor, 
6.mdvos’ Sia 8 To TONG TavT elvat, puKpov ov 


cor Kal TO me 


nov daiveras eyeuv. 
‘ > / e ‘ /, \ \ 
THY avopeiav, 0 ev Oavatos Kat Ta 10 


Et 8) rowdrev 


awit / \ + y¥ e / 
para Aumnpa TO avopeitp Kab GKOVTS EOTAt, VITOWENEL 


-° aicxpov TO ra 


abd ¢ X 
Kai oo@ av 


paddrov thy apeTny exn Tacay Kal evdapoveorepos 


exercised without pain, and hence it is difficult and propor- 


2 the endurance of things painful. Courage indeed cannot pe fear rather 


than of con- 
fidence, and 


I tionately praiseworthy. It may be asked, How is this recon- therefore 


cileable with our repeated assertion that the practice of any penrecnaly 
virtue has pleasure in itself? We reply, As in training men ba seyacn 
endure Siedahin and pain willingly for the sake of the superior loss. 


3 pleasure of the end they have in view, so the brave man gti the — 
4 endures the loss of life (a greater loss to him by reason of its 


joy of the 
noble end 


superior happiness and virtue than it would be to any ordi- fame over: 


2. xadher@repoy xt.r.] The 
regulation of fear implies endur- 
ing pain (Avmnpa tropeveww), the 
regulation of confidence re- 
sembles checking pleasure (nd€av 
anéxecOa), and the former is 
more difficult, and therefore 
more virtuous, as we have seen 
before (II. iii. 10, etc.). 

8. pixpdy dy] i.e. insignificant 
in comparison with the numerous 
and palpable circumstances. of 
pain and terror. Comp. S. Paul 


in reference to the same yupvixol 
ayaves, ‘ they do it to obtain a 
corruptible crown,’ etc. 

ll. vmopevee Se x.r.d.] 
Though he loves life much, he 
loves honour more: and though 
the loss of life is painful, the loss 
of honour would be yet more 
painful, and therefore he chooses 
that course which after all secures 
for him the greatest and highest 
pleasure, 

12. kat dom Gv paddovr x.7.A.] 


this pain 


160 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III. 





I> Padov ert TO Oavarep ) umn Oqoer a TO TOLOUTD yap 
padora onv Siov, Kal OUTOS peyiorav ayabiv d aTrooTe- 


5 petra Eiders’ humm pov Se TOUTO. 


"AAN ovdev Hrrov 


Nae Fr 
avdpeios, tows Se Kat paddov, StL TO eV TO TONE LD 


‘ > b ] b ] , € al 
KAXNOV aVT €EKELVOV QLpELT at. 
9 A X ta / > a ¢ , ‘ >,9 of aA 
QpEeTals TO NOES EVEPYELY UTTAPXEL, TwAnV ep OGOV TOU. 


3 N93 e , r 
Ov on ev amacas Tats 


6 Tédous eharretar. Srpatioras S ovdev tows KOAVEL [1 


nary man), deliberately preferring to it the glory, of death in 


5 battle. 


In such cases then pleasure is possible only so far 


as the attainment of the end and ideal of his being is felt and 
6 realized. Nor need we deny that a more reckless, though less 
brave, man might perhaps make a better rank-and-file soldier. 


Jeremy Taylor says ‘A great 
man is naturally a coward, as in- 
deed most men are, knowing the 
value of life; but the power of 
reason enables him when required 
to conduct himself with uniform 
courage and hardihood.’ This 
passage like that in the text 
would go far to excluding mere 
animal spirit (@vpds ch. viii.) 
from the highest form of courage. 
The recent successes of the 
civilian soldiers of Germany over 
the professional soldiers of 
France, with the further supposed 
advantage of natural ¢/an on the 
part of the latter, would support 
Aristotle in assigning more im- 
portance than is_ popularly 
allowed to the rational or calcu- 
lating element in true Courage. 
4, paddov] i.e. because the 
sacrifice is greater and mor ediffi- 
cult. See note on § 2 Grant 
quotes Wordsworth, whose 
‘Happy Warrior’ is 
‘More brave for this, that he hath much 
to lose.’ . 


6. rod rédous eanrera] To 
understand this we must recall 
what was said in I. i. about the 
‘final end’ of all human efforts 
and aspirations, and its identifi- 
cation with ‘Happiness.’ So far 
as the brave man secures for 
himself a result so ideally noble 
(compare vii.. 6), he ‘attains to 
something of the final end’ (rod 
Tédous ehamrera) of human 
existence, and therefore to Hap- 
piness ; but only so far, because 
the accompanying circumstances 
of his actions are otherwise pain- 
ful. He has what a modern 
religious writer would call ‘a 
foretaste of heaven,’ in this 
supreme act of self-sacrifice, 
We may even compare the lan- 
guage of the Apostle of a yet 
higher Ideal ‘who for the joy set 
before Him endured the cross, de- 
spising the shame.’ 

7. Observe the emphatic 
position of orpariras, ‘As mere 
rank-and-file soldiers the most 


7 


, - 


ade: a 


a els 


ey 


CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


161 





TOUS TovouTous Kpariorous eivat, andra TOUS HTTOV pep 
dybpeiovs, ado s aryabov pndev éxovras: Erouuoe ‘yap 
ovToL mpos Tos KwWdvUVOUS, Kal Tov Biov Tpos pLKpa 
Képdn Karadarrovrat. 
Tepi pev ovv avdpetas emt Tooovrop ipo Bor ri 3 5 
éoTiv, ov xarerov TOTS ye mepthaPeiv € ek TOY ELpnuevon. 
X. Mera S¢ tavrnv wept cwppocrivns Aéywpev" Soxod- 


CuHaP. X.—The proper objects of the Virtue of Temperanct. 


The other Virtue of our lower and irrational nature is Tem ce 


. . . ba cons sts in 
Temperance. Theoretically, it is a mean state in reference frees = 


gulation of 


truly brave may not be so good 
as those who have little or 
nothing to lose by death.’ Mere 
recklessness of life is not courage. 
The savage Turcos may be the 
most serviceable soldiers in a 
bloody war, or for certain opera- 
tions of war, but no one would 
say that they were therefore the 
bravest men. 

Cuapr. X.—The discussion of 
the Virtue of Temperance, with 
its related vices, occupies three 
Chapters (x—xii). 

In ch. x. the proper objects 
of Temperance are determined 
by a method precisely similar 
to that employed in the case of 
Courage in ch. vi. It is first 
broadly stated that Temperance 
deals with Pleasures, and then 
by successive limitations we 
arrive at the precise class of 
Pleasures to which it properly 
refers. 

In ch. xi. the excess and de- 


fect are described and contrasted 
with the mean state, 

In ch. xii, the comparative 
voluntariness of Cowardice and 
Intemperance is discussed ; and 
some supplementary remarks 
added concerning the nature of 
Intemperance as illustrated by 
its etymology. 

7. ocadpoovvn is usually, 
though inadequately, translated 
by ‘temperance.’ ‘Self-control’ 
or ‘self-mastery’ would perhaps 
be nearer to it, The derivation of 
capper, or cadppeor, from ods 
(cdos) and dpjv, shows that the 
original idea of the word was 
that of a man who never ‘loses 
his head,’ but keeps his mind 
clear and calm, however assaulted 
by pleasure or passion. Con- 
versely the adxéAaoros is one 
subject to no restraint: xdéAaows 
(see note on v. 7) being the tech- 
nical word for chastisement, or 
punishment for the purpose of 


our plea- 
sures, 


of mental 
pleasures. 


Nor all 
bodily 


pleasures. 


- 362 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III. 





ot yap TOV adoyor pepov adrTas eivat at aperat, 


7 
“Ort 


pev oy peaorns éort Tept ndovas 1 Ny coppootyn, elpy Tat 
nuiv’ HTTov yap Kal ovy Omoiws éoTi Tept Tas AUTAS 


+ A Sak \ Sint 6 7 ! / 

ev Tois avTois S€ Kat n akoNacia paiverat, 
/ 9 e ray 3 / 

Trouas OUD TOV ndovarr, yov axpopiopev. 


IIepi 
Auppno8acav 


dé ai puxueat Kat a TOMAT Kal, otov _pidoripia, ptro- 
pdbevar ExaTepos yap ToUTwY yalpeL, ov hiANTLKOS eo TLV 
>n 4 a / bs \ A a 
ovev TacxyovTos TOU cwMpaToS, aANG PAadXdoV THS dia- 
volas' ob Se Tept Tas ToLavTas ndovas ovUTeE cappoves 
-Opoios S oud ob Tept tas 10 
adas doa pn copariKad eloww" TOUS yap Pirouvbors 
Kat Supyntixovs Kat mept Tov TUYdvTMOY KaTaTpiBovTaS 
“ e / > / 3 / > / Ia 
Tas nuepas ador€oyas, akordaTous 8 ov A€yomev, ovdE 


of > / 
OUTE aKohacrot doe niga? 


4 TOUS AVTFOUpEVOUS ETL YPN Lao ) hirors. TIepi Sé Tas 


2 + xX e , > , \ Ia : 
copatiKas en av n ocwdpocvvn, ov tmacas Se ovode 15) 


/ ¢ \ / a \ A 4 @ 
TavTas’ ol yap yatpovtes Tois Sua THS Oews, Olov 


to pleasures and pains (as we have already said); but, practi- 


2 cally, its operation is limited to pleasures. 
Nathowever further to certain kinds of pleasures. 


Next, we limit it 
First, pleasures being 


either mental or bodily, we exclude the whole of the former 


3 from the sphere of Temperance, as well as certain others, such 


as love of gossip, idling, love of money or friends, which, 
though not exactly mental, are not at any rate bodily pleasures. 


reformation. The derivation of 
the word dxodagia is discussed 
by Aristotle in xii, 5, etc. 

1. trav dddyov pepdv] This 
(as was remarked in II. vii.) is 
almost the only hint as to the 
principle of arrangement in the 
Catalogue of Virtues. 

3. Rrrov] This was noticed by 


4 Secondly, among bodily pleasures, it is not concerned with 


Aristotle in passing in II. vii. 3. 
ovx dpuoiws will be found ex- 
plained in the next Chapter, § 5. 
Intemperance is shown not so 
much in avoiding pain, as in feel- 
ing pain at the loss of pleasure, 
or in excessive sensibility to pain. 


7. €xatepos yap] i.e. both 4 
@iAdripos and é ae 


+ afats 


cuap. x.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 163 








puace Kat oxmpace Kat pay, ore oappoves oure 
aKohacrou Neyourau Kaitou Sofevey av civas raul OS 


det xatpew Kab TOUTOLS, Kat Kal dmepBodny ai én- 
5 Newpov. “Opoiws S€ Kai 7 TOUS Tepl THY axon Tous 
yap dmepBePdnpevors Xaipovras pereow 7 v) vrroxpioes 5 
ovbeis axodaorous Dever, oude Tous ws Set cadpovas. 
—~6 Ovde TOUS epi TH oop, may Kara, oupBeBnxes 
TOUS yap xXalpovras pndov HF posor 7) Oupraparev 
e do pais ov Nervyowev axodaorous, adha padov TOUS 
' pipov Kal ov. Xatpovor yap ToUTOLS of akoXNacToL, 
Ort Sia ToUTeY avapynors yiverat avTors Tay emtOv- 
4 paren. I So. & av tus Kai Tous aXdovs, Stay Teé.- 
VaOCt, xXatpovras Tals TOV Bpoparov oopais. To &é 
_ ToLovToLS xaépevy akoNdOTOU: TOUT@ yap emvOupnra 
8 Tava. Ov« éort dé ovde Tots aos Coos KaTa TavTas 15 
Tas aicOnoers 780vn TRV Kara oupBeBnrcos ovde yap 
Talis Ocpais TOV AaywoY al KUVES yalpovoL,, aAXa TH 
Bpoce: rhv 8 aicOnow 7 dopn eroincev. Ovd 6 rewv 
™ dwvn tov Boos, adda tH edwdy Ste 8 éyryds eos, 
dia THs povis noero, Kai xaipew &) TavTyn paiveras. 20 


< 


ie 
a ' 
b i 
ene 
ie 
] 
a 


10 


(a) pleasures of sight, such as love of painting, colour, ete. ; Nor bre 

5 (f) nor pleasures of hearing, such as love of music ; (y) 

6 pleasures of smell, except indirectly as they may suggest or 
, 8 recall gluttonous or luxurious desires, just as the scent of the 
lower animals gives them pleasure only by its suggestion of 


7. Kata cvpP_eByxds] ‘ by a co- 
incidence,’ i.e. by the same occa- 
sion which excites the sense of 
taste exciting that of smell 
also. 

14, rowovros] ie. such as 
pupa cai da (Ll 10) in contrast 


with the ordinary Sp@para last 
mentioned. 

15. ovx €ore Se x.t.A.] The 
truth of this assertion is made 
very doubtful by well-known 
facts, at least as regards smcli 
and hearing. 


Q adr Ort Bopav et. 


e : We 4 ‘\ X\ na 
10 auras o eo adn Kat yedous. 


I 


— 


Lael 
~ 


164 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


‘Opoiees 8 ovd idav 4 eupav Eradov ) a aypiov aiya, 
II cpt Tas TOLaUT aS, 7 mBovas 7 0 
ow Kai 7) akoNacla éotiv av Kal Ta AowTa Cou 
xowavei, Sev avdparrodades kat Onprwders daivovrar 
Paivovrar oF Kai 7H 5 
yevoes ert | axepov 4) ovdev yppcbac Tis yap syevoeas 
Ect 1) Kpiots TOY Kup; Omep Tmrovovow ol Tous olvous 
Soxipatorres Kat Ta ofa aprbovres: ov mavu be xai- 
poves TOUTOIS, oux ot ye addacrol, ada TH aro 
Aavoe, eyveras maca & adns Kal ev ovtiows Kai ev 10 
morois Kal Tois adpodiciows Aeyomevows. Avo Kat nv- 
Eato tis oodpayos av Tov hapuyya avT@ pwaKpoTepov 
yepavou yevécOar, ws ndduevos TH abn. Koworarn dy 
Tov aicOncewv Kal sp % aKohacia’ Kal Sogevev ay 
Suxcatws erroveldiaT0s elvat, Ort ovy H av0 pwrrot eopev 15 
umrapyet, GAN 9 faa. To dy tovovTos yalpew Kai 


[BOOK III. 





eS See a ; th 


prey; (8) nor dainas of taste, except to a slight extent, 
viz. 80 far as by prolonged or artificially- stimulated contact of 
the food with the throat the sense of Touch is excited. (e) 
The sense of touch alone remains. We have thus limited 
Temperance to the regulation, and Intemperance to the in- 
dulgence, of the pleasures of the sense of Touch, and we must 
further and finally limit it to the commonest and most ignoble 


6. Aristotle regards the pri- dishes (as a cook), would be the 


mary function of taste (as of the 
other senses) to be the discrimi- 
nation of objects; the transmis- 
sion of information to the mind 
concerning things external to it, 
rather than the communication 


. of pleasure :—in a word, he looks 


at their powers of perception 
rather than their powers of sen- 
sation. Hence to judge of wine 
(as a trader), or of seasoned 


most proper function of the sense 
of taste as such; but it is not in 
such an exercise of it that plea- 
sure is conveyed. That depends, 
according to Aristotle, upon the 
prolonged contact of the thing 


‘ tasted with the throat ; i.e. upon 


a particular application of the 
sense of Touch. It is of course 
true (though not quite in the 
sense intended by Aristotle) that 








cHAP.xI.] * ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 165 








12 wddora ayanay Onpuddes. Kab ydp ai édevdeprararas 
TeV bua Ths adns ndover adnpyvrat, olov ai ev TOUS 
yupvacion Sia Tpiyrecs Kai THS Gepwacias ryevomevaa 
ou "yap meph Tay TO TOMA y TOD aKkoddorou adn, adda 
Wepi TWA MEpN. 5 
XI. Tov 8 emBupudy ai yey Kowat Soxovow elvat, 
ai & i8cou Kat emiBerou olov 2) mev THIS Tpopiys duaiKny 
mas yap emiBupel 6 evders Enpas i) iypas rpodis, 
ore © appoir, Kat evs, dnoiv “Opnpos, 0 véos Kal 
 axpatov: to Se tovdcde 4 tovaede, oveets mas, oude 10 
2 Tav avTav. Aw daivetas erepor eivas. Ov pay aGdX 


kinds of pleasures even of this, which is itself the lowest and 
most animal of all our senses. 


CHAP. XI.—The excess and defect related to the Virtue of 
Temperance. 


The pleasures spoken of in the last chapter admit of ‘a These plea- 


further division into those which are common and natural, further 


such as the desire of food generally; and those which are pan 


peer and acquired, such as the desire of some particular Acquired. 
ind of food; the latter depending (within certain broad 


tN 








the sense of Taste depends upon 
Touch, but such is also the case 
with all the other senses. 

1. ehevOepiorarat] ‘the noblest 
pleasures,’ a converse metaphor 
to avdparodades in § 3 and else- 
where. 

Cuar. XI—This Chapter 
treats of (1) the Excess of In- 
temperance (a) in reference to 
natural and artificial Desires 
($§ 1-4), (8) in reference to Plea- 
sure and Pain generally (§§ 5, 6) ; 
(2) The Defect of Insensitiveness 


(§ 7); and (3) adds a few words 
on the Mean of Temperance in 
contrast with both. 

6. ray pev emibuudy] Plato 
(Rep. p. 558) makes a similar 
distinction of émOupia, and adds 
that the gratification of the 
natural or necessary desires is 
always beneficial, that of the 
artificial desires not generally so. 
7. eémiOero} ‘acquired’ or 

ificial,’ 


8. §mpas 4 typas rpopis] 


‘either solid or liquid fo 


Errors inthe 3 natural limits 


166 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK ith 





exe ye Tt Kal hvotKoy" _erepa yap er épous corly n8€a, 


/ 
3 Kab évia TAG. by nolo TOV i ea 


"Ev pev ov Tals 


puoveais emsOupiaus oheyou dpaprdvover Kat ed &, 
emi TO Whetov? TO yap ea Die Ta TUXOvTa i) qivew wos 
av vrepm do Oh, vmepBadrew éotl TO Kara puow TO 
TAnOe avarrnpwois yap THs evdeias 4 pvowwn eme- 


Oupia. 
Séov mAnpovvtes avrqp. 
> / 

4 avOparrodmdets. 


XS / @ / e . \ “ 
Ato AéeyovTat ovTOL yaoTpLLapyol, WS Tapa TO 
n y* / ¢ / 
Tovovtou S€ yivovtat ot Niav 
\ \ \ In/ a ¢ \ 
ITepi 5 tas wdias tev ndovav TrodXot 


a 


a a 4 
Kal TOAAAYXWS duapravovow" TOV yap diroTotovTwy 10 
x 4 x a / @ ‘\ 5 a sx a anno i) e 
EYOMEVWY 1 TM KALPELY OLS MH OL, Y TH pa V, ) WS 
¢€ ‘ ‘\ € n ‘\ / € 
Ot TONAL," i) BN OS O€l, KATA TavTa 8 of axcdXacTot 


) upon individual taste. Now in natural desires 


error is rare, and must always take the form of supplying in 
excess what is in itself a natural want; and this, when it is 


of excess ; 4 found, indicates a degraded and alinost brutish nature. In 


the case of acquired desires, error is very common and multi- 
form, extending to the object, manner, degree, ete., of the 


2. €ua wacw] ‘Some things 
there are which give every one 
more pleasure than things ordi- 
nary and indifferent.’ i.e. How- 
ever much individual tastes dif- 
fer, there are still some things 
naturally more pleasant than 
any to every one. 

3. odiyou K.T.A.] eg. Exces- 
sive eating is not likely to occur 
in regard to bread, or any simple 
food which is desired merely to 
supply a natural appetite, and 
not for any special pleasure to 
be derived from eating it, but 
rather in regard to some parti- 
cular viand or favourite 


‘ Gluttony on oatmeal porridge’ 
ov wavy vyiverat. 

9. avdparrodadets | ‘ degraded,’ 
a metaphor converse to éAeuv6é- 
ptos, both words having passed 
from a social to a moral signi 
cation. See last Ch. § 12, note. 

11. 7 ws of modo] In some 
editions @s is omitted, and if so, 
7 =‘ than,’ after the comparative 
paddrov. If ws be retained, the 
sense may be explained by what 


is said in I. v. 3 about the exces- 


sive and exclusive devotion of 
of woAAot to Pleasure. See also 
the concluding words of this 
section. 


6 


“Tator@ § éouxe ro Se 7Sovnv AvTeia aw. 


CHAP, XI.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


167 





bmepBadrovew" Kal yap xaipovow éviois ols ov Set 
(uionta yap), Kat e tice Seb yaipew tdv ToLovTar, 
5 HGNXov 7) Sel, Kai ws ot TONAL xaipovow. “H pev ovv 
Tept Tas ndovas vmepBodn OTL axodacia Kal rpexrTor, 
Sirov: rept Se Tas AvTas ovy BoTep ert THs avdpeias 
T) vTopeve NéeyeTas cappav axodacTos Se TO i), 
GN’ 6 pev axodacTos TO AvTetcOaL padrov 7) Set Ste 
Tov 75éwv ov Tuyydver (Kal THY AUTHV Se ToLE AUTO 7 
noon), 6 Se cadpov TO py AvTrEeicOas TH aTrOVGia Kal 


a 3? / aA ¢o/ 
T® aTrexeoOat TOU 7d€os. 


@ \ 93 > ] > rn nr e / , 
O pev ovv axedrXacTos eriOupet Tdv ndéwv TavTwv 4 10 
Nea, eo% a > / A > ‘ 
TOV padoTa, Kal ayeTar vO THS emiOvpias WoTE avTL 
na . A c rn ‘ \ rn >," > 

TOV Gddrwv TAdO aipeicOar: Sv0 Kai AvTEsTAL Kai aTrO- 

, ‘\ > a ‘ 4 ‘\ €.1 9 / 
avev Kat emiOvpav peta dAvTrNS yap 7 EmrUOvpIa’ 


"EY Xelrrovtes 


\ \ ‘ ¢ ‘ \ @ A a / 3 / 
de Téepl TAS noovas Kat HTTOV 7H Set NALPOVTES OV TTAVU 
/ 2 \ b) oe ¢e 4 b] / 
yiwoyvTat ov yap avOpamiKn eat n TOLaUTN avatcOnota 


indulged desire. 


It is clear then that in this ill-regulated 


15 


5 pursuit of pleasure consists the Excess in reference to the The Excess 


6the temperate man. 


7 


Virtue of Temperance, viz., 


Intemperance. In its rela- 


has refer- 


ence both 


tion to pain, however, it does not consist (like cowar- to pleasure 
dice) in shrinking from it, so much as in feeling pain though ina 


at the absence of pleasure. 


This is not the case with 


Thus the intemperate man in his 


excessive devotion to pleasure paradoxically makes it to 


be a source of pain. 


15. Rage was evidently 
aconception wholly unintelligible 
to the Greek adad. In explana- 
tion of this we might quote the 
apology of Erasmus for Ecclus. 
xxv. 13 (where the wickedness 
of women is denounced as ex- 


ceeding all other), ‘Il faut re- 
marquer qu'il n’y avait pas encore 
des moines.’ 

17. dvaic@ncia] ‘insensitive- 
ness,’ the word being as unusual 
as the condition indicated by it. 
Indeed if it did occur, it would 


different 
sense. 


The Defect, or absence of proper sensi- The Defect 


does not oc- 
cur in fact. 


168 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK UL 


pa 





ype \ \ A / \ / \ a 
Kal yap Ta AoLTAa FHa Siaxpiver Ta Bpapara, Kal ToIS 
‘ / A y 2 / oe ek ‘as 
Mev Naiper Tois ny our et b¢ To pmbev EoTLV NOU pode 
Sradeper érepov érépou, Topp av ein Tov avOparos 
elvaw ov TETEUXE & 06 Tovovtos ovdparos Sia 70 pr 
wavy vives Bau. 0 Se cadpov perws wept TavT exe" 5 
oUTE yap HoETAaL ots wadioTa 0 dxohacros, GMa panr- 
ov Suaxepaiver, oul dheos ois un Set ovte ohddpa 
TowouT? ovdevi, ovr arr ovrasy humreirat oud ervOupel, 
i) petpiws, ovde wadrov # Set, ovd dre pa Set, ovd 
e/. an / 21/ Oe \ N ER Bee Ci 
d\ws TOY ToLoOUT@Y ovlEv" doa Se mpos vyleLay éeoTW 10) 
x A 2 / ta / 4 4 : BE / \ 
i Tpos eveEiay 7déa ovTa, TOUTMY opEkeTaL METPLWS Kal 
e a \ a A ta / ie 4 / 7 4 
@S S€l, KAL TOV AAAwY NOEMY fH EuTTOdi@Y TOUTOLS OVT@VY 
Ry eae. \ e N ‘ Teh . \ Py : 
i) Tapa TO Kadov 4) vTép THY ovciav. ‘“O yap ovTas 
A A b cal Nig tue 4 ¢e \ A Ige/ ¢€ | 
EXaV padrov ayaa Tas TolavTas noovas THS akias’ O 
2 A 
Se cadpov OU TOLOUTOS, GAN ws 6 opOes Noryos. 15) 
bility to pleasure, is only imaginary, for not only all men, 
but even all animals, must have some tastes and preferences. 


The mean 8 The Temperate man, as we have seen, holds a mean position _ 


stands in 
contrast 


with both. 


between excessive devotion and utter insensibility to pleasures. ‘ 
He enjoys them in moderation, and with due regard to the 
various considerations as to objects, degree, occasions, and 
consequences which right reason suggests. 


lar difficulty about dopynota in 
IV. v. 5), it is perhaps conceiv- | 
able that a man might be with- : 


be rather a physical than a moral 
defect. The practical non-exist- 
ence of dvatoOnoia and of adoBia 


(see vii. 7) is a comment on the 
statement of x. 1, that the vir- 
tues of Courage and Temperance 
relate to feelings which are 
purely animal and instinctive 
(belonging to ddoyov pépos). In 
the case of all the other virtues of 
the catalogue (except perhaps to 
some extent dpy7—see the simi- 


out the feelings, or be altogether 
removed from the circumstances, 
in which thesphere of the exercise 
of the virtues lies. In sensibi- 
lity to fear and to pleasure a man 


could hardly be wanting without. 


ceasing to be human. 
13. ovr@s] i.e. i} wapa TO Kadaw 
i) brép Thy odciar. 


2 aiperov, To Sé deverov. 


36 Tav dhoBepav avaraduv. 


7 


s — 
si 
- i, 
ee 


CHAP. XII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 169 





XII. ‘Exoucip Sé wadrov eouxev ) Gkodacia THs Set- 
Mas. ‘H pev yap 80 ndovqy, n Se Sia AUTH, Ov TO pEV 


Kai » pwev dwn eEictnot Kat 


/ ‘ a 4 e % ¢ ‘ Jar 
HGcipes THY TOU exovTos gua, n Se Ndovn ovdev Tob- 
A ral a € 4 ‘ \ > , 
oUToY Tole, maddov & éxovovor 510 Kau emroveidtoT o- 5 
TEpov. Kai yap era Oijvar p paov Tpos avTa? ToAAG yap 
ev ™]? Bio ta TowadTa, Kai ot eOucpot axvSuvo., ‘Eni 


Aokeue & av ovy opoiws 


CHAP. XII.—(a) Js the external compulsion stronger in Coward- 
zce or in Intemperance ? 
(8) The nature of dxodacia ts illustrated by its 


etymology. 


The question may be asked, Which is more voluntary (and Intemper- 


ance is more 


therefore more blameable), Intemperance or Cowardice ? We jojuntary 
reply, Intemperance :—(1) because the pressure arises from thanCoward- 


ice, if we 


2 pleasure, whereas in Cowardice it arises from pain; (2) be- consider 


cause it is both easy and safe to practise resistance against Simsle acts, 


temptations to Intemperance ; 


3 with temptations to Cowardice. 


Cuar. XIL—We have seen in 
ch. y. that no vice is really in- 
voluntary, still the degree of 
external pressure, though it 
never amounts to compulsion, 
varies in different cases. It is 
naturally greatest in regard to 
these two Virtues which relate 
to those feelings of our animal 
nature (x. 1) which are ever 
present, and must be excited 
under given external circumstan- 
ces whenever they arise. The 
object of this Chapter is to de- 
termine in which of these two 
cases there is more external 


though per- 
while the reverse is the case haps the re- 


A distinction however must be Vere. br “ 


the 
settled ha- 
pressure, and, so far, less of bits. 


voluntary action. 

6. kal yap] ‘and what is more,’ 
introducing, as usual, a fresh 
argument. 

avra from the context, though 
it has no grammatical anteced- 
ent, evidently refers to pleasur- 
able objects, or temptations to 
Intemperance. 

8. Sd&ere F Gy k.7.A.] eg. A 
man may resolve that he wil! 
give up his property, and offer 
himself as a prisoner, or indeed 
do anything, rather than face 
the enemy in fight. That would 


The etymu- 
logy of the 
Greek word 
axodacta 
throws light 
upon the 
nature of 
the vico, 


/ 3 
4 Biata eivat. 


170 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK III. 





e 7 e / > a d i. be} 
Exovolov ) Setdia eivas Tois Kal éxacTov’ avTn meV 
\ EY a N \ 4 Ion / ef ‘ 
yap arvios, tavta Sé dua AvIrHY EkioTHOW, MoTE Kat 
OF e/ \ -) 3 a SS \ al 
Ta OTA piTTEW Kal TAaAXA aoynuovety’ S10 Kat SoKE 


2 , fe A \ XN 
To 8 axoNdoTm avdradw ta pev Kal 


v4 ¢ 4 3 fa) \ NP / > 
exaota éxovala, emOupodvTL yap Kat opeyomer@, TO O 
¢ e InN \ ? > f. 3 
Odov HTTov" ovOeis yap emOupes axdracTOS Elva. 

T 5 + A > / 5 a Aaa, SI ‘ ¢ 

00 OvOm“a THS aKoNacias Kal ET TAs TaLoLKaS apLap- 

/ / aX. 4 , / 
Tias pépopev' éxovor yap Twa cpowwTnta. Llorepov & 
PAN 4 a Ink \ \ A / 
amo ToTépou KaXElTaL, ovOEv mpos Ta voV Svaeper, OHAOV 


drawn according as we regard the single acts, or general 


habits. 


In the case of acts of Cowardice the violence of 


the present pain (of which there is none in Intemperance) 
is often such that a man hardly knows what he is doing. 
But looking at these Vices as habits, no man has an 


4 actual desire to be habitually intemperate, as he does 


sometimes to be an habitual coward. Thus in Cowardice 
the general habit is more voluntary than the single acts, 


5 but in Intemperance the reverse is the case. 


The Greek term for Intemperance (dxoAacia), or,aswe might 
translate it, Wantonness, involvestheidea of absence of restraint, 
and it is also familiarly applied to the errors of childhood. 
Without deciding which is the primary meaning of the term, 
we may assert that its application is in both cases appropriate. 


6 No things need restraint more 


imply a deliberate and voluntary 
habit of cowardice. Another 
may resolve to fight to the last, 
but when he sees actual blood- 
shed be overpowered with horror 
and throw down his arms. That 
would be the half-involuntary 
cowardice of particularacts. (See 
Supplementary Notes.) 

1. ari] i.e. Betdla ‘ Cowardice 


than desires of pleasure, and 


in itself.’ ratra dé, i.e. Ta Ka 
éxacrov ‘the surroundings.’ 

10. rd dorepoy dard Tov mpore- 
pov] not ‘the latter from the 
former,’ but ‘the later in concep-. 
tion from the earlier.’ 

11. Two conditions are noted 
as requiring xdéAaots, viz. ten- 
dency to what is vicious, and 
capacity for rapid growth. Both 


/ \ of aes n > 54 
88 dru 70 totepov aro Tod mpotépov. Ov xaxads 8 eouxe 10 
/ / 9 ‘ 
petevnveyOar' KkexodacOat yap Set To TOY aloypa@v opeE- 


bt ee NS) oe A el gs 18 de 


_ 47 eminent force. 


CHAP. XII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


171 





, \ ‘ EA A a ‘\ /. 
youevoy Kat ToAAnY avénow exov, ToLlovToy Sé wadiora 
e ? / 4 “Ss x 3? / \ ge he 
9 eTlOvpia Kat o Tras’ KaT eTiOupiay yap foot Kat Ta 


/ \ /. 9 4 ¢ a tel y+ 
4 Talla, Kat padtoTa Ev TOVTOLS n TOU Ndéos Opekts. 


Ei 


obv pm éoras eves Kal UTO TO Apxov, emt wodw Hee 
dm doros yap y TOU 1d€0S opetis Kab Tmavrax obey 7 
avonr, Kal 1) THIS er Oupias € evépryeva avée. To _ovyyeves, 
Kav peyarat Kal apodpat a aot, Ka Tov Roya pov exxpov- 


ovOolr. 


8 ovo pn dev evavtwove bas. 


Ao Set peTpias elvat auras Kat oruyas, Kal 7 
To be ToLovTOV evtreibes Nem 


youev Kat Kexohac pevor" aoTep yap TOV Tatoa bet Kara 
TO mpdoTaypa TOU TauBaryryou tiv, ovTw Kar TO emt- 
9 Oupntixov Kata TOV Aodyov. 


Mw Set tov awdpovos TO 


children; and moreover in children desires of pleasure are in pre- 


Such desires grow prodigiously by indulgence, 


are insatiable, and if unrestrained choke reason altogether. 


these conditions are found most 
strikingly in each of the two ob- 
jects to which ‘ Wantonness’ is 
attributed, viz. Desire of Plea- 
sure, and Children. 

5. mavraxdbev TH avo7nra] 
‘assails the weak man from 
every quarter.’ 

6. 7 THs émOvpias évépyesa] 
‘the exercise (or gratification) of 
desire strengthens that which is 
kindred to it in our nature,’ i.e. 
strengthens 76 émiOupnrixoy until 
it altogether overpowers the 
rival part of our nature rd Aoyio- 
tikdv. (See I. xiii.) This seems to 
be the idea of ‘evrreplotatos dpap- 
tia in Heb. xii. 1, ‘paraphrased by 
Chryst. ‘ mavrdbev iorapévn.’ 


8 They ought never therefore to be allowed to resist reason, 
g any more than a child to resist his master. 


When the habit 


11. Is must be remembered 
that the ma:daywyds was not the 
teacher, but the servant who 
conducted the boy to school, and 
was responsible for his conduct 
when not in the hands of the 
teacher. His office somewhat 
resembled that of the ‘governor,’ 
as contrasted with the ‘tutor’ of 
our royal princes. This adds 
point to the illustration, since 
moral and not intellectual discip- 
line is in question in the text. 

12. 81d Sei x.7.A.] This is illus- 
trated by the often recurring dis- 
tinction between cadpary and 
éykpar7s (see notes on I. iii. 7 and 
I. xiii, 17), The cadpov has no 
bad desires left to contend with. 


LEC, 


172. | ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [Book m1. 


re 2 “ 





ervOuuntixov cupbwveiy TO Oye’ aKoTrOs yap auboty 


TO KaNOV, Kal erLOupet 6 codpwv wv Set Kat ws Set Kat 
10 Ore ovTw Se TatTEs Kat 6 AOyos. Tavr ouv tiv et- 

pjcOw rept cwppocuvys. 

of self-control is formed, reason and desire are in ‘Sema 


10 and both tend towards one goal, the ideally noble. So muc! 
then for the Virtue of Temperance or Self-control. 








a IV. 


it LL Adyopev 8 Efjs rept édevOepvorntos, Soxet § elva: 
) Tept YpHpaTa pecoTys erauveitar yap 6 édevbEpLos 
ovkK € TOS TrONEWLKOIs, oVd E&Y ols 6 awdpwr, ovd 
av ev tals Kpicecw, adda Teplt Seow ypnudtov Kat 
2rprw, parrov § ev tH Sdce. Xpnuata 8& reyouer 5 
3 wavra Sowv 4 akia vomiopate petpeitrar. “Eoti 5é Kat 
9 acwtia Kat 9 avedevOepia mept ypnwata virepBodat 


CuHap. 1.—On Liberality. 


1 Our next subject is the Virtue of Liberality. Prodigality, Use of terms 
Liberality, and Sordidness relate simply to the giving and “™** 

2 taking of property, but chiefly the former. By ‘property’ 

3 we understand whatever can be exchanged for money. The 
term ‘sordid’ is generally restricted to the sense just indi- 


Cuar. L—The discussion of 
the Virtues in detail proceeds as 
in the order given in IL. vii. Libe- 
rality occupies the next place. 
Refer to note on II. vii. for the 
principle of this arrangement. 

This Chapter falls under three 
heads :— 

1—5. Preliminary—The use 
of terms explained. 

6—27. Liberality described in 
its various practical details. 

28—45. Prodigality and Sor- 
didness described. 


4. k«piceow] ‘decisions,’ in 
reference apparently to the Vir- 
tue of dixaocvvn discussed after- 
wards, as the words ey fois 
modeutkois and év ois 6 cadppayv 
refer to the two Virtues already 
treated of in the last Book. 

7. dvehevOepia] I have, after 
some hesitation, adopted ‘Sor- 
didness’ rather than ‘Illibe- 
rality’ for dvedevOepia, as being 
more applicable to the various 
types of dyvedevOepia distin- 
guished in §§ 38-465, 


4 MeV. 
/ / + 
5 Qua KaKLaS EYOVOL. 


6 exdeyoueba. 


4 money upon their lusts. 


174 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK IV. 





9. N ‘ 
Kat ENDetnfrens: Kal THY pep avehevOepiav Tpoodmrowev 


act Tos | baidNov i Set mept Ypnuata orovdatouar, vy 
6 acwriav emrudépopev eviore oupmékovres: Tous yap 
axKpareis Kab eis akohaciav Satravnpovs aowToUS Kaov- 


‘ ca) 9S 

Aw Kat dhavrdtaro. Soxodow eivas moddas yap 
> \ ? 4 

Ov &n oixeiws tpocaryopevovras 


/. » > ¢ ff ‘ + ‘ / 
BovreTat yap acwros eivar o & Tu Kaxov éyov, TO hOei- 
x ’ / of “ e 3 eu > 4 
pelv THY ovoiay' acwTos yap o ov avTov amroAdvpeEvos, 
§ a § tees / ¢ a 9 Soe eae ‘ 
OKEl O ATMONELA TIS ALTO eival Kat _n THS oveias POopa, 


¢ A a \ ’ ¥ 
as tov Snv dia TovT@Y OVTOS. 
@ » 3 / 4 4 A 
Nv 8 eat yxpeia, éore TovTows ypnocOat 


ef » X > / 
Ovtwo &) THY acwTiav 


\ i) s aA € al 3 \ n / 
Kat €U Kar KQAKOS’ O 7 NOUTOS bY €oTL TMV XPNT ti@Y" 


cated; but ‘prodigal’ is often used in a wider sense, and 
applied to the intemperate generally, who do in fact spend 


Hence it is a comprehensive term 


5 of reproach. We prefer however to use the word in its strict 


Liberality 6 and limited sense. 


has more 
to do with 
giving than 
taking. 


Now whatever admits of being used may 


be used well or ill, and a virtue related to any such object 


4. ‘Prodigal’ is commonly 
so applied in English (e.g. The 
Prodigal Son), but scarcely the 
abstract term ‘ prodigality.’ Rea- 
sons are given for this con- 
nexion between dkodacia and 
aowria in § 35 of this Chapter. 
‘ Profligate’ has a similar double 
meaning. 

7. Bovdrera] ‘means’; like 
the French ‘ veut dire.’ Much of 
the force of this section depends 
on the etymological connexion 
of dowtos and doortia with 
coe, and is consequently diffi- 
cult to reproduce in a transla- 
tion. 

12. ‘The very essence of pro- 
perty is its use.” This would be 


explained by what is said in I. v. 


8, or by Plato’s remark in Rep. 


p. 333 B, that money laid by is 
as useless as a pilot on shore or 
a physician in health. Wealth 
is an instrument as much as a 
spade or any other tool, and in 
like manner, when not being 
used is for the time useless. 
The following passage from 
Bacon’s Essay on Riches offers 
several points of comparison with 
this and the following Chapter: 


‘Riches are for spending, and 


spending for Honour and Good 
Actions (rod xadovd évexa, § 12). 
Therefore extraordinary expense 
must be limited by the worth of 





the occasion (ii. 11, 15, ete.), but — 


Sew ie, 
) 
* TR < 


cmap. 1.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


175 





éxdorp o a apiora xprrrae 6 Exo TV rept TOUTO aperay 
Ka Toure én xpncerae dpora 6 €yov TH Tept Ta 
7 Xpnuata apernp. Ovros § éativ 6 érevOépios. Xpijous 
& elvat Soxet xpnparoy Samavn Kat Soc. am ée Mies 


KaL 7 gudann KTHOW HaNROV. 


Aw paddov éoTt TOU 


erevBepiou To Sidovar ois S22 7 Aap Pdvew d0ev Set Kar 


8 pa Nap Baivew dGev ov Sei. 


Ts ‘yap aperis HaNNov 


TO ev mrovety i) TO ev Tao, Kal Ta KaNa mpdrresy 


- piirdov }) Ta aicxpa yn mparrew" ovK anrov § & ore Ty 
pev ddoet creat TO ee rrovei kat TO Kana mparrery, 


7 ée dave TO maaxew i yn _aiexpomparyeiv. 


Kat 


n Xapls TO SiSdvr0, 02! TO pn hap Bavovre Kar o errawvos 
9 Se wadrov. ' Kaz paov S€ ro py AaBelv Tod Sobvarr TO 3% 
yap oiKelov HTTOv TpolevTaL pAAXov 7) ov NawBavovar 


is displayed in its being used well. Property is evidently a 
thing to be used: Liberality therefore is that quality or virtue 
_ which enables us to make the best possible use of property. 
7 Again that use consists in spending and giving: taking and 


keeping resemble acquisition rather than use. 


Hence, as we 


have already hinted, liberality relates to giving more than to 


8 taking. 


This appears also from the following considerations : 


—(a) Virtue is always active and positive rather than passive 


and negative. 


Giving is the former, taking is the latter. 


9 (8) It is harder, and so more thankworthy, to give rightly 


ordinary expense ought to be 
limited by a man’s Estate, and 


governed by such regard that it 
be within his compass’ (i. 19, 
ii. 12). 

12. xapis] Exactly in the 
sense found in 1 Pet. i. 19, 20, 
rovro yap xapis, ‘for this is 
thankworthy’; and in Luke vi. 
32, ‘If ye love them which love 


you, what thank have ye? ola 
tpiv xapis éotly ; ; 

13. kat paoy Se] Compare the 
dictum in Il. ili, 10, mepi rd 
xahenarepov ael kal téxvn yly- 
VETat kal dpern. 


5 


14, qrrov- paddov | a redundant _ 


comparative, and=7rror simply. 
Cf. paddov evruxéotepor, etc., 
and Shakespeare’s ‘ most un- 


176 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





Myo 2 / Nf ‘ e / 
10 To GANOTpLov. Kai erevOépior Se Acyovrat ot Ssdovres" 
€ ‘ AQ , > b ] , 3 A 
ou O€ lal AapBavovres OUK «Ets erevBepuoryta eT awovr- 
Ta, aNN oux HTTOV eis Suxaocvvnv ob Se hapBavovres 
Il ovO ématvovvTat Taye. Didovvrat Se oxedov pavora 
2. / 
ot €evbe TeV an apes" aherspor yap, TOUTO 8 avd 
a / J 
12 TH Sooe. Ai Se kat aperny m pagers Karat Kal Tod 
a of 
Kanov evexa. Kai 6 édev0épus ovv doce. Tov Kado 
c/ ae nA @ \ a \ wow A le \ 
évexa Kat op0as ois yap Set Kat dca Kat OTe, Kal 
5 v4 / 3 a / \ n / 
13 TaANA doa Eretas TH OpOn Soca. Kai tadta nd€éas 


ro than to decline to take wrongly. Those who give rightly are 

called liberal; those who refrain from taking wrongly are 

called honest and just, but not liberal; while those who merely 

11 take or receive rightly are scarcely praised at all. (y) Liber- 

ality is one of the most popular of virtues, and that because 

of its usefulness, and this consists in giving, not in taking. 

Yet liberal, 12 However, as all virtue has a noble end in view, mere giving 

eotdlamrord freely is ‘not enough to constitute Liberality. Regard must 

conditions. be had to certain conditions, of which we specify three :— 
1. A noble motive. 2. Due consideration of the recipients, ~ 

13 the amount, and the occasion of the gift. 3. Cheerfulness on 


kindest cut of all.’ Translate, 
‘Men are less inclined to spend 
their own money, than merely 
to refrain from taking that which 
belongs to others.’ In other 
words, ‘it is easier to be honest 
than to be generous.’ Many 
men who are very reluctant to 
part with their money, and 
anxious to hoard, would yet 
scorn to gain anything by dis- 
honest or suspicious means. 
Avarice is not necessarily accom- 
panied by dishonesty. 

4. ovd émawodvra mdvv] The 
virtue is in fact too common and 


easy to deserve commendation. 
Praise on such grounds would be 
almost derogatory (foprikos 6 
emaLvos, as Aristotle says in X. 
Vili. 7). 

8. ois yap Sei x.7.A.] These 
words are explanatory of dp0és.. 

9. 70€os 7) dkvm@s] This con- 
dition is explained by such pas- 


sages as I. viii. 10-12 (No one is / 
unless he takes plea- 


virtuous © 
IT. iii. 


sure in virtuous actions) ; 
1 (The test of the formation of 
any habit (€f:s) is that the 
actions to which it is related are 
done with pleasure); or by the 


ia 


CHAP. 1] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 177 





; 4 GUT MOS* TO yap KaT aperny 700 7 n adurrov, euora 
4 Se Aumnpov. ‘O ée SiS0us ots ea Sei, 7 y pu TOD Kado 
 &exa adda Sia tw’ anv airiay, OUK éhevbéptos aN 
Gos 78 pnOnoerar. Ove 6 Aumnpas" padov yap 
 ddowr’ ay Ta xpnpara THS KAAS mpatens, TovTo & ovK 5 
5 5 Beveplas Ovde dapperau be dOev pa Sei ovde yap 
€oTL Tov pn TLL@VTOS Ta xpnpara a Towaurn hap es. 
16 Ove ay ein Se ovd airntixds' ov yap eats Tod eb 
7 TOLoUYTOS evxepas evepyereta Bau. “O0ev de Sel, dinpe- 
Ta, otov amo TaD iSieov KTNMATOV, ovr @S Kadov arr 10 
@S dvaryKaion, omas eyn SiSovae. Os awednoet TOV 
iScoon, Bovdopevos ye bua ToUT@Y TLOW emrapxeiy. Ovée 
Tos TUYOUCL Sac, wa ex Svdevas ois Set Kat STE Kat 


the part of the giver. There is no grudging or hesitation in 
(4 true liberality. The absence of any of these conditions would 
[5 destroy the liberality of the act. aking however as well as Soalso 
giving is subject to certain conditions: for—(1) The truly 7usthe 
liberal man does not care so much for money as to be indif- taking of 
(6 ferent to the source from which it comes. (2) He will “°"™ 
[7 be reluctant to ask for this as for other favours. (8) His mo- 
tive in taking is to secure not the money itself but the 


means of giving. Hence he will not neglect his own affairs, 


distinction regularly drawn be- thing noble in taking or re- 
tween eykpdreia and cwppootvn, ceiving, but it is none the less 
the outward acts of which are necessary with a view to giving ; 
the same; for this see note on for liberality is one of those 


T. in, 7. virtues which cannot be exer- 
4, 6 Avmnpds] Understand cised without appliances, ‘ dxo- 
d:d0vs. pnyntov dyra,’ as we read in 


8. ov yap éort xr.A.] See LI. viii. 15. (See further on this 
ch. ili. 24-26 for this trait in the point X. viii. 4.) With the 
character of the peyardoyuxos. statement in the text compare, 

10. ody ws Kadoy kx. TA.) Cf. ‘It is more blessed to give than 
§ 20 just below. There is no- to receive,’ 


M 


The relative 


not the abso- 


lute amount 


givén is to be 


considered. 


tical points 
of detail 
about Libe- 
rality 

(§§ 20—27). 
Liberality is 
more com- 
mon with 
inherited 
than with 
acquired 
wealth. 


@ 4 
18 ov KaNOV, 


2\ ee 
20 €QV ATT 


IQ occasions. 


178 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Iv. 





‘Enevdepiov 8 éoti opodpa Kal TO vIeEp- 


Barrew ev 7 doce, ware Karanetrrew EavT@ eNaT To’ 


19 TO yap pa emuBnemewy ep éavTov erevbepiou, Kara 


TH ovciav & n enevBepiorns heyerau ov yap ev 7? F 
mrnbes tov SiSouevov To édevOepsov, GAN ev TH TOU F 


Siddvros eer, ality Se Kata THY ovclay Sidwow. 


Ovbéev 


‘\ 4 / “ Qe / / 
On Kw@AvEL énevOepu@tepov elval TOV Ta ENATTM OLOOVTA, 


éXNaTTOvar bdo. 


’ Erevdeprarepor 8é elvas 


Soxovow ob pm KTHoGwEvoL GAAG TapadaBdvTes THY 
ovciay" ametpot Te yap THs evdelas, Kat mavres ayar bo ¢ 
paArdov TA avrav epyas @omEp ot ryovels Kat ol mounT a. - 
TTyovrety 8 ov padiov TOV edevdepuov, pyre AnTsKOv 
dvta pnte dudaKtiKov, TpoetiKoy Se Kal un TYLovTa Ob 


18 nor scatter his gifts indiscriminately (though his tendency ; 


would be rather in this direction than the opposite), for thus 
he would cut himself off from the power of giving on proper 


to the means of the giver. 


Liberality is always to be measured, not by the : 
absolute amount given, but by the proportion which it bears 
We conclude this part of our 


subject with some general considerations upon Liberalit 
Sundry prac-20 Liberality is more often found in those who have ‘het 7 
than in those who have made, their money. This is partly 4 
because the former do not know what it is to want money, and 


partly because they have not that sort of parental love to ~ 


it which men feel for anything which they have themselves \ 


3. Kara THY ovciay] ‘in pro- 
portion to one’s means,’ 

6. €&e] ‘the disposition of the 
giver. Cf. ‘Non donum sed 
dantis animum.’ 

ovev 8) Kwdver xK.T.A.] The 
‘ widow’s mite’ affords a familiar 
illustration of this. 


11. %pya is used in the sense of 
‘productions.’ So Bacon speaks © 
of the children of men who have — 


first founded a family, as being 


‘both Children and Creatures 
(€pya), a continuation not only 
of their kind, but of their work.’ 





CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 179 





1 > > al / > 
21 avTa Ta YpnpaTa GAN svexa THS Sdcews. Avo Kai éyKa- 
rn la od ¢e 4 y+ y¥ 
Aelras TH TUYN OTL ob padtoTa Akos ovTES FKLoTA 
A / > >. ; A > QA 
Trovtovow. upPaives S ove aroyws tovro: ov yap 
/ > »+ ‘ bd / 4 ¥ 
olov Te y“pnuaT EXEL pa eTrLmedovpEvoOY STras exn 
d > aS a +. > ‘ / @ > 
22 WoTep ovd emt TOV GAdwv. Ov pH Swces ye ols ov 5 
asc? oe ‘ rn > oe ¥ eh: a > N 
Se ovd dre pa Sei, ovd Soa adda ToladTa: ov yap 
\ ‘\ , 5 n 
av ére mpatros Kata Thy edevOepioTnTa, Kal els TadTa 
> 7 > AY ¥ > rn > / / 
23 avakWoas OVK av éyxol Els & Sei avadicnev. ‘ Norrep 
” ree \ > s 
yap eipynrat, éxevOepis eoTw 6 KaTa THY ovolay Sa- 
n 5 n ¢ x» ‘ 
mavov Kai cis & Set 6 8 wrepBadrdwv aowrTos. Avo 
\ / > / 5 / ‘ A A 
Tous Tupavvous ov éyouev aowTouvs: TO yap mMAHOos 
/ ? / a a 
Ts KTnoews ov Soxet padiov elvar tais Socear Kal Tais 
y , \ 
24 damdvais vmepBarreww. | Ths exevOepidryntos 81) peod- « 


10 


21 produced. Again the liberal seldom grow rich, and it is phe liberal 
unreasonable to complain of this, for no one can expect to seldom | 
22 have what he takes no pains to obtain or to keep. This Liberality 
tendency to spend however will always be checked (as we tiie mn 
have said already) by careful consideration of the objects considera- 
23 and occasions of expenditure, and also of the amount out of beste 
which it is taken. (Hence, we may note in passing, princes, 
whose wealth is all but boundless, can scarcely be called 


24 prodigal for disregard of this last point at least.) Moreover 


1. €vexa tis Sdcews] see note 
above on § 17. 

2. éyxadeiras tH TUX] This 
is like the familiar reproach 
against Providence: Why do the 
unworthy prosper in the world? 
The answer to this-(as Aris- 
totle says) is obvious; ‘a man 
reaps what he sows.’ The har- 
vest of .success which such men 
reap is not that which worthier 
men spend any pains upon, and 
therefore, naturally, do not ob- 


tain it. So in the case before 
us, the liberal do not devote 
themselves to making money, 
and naturally therefore do not 
make it. 

5. ov phy guards against a 
misinterpretation of what pre- 
cedes. Though the liberal man 
does not care about keeping his 
money, it does not follow that 
he is indifferent how it goes. 
For similar use of od pay cf. Lx 
14, III. vi. 11, ete. 


180 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 





THTOS ovaNS Tepl ypnudtav Sdow. Kat Ampw, edevOe- 
pos kat Soca Kai Saravyce cis & Seb nat doa Sel, 
Omolws év puKpols Kab peyadors, Kai Tabra d€cos Kal 
happera & dOev bet Kat 00a del. Tis aperis yap Tepi 
ada bons pecornTos, TroUnoel apporepa WS det emre- ny 
Tat yap TH emerxer Sdces 4 ToLavTn Apis, H Se pa 
TovauTn evavria erin. ‘At pev ouv emopevat yeyvovTat: 
aya ev 7? aut, ab oe evavTiat SHAOV ws Ov. ‘Eay de 
Tapa my Dov seal ad Karas exov oupBaivy avr ava- 
Noe, AvIrjceTaL, perpleos dé Kat ws Set THS dperijs 1 
yap Kau deo Oat Kai dumetabau ef’ ots bet Kab os dev. 
26 Kai eVKOLVOUNTOS S éorly 0 édevdéptos els xpriparar 
7 duvatau yap adixcio bas, 1) TOLOV ye Ta Xpnwara, Kab 
uarrov ayOouevos & te Séov pn avadwoev 7} AvTov- 


we 
Wi 


andthat  -—- such proprieties must not be disregarded either in giving or 
ooca taking, in great matters or in small: and though we have 
taking. admitted propriety in giving to be the more important, yet 
The liberal 25 the two habits will naturally-be found together. If the liberal - 
Soy Dae man should have made a mistake in any of these points, he 
casional will feel regret in due measure and moderation. -And such 


Goaally 26 mistakes may occur, for the liberal man will not be hard to 


as he is . : / | 
<< the ONE deal with in money matters, nor is he by any means proof 


drivinga © against fraud, partly on account of his low esteem for money, | 
pargain or and partly because he will always regret more keenly having - 
ing the 

ci NX, é 
poe, 5. emerar yap «7.d.] Libe- ~ 12. edkowdyntos] ‘an easy 






man to have dealings with.’ 


bh ' 
e spends. ith giving, cannot exist'com- 14. paddov dyOdpuevos K.T.A,] 





self than cheat others even in- 
>. voluntarily. Or again, he would - 
rather find that he has given — 
money to an impostor than that 
7. éwdpeva] sc. e€ers or dperai. he has turned a deaf ear to a. 
11. kai 7decOa Kal Avreioba] case of real distress. This of 
For this see II. iii. course might arise from a true 





28a aperKopevos. 


CHAP. I.] 


ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. 


181 





pevos et pn Séov Tt dvddoce, Kai 7 Sipovidn ove 


ore yap qBerac ed o 


‘0 8 aaowros Kai 
ois Sel, ovde 
29 éctat Se mpoiovat paveperepor. 


ev TOUTOLS  Seapaprdver 
ws Sel, ovTe Aviretrat 
ee Oi aes 
Etpyrau 6 piv OTL 


= - imepBorat Kai edrecypers €Lolv q aooTia Kal 7 aveneu- 5 
Oepia, Kai év Suaiv, ev Socer Kat dapypee Kau Tp Sama 


vay yap eis THY Seow TiBepev. ‘H pev ovv acwtia TO 


28 spent too little than having spent too much. This and other Bradiguie 
characteristics of the liberal man are wanting in the prodigal. {, 
29 Both in giving and in taking he will err, and so will the 


more of 
accords better with that self- 


sordid man. 


feeling of benevolence, but the 
assertion in the text probably 
has reference to the same sort of 
feeling which makes the mag- 
nanimous man prefer giving to 
accepting benefits (iii. 24). The 
error on the side spoken of has 
TO xadoyv in it. It 


esteem, not to say pride, which 
forms so large an element in an 
ideal Greek’ character. Bene- 
volence occupies a very subordi- 
nate place in the character of 


_. Aristotle’s liberal man. There 


is a strong vein of self-conscious- 


| Bess running through all the 


manifestations of this strictly 
speaking unselfish virtue. 

1, Simonides was the type of 
a courtly poet, a sort of embodi- 


ment of common-sense worldly 
-wisdom. He figures 


thus in the 


- introduction to Plato’s Republic. 


-Among his recorded sayings we 
find one that ‘it is better to 
be rich than to be wise, because 


Strictly speaking, the former exceeds in spend- The first 


philosophers are dependent upon 
the patronage of the rich, and Wi 
not vice versd.’ 
7. Two types of prodigals ate 
ng 
and falls short in taking; the 
other exceeds both in giving an¢ 
in taking. The former perhaps 
may be styled the liberal prodi- 
gal, and the latter the mean 
prodigal The former™is an 
indolent Jaisser-faire sort of cha- 
racter, who spends freely, but is 
either too careless or thoughtless 
to trouble himself about replen- 
ishing his wasting resources : e.g. 
the typical Irish landlord of the 
close of the last century. The 
latter is a selfish and unprin- 
cipled man who cares not how 
or whence the money comes so 
long as he has it tospend. This 
is said in § 33 to be the com- 
moner type, because indiscrimi- 
nate giving soon necessitates 
unscrupulous receiving. 


types @ 2 


unites 
excess in 
spending 

th defect 

takin. 


Gs 29—32). 


182 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





Sdovar Kai pu dap Bavew drrepPBarnet, 7? Se ap Bavew 
errelrrer, 7) & averevOepia TO SSdvar jev ednetret, T@ 
30 NapPBdvew 8 brrepBarner, Ty emi puxpois. Ta pev 
ody THs aowrias ov mdvy cuvdvdferar (ov yap pasdiov 
pmdapober Aap Pdvovra mac. Siddvar Taxes yap ému- 
Nemes ” ovgia Tous isv@ras Siddvtas, olrep Kat Soxovow 


EE Te A. 2 f 5.) > " a 

aowrot ei et & ye ToLwovtos jOoEceEY ay OV piKp@ 
De / 3 

31 Bedriov clvat TOU avehevb po i/Evatos te yap eott 


~ 9 / A) Oe 
Kal vTo THS NAtKlas Kal UTrO FHS Oplas, Kab €Trb 70 


5 


wero Suvatat eNOcin. "Eee ie Ta TOU edevBepiou" 10 


Kai yap Sidwot Kai ov Nay Baver, ovderepop S ws Set 
voll § 4 87 tovTo eOvcbein, 7 TwS Gros peraBaror, 


ing (z.¢. giving) and falls short in taking, the latter exceeds 
30 in taking and falls short in spending. True, both these condi- 
tions are not generally united in prodigality. Should they be 
so, prodigality under this type becomes vastly superior to sor- 
didness, for (1) it tends to work its own cure as life advances 
and means fail; and (2) its outward actions resemble those 
of liberality, and judicious training may complete the resem- 


Lan 


3 


‘3. mAnv emt puxpots] ‘oniy in life. See § 33, ete, Conse- 
reference to small matters.’ quently the statement ov mavv 
Similar conduct on a large scale ouvvdvd¢era x.7.r. holds good of 
is otherwise characterized ; see prodigality generally speaking. 

§ 42. 6. olmep Kal x.t.A.] ‘who (i.e, 

4. The first yap explains ov idv@rar) are in point of fact prodi- 
nav ovvovacerat, the second yap gal.’ This is explained by the 
(in line 5) explains od padiov. exclusion of ripavvyo: from the 
emei ye (1. 7) appeals to the con- class, for which see § 23. 


sideration that such prodigality 9. nArxias] It is a matter of | 


as should unite both characteris- common observation that ava- 


tics would be vastly superior to rice (i.e. the reverse of prodi- 


the opposite vice of sordidness, gality) is the characteristic vice 
and that it would be a very (or as Simonides is said to have 
little way removed from libe- called it, ‘the proper pleasure’) 
rality itself. This, however, is of old age. 

not usually the case in actual 


CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 183 





ein av erevOepuos Saces yap ols Sel, Kai ov Amperas 
50ev ov Sei. Avo Kai Soxet ‘ove eivat dadrdos TO 700s" 
ov yap poxOnpod ovd ayevvods To DmepBadrew ddevra 
32 Kal pn ap Bavovra, HrvOiov Sé. “O Sé TodTov Tov TpO- 
Tov dowros oN SoKet Bedriov TOU dvedevepov eivaw 5 
dud te Ta etpneva, Kat ort ri pev opened TORDOVS, 6 O€ 
33 oudeva, aX ove avrov. "AX ot TONNot TOV acarav, 
: xabamep eipyrat, kat rNapBavovow Sev pa Sel, Kat eit 
34 Kara TOUTO avehebBepo.. Anrrucot. Se yivovra Sia 70 
Bod cba per dvanioKewy, evxepas 8e TovTO Trove pn 
au TAXV 4p émtheles avtous Ta bmdpxovra. 
” Avaryndtovrat ovv érépwev tropitew. “Awa 8 Kat dia 


10 


blance by supplying the proper motive and consideration as 
$2 to the circumstances of the expenditure. Again (3) a prodigal 
of this type, a weak rather than a vicious man, benefits others, 
33 the sordid no one, not even himself. Most prodigals however Ton meees 
err more actively on the side of taking. They take whence they ‘P98, 
34 ought not. They must take in order to keep going, and they eens bore 


6. 6 pev @edei wodAods] infer therefrom that ‘private GS 38—86). 


This unqualified statement would 
not be universally accepted. e.g. 
Lecky (Hur. Morals, i. p. 38) 
maintains the direct contrary. 
‘The selfish interest which leads 
men to accumulate confers ulti- 
mately more advantage upon the 
world than the generous instinct 
which leads men to give.’ Indeed 
it is generally acknowledged now 
that indiscriminate spending, 
even if it be with a directly 
benevolent intention, is most mis- 

chievous to society. Though it 
is true that ‘ the folly of one man 
may be the fortune of another’ 

(as Bacon says), yet before we 


vices are public benefits,’ we 
ought to strike a balance between 
the advantages and disadvan- 
tages resulting from each vice: 
e.g. in this particular case we 
must not forget that both hoard- 
ing and squandering have some 
good and some bad effects. Each 
is @ perversion or exaggeration 
of a good tendency. Hence both 
good and bad results may be 
traced in each case. Aristotle 
excludes from his comparison (a 
passing one it ia true) the favour- 
able aspect of the former and 
the unfavourable aspect of the 
latter. 


184 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





\ ‘ a A / b) / \ , 
TO pn Gev TOU KadOU ppovrecew omvywpws Kat mayToev 
hap Bavovow didovau yap eriBupodot, To Se was 


35 Trev ovdev avrois Siadéper. Avomep ove erevO prot 


ai dooens avTov eli ov Yap Kanal, ode TOUTOU aU- 
Tob vera, ovde ws Sex adn €VvLOTE ous Set méver Ba, 5 
TovToys TAovGlovs TOLOUGL, KAL Tots pey petptous Ta On 
ovdev av Soler, tots Se Konak 7p TW andy ndovny 10- 


pilovor TOAAd Ao Kal akodacTo auray clot ol TOA- 


hoi: euxep as yap avadioxovtes al eis Tas axohacias 
Samavnpoi ect, kat Sia TO en mpOs TO kanov ony T pos 10 


36 Tas noovas arroKhivovaw. ‘O ev oop dowros amauSa- 


yoryntos /eVOMEVOS els TavTa weraBatvet, TUXov 8 émi- 


37 meAElas els 70 | Bé gov Kal TO Séov apixour av. ‘HS 


avedevbepia aviatos eat: SoKet yap TO Yynpas Kal Taca 
advvapia avedevbépous mov. Kat oupduéorepov TOUS 15 


concern themselves as little where the money comes from as 


{ 
35 they do where it goes to. They are neither honest nor gene- . 


rous; for money spent at hazard or squandered on pleasures, 
flatterers, and other unworthy objects, may be spent lavishly, 
but not liberally. Hence it is not difficult to see how a pro- 
digal in the proper and limited sense of the word becomesa ~ 
prodigal in the wider sense noted at the beginning of the 


36 chapter. This in fact is what prodigality comes to if it runs 


its course unchecked, though, as we have pointed out, it is a 


Sordidness 37 condition admitting of remedy and guidance. The condition 


ee three 


& 3 37-45), 


of Sordidness however is incurable: for—(1) Age and want 
of means, so far from curing the habit, tend to produce it; 
(2) It seems in some way a more natural vice among men 


1. dAvyopas] thoughtlessly, rently means ‘persons of a fair 
indifferently, unscrupulously. disposition.’ 
6. rois perplos ra On] this 15. ddvvayia corresponds to 
being opposed to chat appa- amopia in the converse case of 
the prodigal (see § 31). 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 185 


CHAP. I.] 





avOparrois THS aowTias’ ob yap ToANOL pioyphwatot 
38 warrov 7) Sotixot. Kai Svateiver & émt ov, Kat Tro- 
Averdes éoriwv' ToL yap TpoTroy SoKovor THs avedev- 
Oepias eiva. “Ev Suci yap ova, THT ed\rEiper Tis 
Sdcews Kal TH vTEepBodn THS Aprews, ov Taw Odo- 5 
KAnpos Traparyivetat, GAN éviore yopiverar, Kal ob pev 
Th Aver UmepBadrrovow, ot Se TH Sdcet Eeddctrovorr] 
39 Ot pev yap év Tals TovavTais Tpoonyopiass olov peida- 
hol, yAdoxpor, KipPBixes, TavTes TH Soce EAdéiTrOVOL, 


tav & aAdoTpiov ove édievtar ovde Bovrovtas rap- 10 


5 du 
" 


38 than prodigality; (3) It is also widespread, and has many 
forms. (a) Its complete development implies (as in the case (a) Bxcess ix 
of prodigality) error both in giving and taking. In taking it defect in. 
39 exceeds, in giving it falls short. But besides this perfect givin be 
owth of the vice, we have two other forms of it. () We @) Defect in 
d Sordid men who are niggardly in spending, without being &'V7s ™Y- 


5. dAdkAnpos] ‘in complete- 
ness,’ same expression 
occurs in v. 7 in reference to 
various types of Anger. Of. 
James i, 4, réAetoe kal 6ASKANpor 
‘perfect and complete.’ Add 1 
Thess. v. 23. 

8. Oi pev corresponds to oi 
éé in the first line of § 40. The 
class introduced by this oi pey is 
subdivided (and the subdivision 
marked by another of pév and of 
8 in 1 1 and 1. 6, p. 186) 


hevdwAoi 
yAtoxpor 

(a) only is found in pinixes 
Kupivorplotas 


TmopvoBoaKot 
: ToKioTat, etc. 
(8) only is found in asm also 
kuBevrat 
Ammodvrat 


before we come to the of d¢€ be- 
longing to it. The sentence is 
further complicated by an ex- 
planatory parenthesis attached 
to the first of these subdivi- 
sions, Aoxovot . . .dyv Sodvat 
The following analysis may be 
found useful :— 

Full-blown Sordidness (é6A06- 
KAnpos) implies both (a) falling 
short in giving and (8) excess in 
taking. There are two imper- 
fectly developed types : 


some from natural 
ve phe sodas shame, others from 
y of (8) _ fear of reprisals, 

§ 39. 


who do not necessarily err in respect of 


(a). Such people are in fact often ex- 
travagant, and their ‘ ill-gotten gains 
fly apace.’ 


40 Svdovas. 


41 


40, 41 
(c) Excess in 
taking only. 


186 ARISTOTLE'’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





Bavew, ot ev Sia Twa errveiicevay Kat evrdBeav Tov 
aioxpav (Soxovot yap evioe 4) dact ve Svat TOUTO 
puharrewy, va pn mor avaryeacbacw aicxpov Tb ™pa- 
far. Tovrwv Sé Kai 0 KupworpioTns Kat TAS O TOLOUTOS 
ovopactat 8 amo THs UTepBorns Tod unOevi ay Sodvas). 
ot & av Sia foBov améyovrat Tay addoTpioVv, ws Ov 
padioy To avTov pev Ta érépwv AapBavew, ta 8 avTod 
ETEpOUS py apéoket ovv avTois TO unTe NapBavew pre 
Oi § av Kata THY AWW bTepBadrdover TO 
mavrobev AapBaver Kal TaV, otov ob Tas avenevB€pous 
epryacias épryabopevor, TropvoBoaxot Kal TavTes ob Touov- 
Ot, Kat TOKIO Tal KATO, puepov emt TONG Ila avres yap 
Ouro Oey ou det apPavovor, Kal OTOTOV Ov Sei. Kou- 
vov S’ én avrois i] aicxporepdeva paiverau mares yap 
évexa xépdSous, Kal TovToU piKpod, Oveton viromevovow. 


unprincipled in taking, money :—some from a natural sense of 
shame, others from fear of reprisals. This class we charac- 


terize as stingy, close, niggards, cheeseparers, and by other 


similar appellations. (c). We have again another class of 
sordid men, utterly unprincipled in the source from which 


1. dud twa émveixeray K.T.A.] A 
sort of honesty may accompany 
meanness and excessive devotion 
to money. See note on § 9. 

4, kupworpiorns] i.e. a man 
so stingy that he would split a 
cummin seed. Compare our 
metaphors . skinflint,” ‘ cheese- 
parer,’ and Juvenal’s ‘one who 
counts the fibres of a leek’ (Sat. 
xiv. 133). 

6. dia PdBov «.r.A.] This 
according to the Sophists was 
the sole ground and principle of 


Justice between man and man, 
and the cause of the very exist- 
ence of society. See Plato, Rep. 
P. 358, mhéove KaK®@ imepBadrew 
rd dixeiobas } u] dyabg TO GOLKEty. 

12. roxioral Kara puxpdy emt 
TOAA@) ‘ Money-lenders 1 in small 
sums at a large rate’; émi with 


10 


dative expressing the conditions — 


of the act. 

15. _ Hekpou is no contradiction 
to emt mokd@ above, for though 
the rate of interest is very large, 
yet the absolute amount is small. 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, 


CHAP. I.] 187 





42 Tovs yap Ta peydha pn OOev Se Set dap Pavorras, ponde 
a ov Aé€yomev avedevOépors, Oiov Tous Tupavvous 

$ mopOovvras Kal lepa ovNOVTAS, GAG ToVNpOUS 

43 padner Kab aceBeis Kat abdixous. ‘“O pevror xuBeurys 
Kat 0 Lomodurys Kal 0 MorIS Top avehev0 épov elo" 
aiaxpoepdeis yap. KépSous yap evexev  apporepor ™mpary- 
parevovrat Kat aveidn Dropevovow, ea ob pep Kwovvous 
Tous peyiotous Evexa TOD Anpparos, ot & ard Tov dirwv 
Kepdaivovory, ois Set Svdovar. "Apuddrepor Sn SOev ov Set 
Kepdaive Bovdopevor atoypoxepdeis, Kal wacas 8) ai 
44 ToavTar Ampers avedevOepor. Eixoras Se th édevOepic- 
TyTt avedevOepia evavtiov AéyeTas peilov Te yap éote 


they take money, and at the same time open-handed in spend- 
ing it; e.g. panders, usurers, and those who follow any such 
42 base and illegal traffic. Still, as before, we are speaking of 
gain on a small scale; we reserve other and stronger terms 
43 for those who plunder wholesale. We ought however to add 
to our list gamblers, pickpockets, and thieves, who all agree 
in their indifference as to the source from which they take, 
and are therefore described as sordid, no matter what subse- 
44 quent use they make of the money thus unfairly taken. We 
conclude by remarking that Sordidness is more opposed to 


4, pévrou( =‘ however’) implies 
that those following are to be 
included among the 
though the somewhat similar 
characters just mentioned are 
excluded on account of the large 
scale on which their villanies are 
practised. 

6. audédrepor] ie. kuBeurijs in 
one class, and Awrodurns and 
aH together in the other. 

The distinction between the lat- 
ter corresponds nearly with that 


sordid, 


between ‘picking and stealing’ 
respectively. Aezodvrns is lite- 
rally one who slips into other 
people’s clothes, a clothes- 
stealer, and hence a thief on a 
small scale. The words of péev 
obviously refer to Awmodvra: and 
Anoral, and oi dé to KvBevrai. 

12. évavriov] ‘the opposite to’ 
—explained by IT. viii. 7. 

peitCov Kxaxov] The reasons 
for this have been given in §§ 
32, 37, 38. 


Sordidness 
is the worse 
extreme of 
the two. 


45 


g 4 


e/ 
3 To Tpérrov on pos avToV, Kal év @ Kal Tept a. 


45 


ei ‘Saag I 
2 in the largeness of the sums with which it deals. 








188 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 
“ A b] / \ A - Ag. 4 , 
rower TNS ACWTLAS, KAL pahov ekg Ta ou- 


oly ul Ka Karam rex Qeioav a acworiave—~ 


Rare 





Tleps ept pev oy enevOepioraTos Kal TOV pmampeairele 


KAKLOY TOCAUT eipna Boo. 


meias SiedOeiv: Soxel yap Kai avTn wept KpnaTa TIS 


5) ee 
apern elvat, 


Ovy, domep S 7 erevOeprorns Svareiver 


Tept wacas Tas ev YONA mpagers, aAXa Tept Tas 
Samravnpas povov" év TOUTOUS S vrrepexet THs erevOepud- 
THTOS peyeBer. Kadarep yap ToUvopa auto vrroonpaiver, 
2 €v peyeBer mpérouca Saravn éeotiv. To Se péyeBos pos 
TU Ov yap TO avTo Saravnpa TpINpapK Kab apy Bewpe. 


‘O8 


Liberality than Prodigality is, as being both more mischievous 


and more common. 


So much then for the Virtue of Liberality. 


_Cuap. II. —On the Virtue of Magnijicence. 


Magnificence, as the name implies, differs from Liberality 


Its general 


3 characteristic is magnitude, but this must be in relation 


1. padAov ext ravrnv] Obvi- 
ously men in general are more 
ready to take than to give. 

8. Tas Samaympas pdvor] ‘only 
the expensive ones,’ z.e. those in 
which the expenditure is grand: 
this being the point of difference 
between peyadompemeva and €dev- 
Oepidrns. Here and elsewhere 
ry Rhy the Chapter the ar- 
gument turns upon the etymo- 
logy of the word peyadompereta, 
which implies a combination of 
greatness and propriety. (See 
Supplementary Note.) 


12. tpinpdpx] The duty of 
equipping a trireme, and (as was 
usual) commanding it in person, 
was the most important of the 
Aecroupyiat at Athens. Cf. note 
on § 11 below. 

dpxiewp@] Oewpia was & 
state embassy or deputation to a 
festival or public games. dpxe- 
Gewpos was the head of such an 


I. Aokeve 8 ay axdrovbov elvaw Kal mepl peyahompe- 5 


embassy, who defrayed its ex- 


penses. This duty was another 
of the Aecrovpyia, and often a 
very costly one. 

13. €v @ perhaps refers tothe oc- 


pe. 7; 


ras 


CHAP, 11.) ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


| 
~ 





év puxpois 2) ev perpiows Kar agiav Satravav ov Nevyerau 
peyaror pens, otov TO “ mrohhane SdoKov adary ” ayn 
6 & peryanous ovtas. “O pev yap peyadorpemns edeu- 
Oépuos, 6 8 erevbépios ovdev pahdov peyadon pers. 
, Ts ToLavTNS 8 eewos  pev ederyus puxpom pérresa- 
KANEVT A, y s vmepBod} Bavavoia Kai arretpoxadia Kea 
doa TOLAUTAL, OU*x, vrepBaddovoat TO peyeber Tept a 
ei, GX’ ev ois ov det Kat ds ob Seb apm puvopevan 
5 Borepov de Tept avrav épodper. ‘O 8é peyahomperis 
ETLOTNILOVL EOLKEL” TO TpeTrov ap Suvarat } Pewpyo as at 
‘Dorep yap ev XD el 
mopuev, 9 eis Tais evepyecais opiverar, Kal wv éaTiD, 


Ser ae RS 





6 Sarravicas peyaha EHperas. 
, 
| 
; 


_§ of the expenditure. 


to three things :—the person who gives, the circumstances of 


the gift, andits object. 


of defect i is Paltriness. 


4 liberal, but not every liberal man is magnificent. 


Hence every magnificent man is 


The vice 


The vice of excess, which we describe 


as Bad Taste and Vulgarity, errs not in the greatness of the 
amount spent, but in the inappropriateness in different ways 


But of these hereafter. 
of scientific skill implied in Magnificence. 


There is a sort 
This is needed to 


a 


Conditions 
required for 
the exercise 


: 6 decide under what various circumstances, as they actually of Magnifi- 


casion and accompanying circum- 
stances, wept & the objects; but 
the distinction is not very marked 
in itself, nor carefully retained 
in the text. Another reading is 
& instead of epi a, ie. the 
amount spent. 

1. The widow’s mite was an 
act of liberality but not of magni- 
ficence, Mr. Peabody’s donations 
an example of both. The Vice- 
roy of Egypt’s gift of a doll, with 
dress, jewels, etc., valued at 
£2000, to the Sultan’s child, 


was neither one nor the other, 
for the reasons explained in § 11, 
etc. 

6. Bavavoia kai dmetpoxaXia] 
see note on II. vii. 6. 

11. €upeAds] ‘harmoniously,’ 
literally ‘in tune’ (év, pédos), 
just as mAnppenres (Any, pédos) 
is what is out of tune (cf. L. ix. 
6, etc.). 

12. 7 e&ts rats evepyeiats dpite- 
rut] ‘The habit is determined by 
its outward acts, and by the ob- 
jects on which it is exercised,’ 


mce 


(83 5—9). 


190 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 





Ai & tod peyahomperrois Samavas _ heya Kab mpé- 
TOUG ab. Towra 8) Kat Ta eprya ouTM yap éorau perya 
Samana Kab mperroy TO epyy- “Note To pev Epyov TS 
Samdvns aévov Se etvar, TV Se Samdvny Tov Epyou, 4) 
7 Kal vmepBadhew. 
m pers TOU KaNOU Svewa: OLVOV yap TOUTO TAILS aperais. 
8 Kai éri dews Kai mpoetixas' 1 yap axpiBoroyia ut- 
g Kpomperes. Kai was xaddoTov Kai mperwdéeotator, 


There must be ogcur (for action is the only real test of disposition in this as 
a scientific 


appreciation in other Virtues), great expenditure is befitting and appropri- 


cciation «sate, ~The occasion must be worthy of the expenditure, and 
between 7 the expenditure of the occasion. There must also be the 
fig object; “Same motive as in all the other virtues, viz. the desire for 
the motive § what is noble. Again the magnificent act must be done cheer- 
noble; fully and ‘ungrudgingly : there must be no close calculations ; 
action ready 9 20 Considerations of ‘ How much, or how little, will it cost?’ 
and cheerful. 


In the following sentence the 
Samavat correspond to the évép- 
yevat, and the epya to the is 
eotit (which =mepi & of § 2) 
in the particular case under 
consideration, viz. Magnificence. 
Compare a similar passage in III. 
vii. 6 (and note there); and in 
explanation of the necessity of 
action (évépyeva) for the perfect 
determination of a moral habit 
(c£ts) see further X. viii. 4, 5. 
The 67) in 1. 1 and 1. 2 marks the 
application of the general prin- 
ciple to the particular case. 
Divested of technical language 
the passage in S$ 5 and 6 means: 
‘Magnificence, to be determined 
and recognised. as such, must be 
actually put in practice on cer- 
tain definite occasions. It con- 


sists, as we have seen, in large 
expenditure on a befitting occa- 
sion. Hence there must actually 
occur both the expenditure and 
the occasion: and to form a cor- 
rect judgment of these in prac- 
tice implies a sort of scientific 
skill.’ 

2. €pya] the ‘works’ or ‘re- 
sults.’ 

5. We had similar conditions 
insisted on in the case of libe- 
rality, i. 12-14. 

6. Here, as in the case of 
liberality, we miss any recogni- 
tion of benevolence or the de- 


sire to do good. See note on 


i, 27. 

7. dxptBoroyia pixpomperres] 
as is explained in§21. oxorar 
was av ehdxtoroy RTA. 


——— 


A arranoet Se Ta TOLAUTA O peyaro- 5 


CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 1Qt 





oKneyaur ay paddov 7) mWecov Kai Tas édaxioToU. 

10 Avayxaiov 8) Kat €devOépror TOV peyaoT per Elva 

aor. A \ c eNEU / BS 4 / aA 5 a Cl Se? ? E 

Kai yap oO édevOepios SaTravncer & det Kat ws Set. y 
‘ a A 

rovtois Se TO peya Tod peyadorpeTrods (ofov peyeHos), 


i 


To ate way of doing it?’ 


but rather, ‘ What will be the grandest and the most appropri- 


And hence the magnificent man will Magnificence 


rs mm 


necessarily be liberal also: but besides the mere grandeur of {ind as well 
the amount spent, there is a grandeur of manner which im- 38 2 degree 


3. év TovTos . . . peyadompe- 
méotepov] The object of this 
passage is to explain that magni- 
ficence differs from liberality not 
in degree only (which it com- 
monly does, ofov péyeOos), but in 
kind also. It involves a sort of 
scientific instinct (so to speak, 
see § 5), which, even without add- 
ing to the cost, disposes of it to 
the best advantage. Whatever it 
spends it makes the very most of. 

As to the translation :—oiov 
peyeOos is parenthetical and ex- 
plains that rd peya may be, and 
commonly is, literal greatness of 
amount (yéyefos). Translate, 
‘which may take the form of 

tness of amount.’ év rovrots 
de, literally ‘ but in these things,’ 
and so nearly = ‘still,’ ‘notwith- 
standing.’ «ai (l. 1, p. 192) is 
‘even.’ 

In illustration of the paren- 
thesis ofov péyebos, cf. § 17, 18 
(kal emt rdév Samaynudrov x.7.X.), 
where we have an instance of 
péya, which is not péyeos, ie. 
of appropriate greatness which 
is not greatness of bulk. With 
the statement involved in «at 


from Liber- 
ality. It al- 
7 ae ad ways makes 
amd tHs tons Saravys k.T.X., the most of 


compare Bacon’s Hssays (on Ex- what it . 
pense), ‘Ordinary Expense... — 
should be so ordered that the 
bills be less than the estimation 
abroad.’ Tacitus (Hist. ii. 80) 
attributes a gift of this kind to 
Mucianus, ‘Omnium quae dice- 
ret atque ageret arte quidam 
(cf. émurrnpove § 5) ostentator.’ 
It is a familiar fact that some 
people spend profusely and yet 
‘have nothing to show for it,’ 
while others contrive to do a 
surprising amount with slender 
means. The former lack, and 
the latter on a small scale pos- 
sess, that peculiar skill which 
Aristotle in the text ascribes to 
the peyadorpénns, of making the 
most display from a given expen- 
diture. Speaking generally, the 
French have this gift much 
more than ourselves. We notice 
again how the scientific or intel- 
lectual rather than the moral 
side of Magnificence is insisted on 
(See Introduction p. xxxiv.). 

It should be added that the 
passage is also sometimes written 
with a parenthesis enclosing the 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 


192 





\ a A i, / + & Sook a »¥ 

Tepl TAVTA THS EXEVOEpLOTNTOS OVENS, KAL ATO THS bons 
, bea. / / 

Sam avs: TO Epryov Trounaer peyaor peTt eaTepoy. Ou yap 
” aur apern kernparos Kat epyou" KTH [ae pev yap 70 
melorov aEvov TYLOTATOD, otov Xpvoos, Epryov Se 70 
meyar Kal xkarov. Tod yap TovovTov u] Oewpia Oavyacr%, : 
To Se peyadomperes Oavpactov. Kai au eaTu epyou apeTn 
peyaomperrera ev meyeGer. 

"Eott Se tov Saravnudtov ola Aeyomev TA Tyme 
@ ‘ \ ‘ 3 sas \ ¥ ‘i ‘\ \ e ‘ 
otov Ta Tept Ocovs avaOnpata Kat KaTacKevat Kat Ovovat, 

‘ A / ¥ ed ‘ 

ouolws S€ Kai Goa epi Tay TO SaLpovioy, Kat dom pos 1 


il 


parts a special lustre to the acts of a magnificent man beyond 
what would be achieved by mere liberality even with the same 
expenditure. For a work and a possession are not to be 
estimated in the same way. In the latter case there is only 
a question of intrinsic value; in the former we must take into 
consideration the grandeur and the moral effect produced on 
the beholders. The perfection of any work or action is its 
magnificence, and that must be exhibited on a grand scale. 
We pass on now to the occasions which are fitting for the 
display of Magnificence. We notice first, the service of re- 


ag 


‘munificence ’ 


words olov péyeOos . . . ovons. 
The sense will then be, ‘The 
greatness of the magnificent man, 
being a sort of greatness of Lihe- 
rality (or Liberality on a large 
scale),—-Liberality having refer- 
ence to the same objects,—even 
from an equal expenditure,’ etc. 

This however seems rather to 
mar the force of kai amd Tis tons 
daras. Itisprobablethatthere 
is some corruption in the text. 
oiov peyebos looks like a gloss. 

rf peyadonperea combines 
the ideas of ‘ magnificence’ indi- 
cated in its etymology, and 


implied by its 
technical limitation to money 
matters in this Chapter. As we 
have no one word exactly co-ex- 
tensive with this, we may adopt 
‘munificence’ or ‘ magnificence,’ 
according to the idea most pro- 
minent in the context, but see 
Suppl. Notes, p. 289. 

9. katacKevai] probably refers 
to the adornment and permanent 
furniture of the temples. xara- 
okevn denotes permanent, and 
mapackevr temporary and move- 
able, decorations. Compare xata- 
oxevacacba just below, § 16. 


CHAP. 11.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 193 





70 Kolvov evdidoTivnTa eat, olov eé Tov xopnryely 
otovta Seiv apr pes 7) Tpinpapyxelv i ka cori TI 
12 wom. *Ev aract oa ao7rEp elpyrat Kat Tpos: TOV mparr- 
TovTa avahépetat TO vis. Ov Kat Tivep vmapxevreav™ agua 
yap Sef TovTwy elvat, Kal pm povov TO epye ara Kat 5 
13 T@ TrovowvTt mperrew. Aw meus pev ovK ay ein peyado- 
mpens* ov yap eoti ad av ToNha Samavnces ™peTov- 
Tas" od é emuxerpav mriBvos* Tapa THY agiay yap Ka 
14 70 Séov" Kat’ dperny de To op as. Tperes de Kat ois 
Ta TOMAVT A mpoimapxer Sv avrév ij Sua Tay _Tporyoveav 
) @ ov avrois pereoriy, Kal Tous euryeveat Kal TOUS evdo£ous 
Kal doa ToLavTa: mdvra 4p TaUTa peyebos eyes’ Kal 
15 aktopa. Manora bev ovv TOLOUTOS 0 peyahorpemns, 


Kai €& TOS TOLOUTOLS Saravnpaci  peyaror perrea, 

12 ligion, and next, great public or patriotic services. In all Occasions 
these cases however regard must be had to the social position, i itdeni 
and to the means, of the doer, as well as to the work done, (cence 19) 

13 It would be out of place for a man of small or moderate means are chiefly 

14 to aspire to be magnificent. It is a virtue reserved for those lie, such 


of great wealth, inherited or acquired, good birth, high station, vice of Reli- 


15 and so forth. To these cases we may add great and rare {he state: 
4, rd groups the words that 

follow into one idea forming 

grammatically a sort of nomina- 

tive to dvaéperat. (Compare 


1. edpidoripnral ‘objects of 
laudable ambition.’ 


xopnyetv . : - Tpinpapxety ge 
éoTiay] ese Aevrovpyias at 


Athens resembled High Sheriffs’ 
duties among ourselves, being 
imposed without remuneration 
on the rich citizens. xal joined 
with éoriay implies that this 
office of providing a feast for 
the citizens was less costly than 
the others. See § 2 for other 
references to these offices, and 
note there. 


7d ri-fy-eivas in II. vi, etc.) 
‘There is also a reference made 
to the agent, viz. who he is, and 
what are his means.’ 

1l. Sy adrois péreorwy] ‘their 
relations or connexions.’ 

12. péyeOos kal afiopal * gran- 
deur and di 

14, eibbries]: i.e. the two 
classes of objects already men- 


194 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 





A MA / ‘ \ 3 / a . @ 
@orep erpnrar peyioTa yap Kar evrymoTaTar Tov de 
iSicov 5 boa eiodmag yiverat, olov yas Kal et he TOLOUTOD, 
kai el met Tl TACHA 1 TOMS omovddtes }) ot &v afvopart, q 
kat trept Edvav Se vrodoyas Kai awooroXas, Kat Swpeas — 
Kak avTidwpeds* ov yap eis éavTov Samravnpos 6 peyado- 
‘ 3 3.32 \ 4 ‘\ ‘ a al > 4 

MpeTNS, GAN els Ta Kowa Ta Se Sapa Tos avalnpacw 
.'4 - plea A ‘ \ 

16 éyves Tt Gpwouov. Meyarorperots S¢ Kai olxov Kata- 
oxevacacbat TperrovTas TO TROUT Koo pos yap Ti Kat 
oUTOS. Kai Tept TAUTG paiddov Sarravay doa mohuxpovea 

17 Tov epyav" KadMaTa, yap tavta. Kat ” éxaorous 1 
TO mperov" ov yap TaUTa dppoter Geois Kab avOparrous, : 
ov év vepp Kat rape Kai eres TOV Samavnpdrav 
exaorov pea év T® yevel, Kat peyadonperéoraroy pep 
TO & peyddp péya, evtaid0a Se To & TovTOIS péeya. 





but also occasions in private life, such as a wedding, works of public — 
in private OF general interest, entertaining strangers, making and return- — 
life. 


16 ing presents, and so on: or again, the furnishing and orna- — 
ments of one’s house, and generally, permanent, rather than | 

17 perishable, objects. In all cases however the expenditure — 

. must be fitting to the occasion, whatever it be. Thereisa ~ 
greatness in any work when it is perfect of its kind, even in | 


tioned, viz. the service of Religion 
and the service of the State, as 
contrasted with the less striking 
cases which follow, viz. great 
and rare occasions in private life. 

2. dca ciodraé] Compare 
‘A man ought warily to begin 
charges, which, once begun, will 
continue; but in matters that 
return not he may be more mag- 
nificent’ (Bacon). 

3. ef Sé mepi tt waoa H rors] 
The entertainment of the Vice- 
roy of Egypt by Lord Dudley in 


1867 would be an instance in 
point. 

oi év d&imparti] ‘the leading 
men in it.’ 

6. ra d€ Sapa] ‘ presents have 
something of the nature of offer- 
ings,’ which have been specified 
already in § 11 as occasions fit- 
ting for Magnificence. 

14. évradda Sé x.7.X.] 
possible to do a thing hand- 
somely though it be no great 
matter in itself: but the hand- 
somest actions are naturally those 


‘It is 


FE eg ee ne eS 





a ny, ee, ee > 


CHAP. I.) ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 


195 





18 Kai Suagéper 70 év TO epry pea. Tov €v 7 Saravnware 
_  ohaipa pev yap i) AijcrO0s 7 n Kadriorn & evel peyadompe- 
Tela maudicod Sapou, 7 y Se TovTou Tin pLKpov Kal ave- 
19 AedHepor. Ava tots éote Tod Heyaor perrovs, ev @ ay 
Troup evel, peyaromperas Trovly To yap ToLoUTOV ovK 5 
_-evuTre Lt t-éyov kat’ akiav tov Barauaros.l | 
20 Totovros pev ouv 6 peyarompemis, 6 © tmepRaXhov Kab 
Bavavoos TO Tapa To S€ov avadioxew vrepBadrer & aomEp 
elpyTat, "Ev "yap TOUS ' Hexpois TOY Samavnpdroy Toa 
avaNioKe, Kat apm puverat Tapa éXos, otov épavic tas 10 
YAMKOS éEoTLOV, Kal Kopmdois Yopnyav ev TH Taped 


18 toy-presents to children, but not such greatness as to consti- 
tute magnificence in its proper sense. This is strictly speaking 

19 a grand outlay on a grand occasion. Still even in the smallest 
matters the Magnifi cbnt man will act magnificently, and strive 

20 if possible never to be outdone. In contrast with all this note the Excess 
the character of the Vulgar man. On small occasions he will displace 
spend large sums, and make a vulgar show, and that not from 
any noble motive, but simply to display his riches, and to draw 


which are on the largest scale, 
and next come those which are 
handsome in matters of smaller 
degree.’ This seems from the 
context to be the meaning of év 
TovTots. 

3. Tun pixpov kai dvehevOepor] 
‘The cost is small and not a 
matter for liberality. ; Thus the 
condition €y éxdorois Tb mpémov 
(§ 17) would be violated. 

4, bua TOvTO] i.e. because there 
is a ‘great’ even in small 
matters. 

10.’ mapa péXos] ‘in bad taste.’ 
Contrast eppedGsin§5. épavc- 
Tai are persons associated for 


festive purposes on condition of 
each bearing his share of the 
expense, or of each entertaining 
the rest in turn, as is here sup- 
posed, It would be vulgar dis- 
play and not magnificence for any 
one, when his turn came, to 
furnish the club dinner with the 
splendour of a marriage feast. 
11. mdpodos] literally ‘a com- 
ing forward’ or ‘appearance ;’ 
technically applied to the first 
entrance of the Chorus in a Greek 
play (the Chorus usually not 
being on the stage from the com- 
mencement), and then to the 
song which accompanied that 


2 


— 


The Defect, 21 
Paltriness, 


196 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





moppupay elopépwr, & aomrep ot M Leyapeis. Kai Tata Ta 
TOLAUTA TOUnTEL ov TOU KaNoU vera, aXe TOV TAOUTOY 
eriderkvupevos, Kat Sia TavTa olouevos Oavpaterbar, 
Kat ov ev Set mora dvahacat, oheyar Saravan, ov & 
ohéya, TON). °O Se puxpompemns Tept mavra, edredypet, 
Kai Ta peyora avanocas & pup TO KANOV aTronEl, 
Kal 6 TL av Trou pero, Kal CKOTTOV TOS ay ehaxuorov 
avardooal, Kat TaUT odupdpevos, Kal wavr 010 LeV0S 


attention to himself. When he ought to spend much, he will 
spend little; and when he ought to svend little, he will spend 
much, On the other hand, the Paltry man always spends too 
little. If ever he does spend largely, he will spoil everything 
by some petty economy. He will be always hesitating and 
calculating how cheaply he can get off, and will be continually 


entrance. The emphatic word 
here is kap@dois, comedy natu- 
rally requiring less splendour 
than tragedy. 

4. ob pev det x.7r.A.] This 
follows naturally, because his 
only object being to display 
himself and his riches, he pays 
no regard to the proprieties of 
circumstances and expense, 
which it needs a careful scientific 
discernment (§ 5) to observe pro- 
perly. Consequently if a proper 
occasion for great expense hap- 
pens to be one for little personal 
display, the Bdvavoos holds aloof. 

6. Ta peyiora dvah@oas] 
This is a point of difference be- 
tween dvedevOepia and puxpompe- 
mera. The latter being the 
defect where great expenditure 
is in question, the Paltry man is 
one who tries to combine cheap- 


ness and display. He wishes to 
make a show and yet hates to 
part with his money. The Sor- 
did (dvedevOepos) cares only for 
keeping his money on any terms. 

€v pikp@ Td Kady arrodei] ¢.9. 
If a man should make a hand- 
some donation to a Charity and 
send in the bill for the carriage 
and packing. Or, as Theophras- 
tus says, ‘He will give a grand 
feast and stint the supply of 
wine, and the dishes will hardly 
go round; or ‘when he is cele- 
brating a marriage feast, he will 
hire the waiters on condition 
that they find their own food,’ 
andsoon. He isthe sort of man 
who cannot feel that in reference 
to such cases it is better ‘to do 
the thing well, or not at all.’ 

7. pédAr\ov] ‘with hesitation 
or reluctance.’ 


y 
4 ' 


* } 
ei i 
F P \ 


CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


197 





— 


22 petbeo rove Set. Eici ev ov au Ges auras Kaxias, 
ov pny oveidy 2 emupépovor Sua To pnte BraBepai Te 
TéXas elvat, pate Nav doxmpoves. 

1 IIL ‘A 8€ peyadowvyia wepi weydda pev Kat éx TOU 
évopartos Eouxev elvat, Tept Tota & éoti mpatov Aa- 5 

2 Bopev. Avadeper 8 ovdevy tov ew H Tov Kata THv 

3 ew cKoreiv. Aoxed Se peyadowvyos eivas 0 peyadov 


22 grumbling that whatever he does spend is excessive. Still, 
vices as these are, they are not of the worst dye, for they are 
neither very injurious, nor very offensive, to society. 


Cuap. I1].—Ox the Virtue of Highmindedness or Self-Esteem. 


t The very name Highmindedness, which we give to the High- 


virtue of well-grounded Self-esteem, implies that there is Vaingion. 


' 2something great about it—(whether we consider the habit in cusness, 


and Little- 


the abstract or portray an individual character in the concrete mindedness 


3 is indifferent)—and that greatness may be described as great 


Cuap. IlL.—peyadoyvyxia is 
another very difficult word to 
translate. The exact etymologi- 
cal equivalent ‘ Magnanimity’ 
has by the usage of language 
acquired too restricted a sense. 
Perhaps we must content our- 
selves with the awkward com- 
pound, ‘Highmindedness.’ On 
the inadequacy of this and the 
related terms see further the 
Supplementary Note at the end 
of this Book. 

The groundwork of this and 
the related types of character 
described in this Chapter is the 
amount of, and the relation 
between, a man’s merits and 
his own estimate of them. A 


are con- 
cerned with 
the relation 


more tangible and _ practically eed siatite = 


applicable test is substituted in and hisown - 
§ 10, viz. his relation to Honour paren oO 
(rin). 
The Chapter falls under the 
following divisions :— 
§§ 1—8. Terminology ex- 
plained. 
§$ 9—17. Highmindedness de- 
scribed generally as the desire to 
deserve, and to secure, Honour. 
§§ 18—34. The characteristics 
of Highmindedness in reference 
to sundry practical details of 
life. 
8§ 35—37. The related vices 
of Excess and Defect. 
6. diaheper dé x.7.A.] In this 
case the latter method is con- 


198 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK “Vv. 





es 9 aye x eee \ > %f > a 
avTov agiov aftos wv’ o yap wn Kat afiay avTo Tolav 
3, / a \ 9 #9 ‘\ > \ 3, / ? Bee 
nrALOvos, Tov dé KaT apeTHY ovdeis HALOLOS OVO aVONTOS. 


4 Meyarorpuxos pev ovv 6 etpmev0s. 


‘O yap puKpay 


aEv0s Kai TOUTOV aviv éauTov cadpon, peyarowpuxos 
58 ov ev , beyeBee yap y) peyaroyuxia, aomep Kat 70 
KaNDOS év peyare copart, ob pilcpot 5 aareiot Kab 


6 oULMETPOL, Kano. & ov. 


‘O Se peyahov éavtov akiav 


By x A ‘ \ , a p) a 
avalos av Kavos o dé perbovey n aftos ov mas 


7 NAUVOS. 


€ 2 

O o eharrovey i aftos puporpuxos, éay 
27 

TE peyadoy éay Te petpion, €ay Te Kal 

a&os @v ett éXaTTOvweY avTov afvol. 


puKpov 
Kai pariora 


XN / e /- A / ‘ X\ b / ? 
ay Sofeev 0 peyddwv akws Te yap av Emoie, € 


self-esteem based upon great merits. 
{, 5 merits such self-esteem would be mere folly: and in such a 


In the absence of great 


case an adequate estimate of ourself, being necessarily a low 


6 one, is not Highmindedness, but rather sober judgment. 


A 


too high estimate of self is Vaingloriousness, provided it be 
7 not only too high but also high absolutely. Conversely a 
lower estimate than facts would warrant, be it small or great 
in itself, is Littlemindedness, and above all when a man’s 
merits are really great, because then the contrast is more 


spicuously adopted. We have 
almost an individual portraiture 
of a peyaddWuyos in this Chapter. 
Pericles has even been suggested 
as the original. 

6. According to the Greek 
estimate beauty implied bulk. 
Perhaps our word ‘ handsome,’ 
as used in contrast with ‘ beauti- 
ful,’ conveys the same idea. 
Comp. Pol. IV. iv. 8, r6 kadov ev 
mAnOer kal peyeet clade ylveo Oa, 

8. 6 dé petdvov KA.) A 
man may estimate himself at a 


eS 


low rate and yet more highly. 


than he deserves, in which case 
he would hardly be called ‘ vain.’ 
e.g. Whately says of his tutor 


at College that ‘he would be 


generally described as an emi- 
nently modest man. He never 
rated himself high either in abili- 


ties or attainments, and yet he — 


overrated himself to a great de- 


gree, else he never would have 


undertaken the office of a Col- 
lege tutor.’ This is just the 
case described in the text. See 


oe 
ee 


CHAP. 111] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 199 





8 pn ToTOUT@Y mp aEvos ; 3 éore dn 0 heyarorruyos 
Be 78 pep peyeBer axpos, To Se as Sel pécos ToD yap 
Kat atiay avrov abv. 0: & vmepBaddovar Kab éA- 
9 Aetrrovow. Ei 8€ & eyahoov éaurov afvot afv0s & ov, 
Kat padora TOV peyioTov, Tept ev padiora av em. 5 
10°H 6 agia éyerau ™pos Ta exTos ayabd. Mé eyioroy Se 
TOUT ay Oeinyev © 0 ToLs Oeois arrove oper, Kal Ov pad’ 
épievras ob ev afvopare, Ka TO emt TOUS KaNNOTOLS 
aOrov. Tovodrov § 4 -Tup7 _peparov yap on TOUTO TOV 
 éxtos aryabiav. _Teph TLLas 3m Kab aripias 0 peya- 
* hawpuxos eoTL WS bei. Kai dave Se Aoyou paivoyrar 


ot peyanroyruyor Tept TY elvas THAN yap pariah 
120i peyddor akwotow éavtovs, kat atiav dé. ‘O Se 


8 striking. In perfect Highmindedness self-esteem is in a sense 

extreme, because it is always in proportion to merit, which is 

in that case extreme. It is in the observance of that propor- 

tion that the familiar law of the mean is exhibited; while its 

violation gives rise to the related Vices of Vaingloriousness 

and Littlemindedness. So much for the phraseology which 

, 10 we propose to employ. Now how is merit estimated or re- 

compensed by men? Chiefly by Honour. Honour therefore 

II is the aim of the Highminded ; to obtain Honour on condition 
12 of deserving it. The Little- ‘minded man falls short in his and the 


three charac- 
further note at the end of this 


in other words, is something ex- tt may be 
Book. judged by 
1. He is extreme in the great- 


ternal; it is in fact the honour the amount 
or estimation of others (riz). of Honour 

ness of his self-estimate, moderate 

in the propriety of it. A simi- 


Hence, practically, we may de- they, 4eem 
lar paradox was explained in re- 


to be their 
gard to Virtue generally in IT. 


10 


scribe this as the object and aim due. 
vi. 17. 


of Highmindedness, and the re- 
6. “‘H & déia] i.e. the expres- 


lated excess and defect. See 
further I. v. 5 and note.. Hence 
sion, ‘worth’ or ‘worthy of,’ has 
reference to some external good 
_as the standard by which it is 
measured. The index of merit, 


in the Catalogue of Virtues in 
II. vii. tip7 and dripia were 
taken at once as the groundwork 
of peyadoWuxia with its related 
Vices. 


200 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK IV, 





‘ 


\, puxporpuxos EAXeimret Kai pos éavTov Kat ™pos 70 TOU 
| 13 peryarorpuyou akiopa. ‘O Se xXavvos mpos EQuTOV [ev 
14 UmepBadneL, ov pny Tov ye peyadouyov. “O dé peya- 
AdWuyos, elTep TOV peylaTwv akios, ApioTos av elm 
peiCovos yap det 0 Bedricoy aéwos, Kal peyioTov 6 apt- 

oTOS. Tov os ads apa peyadoypuxon bet ayabov 

elvau. Kai Sdfeve § av eiva peyadoypuxou To é éxaory 

15 aperh perya. Ovdapés Tt ay dppotou peyarowpoxe 
pevyerv Tapaceicayrt, oud aduxeiv’ Tivos yap vera 

mpager aicxpa, ¢ @ ouev peya ; Kal &xaora & é emia Ko- 

TOUVTL map ay yeroios paiivorr’ ay 6 peyarorpuxos 7) 

ayabs ov. Ov ein 8 & av ovde Tops afvos pavros 

OV" THS aperiis yap aOdov 1 0 TLUMN, Kab aroveperan TOS 

16 ayabois. “Eoike pev ovv » peya ia olov Koopos 


estimate of himself both in reference to his own merits and 

13 also in reference to the standard of the Highminded. In 
reference to that standard the Vainglorious man on the other 

hand cannot exceed, but in reference to his own merits he 

High: ness Lt 008 80. Highmindedness, being based upon merit, implies 
implies all the possession of the other virtues, and that in the highest 
othe hich +5 degree. .Undignified flight, for example, or injustice of any 
est degree, kind, would be utterly incompatible with a well-merited self- 
I6 respect. True Highmindedness is, as it were, ‘ the head and 


High- 


2. a&impa] The vainglorious 
man’s estimate of himself cannot 
of course exceed the highminded 
man’s estimate of himself, but it 
does exceed the estimate which 
his own merits warrant. 

7. Kat dd&ece x.7.A.] He not 
only possesses every Virtue, but 
every one on a grand scale, just as 
the peyadompemis was explained 
(in ii. 10) to possess the particular 
virtue of Liberality on a grand 
scale. 


9. mapaceicartt] understand 
ras xéipas, i.e. ‘swinging the 
hands in precipitate flight.’ 

08” ddikety x.7.A.] His high 
sense of the a. gnity of his moral 
nature is such (mdymay yeAoios 
gaiverat pn ayabds dy) that he 
scorns to do an unjust or base 
action. This has sometimes been 
censured as if it was mere pride, 
but we should not forget that 
mutatis mutandis Christianity 


10 


CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





a a > A 3 
Tis eval TOY apeTav’ pelfous yap avTas Tote, Kal ov 
yiveras avev exeivav. Ava todto yaderrov TH adneia 
peyarorruyor eivas ov yap olov Te avev xadoxayabias. 

17 Manota peév ody rept Tyas Kai atipias 6 peyadouyes 
éoTl, Kab emt wey Tals peyddals Kal UTTO TOV oTrovdai@y 5 
petpiws noOncetrat, ws TOV oiKEiwy TYyYdvEY 7} Kal 
éXaTTover’ apeTns yap TavTédods oun dy yevoto akia 

a \ 
Tim Ov py GAN arrodckeTai ye TO pn exew avToUS 
peilo autre arovéuew. Tis 5¢ mapa tov TuyovTer Kai 
a > 
emt puKpois Tapmay OAvywpyce ov yap ToUTwY aktos. 
“Opotws Se Kat atipias ov yap éotat Sixaiws tept 
| ae /- ‘ 9 > ‘ 4 of e 
18 avtov. Manora pev ovy eotiv, wotrep elpnTat, 0 peya- 
, \ N ) \ aes N N a 
oruyos TEepl Tyas, OV HV AAG Kal rept TAOUTOY 
crown’ of all the virtues. Need we wonder that it is rare and 

17 difficult to attain to? The Highminded man, when he re- 
ceives high honour from good men, will feel pleasure, though 
in a moderate degree, for he knows that he is obtaining his (ischiminat- 


due, or rather, less than his due, but still the best it is in gard to the 


their power to give, and as such he is willing to accept it, honour 


The paltry homage of ordinary men he will despise as un- by others. 
worthy of him, and so he will also their contempt, which he 
18 knows is undeserved. With the same dignified attitude will Minor prac- 


tical charac 
teristics of 


The High- 
aed man 
is sober and 


appeals to a somewhat similar 
motive, ¢.g. Rom. vi. 2, 11, 21, 
etc. ete. So Plat. Rep. p. 486 A. 

1. pei{ous .. . moet] High- 
mindedness is not so much a 
separate virtue as a combination 
of all virtues in one perfect char- 
acter, eachand all being enhanced 
by the full consciousness of 
their possession, or (as a modern 
might phrase it) ‘the testimony 
of a good conscience’ in respect 
of them, (See Suppl. Note.) 


3. kxadoxayabias] ‘ Nobility’ 
seems to hit the double signifi- 
cance of this word. kadoxdya- 
Gos, if it has not (like ‘ optimates’ 
in Latin) passed from a moral to 
a social significance, yet implies 
the latter in combination with 
the former. 

5. imi trav omovdaiwv| He 
only cares ‘laudari a laudatis 
viris.’ Comp. Lv. 5. ~ 
10. émt puxpois] ‘on trivial 

3 


202 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





Kal duvacretay Kat Tacav evTuxiav Kat aruxiav perpleos 
e€el, omras ay yionrat, Kal our eUTUX OV Tepuxapns 
éoras, ovr’ arux av TEpihuTros. Oude yap epi TYpTY 
ovTMs eyer ws Heyarov ov. Ai yap Suvacreiat Ka O 
Toros Sua Thy Toma eoruy aipera: ob ‘your exovres 5 
avTa Type Oat & auray Bovdovrau. “Qu 87 Kab 1) Tym 
puKpov éoTt, TOUTM Kal TaAXa. Avo vmeporrar SoKovow 
elvat. Aoxel Sé kat Ta evtuynpata cupBddrdrecOan Tpos 


‘9 
peyarowruyiav. Ot yap evyevets akvodvras TYumsS Kab ob 
the High- he regard riches, power, and prosperity and adversity gene- 
(iss). Tally. Riches and power are but means to honour, and he who 
eh ~aam estimates z¢ so soberly will not be dazzled by them. Hence 


power, pro- 19 men think him supercilious. Indeed these very advantages 


Convey are thought to tend to Highmindedness because they secure 
the influence 

of these on 

ont ag SP 8. Men expect to receive, and possession of such advantages as 


do receive, honour in respect of 
riches, power, or good birth. 
Hence the possession of these 
advantages will in fact help the 
Highminded man to that honour 
which is his due, though he de- 
serves it on higher grounds. 
Hence too, as honour intensifies 
self-respect, Highmindedness it- 
self is thought to be fostered by 
any of those external advantages 
which in the opinion and prac- 
tice of mankind entitle their pos- 
sessor to honour. In strict truth, 
however, goodness, and goodness 
alone, is the proper ground for 
self-respect, or for the esteem of 
others. In § 21 it is added that 
superciliousness, which is an ex- 
ternal accompaniment of High- 


mindedness, is also a result of the 


these. 

It is interesting to notice that 
the Greek words for moral excel- 
lence are generally derived from 
those which express outward 
beauty, good birth, strength, 
ability, ete. The primitive im- 
port of such words is generally 
found in Homer, and their ethi- 
cal meaning can scarcely be said 
to be fixed before Socrates. e.g. 
kaos and aicxpés (cf. 6 rny idéav 
mavaioxns, I. viii. 16), yevvaios, 
eaOhos (i.e. €OAds =‘ edel’ noble’) 
xpnotos. This bears witness to 
the confusion noticed in the text 


between material prosperity and 


moral worth. The other side of 
the picture appears in the dictum 
of Tennyson’s Farmer, ‘The 
poor in a loomp is bad.’ . 


a ey ee ee eg eg 


3 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


| CHAP. III. ] 203 





Bvacredovres 4 7 ot mouTovTes: ev UITEpOXT yap, TO 
8 arab Umepéyov may evTLOTEpoD. Avo Kau ke 
 ToLlavTa peyadowpuxorépous Tovel” TopavTaL yap vm 
Oo TLWOD. Kar’ arnbevav § 6 ayabos povos Topnreos® @ 
1% - aude Umapxet, padov afvoirae Tos: Oi § avev dpe- 

THs Ta TowadTa ayaa EXOUTES, ovte Sixaiws éavTous 

| Bey ado akwdow, ouTeE opAas peyarorpuxor AdyovTas 
1 dvev yap aperiis TavTEhovs ouK eoTt raira. ‘Lrreporras 

Sé Kat bBpuerat kai ot Ta Tovabra exovTes arya a yey 

vovta. ”~Avev yap dperijs ov padsov pepewy eHpedas ta 10 

evTUXTaT a ov Suvdpevor Se depew Kat oldpuevoe Tov 

addov Drrepexew EKELVOV [LEV Karappovovow, autot 8 6 

T ay TUX WOE mparrovow. Mipowvras yap Tov Heyano- 

abuyov ovyx dpovot ovres, TOUTO be Spacw ev ois Suvay- 

Tau Ta pev ovv Kat dperny ov MpaTTovat, KaTappovovat 
2 Se Tov GAdwv. ‘O Se peyaroypuxos Sucai@os Karapovet 
3 (Soave. yap adnOas), ot Sé morro TuxXdvTas. OvK 


20 honour among men to their possessor. In truth, merit alone 
deserves honour, but when merit and these advantages are 
united, honour is accorded more freely. Without merit they 
cannot form the ground of that self-esteem which constitutes 
21 Highmindedness, nor again can they justify the supercilious- 
22 ness in which their possessors ape the Highminded. Unlike 
him, they have no superior merit to warrant that feeling, nor 
23 discrimination in its exercise. The Highminded man will His ag bib: 





= 


\ 
. 
Ve 


er | 


l. ev bmepoxh yap] ‘For they ‘Who stand aloof from other men 
are in a position of superiority.’ Tee oF cia, atone 


13. 6 rt dy rox@or mparrovaty] 
is explained by the words Tad pev 
ouv Kat’ aperny ov mpdrroucr just 
below. . 

Sees yap «.1.A.] The 

peyaddyvxos is imitated by in- 
ole characters, 


He stands aloof in a well-founded 
consciousness of superiority. 

14, Sixaiws xaradhpovei] SA 
due contempt for inferiors’ is 
not regarded by Aristotle as in 
itself objectionable. It is per- 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 


204 [BOOK Iv. — 





i ) 
éoty dé puKpokivduvos ovde diroxivduvos Sia TO odoya 
TYav, peyarokivduvos Se, Kal Orav KwOuvevn, adidas 


a /. ¢ > ¥ KA , A Ee : ae 
24 Tov Biov, ws ove akiov dv travtws Env. Kai otos ev 
a 3 4 > / \ ‘ 
Tovey, evepyetoupevos 8 aicyuvera. To pev yap 


urrepéxovTos, To 8 wmepeyouevov. Kat avrevepyerixos 6 

TrELover OUTw yap ot TpocodArjoet O UTap_as Kal EoTAL 

a) V4 rs \ \ / a / 

25 ev merovOws. Aokovor Se Kat. uvnwovevewv ovs av Tom 

. 
not court danger, but if it be great and worthy of him he will 
face it without regard to his life, which he does not think 
24 worth preserving at the cost of honour. He loves to confer 
haviour in _ and is ashamed to receive benefits, and he hastens to requite 
Sontersing 25 them with increase. In fact men are apt to remember those 

or aoaity 


haps a corollary to the somewhat 
over-conscious self-respect incul- 
cated as the basis of the Virtue 
under consideration. The fol- 
lowing passage from an Essay of 
Archbishop Whately on ‘Gene- 
rosity’ perhaps exhibits this 
trait in the more favourable 
aspect in which it appeared to 
Aristotle :—‘ If a man who feels 
himself capable of generous and 
exalted conduct, measures others 
by his own standard, he must 
be first disappointed, and then 
dissatisfied’ (from which ‘con- 
tempt’ would be an easy step) 
‘with almost all the world: for 
very few have even any con- 
ception of real heroic generosity. 
As a celebrated ancient once 
said, *“‘As he never excused a 
fault in himself, he could not 
tolerate any in others.”’ 

6. mpocopAnce 6 wtmdpéas] 
‘the one who began it will be 
left in his debt besides’; and so 


debtor and creditor will change 
places. 

7. Aoxovo. used thus imper- 
sonally seems to refer to mankind 
generally, not to the peyaA 
xos in particular, though ip 
far shares the feeling as to 
hasten to requite benefits re- 
ceived, and so to wipe out the 
feeling of obligation. 

So remarks Thucydides, IT. xi. 
§ 7, ‘He who has conferred a 
benefit is glad to keep alive the 
obligation by renewed acts of 
kindness: while he who has re- 
ceived one is less keen about it, 
knowing that any service he may 
render will be regarded as pay- 
ment of a debt, and not as an act 
of favour.’ The point is further 
worked out by Aristotle himself 
in IX. vii. In the same spirit 
remarks La Rochefoucauld (Maz- 
imes 238), ‘It is not so danger- 
ous to do harm to the majority 
of men, as to go too far in doing 


} cuar.m)]  ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 205 





_ eHow ed, © ov 8 av mdbwcw ov edarrey yap 6 mabey 
ev Tov Tounaavros, Bovrerat § brrepexely. Kai Ta pep 
$Beon dnovet, ta § andas: 10 kat vy Ocrw ov Aeyeuw 
Tas evepyecias 7@ Avis ovd ob Adkwves ™ pos TOUS 
“AOnvaious, aX a a merovOecay ed. M feyadopoyau Se 5 
| nai TO pndevos Seto Bau i) poyes, virmperey Se mpobipas, 
Kab mpos pev TOUS e@ akiwopate Kat evruxiaus peyav 
- edlvai, mpos Se Tous écous pérpiov’ TOV weV yap vTreEp- 


whom they have benefited, but when they have received a 
benefit they are glad to forget it, because such a position is 
one of dependence and inferiority. He is reluctant to ask a 
_ fayour, though’ ready to confer one. With great men he His com. 
_ carries his head high, while with ordinary men he is unaffected, portment 





_ them good.’ ‘There is scarcely 
any one who is not ungrateful 
for great benefits’ (Maz. 299). 
An Eastern despot is said to 
have beheaded a man who had 
saved his life in order to avoid 
remaining under an obligation 
which nothing could ever re- 


pay. 

Again notice the absence of 
the recognition of Benevolence, 
or any desire to benefit others. 
(See Introduction, p. xxxv.) Both 
Aristotle and Thucydides look 
mainly at the pleasurable sense 
of superiority on the part of one 
who confers a benefit, 

3. 8:6 kai tiv Cérw] Passing 
illustrations of this sort are ap- 
parently introduced by Aristotle 
from memory, and are not un- 
frequently incorrect. This would 
not be unnatural if they occurred 
to the author during an extem- 
pore Lecture. (See Introduction, 


’ 





p. Xxxvii.) Thetis (Homer, JI. 
i, 503) seems to do the reverse— 
Zed warep, Eiwore 54 oe per’ abavdn 
TOLELY | moa 
*H éres } Epye. 
(See Supplementary Note.) 

The reference in the case of 
the Lacedzemonians is uncertain. 
A case is related by Xen. Hell. 
VI. v. 33, in which however 
benefits conferred as well as re- 
ceived by themselves are men- 
tioned by the Spartans. 

6. deicOa: here means, ‘to 
ask for,’ not ‘to stand in need 
of,’ as we judge from the High- 
minded man being said to do so 
reluctantly (udyts) and also from 
the natural contrast between 
seeking and conferring favours 
(omnpereiv). Compare denrixds in 

§ 32. 


7. tous év a&impari] ‘men of 
repute.’ See § 15 of the last 
Chapter. 


pe ahay 


roused to * 
action on 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





Leek 





exew xarerov Kal oeuvor, TOV Oe padzov, Kat ép cell 


9 EN 
per cepviver Bat ovk ayevves, ev Se Tos TaTrewois pop- 
27 TUCOY, aomep eis TOUS aobeveis toxupiter Bau. Kai eg 


" 


7a evTypa pm teva, 7) ov mpwrevovewy Grou Kar apyov 
elvat Kat perANTHY, ad ) Strov TUM) peyadn H) & epyove 
Kai Odiyov poev T paKruxcon, peya dav Sé Kat dvopacrav, 


28 ‘Avaykaiov dé Kat davepomion eivae Kab pavepopihoy 


(ro yap NavOavey poBovpévor, Kal apereiv THs adnbetas 
parrov 7 THS S0&ns); Kat eye Kat TpaTrew pavepas 
(mappnovaarns 4p Sua TO Kar appovnr Kos elval, Kab 
adn Devries, TrHv boa # 6: cipwvelay [eipwveta dé] 


29 ™ pos Tous moAXovs), Kat mpos adov He) SivacOat tay 


arr 7 ptrov" SovALKov yap" v0 Kal-araytes ob KoAaKES 


Ontixot Kal ob Tamewot KddaKes. 


Ovse- SavpacriKose 


for there is nothing grand in giving one’s-self airs before them, 
Heisonly 27 He is not roused to exertion by any but the greatest objects 


of ambition, and is therefore generally in a state of 


ed 


great occa- 28 inaction. He is open in his hatreds and his friendships, cares 
- for truth more than the opinion of men, scorns concealment 
in words or actions, and speaks the plain truth except when 
he shrinks from asserting his full rights, as he does in fact 


sions. 


His plain- 
spokenness. 


His inde- 
pendence, 
undemon- 
strativeness, 


- 29 with the majority of Perper: 


4. evripa) ‘ objects of com- 
mon esteem.’ dpydv kal peAAn- 
Tnv =‘ inactive and hesitating.’ 

11. eipdvera is explained after- 
wards in ch. vii. to be a consci- 
ous depreciation of one’s own 
merits or powers, and must not 
be mistaken here for ‘irony.’ A 
man of such pre-eminent dignity 
and merit as the peyaddyruxos 

must ‘let himself down’ with the 
majority of those he meets. He 
therefore consciously lowers his 


He cannot conform himself to 


own pretensions on most occa- 
sions, and this would be e 
vea. The word ddyGevrixds is of 
course As be supplied again after 
oo ape | 
14, " bqroeol] ‘slavish’ (Ons), 
Tamrecvol= ‘mean’ or * 

The word (as has been noted 
elsewhere) has a bad meaning in 
classical Greek, though no better 
word could be found by Christian 
writers to express the new idea 
of ‘humility’ as a virtue. 


CHAP. YI} ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 207 





© ovbev yap peya are éoriv. Oude puncixaKos ov yap 

 peyarorpvyov TO arromvnwovevewr, adrws TE kat KaKa, 

31 ahha Hadov Tapopay. Ovs av pomodayos" oure "yap 
Tepi. avToo épet oure rept érépou" ouTe yap iva er avy 
Tat meet avT@, OVO Sirws of Grou reywovtTas' ovS ad 5 
erauver ids éoruy Sudmep ovde kaxohoyos, oude TOV 

32 exOpav, et pn Oe UBpuw. | Kai trepi avaryKaicy 7) puKcpav 
Hewora ohogupruxos Kat Senruxds: omovdatovtos yap 

33 oUTws eyew Trepi TadTa. Kai olos xexrnoOas paddov Ta 
Ka Kai axapta TOV Kapripov Kab apeipor avtap- 10 

34 Kous yap waddov. Kai Kivnots Se Bpadeia TOU peyano- 

 abiryou Soxet elvat, Kat gown Bapeva, Kat rekis_ oT AGI 

Hos" ov yap oMEVOTUKOS 0 rept oheya omrovdaton, 

ovde cvvTors 6 unbev péya oidpmevos 4 8 dfudwvia 






another’s mode of life though he will do so for a friend. He forgetfut- 
3° is not apt to express astonishment, nor to remember injuries. ioe aa 
31 He is no gossip: he is a man of few words, sparing alike in general 
32 his praise and in his reproaches. He will not be anxious qs inaie. 
33 about trifles: he will prefer to possess what is grand and ret snip 


34 unproductive rather than what is merely useful. His gait, eneral 


1. ov yap . Gropynpovev- Pharisees might come under this manner. 


ev) Heis sis apt to bear any- 
thing long in mind, good or ill, 
but especially (GAs re xal) the 
latter. For the former see § 25. 
7. 8¢ dBpw] He is not abusive 
except when he wishes to express 
his disdain. If he does speak ill 
of people, he will do it to their 
face, and in order deliberately 
to brand them with contempt, 
not because he cannot control 
his own feelings, and still less to 
gratify any personal impulse of 
malignity orrevenge, Our Lord’s 
withering denunciations of the 


head. In fact véweccs (see IT. vii. 


15) would sometimes find ex- 
pression in vBpis or Scorn. (See 
Supplementary Note.) 

avaykaiay] ‘ ‘things which can- 
uot be helped.’ 

8. ddopuprixds] § querulous.’ 

12. ordowpos| ‘stately.’ Com- 
pare La Rochefoucauld (Maz. 
142), ‘C’est le caractére des 
grands esprits de faire entendre 
en peu de paroles, beaucoup de 
choses, les petits esprits au con- 
traire ont le don de beaucoup 
parler st de rien dire.’ 


208 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





Kai  TaxuTns Sia TovTwv. TovodTos wev ody 6 peryado- 
rpuyos, 6 8 éAXeirav pixporuyos, 6 8 vmepBadrwv 


s > \ \ > a 9 > 2 ? 
35 xavvos. Ov Kako pev ovv Soxovow eivat ovd ovToL ov 


35 and deliberate. 


\ / > ¢€ / / c ‘ ‘ 

yap KakorrowoL ecw nuaptnuevor Se. O pev yap 
/ of > a X > e 

puxporpuyos, a&ios av aya0av, éavTov amoorepel wv 

¥ > BA ‘ 4 > Ee. 

akios éorl, Kal eolKe KaKOV eye TL Ex TOD pH aktodr 

a 3 an cal , Ae 

éauTov Tov ayabav, Kai ayvoeiv 8 éavTov" wpeyeTo yap 
2 5A a 54 > ‘ J 

av av akvos qv, aya0av ye ovrav. Ov pny HriOsoi ye 

e n a b) \ a 9 / € 

ob TotodTot SoKxovow eivat, adda waddov oxvypol. “H 
/ \ a / val 

tovauTn Se Sofa SoKxet Kai yetpous Toes ExacTou yap 


his voice, and his manner of speech will be grave, dignified, 


Such is the Highminded man. The related 


The related characters who are in excess and defect in the matter of self- 
estimation are, as we have seen, the Vainglorious and the Little- 
minded. They are misguided, rather than actively vicious. 


Vices are— 
Little- 
minded- 
ness, 


4, There is an obvious con- 
trast between xaxozrotoi (actively 
vicious) and xaxoy €xeu rt (having 
something wrong about them). 
Aristotle means to say that men 
would hardly form so low an 
estimate of themselves unless 
there was something to partially 
justify it. ‘There cannot be so 
much smoke without some fire.’ 

9.  doxvnpot] ‘wanting in 
energy,’ ‘ diffident.’ 

10. 9 roavtn Sdééa x.7.r.] In 
other words, the absence of moral 
aspiration is most injurious. 
The moral influence of a man’s 
estimate of himself is very im- 
portant. Witness the elevating 
effect of a conscious feeling that 
a man has powers beyond the 
perhaps humble sphere in which 
he finds himself placed, and con- 


— 


versely the depressing effect of 
the feeling (whether due to con- 
stitutional indolence, despond- 
ency, etc.), that one will never 
accomplish the task in hand. 
Many thus fail, simply because 
they have made up their minds 
that they cannot succeed. It is 
remarked by Nassau Senior in 
his Notes on Turkey, that the 
general spread of corruption 
among Turkish officials seems to 
date from the time when an oath 
of office was first imposed, in 
which the strictest integrity was 
promised ; and he accounts for 
this by the supposition that the 
officials, unable to keep the 
oath completely, became reckless 
when they had once broken it. 
In other words, the conscious 


degradation of perjury (leading 


= 


[BOOK Iv. — 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


CHAP. IIL] 209 





epievras TOV Kar agiay, agiorayras Se Kai Tov mpagewv 
; TOY KAN@V Kea TOD exurndevparov @S avicEvor ovTes, 
Cpotos Se Kat Tay €KTOS aryabév. Ou dé yadvor mriBvot 
Kab éavrovs ayvoodvres, Kal TAUT erupavins: ov yap 
aE cou 6 OVTES TOLS evripous erixerpodow, eita eEedeyxovrau 5 
| Kau eo ijt Koo MOUVTaL Ka oYNaTL Kab Tois TOLOUTOLS, 
| Kat Bovrovras Ta evtvynpata avepa eivar avTav, Kar 
| A€youce Tept avrav, as 80a ToUT@Y TopmOna opevor. 


AvreriBeras Se 77 peyaroyruxia n puxpopuxia paNAov 

THS Xavvornros® Kab yap yoyveras paAXov Kal xsipov 10 

éoTiv. 

weer” 

We note however that there is probably some ground at the 

_ bottom of even undue self-depreciation; and also that such 

_ characters have a tendency to sink to their own standard. 

36 The Vainglorious man is conspicuous by his ignorance of him- and Vain- 
self, and seeks by a vulgar display of such external advantages Sue" 
as he does possess to secure for himself that admiration to 

37 which his merits do not entitle him. Littlemindedness is rittie- 
more opposed to Highmindedness than Vaingloriousness is, mindedness 

It is a worse error, and also a commoner one. me. 





of individuals. 


to pixpoyuxia, or a low moral 
estimation of one’s-self), extin- 
guished all scruples as to minor 
offences, and all desire to avoid 
them, and so the whole character 
settled down to the level of the 
estimate of itself already formed. 
We may extend the remark to 
the moral influence of the estim- 
ation of society on the character 
Recovery from 
some sins is rendered all but 
hopeless, out of all proportion to 
their relative guilt, simply by 
the arbitrary ban of society 
uponthem. The offender in fact 


acquiesces himself in this esti- 
mate of his degradation and soon 
comes to deserve it. Thus 9 
roau™ Oda xelpovs srotel. 
This is familiarly expressed in 
the proverb, ‘Give a dog a bad 
name,’ ete. 

5. rois évripows] See note on 
§ 27. 

10. xetpov eoriv] Though Aris- 
totle gives no reasons for this 
statement, we may suggest, (1) 
Its tendency to make men grow 
worse (§ 35), and (2) Its out- 
ward aspect being the reverse of 
that of Highmindedness. Both 


The 


Ambition 
and its 


relation to 


minded- 
ness. 


objects of 


210 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Iv. 





IV. ‘HL yey oby peya 


ia mept ropa éoTL peyahmy, 


Bomep elpyrau é E0LKE ée Kal Tepl TAVTHY ElvaL GpETN THs, 
nabamep ev Tots mporous eneyOn, 4) dofevev ay Tapa 
TAncios eye T pos THY peyaroyruxiav domep Kat a 


edevdepiorns TpOs THY eyadompérresav. 


“Auda yap 5 


@ 
auTat TOU jev peyahov aera, mept Se Ta peTpta. Kab 


27a puxpa SiatiOdacw judas ws Se. “Qomep & ev dapper 


CHAP. 1V.—Ox Ambition. 


We may now descend to the level of ordinary life, and 
describe another Virtue which, with its related Vices, has for 


these reasons were given in ch. i. 
for preferring Prodigality to 
Sordidness. 

Further, xavvdrns and - 
Wuxia must be carefully 
tinguished from ddatévera sae 
eipovea Which are discussed 
in ch. vii. Jnter alia, note that 
while pixpo\rvxia is here said 
to be worse than yavvrdrns, 
Aristotle regards eipovera as a 
less evil than ddafdvea. See vii. 
17. Hence too we must not con- 
fuse puxporuxia with Humility, 
though it is true that the char- 
acter of Highmindedness as de- 
scribed in this chapter shows that 
Humility would find no place as 
a Virtue 1 in Aristotle’s system. 

yiyverat 1adov] The deficiency 
of moral aspiration is much more 
common than vaingloriousness. 
The dignity of our moral nature, 
the worth (d&ia) that belongs to 
man as man, and the motive for 
moral action supplied by such a 
reflection, is totally unrecognised 


2 its object Honour on a moderate scale, just as we before dis- 


by the majority of mankind. 
[See further a Supplementary 
Note, too long to be introduced 
here, on the character of the 

an os, p. 234.] 
Ce eat ae —In this Chapter 
habits are discussed differing 
from those in the last chapter in 
degree rather than in kind ; just 
as Liberality was related to, and 
yet differed from, Munificence. 
We must recollect that the real 
subject-matter to which High- 
mindedness refers was explained 
to be ‘Self-Esteem in relation to — 
merits’ (last ch. § 3); but that 
practically it might be viewed as 
concerned with the pursuit of 
honour on a grand scale (§ 10). 
In this chapter Aristotle takes 
the latter point of view at once 
as his starting-point, with the 
proviso that only honour on a 
moderate and ordinary scale is 
now in consideration. 

3. €v Tois mpwrots] Referring 
(as in § 4 below) to II. vii. 8. 


CHAP. IV. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 211 





Kat Socet Xpnparav peaorns é€oTt Kai vmrepBorn TE Kal 
ENEWS, ove Kal €v TONS opeker TO padrov 7 H Set Kat 
3 TTTOV, Kal TO dev bet Kab OS Set. Tov TE yap pidore- 
poov peyope OS Kat padRov Fj 7 det, kat dGev ov bet, THs 

| TLULNS eprepevor, TOV TE agidoripor, @s ovd emt tow 5 
 4kadois Tpoatpovpevov Ttiacba. “Eats § are tov du- 
-Adripov eraivodpev ws avdpodn Kai hidoxadov, Tov Se 
adihOTLOV ws METPLOV Kal cadpova, WaTTEp Kal ev Tots 
mpotos evmouev. Anrov 8 Ott TAECovayas Tov Pido- 

ToLovTOU AEyomevou, OK él TO avTO ael Hépomev Tov 10 
—s- diddTipov, GAN erawodvres pev, emt TO paddov 4 ot 
Tool, Wreyovtes 8 emi TO padrov 7 Set. *Avwvupov 
8 ovens THs pecoTnTos, oS Epnuns eorxev adic Byrteiv 
\ ¥ > @ > + ¢ ‘ See SE % iS 
_ +Ta axpa ev ois 8 eotuv vmepBonn Kal ehnrewpres, Kau TO 

y 5 peor. ‘Opeyourat ée TUN Kai padQov i) Sei, Kat 15 
: 





qTtov, éote S Gre Kat ws Sel emawettar you H kus 


tinguished the Liberality of moderate means from the Munifi- 

3 cence appropriate to vast wealth. The term ‘ Ambition,’ by thephraseo- 
_ which this habit is sometimes described, is not definitely re~ Serer 
stricted to it, being sometimes employed also to denote an Virtue is 
4 excessive pursuit of Honour. ‘Ambitious’ and ‘ Unambi- beet pac 
5 tious’ may either of them be terms of praise or of blame. The istenceis rc 


point to notice however is that there zs a right and a wrong agg 


6. It so happens that in our 
words ‘ambition,’ ‘ambitious,’ 
*‘unambitious,’ we have terms of 
similar ambiguity. As Aristotle 
says in the text, ‘ambitious’ is 
sometimes equivalent to ‘ manly 
and of noble spirit’ (dv8pa6n kat 
@uAdxahov), and yet ‘unambi- 
tious’ is likewise a term of praise 
reserved for ‘men of moderation 
and self-control’ (uérpioy Kai 


oappova). When we praise an 
‘ambitious’ spirit we do so from 
its favourable contrast with the 
complacent indifference to ‘rise 
above themselves’ found in the 
majority of men, when we blame 
it we do so in reference to the 
standard of propriety, which it 
transgresses in its excessive 
eagernessforhonour. Cf. co@pPpeov 
as used in the last Ch, § 4. 


“ih 2 an 
phraseology 
exists in ad 
ard to tais 
Virtue, 


I 


I 


N 


ao 


212 


a | 
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


| BOOK Iv. 





airrn, pecorns ovea. rept TopMY aveavupos. 


Paiverat Se 


Tpos pev TH piroripiay agidoripia, pos Se Thy adi- 
orewiay pidor ipa, ™ pos apporepa Se apporepa TOS. 
6"Eotxe 8¢ tovr’ evar Katt epi Tas adXas a aperas. “Avri- 
Keto Oat 6 evradd ot akpor daivoyvrar Sia TO pm @VO- 


peacOat Tov pécor. 


V. IIpaorns &§ éoti pev pwecorns mept same AVOVU LOU 
S ovros Tob peécou, oxedov Se Kai TOP aKpe, emt. Tov 
peéoov TH mpaornTa Pépoper, ™pos Thy én? evry atro- 
2 KNivovcar, aveovupov ovcay. ‘H 8 vmepBo? 9 ” opyihorns 10 


Tis NeyouT av. 


To pev yap maOos éott1 opyn, Ta 


(and the latter in both directions) im fact, though our phraseo- 
6 logy may not sufficiently indicate it; and this defect of lan- 
guage is the sole cause that we have apparently in this case 
the opposition of two extreme habits nter se, without a settled 
mean state in contrast with both of them. 


CHAP. V.—Ox the regulation of th Temper. 


Due moderation in the regulation of the Temper may be~ 


termed Meekness. 


There is no one term in settled use to de- 


scribe this virtue, nor indeed the related vices. We may per- 
haps employ the term ‘ Meekness,’ though it suggests rather a 


deficiency in this respect. 


Cuap. V.—See what was said 
in the note on the Catalogue of 
Virtues, at the end of B. I. on 
the position occupied in the list 
by mpadrns, as being intermediate 
between the personal virtues that 
precede and the social virtues 
which follow it. 

10. dpythdrns tis] ‘ Passionate- 
mess’ and ‘ impassionateness’ 
seem to express the ideas re- 


The excess we may describe as a 


quired, and their somewhat 
uncouth character reproduces 
that of the Greek originals for — 
which Aristotle apologizes by 
adding ris here and i in § 5. 

11. rd pev mabos éeoriv opyn) 
It will be remembered that all 
Virtue and Vice are held by 
Aristotle to consist in the 
moderate, excessive, or defective 
indulgence of some feeling in 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





CHAP. V.] 213 





= eo ee 


3 ewrowoivra. TOANG Kab Sraxpepovta. ‘O per ouv ep ois - 
bei, Kat ois Set, opyEdpevos, & ére Se Kat ws bei, Kab ore, 
Kai doov xXpover; errawetrau mpaos 87 ouros ay ein, 
elarep n mpaorns erasverra, Bother ‘yap 6 mpaos 
arapaxos elval, Kat rad ayer Oat bro TOU mabous, aAn 5 
ws av 6 aryos Taken, OUT Kai ert TovTOIS Kal Et TOTOU- 

_ 4 Tov xpovov xarerraive. ‘Apapravewy Sé Soxet parov 

ert THY ENE" ov "yap TLLWPNTLKOS O Taos, ada 

5 paddov ouyyrapovixes. ‘H & @d\rewlis, et et dopynoia 
Tis éoTw, aif 6 & ru &n torte, Wreyerar. Oi yap pn opyeto- 10 
pevot ob ois Set MMw0t Soxovow iva, Kat ob pn ws Sei, 

6 pnd OTe, pnd ots Set: Soxet yap ovK aicPaveabat ovde 
AvrreiaOar, un opyitowevos Te ov‘ eivas auvytixes. To de 
mpommraxiCopevoy avexecOar Kal Tous oiKeious TrepLopay 


a a a 


sort of Passionateness, Anger being the feeling in itself morally 


3 indifferent in which the excess or defect takes place. We General 


shall then apply the term ‘Meek’ to a man who, though he {iacter 


is roused to anger on right occasions and in due measure, ever may 
be given of 
is naturally of a tranquil disposition, and never allows his Meekness, 
4 anger to get the better of his reason. His leaning is towards Which tends _ 
a deficiency in the feeling of anger, and forgiveness of injuries fect rather 


5 comes more naturally to him than revenge. That deficiency, ip page Peso 


impassionateness (if we may venture so to call it), is a fault. Ebe Serey 
6 Tt leads to a neglect of self-defence, and a submission to insult sort of im- 
passionate- 

ness, 


itself morally indifferent, neither 
good nor bad. See note on [J. 
vii, 2. That feeling is in this 
case Anger. We are accustomed 
to give a bad sense to ‘ Anger,’ 
and to describe the nobler forms 
of the passion by ‘ Indignation.’ 
That ‘Anger’ had not always 
this restricted sense in English 
may be seen from such passages 


as ‘Be ye angry and sin not,’ 
and S. Mark. iii. 5, where ‘anger’ 
is unite to our Lord. 
1. ed’ ois] ‘on right occasions’ 

(emi with dative as usual ex- 
pressing the conditions of the 
action). 

2. ots dei] ‘ with right persons’ 
(dative of reference). 


The excess 
alls under 


214 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Iv. 





7 avdpaTrodaoes. “H & tmrepBodn kata ravta ev yiveras 


‘\ ‘ @ > r \ 3959 @ > ro \ 

Kal yap ols ov Set, Kat ed ots ov Sel, Kat wadrov % Sel, 
A loa \ / , b] c od , 

kat Oartov, Kat TAELw YpovOY" ov pHY aTaVTa Ye TO 


oe 518 / 
QUT@ UTTapXel. 


SR Sie , . x. A 
Ov yap av Svvair eivavy TO yap KaKoV 


Ke 2 EAE XK / 9 337 / 
Kat EAVTO ATOAAVGL, KAY OACKANPOV 7H, AhOpNToY yiveTat. 


Sel, at éb ois ov Set, Kat 


ya 5) / N 9 / \ _.@ ? 
8 Ot pev ovv opyidos tayéws pev opyitovTat, Kal ois ov 


parrov 4 Set, wavovra Se 


/ ra ‘ 4 / ? 
Taxéws* 0 Kali BéedticTov éxovow. ZupBaiver 8 avrois 
A ef > , XN +) oe a. a See , 
TOUTO, OTL OV KaTEXOVoL THY OpynY GAN avtaTrodiwoa- 
e ln Wigs ete FY o> 9 , 
ow 9 pavepoi eiot Sia tHv okuTHTa, cit atoTavoVyTal. 


€ an : ek e+ / b an . a a ’ / 

9 LrepBor7 & eiciv ot axpoxoror o€ets Kat mpos Tay opyi- 
a De S A@¢ \ x € \ 

10 Aol Kai eTrl TravTit bOev Kai Tovvoma. Ou dé miKpot due- 


directed against one’s-self or one’s friends, which is slavish. 


7 The vice of excess is exhibited in every variety of detail, e.g. 


in the objects, the occasions, the degree, the amount of pro- 
vocation, the endurance of the feeling, etc. Errors in all these 
respects would scarcely be united in one instance, and if so, 


would be intolerahle. 


Hence we have several types of the 


The pas- 8 excess in question. (1) The passionate, who are soon angry, 
without due cause, and in too violent a degree, but soon come 
round. Their passion, being utterly unrestrained, speedily ex- 
[he quick- g hausts its force. (2) The quick-tempered, who are angry in a 
moment and at anything and everything—hence their name. 
‘hesulky. 10 (3) The sulky, who are hard 


jionate. 


tempered. 


5. éAdKAnpoy] see note above 
on i, 38. 

6. The four classes described 
in §§ 8—11 have naturally many 
points in common. Their char- 
acteristic features seem to be 
respectively, (1) Violence and 
ungovernableness of temper 
(gpyAo) — (2) Extreme irrita- 
bility and touchiness {(axpdxonor), 
—(3) A sulky and irreconcilable 
temper (mxpot)—(4) General ill- 


to appease; and their anger, 


nature and revengefulness (ya- 
Aerroi). 

8. 6 kat BéArioroy €xovow] ‘and 
that is the best point about them.’ 

10. 7 pavepot eiot] ‘in a way — 
that one may see,’ i.e, ‘openly;’ 
as opposed to dia rd put emipaves 
in § 10. 

11. trepBodg . . . d&eis] ‘The 
quick-tempered are also excessive 
in their irritability :’ taking imep- 
Bodq as qualifying d€eis. 





CHAP, V.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 215 





S:ddurot, Kat Tov xpovev opyifovrae Karéxouar yap 
Tov Oupav. Tatra Se yiveras, érav ayramodisg 9) n yap 
Topeopias Tavel THS opy is: ndovny a ayrt THS roms €wrrot- 
ovoa. Tovrov Se pu) ytvomevov To Bapos & exovow" Sua 
yp 7 TO Py emupaves evae ovde ovpreiber avTous ovdels, 5 
ev avre be meat TY opyny xXpovou Sei. ici & ot 
_- ToLodTOL EéavTois oxdmporaror Kal Tos padwora Pirous. 
_.1 Xaderovs Se A€yopev rovs ef’ ois re pH Set yarerrai- 
_—«-vovTas, Kat waddov 7 Sei, Kai TrEeiw Ypovor, Kat jn Sah 
12 arropevous divev Tipaplas i) KoNacEws. Tp mpaornte 10 
| be padXov THY vmepBohnv avruriBeper- Kat yap “aAdov 
ryiverau avOpeorrixarepov "yap 70 Typopera dan. Kai 
13 Mpos TO cvpBuodv ot yarerrol xeipous. X ‘O Sé Kat év trois’ 





being suppressed, lasts long, and is only fens GEN by revenge. 
Its concealment prevents any attempts on the part of others 
_ to appease it, and makes its subjects a curse to themselves as 
11 well as to their best friends. (4) The ill-tempered, whose Tne m- 
anger is generally ill-directed, unrestrained in degree and *empered 
12 duration, and seldom to be appeased without revenge. Excess Excess is 


is worse than Defect in the case of anger. It is more common, (ie.wor 
13 and it is also more practically inconvenient. It is impossible Precise 
practical 


8 are 


rules 
5. rd pr) éemibavés] Compare which Xareroi are distinguished impossible 


what Tacitus says of Mucianus 
(Hist. iii. 53, fin.), ‘ callide eoque 
implacabilius.’ 

6. méyyar] literally ‘to digest’ 
év avr@, i.e. without the external 
aid of ‘smoothing down’ (cvpzrei- 
Gevv) mentioned in the previous 
line, , 

8. xa\erroi] literally ‘harsh and 
hard to deal with,’ nearly what 
we mean by ‘a thoroughly nasty 
temper.’ It will be noticed by 
referring to § 8, that the point in 


from dpyidot, is that the former 
retain anger helo xpdvov. 

10. tipwpias 7 KoAdcews] For 
the distinction see note on IIT. 
v. 7. There is no emphasis how- 
ever on the distinction here, the 
former only being really applic- 
able. 

13. of xaXeroi is here used as 
a generic term for all the four 
different forms of excess just de- 
scribed, 

& 8é cal x.r.A.] See IL ix. 7, 


216 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





™pdorepov elpyrau, Kat éKx Tov Deyoueveav Sihov ov yap 
paSsov Svopioas TO Tas Kai iow Kat emt toto Kal 
TOoOV Ypovoy opylaTEoy, Kab TO wEXpL Tivos OpOAs moLeEt 
Tus 7) dwapraver, O pev yap pasepov TrapexBatvey ov 
yeyeras, ouT emt TO padrov OUT emi ij TO WTTOV" ev 5 
yap TOUS.€ANELTFOVTAS é emrauvoupev Kat i mpdous Fait, Kat 
TOUS Xaderraivovras avdpades os Swvapevors a apxew. ‘O 
én Wocov Kai TOs mapexBatvo penros, ov padiov TT? 
ayy arrodobvas év yap Tous Kal’ éxaocta Kai AP aio 
14 Onoes 7 n Kpiow: ‘Anda TO ye 7 TocouTov SHrov, OTL n pey 10 
péon ets emawern, nal iy ois bei opyrtoueba Kat eb 
ots Set, Kai as Sel, Kal TavTa Ta ToWavTa, at Sv virep- 
Bonat Kai edneipers penrat, Kal emt peucpov pev yevope- 
va Tipe Has emi TAEov Se paArov, emi modu Se opadpa. 
Anrov ovv ote THs wéons EEews avOextéov. Ai pev ovy 15 
mept Thy opynv ees eipjoOwoar. 


to lay down precise rules as to the right objects, degree, dura- 
tion, ete., of anger. Small errors on either side are not 
serious, and indeed often gain our approbation on account of 

14 the element of good which may be traced in them. That there 
however 7s a virtue to be cultivated and that there are vices 
to be avoided in the regulation of temper is abundantly clear. 
The practical details must be left to individual feeling and 
judgment. 


where nearly the same words 
occur. €k TOV eyouevor, ‘from 
what we are now saying.’ 

8. r@ Ady@] see note IT. ix. 7, 8. 


any given action, and even 
granting all such circumstances 
could be taken into accurate 
account, so much still depends — 


9. aicOnoet] ‘individual feel- 
ing.’ Questions of casuistry such 
as these cannot be determined 
by scientific rules. So much 
depends upon the infinite variety 
of circumstances bearing upon 


on the physical and moral con- 
stitution of the agent, that indi- 
vidual feeling (aicOnoet) or, as a 
modern writer might say, ‘each 
man’s conscience,’ must in the 
last resort decide such points. _. 





j 
‘4 
2 
a 
bi 


CHAP. VI.] 


ARISTOTLZLE’S ETHICS. 


217 





> ‘\ ral / ‘\ al A ‘ , A 

VI. Ey dé Tais opurious Kae TD outny Kat haryoov Ka 

Tpayparev Kowevely ob pep dpecxou Soxodow elvan, ol 
/ 

TavTa pos ndovay emaLvouvTes. Kat oudev dyrireivouTes, 


2 aX oldpevot Sew adurrou Tous evTuyxdvoucty elvas ot 8 


ée& évayTias ToUTOLS TpOS TavTa aVTLTEiVOVTES Kat TOD 
~ > a / 4 ‘ / 

hurreiv ovd otiovv hpovtivovtes SvcKorot Kai Sucépides 
A if ‘ > Ta 4 / ¢ r Be: 

3 KanovvTat. Ort ev ovy at eipnucvas e€es WexTai evo, © 


3 x . - / > ‘ 

OUK Gondor, Kal OTL ] eon ToOUT@Y emaLveTn, KAO Hp 

> Ww - +-"€ a, ae \ \ s 
amodeteras & Set Kai ws Set, opoiws Se kai Svoryepaved. 

¥ > > is I A ¥ \ L 

4 Ovowa & ove amodédota: avtn tt, éouxe S¢ pddiota 10 
/ a /, ? e \ ‘ / e/ e 
pidiae TowvTOs yap éoTW Oo KaTa THY peony cEW Oloy 
/ / \ 2 A ‘ / 
BovropeOa reyew Tov emery dirov, TO oTépryeuw T poo 


CHAP. VI.—On Friendliness, or Amiability. 


1 In their conduct and deportment i in society some men, whom Phraseclogy 
we may perhaps describe as ‘ obsequious, shrink under any *7g,ene! 
circumstances from making things unpleasant; they would the habit 
rather sacrifice a principle than say or do anything disagree- (§§ 1-5). 

2 able. Others again seem to enjoy running counter to every 
one and every thing, and care not how much pain they cause. 


3 These we may call ‘cross-grained and quarrelsome.’ 


In an 


intermediate position are those whose approbation and dis- 


approbation are re 


gulated upon principle, who love to give 


pleasure, though they do not shrink from inflicting pain when 
4 it is needful: characters whom we may describe as ‘ friendly,’ 


Cap. VI.—We now come to 
the group of Virtues, three in 
number, which relate to our con- 
duct in and towards society. The 
order of the Catalogue in II. vii. 
is departed from. There it was 
GAnGea — evrpamedia — dudia. 
Here it is duAia—adjdeva—ed- 
tpamehia. The order is not of 
much importance, but it seems 


unnatural to separate eUrpareXia 
and gdidia (both dealing with ré 
760), by interposing between 
them dAnGeva (dealing with 7d 
adnOés). This would appear 
from Aristotle’s own summary 
in viii. 12, below. 

9. dmodééera] ‘to approve.’ 
See note on I. iii. 4. 

11. rovotros yap €otw x.7.A.} 


218 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Iv. 





5 aBovra. Avapépet Se THs pidias, Ott avev mabous éort 
Kat TOU ore pyely ois opel ov yap T) pire i) ey Oai- 
pew arrodexerar & eKaora, OS bet, ana 7? TOLOUTOS elvat. 
‘Opoiws yap Tpos ayviras Kat ‘wopipous Kai ourmbens 


Kab aovrnbers avrTo Toujaet, qv Kat ev éxdorous ws 


dppote ov yap opoiws mpoonxer oun Bov reat oOvetwv 


6 ppovritew, ovo av AvTreiDy. 


Kafonov pev ouv elpyrat 


ore ws Set opidneret, avapépav be Tpos TO KAaNOV Kal TO 
cuphépoy otoydcerar Tod pm dAvTreiy  ouvnduvew. 
yf \ \ oan ¢ \ \ 4 \ > a 

7 Hovuxe pev yap jwept ndovas Kat A\w7ras elvat Tas ev Tats 10 


5 and their disposition as ‘ friendliness.’ 


That disposition differs 


from ‘friendship,’ because it has not its root in affection, but 
in a natural inclination to give pleasure and avoid giving 
pain: and moreover because it is not limited to particular 
persons, but is felt towards all in due measure and proportion. 
6 This natural tendency’ to please is controlled however by 
7 several considerations, such as the following :—(1) Can it be 


For he that holds the mean 
position is just such a man as 
we should describe as ‘a good 
friend,’ if the element of affec- 
tion were superadded. Friendli- 
ness + Affection=Friendship. In 
Greek, however, there are no two 
words exactly corresponding to 
this distinction between ‘friend- 
liness’ and ‘friendship,’ and so 
diria has to be employed for 
both. 

3. T@ rowovros ecvat] “because 
it is his nature to do so.’ He 
makes himself generally pleasant 
and agreeable (or if necessary 
the reverse), not because he likes 
(or dislikes) you, but because it 
comes naturally to him under 
certain circumstances, and it 


makes no difference whether he 
knows you personally or not, 
except so far as acquaintanceshi 
introduces some element of feel- 
ing (see § 8 below, | and cf. § vii. 
of next Chapter, TQ THY EE ToL 
ovros eivat). See also Bacon’s 
Essay on ‘Good Nature’ through- 
out, and especially ‘Neither is 
there only a habit of goodness 
directed by right reason (cf. ts 
. .. kata Tov dpbdv Aédyor), but 
there is in some men, even in 
Nature, a disposition towards it: 
as on the other side there is a 
Natural Malignity. The lighter 
sort of malignity turneth to a 
crossness or frowardness’ (ef. 
Sicepis Kal SvcKoNos). 

9. curvndivew] ‘to contribute 


pen bm gee ne 


CHAP, VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


219 





Opidiais ywomevas, TovTav 8 boas pev avT@ éott pH 
kanov 7) BraBepov curmduvery, Suaxepavel, Kat } mpoaupr- 
| oera Aurreiy. Kav T® Towovvts 8 a adoxnpoourny depp, 
Kat TavTaY yn pupa; }) BraBnv, 4 8 evartincis peKpay 
8 8 Adem, ouK amodeterau, ada Suoxepavel. A Lapepovreos 5 
Ry opidajoes Tos ev afiapace Kab TOS TUXodGL, Kai par 
Rov 7) yrrov weopipous, protons be «ab KATO Tas adas 
Svadopas, éxactous amoveuwv TO Tpérov, Kat Kal avTo 








exercised with propriety and with advantage? e.g. it is better Friendliness 
to give pain than to sacrifice a principle, as we have said ; may be de- 
nor again should we hesitate to stand in a man’s way to save the a Sa 
him at the cost of small present annoyance from bringing Jot bo Gus 
8 great future disgrace or injury upon himself. (2) Regard fonsidera- | 
_ must be had to the social position of those with whom we are cumstances, 


associating, our degree of acquaintance with them, and so on. Ut, ete. 





to pleasure’; to ‘rejoice with 
them that do rejoice.’ 

1. rovrav & dcas] this must 
refer to 7dovas only and not to 
Avrds. ‘Such pleasures as he 
cannot conscientiously join in he 
will frown upon.’ He will not 
only not ‘do such things, but he 
will have no pleasure in those 
that do them.’ Cf. viii. 8, a yap 
imropever dkovav, TavTa cah sroveiy 
Soxei. 

Notice the combination of 
natural kindliness of disposition 
with a stern and uncompromis- 
ing hatred of moral wrong. 
There is nothing weak and effe- 
minate about this natural friend- 
liness (fiAia). It is in the best 
sense of the word a manly feel- 
ing. Moreover, the combination 
spoken of is quite true to human 


nature. The ‘Apostle of Love’ 
was also one of the ‘Sons of 
Thunder,’ and some of the most 
vehement denunciations in Scrip- 
ture occur in his writings. Even 
persecution (to take an extreme 
case) has been conscientiously 
sanctioned and practised by men 
otherwise conspicuous for their 
kindliness and benevolence of 
nature. Witness M. Aurelius, 
S. Louis of France, etc. 

2. The student will notice the 
usual distinction between py, 
kaddv, ‘morally wrong,’ an 
BraBepdy ‘materially harmful,’ 
corresponding to the distinction 
between kaddv and ovpdépoy in 
the preceding section. 

5. ee PF dparjoe) 
Cf. iii, 2 


220 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 





per aipovpevos TO ourndvvew, Autrey & evraBovpevos, 
Tois o arroBaivovar, € ea 7 peilo, cuvETroMevos, eyo Se 
TO KANO Kal TO ouphépovri. Kai ndovqs & &vexa tis eio- 

9 aibus peydrns pupa Avijoe. ‘O pep ouv péaos ToLov- 
TOS €OTLY, OUK ovopacTat Se, TOU Se curmdvvovros 6 0 pep 5 
Tov nduS elvas oToYatouevos ym SV GAXO TL ApEeckos, 6 
S Smrws ahérera Tis AUTO yiyvyntas els ypnpata Kat doa 
Sia Ypnuatov, kodak 6 Se wacv Svoxyepaivey eipynrat 


(3) Ulterior consequences must always be taken into con- 


sideration. Great subsequent pleasure or profit may some- 
The Excess 9 times be secured by slight momentary pain. The Excess has 
yee two types, distinguished by their motives. If it be merely 


Pennell an exaggerated and disinterested desire to please, we call it 
two types, _ ‘ Obsequiousness.’ If it be adopted from motives of self- 
Obsequious- interest, we term it ‘ Flattery.’ The Defect has been suffi- 
Flattery. . ciently characterized already. Owing to the want of a definite 


2. rois & amoBaivovow k.t.r.] 
‘but regulating his conduct by 
the consequences if they be on a 
larger scale,’ as compared, that is, 
with the present circumstances 
(see Analysis). 

3. ndovns ... THs eiaavdis 

peyaAns] ‘for the sake of a plea- 
sure that will ‘presently be a 
considerable one.’ 

6. dpeoxos] The dpeckos is 
what we should call an insincere 
or unreal man: one who pro- 
fesses to take the greatest inte- 
rest in you, and uses the most 
friendly and even affectionate 
language, when he really cares 
nothing about you. Theophras- 
tus graphically describes him as 
‘a man who when he enters a 
house at once asks t0 see the 


babies; the moment he sees 
them he declares that they are the 
very image of their father, and 
kisses and fondles them, though 
he cares nothing about them.’ 

8. xédaé] The ancient ‘ Para- 
site’ and the Medieval Courtier 
would be typical instances. e.g. 
Polonius and Osric in Hamlet, 
Act III. Se. ii. (1. 393), and Act 
V. Se. ii. (. 98, ete.). It is re- 
corded that one of the courtiers 
of Philip of Macedon wore a 
shade over his left eye and 
walked lame, because the king 
had lost the sight of his left eye 
and been wounded in the leg. 
The modern servility of ‘the 
Alexandra limp’ shows that the 
race is not extinct, 






Se 


\ 
eI 
3 


CHAP. VII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


221 





4 4 a % / X 
Ott SvcKonros Kai Svoepis. “AvtixciaOar de haiverar Ta 
A a a RE bs / 
akxpa éavtois Sia TO avwvupov eivat TO pwécov. 
> \ / > ‘\ A > / 
VIL. epi ta avra S¢ oyedov eott kai 7 THS adafovei- 
S| ‘ 2 a ‘ \ ‘ 
as pecorns: avavupos Sé kai avtn. Ov xeipov Se Kat Tas 
4 ] nr a / ‘ xX rl] / ‘\ \ 
TovavTas emeNOeiv' waddov Te yap ay eWeinuev Ta TEpt 
+: ibs 2 ei vd 8 , \ / 7. 
To 700s, Kal Exactov SueNOovtes, Kal pecoTnTas civar 
> 4 xX ‘ / od + ’ 
TaS apeTas TioTevoaipev Av, ert TaVT@Y OUTS Exo 


/ 
CUVLOOVTES. 


"Ev &} T@ ovbhy ot pev mpos ndovnv Kat 


4 e an 4 A ‘\ a >. / 

AvIHY OptrodvTes EL_pnvTaL, Tept Se THY adnOevovTwY TE 
‘ / 4 ¢ / > / \ / 

Kal WrevOopéevov eiT@pev Opmoiws Ev Royous Kal mpakeor 10 


and recognised name for the mean state, the excess and defect 
sometimes appear to be opposed to one another immediately. 


CHAP, VII.—Ox Straightforwardness or Truthfulness. 


Turning now to the behaviour of men in regard to the pre- 


1. “AvrixeioOac Sé€ gaivera 
«T.A.] So it was also in the 
case of didotiia, iv. 6. 

Cap. VII.*—Wenextproceed 
to consider the virtue of Truth- 
fulness or Straightforwardness in 
words and actions considered 
out of any relation to the plea- 
sure or pain caused to others. 

The excess and defect here 
must not be confused with yav- 
vorns and pixpowvyia in ch. iii. 
See further note on iii. 37 and 
also that on peyaddoyuxos, p. 235. 

4, dv@vupos x.t.d.] otherwise 
Aristotle would hardly have had 
recourse to the strange descrip- 
tion ddafoveias pecdrns, ‘ mode- 


ration in respect of boastfulness.’ 
In II. vii. 12 ddnOeva and ddrnOis 
Tis Were suggested (the ‘ris’ show- 
ing some doubtfulness about the 
application of the word). dAn- 
Gea, however, is ‘truth’ rather 
than ‘truthfulness.’ ddnduwds, 
i.e * genuine,’ ‘ real,’ would more 
nearly express what we want in 
the adjectival form at any rate, 
but there is no abstract substan- 
tive to correspond. 

Ov xeipov K.7.A.] This is be- 
cause the habits described are 
none the less real and definite, 
though language may not supply 
words to mark their distinctions. 
(See note on IT. vii. 2.) 


* Seo Supplementary Notes on this Chapter, passim. 


General ex- 
planation ot 
the Habits 
in question 
and their 
ie 
§$ 1—6). 


222 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK Iv. 





(2 kat TH TpooToMmpatt. Aoxet én 0 MeV a Cov ™ poomrot- 
nN a 5 \ e 

NTUCOS TOY evdoFov civar Kat pn UTApXOVTOY Katt perto- 

3 vw 7) Umdpxel, 6 8é elpov avarraw apvetc bat Ta dmrdp- 

4 XovTa i) ear TOLELY, o Se _Heoos avdéxacrds Ths av 
adnbevtixos Kal TO Bip Kal TO oYH, TA UTapxovTa 5 
e a \ ems \ A / y¥ / 
Ou“oNoyav elvas Tept avTOV, Kal oUTE peiw oUTE EXATTO. 
yf XN 4 d \o@ , \ 

5 Eots 5¢ Tovtwy Exacta Kat Evera Twos Trovewy Kat pne- 

/ 7 @ / a / S / 

vos. ‘“Exaoros & otos €ott, TowadTa NEyel KAL TPATTEL 


2 tensions which they make in society, we observe that the 
Braggart lays claim to qualities which he does not possess at 
3 all, or possesses in a degree below his claims; the Dissembler 
4 disclaims or depreciates his own merits ; the Truthful man, with 
a genuineness that embraces his whole life and conversation, 
5 represents himself just as he is, neither more nor less. The 
Simulation or Dissimulation thus described may be practised 
with or without a special motive; but, generally speaking, 
men’s words, acts, and lives are a true reflex of their charac- 
ter and disposition, u unless there be some special motive for 


l. rr, oomoinpa] ‘ pretensions.’ 

3. eipwv is a very difficult 
word to translate. As adafaov 
is one who boastfully lays claim 
to qualities - that do not belong 
to him, so eipov is the reverse of 
this, and eipwveca therefore is a 
conscious and intentional con- 
cealment or disclaiming of good 
qualities that really belong to 
one. ‘Irony’ is too wide, it 
may take this form among others. 
‘False Modesty’ and ‘ Reserve’ 
are too unconscious and often 
unintentional. ‘ Dissembler’ and 
‘Dissimulation’ are too closely 
allied with deceit, at least in 
modern English, though it does 
not seem that they were always 
used with this bad connotation : 


e.g. in Bacon’s Essay on ‘ Simula- 
tion and Dissimulation.’ Perhaps 
on the whole either ‘ Dissimula- 
tion’ or ‘ Self-Depreciation’ come 
nearest to what we want: but 
the word in Greek itself is used 


in different senses, as we seefrom 


§ 14-16 of this Chapter. 

7. This distinction is further 
discussed in § 10, etc. With 
some persons the habits of brag- 
ging or of self-depreciation are so 
ingrained that they are exhibited 
even when it is impossible to 
imagine a motive, and where de- 
tection seems inevitable, and, as 
Aristotle proceeds to remark, 
except there be a definite motive 
such conduct is a true index of a 
character corresponding. 


CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 223 





6 Kau ovr fh, €av pm Twos évera parry. Ka® avro Se 
TO pe Ypebdos pavrov Kal peeror, To © adnOes Kaov 
Kat errauveroy. Otro Sé Kai o per adn BevtiKos peoos 
ov erawveros, ot Se Yevdopevor apporepor pev error, 

 padrov 8 6 0 aratov. Tlepi éxarépou S eum [LED mpore- 5 

7 pov Se Tept TOU adnBevrixcod. Ou yap wept Tov ev Tals 
Omonroylas adnBevovros Réeyouer, oud 6 boa els adieiay § 7 
Simavocurnv ovvreiver (4AAns yap av ein TadT’ aperys), 
GAN’ év ols pmOevos Towvrov Svadépovtos Kat év Noy 

8 Kal ev Big adn Bever 7@ Thy ew ToLodTOS elvat. Aogeve 10 
ea av o TowovTos emverns evar. “O yap piradnOns, Kat 
ev ols pn Svaéper arnBevov, adnBevcer Kat ev ots dva- 
deper rt padXov" ws yap aicypov To ypevdos evraB7- 
oeral, 6 ye Kat xa’ avto nudaBeiro: 6 Sé ToLodTos 

9 emaweros. "Emi to éharrov Sé padXov TOU ada Bois 15 
arroKhiver. enpedeorepov yap paiveras Sua TO éerray Geis 

10 Tas wmepBoras evar. ‘O Se peifo trav vrapxovTwv 


6 the contrary. And seeing that any falsehood is in itself 
reprehensible, we have no hesitation in according praise to 
Truthfulness and censure both to Boastfulness and Dissimula- 
tion, but especially to the former. Now to speak of each 

7 character in order. The Truthful man is not only truthful in ‘ Truthfut 
his dealings, or where his interest is involved, but all his life "8, f° 
and conversation are truthful, from the natural love which he whole oie 

8 has of truth in itself: and similarly he shuns falsehood even whieh it 
in matters indifferent, and therefore much more in all other @{7"™)) 

g cases. This habit is evidently i in itself a virtue. If however 
such a man should err, it will be on the side of depreciating, 

to rather than exaggerating, his own merits. Boastfulness has The Excess, 


several types. (a) It may be without a definite motive, Boasttat 
various 


types 
13. os aig x pov is in contrast circumstances involving disgrace, (§§ 10-.-18). 
with xa@ airo. Falsehood under contrasted with falsehood per se. 


I 


_ 


12 


I 


_ 


12 


224 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Iv. 





4 A d 4. ‘ y¥ >) ~ 
mpootrovoupevos pnOevos Evexa havry pev eotKxev (ov yap 
ay evape TO arevdet), paras Se haiveras HadXov } 
kakos. Et & &exd twos, 6 pev Sok&ns h Tyas ov Alav 

a ¢ , ‘ e ns > / > + | 4 
apextos, ws 6 ddatav, 6 Sé apyupiov, boa eis apyu- 
plov, acynuwoveotepos. Ovk ev tH Suvaper & éotiv 6 


coming naturally as it were to a man. In that case it is 
rather foolish than actually vicious. (@) It may be assumed 
with a view to secure honour, or with a view to make gain; 
the latter being the worse form. And observe that Boast- 
fulness is a moral state, the character of which is deter- 


mined mainly by its motive or purpose. 


1. dhavrA@ pév Zorxe] ‘is a bad 
man in some sense.’ This is in 
natural contrast with the state- 
ment in § 8, d6€ere & Gy x.r.d. 

4. ws 6 ddrafov] As the 
dvafwv is the character whose 
different types Aristotle is now 
distinguishing, it seems out of 
place to give as an example of 
one of them ‘6 ddafav.’ Two 
other readings are proposed (a) 
és dvafov (omitting 6), i.e. ‘he 
is not very much to be blamed, 
forabraggart’ (= considering that 
he is a braggart): (8) 6 ddafov 
(omitting @s), te. ‘He who does 
it for the sake of honour is not 
very much to be blamed—he 
who boasts, I mean.’ Thus the 
words supply the place of the 
participle mpooro.ovpevos which 
must be understood with 6, and 
if the sentence were written in 
full would follow rips. It is 
most probable however that the 
words @s 6 adafay represent a 
marginal gloss that has crept into 
the text. 


For the force of 


5. Oix ev rH Suvdper x.7.A.] 
Boastfulness as a reprehensible 
habit consists not so much in 
the mere capacity (Sdvayuis) or 
propensity to boast. That may 
arise in a manner from natural 
constitution (r@ road elvar— 
with which compare a similar 
statement as regards Friendliness, 
vi. 5, T@ Towvros eivat K.T.A.), 
or from force of habit (xara rhy 
é£.v—with which again compare 
T@ THY E&w Tovovros elvat in § 7 
above). The moral depravity of 
Boastfulness depends rather upon 
the motives for which it is 
adopted (mpoaipects), the distinc- 
tion between some of which 
motives has just been pointed 
out. The distinction is in fact 
the same as that which discrimi- 
nates dpecxos and xdéAa&é in the 
last Chapter. 

The remark is introduced in 
the text to show that the classi- 
fication just made of boasters 
according to their motive indi- 
cates a real moral difference. 


CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 225 





ahaton, GAN ev TH mpoaupecer” Kara TH Ew yap ka 
D ToLoade elvat aratov é corey" domep Kal pevorns ) 


pev TO pevder aure Xatpov, ") Se Soéns opeyopevos i 
3 népdous. Oi per ouv b0&ns: Xap adafovevdpevor Ta 
ToLavT a mpoomrovouvras éf ois erauvos i) evdaupoviopos, 5 


ot Se Képdous, ov kat amoravois é éore Tois méhas Kal & 
Svarabeiv core pn ovra, ofov pavrw copov Ht latpov. 
Ava todro ob mheioror mpoomrovovvrat Ta Tovar Kal 
14 aratovetovrar & ort yap év avtois Ta elpmpeva. Oi S 
etpoves ert To éharrov AeyorTes yapieorepor pep Ta 10 


On daivovtas’ ov yap Képdous evexa Soxovor réeyew, 
GANG hevyovres TO OyKnpov" pddiota Se Kal ovTOL Ta 
15 €vooka amapvoivtat, olov Kai Swxparns emote. Oi Se 


habit or natural disposition may make a man boastful, just as 
some men have a natural propensity for lying, and others 
adopt it for a special purpose. In the case of Boastfulness 
the special purpose is the main point by which we judge the 
13 habit. ‘To return to the two last-mentioned types of Boast- 
fulness. The manner in which they are displayed varies with 
the difference of motive. If the motive be honour, pretension 
is made to qualities which are praised or envied by men. If 
it be gain, pretension is made to qualities that are useful, and 
the absence of which is not likely to be detected ; e.g. quackery 
14 and fortune-telling. This is the commoner type. The Dis- The Defect, 
semblers, on the other hand, disclaim their own merits, and tom, falls” 
this in moderation is not altogether unattractive, as in the pase dl a 


15 case of Socrates. The same habit in an extreme form is very Self-Depre- 
Affectation. 
7. olov pavrw cody x.t.d.] aed and thence ‘pompous’ 


€.g., weather-prophets, fortune- (L. and S.). 

tellers, quack-doctors, etc. 13. The cipwveia of Socrates is 
12. gevyovres 1d dyxnpdy] well known. It consisted in a 

‘wishing to avoid (the appear- profession of ignorance, doubt, 

ance of) giving themselves airs.’ and a desire to be instructed, by 

éyxnposmeans literally ‘bulky’or which unwary opponents were 


16 yap n vrrepBon Kat Mav Ederes aratovindy. 


16 guise, in short ‘the pride that apes humility.’ 


226 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK Iv. 





Kal TO pupa Kal Ta pavepa poo ToLovpevot Ravnorra- 
voupryot Aéyourat Kal evnararpovnrot eiaw.. Kat eviore 
araloveia daivetat, oiov 4 TOV Aaxovev écOys* Kat 


Oi 


Se peTpios Xpaepevor ™ elpaveig Kab Tepl Ta bi Mav 
éurodav Kab pavepa elpeovevopevor xapiertes paivovrau. 
17 ‘Avrixeia Bau S 6 adalov haiveras Ta adnOevtiKe xer 


pov yap. 


VIL. Ouans Se eau avaTavcews Vv Te Bip, Kat é 


TavTD Siayaryis pera maudias, doKet ka evtabda elvat 10 


Omidia Tus eupedays, Kat ota Set Aeyew Kat OS, omolws Se 


contemptible, and is often nothing but Boastfulness in dis- 


In moderation 


17 however it is not (as we said) offensive, and in any case is 
preferable to the other extreme of Boastfulness. 


Explana- I 
tion of 
terms. 


Cuap. VIII.—Ox Geniality. 


Some part of life being necessarily spent in recreation, 
there must be in that part also a propriety of conduct, and 
this will apply, though in different degrees, both to speakers 


lured on to discomfiture in 
argument. 

1. mpoomotovpevot] This clause 
stands i in contrast with ra évdo&éa 
amapvouvrat, and therefore we 
may understand some such 
words as pa Svvacba to com- 
plete the sense. ‘Those who 
disclaim small merits, and such 
as they obviously possess.’ 

Thus we have two types of 
elpwveia distinguished :—(1) the 
more favourable type of ‘Self- 


Depreciation,’ of which Socrates 
is an instance, and which is 
exhibited also by the peyadd- 
wWuxos (see iv. 28, note) ; and (2) 
the more unfavourable type of 
‘affectation,’ which often is a 
mere disguise of ‘ Boastfulness.’ 

Bavkoravovpyot] 
knaves.’ 
affected.’ 

11. dpiria tis eupedjs] ‘2 
graceful way of conducting one’s- 
self in society.’ 


‘affected 
Bavkos=‘ prudish or. 


eee ee ee 


a 


CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLES ETHICS. 227 


4 


J 
5 





y 


Se / \ ae , / ry 
Kat axovew. voices SE Kal TO Ev TOLOUTOLS AEyELV 7 
| , > S , N N n> + 
(2 To“ovT@Y aKkovety. Anrov 0 WS Kal TEPl TAUT eoTLY 
A / \ ry 
3 vmrepBorn Te Kat EArEpIs TOU wEcov. Oi peEV Ov TO 
/ A 
yedoiw viepBaddovtes Bwoporoxor Soxovaw civar Kat 
\ / / nA / \ A 
PopTiKol, YALYoMEVOL TayTwS TOU yEhoOloV, KaL wadrov 5 
an A XK a / 
atoxatouevos TOU yéAwTa ToUoaL 7) TOU Aéyew evoyx7- 
A / \ / 
ova Kab pn AVTELY TOY GKwTTOMEVOY? OL Se wT aUTOL 
\ a e / 
Gv eimrovtes wnOev yedolov Tots Te Neyouor Sucxepaivor- 
A 3 rat 
Tes Gypioe Kal aKAnpoL SoKxovow civar. Oi Sd eppedras 
> , 4 ¥ 
mailovTes evTpaTréAoL TpocaryopevoyTal, oiov evTpoTroL’ 10 
n A A / 
Tod yap nOovs at TovadTas SoKovat KwheeEs eival, Oo- 
> ra) / 
Tep Se TA COMaTa eK TOY KIVHCEwY KpivETal, OUTM Kal 
; ‘\ A / la) 
4 Ta n0n. ’ ExrirronaLov tos Se Tov yeAolov, Kal TOV TAéic- 
a a a / a 
TOV YALPOVTOV TH Talia Kal TO TKwOTTEW paAXov 4) 
> 
Sel, Kat ob Bwporoyor evtpamredos mpocayopevovtas ws 15 
/ c ‘ / A > ‘ > nr 
yapievres. Orr de Siadépovor, Kal ov piKpov, ex TOV 
> / n / 2 of 2 ae ee, tee 
5 eipnuevav Snrovn| Ty péon & e&et oixeiov Kai 7 eme- 


4 
2 and listeners in such’ écenes: and here too the law of the 
3 mean holds good. In the one extreme we have the Buffoon, 
who can never resist a laugh however ill-timed, however pain- 
ful to the feelings of others. In the other we have the Boor, 


who neither jokes himself, nor tolerates it in others. The character- 


mean state (1) is characterized by quickness and versatility istics of the 


4 of Wit, though, as nothing is easier than to raise a laugh, the are 
5 Buffoon often gets credit for such versatility. (2) Tact again {iy ea 


readiness 
of wit. 


1. Stoices x.7.A.] The same but the former having gained a (2) Tactin 
difference in fact as exists in metaphorical senselike ‘versatile,’ Sunvcets of 
other cases between the doer of while the latter retains its literal ridicule. 
an act and one who is only an meaning. The notion is that 
accessory. they are called ‘quick-witted’ 

10. Observe the play on words because their wits move quickly. 
between evrpdmwehorand etrpomot, § 13. emumoddgoyros] See note 
both having the same derivation, on I, iv, 4. 


228 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK IV. 





SeEvorns éoriy Tov 5 embe§iov éort rowaira déyew Kai 
aKovewv ota T@ CTLELKEL Ka i enevOepi d dpworres core yap 
Tuva, mpeTovTa, T® TOUT Aeyew ev TraLdias pe per Kal 
aKOvEL, Kal ) TOU ehevdepiou Tmaoua Suaspéper THS TOU 
av8parrodadous, Kat av TOU mremaudevpevou Kat amadev- 5 

6 Tov. "I8ou § av tis Ka ex Tov Keop@ovey TOV TANALOV 
Kal TOV KALVOV" Tous pev yap nv yedotov "7 aicxpodoyia, 
TOLS Sé paddov y vTrovola: Suampéper é ov puxpov TaUTA 

7 ™ pos evoxnnoroyny. TIorepov ouv TOV ev cKamrovTa 
opuaréov TO heyew & a mpérret ehevepion, i) TO pr dumeiv 10 
TOV aKovoVTa, i Kal TEpTreLy ; i Kal 70 ye TOLOUTOY aopt- 

8 orov ; ado yap add pLonTOD TE Kat 700. Tovaira de 
Kal aKOUCETAaL & yap drropéver dnover, TavTa Kal Tovey 

9 Soxet. Ov dn Trav mouncer TO yap TKOppa roLdopnud TE 


is another characteristic, which insures that its possessor, 
whether speaking or listening, shall never forget what it is 
becoming for a gentleman and a man of refinement, even in 
6 the way of recreation, to speak or to listen to. As an 
obvious instance of the application of such ‘tact,’ we note 
what a difference there is between coarseness and innuendo. 
7 Whether then he draws the line at what is becoming to a 
gentleman, or at what will give pleasure, or at least no pain, 
8 to his hearers, is perhaps not easy to define. But in any case 
he will not willingly listen to anything which he would shrink 
9 from saying himself. For though law does not restrain ridi- 


between the coarseness of Aris- 


2. ehevOepios here means ‘a 
tophanes and the ‘intrigue’ of a 


gentleman,’ just as conversely 


avdparoba6ns means ‘a low and 
vulgar man.’ 

7. alexpohoyia] : outspoken 
obscenity,’ tmdvora ‘innuendo.’ 
The difference would be well 
illustrated by the contrast 
between Rabelais and Sterne, or 


modern French play. 
9. evoxnpoovny] ‘decency.’ 
13. mroveiv . . . wouoer] in the 
sense of oxomrew or héyew. AS 
there are certain jokes which he 
would not himself make, so he 
will also refuse to listen to them. 


10 to himself in such matters. 


CHAP. VIII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


229 





\ 
éotiv, of Se vopoberar Evia AowWopely Kwdvovow" eder S 
xy \ / € » / \ / ed 
tows Kai cxwmrew. “O dn xapies Kal édevOepios ovTaS 


ee @ / X ec n 
10 €€€l, Olov vOMoS WY EaUTO. 


n \ 9S e / 
TovovTos pev ovy 0 Ecos 


5 ‘ y>? 4 at De / / \ 
EOTLY, ELT ETPLOEELOS ELT EUTPATENOS AEyeTaL 0 Se Bapo- 
/ ad > \ an / \ ¥ ¢ fa) ¥ a 
AOKOS NTTWY ETTL TOU YENOLOV, KAL OUTE EaUTOU oUTE TMV BH 
of. 3 / > / \ A / 
ANNOY ATTEXOMEVOS, Eb yedora TOWEL, KAL TOLAVTA NEYOV 
2 ? 6 x / ¢ / 4 y > > xX > , ¢ O 
@v ovley Gy ELTrOL O YapLels, EVLA O OVO AY AKoUCAL. 
A > ‘\ 4 / > > i, hs \ 
hy ayplos els TAS TOLaUTAS Omirtas ay pEtos ouGev yap 
/ a / aa ee, Rae ORD 
11 oupPadropevos mact Svoyepaiver. Aoxet de n avatrav- 
a \ 3 fal / 95 > a a > 
12 OlS KaL 1] TraLoLa eV T@® Bip eivar avayxatov. Tpeis ovv 10 
¢€ ] / > al] / /. , A \ A \ 
aL eipnuéevar ev TH Biw pecoTyTes, Etat S€ TATaL Trept 


cule as it does personal abuse, yet a true gentleman is a law 


resist a joke. 


He contributes nothing 


rest and recreation is a real necessity in life. 
This concludes our account of the three Social Virtues. 


2. cxorrey] Understand ‘éua 
kodvew’ from the preceding. 

ovTras] i.e. as if actually re- 
strained by law. 

4. cir’ éemidé&wos cir’ edtpd- 
mehos éyerar] There being no 
settled name for this Virtue, 
Aristotle hesitates by which of 
its two principal characteristics 
(see §§ 3—5) he shall describe it. 

7. Observe the emphatic con- 
trast between ovOév and gna, 
because there are some things 
which a man of refinement 
(xaptets) would not say himself, 
which however he would not 
think it necessary to protest 


against if he heard them (see § 1 
Stoives Sé x.7.X.) 

8. @yptos corresponds with 
aypoixos in the Catalogue of IL 
vii. It describes a man who 
is deficient in humour and the 
sense of theludicrous, and one who 
actsas asortof kill-joy inconvivial 
society. In the former aspect 
he resembles Sydney Smith’s 
Scotchman who needed a surgical 
operation to get a joke into his 
head ; and in the latter he recalls 
Thackeray’s description of the 
‘usual English expression of 
suppressed agony and intense 
gloom,’ 


Boo 


The Buffoon however can never {1s Excess 
No consideration for persons or regard for foonery. 
roprieties ever restrains him. The Boor on the other hand The Defect, 
is quite useless in social intercourse. -— 
11 to it himself, and acts as a continual damper: and yet some 


@8S, 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK 1V. 


230 





Aoryov Tovey Kat mpakewv Kowvaviay. A lvaépovor 8 ore 
0) pev Tept arnBevdy éorw, at Se rept 70 700. Tov 
8é mepi my Hoovnv 4 ev ev tals tratdvats, } 8 ev Tals 
Kata Tov adXov Biov Opiriaus. 

GN Tept dé aidods 6 WS TLVOS aperijs ov mpoonicel deyew" 5 

2 wader 14p pairrov & Eouxev 4) e&eL. ‘Opiveras ryoov poBos 
TU adoFias, amoténeitar Se 7 mept Ta Sewer poBe 
mapamdnovov" épvdpaivovrar yap ob aio xvvopevot, ot Se 
TOV Odvarov ’ poovpevor axprdcry. Yoparixa 87 pai- 
veTat ros eivat auporepa, Omep Soxet mdbous paddov i 10 

3 eFews eivar. Ov aon S nruxig To 1abos dppofer, anna 
77 veg o1opeBa yap Sey Tous THMKOVTOUS aidjpovas 
aiiaa Sci th weds CavrTas Troha dpapravewy, bro THS 
aidods Se KwdwecOar. Kat éraiwotdpev tav pev veov 


Cuap. 1X.—On the quasi-virtue, ‘ Sense of Shame.’ 


Shame cannot strictly be called a Virtue, for (1) it is an 
It may be 


The ‘Sense 2 : 
of Shame’ is. occasional feeling rather than a permanent state. 


t 1 
a Virtue defined as ‘a fear of disgrace,’ and its outward marks resemble 
ron Several —_ those of fear. Shame makes us blush, Fear makes us pale, 


3 and these are similar physical and transient effects. (2) It 


Cuar. IX.—The subject of 
this concluding Chapter is the 
Sense of Shame. The Chapter 
is evidently fragmentary, for 
we hear nothing of the Excess 
of the feeling, the embodiment 
of which was described as 6 
xaramAné& in IT. vii. 14. In fact 
the discussion ends abruptly at 
the words d\Ad tis puxrn in § 8, 
after which a few words have 
been added to connect this Book 
with the Books that follow. 


which are thought to be not 
Aristotle’s, or at any rate not to 
belong to this treatise. 

6. wader paddov 4 ea] If 
so, not properly a Virtue. See 
IT. v. 

dos 
has a variety of meanings in 
Homer, but in all cases itis ‘a 
sentiment which has ultimate 
reference to the standard — of 
public opinion’ (Gladstone, Jue. 
Mundi, p. 384). In Odyss. ii. 


tis adogias] aidas | 


ee et 2 ae 


4) 


\ 


i ae 


5 been done. 


a 


Se 


a cael ae ao 


7 arise. 


CHAP. IX.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


231 





x 7 , Ia \ > / 
TOUS audnpovas, mpeoPurepov 8 ovdels av eTraLver eeD 
ore aioxvyrm dos oudey yap o1oueBa Sei avuTov mpar- 


p+ Tet ep ots éoriy aioxovn. Ouse yap emrvetKous cori 


” aicxuvn, eure yiryverat ent Tots padrous ov rap 


aicxpa, ta Se kata Sdtav, ovdev Siadéperr ovdérepa 


\ / ¢/ ] > > / 
Yap TPaKTEéa, WOT OVK aloyuVTEOD. 
@ / a b] 
—~6 elvas TovovTov olov mparrew TL TaY auoxXpav. 


\ A 
Pavrov Sé Kat TO 


To 8 


ovTws exew OoT el mpagere 7 TOV TOLOUTeDY aioxiver~ 
Oar, Kat Sua tobr’ over Oat erveunch elva, a arorov" ert 
TOUS éxouaious yap 7 aidws, éxov d€ 6 0 errvevienis ovderroTe 


7 mpage. Ta pavha. Ein § a ay 7 aides ef droberews 


eT LELK ES" el Yap mpagau, aicxuvorr’ av our gore Se 


TovTO mept Tas aperds. | | 


Ei aa n avarxuvria pavrov 


5 ™paxréov 7a TOLAUT A. Ei 8 éoti ra pev wat’ adjdear 5 


10 


Kat TO py aidetoOas Ta ainypa mparrer, ovdep panrnrov 15 


is not even a becoming feeling, except in youth: in mature 


4 age we certainly should not praise it. 


(3) It has no place in 


good men as such, because it is felt only when wrong has 


If it be urged that some of the occasions for 


__ shame are only conventionally wrong, we reply that a good 

6 man will avoid even these. 
ought to retain the capacity for feeling shame in case he 
should do wrong, we reply that as all wrong-doing to which 
shame is appropriate is voluntary, such occasions will not 


strictly a Virtue. 


64-5, both aides and vépeois are 
appealed to as distinct motives 
against wrong-doing. . 

12. €& isobécews] ‘ subject to 
a condition,’ the condition being 
that if wrong has been done 


If it be said that a good man 


Thus shame would be only virtuous provisionally ; pro- 
vided, that is, that wrong has been done. 


Hence it is not 


We need not however therefore hesitate 


shame will be a virtuous feeling, 
not otherwise. No virtue pro- 
perly so called is subject to such 
a limitation as this. Aristotle 
is ready to admit that ‘the man 
that blushes is not quite a brute,’ 


Shameless- 
ness how- 
ever is 


a Vice, 


232. 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[Book tv. 





8 70 TouavTa mparrovra aicxwver Bau emrueuces. Our éore 
§ ovd 7 ” eyepdreva apern, GANG TIS [LETH Sex Onoerae 
be ep auTns év Tots Yotepov. Nov Se aepi Simato- ~* 


CUVNS ELTT@pED. 


8 to call Shamelessness a Vice. 


We do not describe even Con- 


tinence as a Virtue, because of the mixture of bad desires 


which it necessarily implies. 


now proceed to discuss Justice. 


though he will not regard him 
as virtuous on the strength of 
this. To do so would be to en- 
courage ‘doing evil that good 
may come,’ or ‘continuing in 
sin that grace may abound.’ 

2. ovd’ 7 eykparera For an 
explanation of ¢ykpdrewa see 
note on L. iii. 7. The point here 
is that as not even ¢ykpareta is 
called a Virtue because it implies 
strong bad desires, though they 


But of this hereafter. We 


are successfully combated, a 
fortiori Shame cannot be called a 
virtue, which presupposes actual 
wrong-doing. 

3. €v trois torepoy] viz. in 
B. VIL. 

viv d€ mepi Sixacoodvns] Thus 
not only is the subject of aides 
unfinished, but that of véueors and 
emtxatpexakia, Of which we had 
so confused an account in IL, vii. 
15, is not even alluded to, 


+ »etowet sel 








ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


233 





NOTE ON CHAPTER II. 


THE CHARACTER OF THE peyaddyvyos, 


SEVERAL questions arise in re- 
ference to this important charac- 
ter, some of which are inserted 
here to avoid making the notes 
too bulky. We have in this 
chapter Aristotle’s conception of 
a perfect and ideal character 
(see especially § 16), combining 
the full social and moral condi- 
tions of kadoxayalia. 

The definition from which the 
whole discussion starts is that 
the Virtue of peyad ia con- 
sists in ‘a a stl self- 
esteem’ (6 peyd\wv airoy dafiav 
Géios dv, § 3), and hence the 
whole character is, according to 
our modern ideas, somewhat dis- 
figured by self-consciousness. It 
may be worth while to state 
some of the principal objections 
which are commonly made 


against it. 
(1) The pervading selfishness 
of the character. He has 


no thought for others (§ 29): 
even his Benevolence is referred 
to himself and resolved into a 
desire for superiority (§ 24). 
(Compare Hobbes’s celebrated 
theory that Benevolence is simply 
the love of power and the desire 
to exercise it.) His courage is 
based upon a somewhat selfish 
calculation likewise ($23). His 
love of Truth is similarly quali- 


fied (§ 28): so also is his forgive- 
ness of injuries (§ 30). 

(2) The conspicuous pride. of 
his character, and the total 
absence, not to say of humility 
(on which see note § 37), but 
even of modesty (§§ 18, 22, 28). 

(3) That such a man would 
be practically an offensive, un- 
amiable, unsociable character 
($$ 27, 29, 31). 

Such are some of the criticisms 
commonly made on the character 
before us. We may feel sure 
however, after making all allow- 
ance for the difference between 
the ancient Greek and the 
modern Christian point of view, 
that a character so palpably de- 
fective and repulsive could never 
have appeared to Aristotle, not 
to say admirable, but ideally per- 
fect. Hence, without attempting 
a defence of all its details, it may 
be worth while to endeavour to 
arrive at a somewhat more sym- 
pathetic view of this ideal cha- 
racter. 

l. The first point would seem 
to be, as we have already hinted, 
that it is an ideal character. It 
implies the combination of all 
the virtues in such perfection as 
never is actually found (rd ev 
éxdortn dapery peya, § 14). Just 
as Plato and others have con- 


« 
—_ 


go 
P<, toa. Fo Se 


234 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





structed ideal States, so Aris- 
totle has here delineated an 
ideal Man. In both cases alike 
some allowance must be made 
for the difference between theory 
and fact in a world where things, 
as they are, are not ideal. 
Within certain limits we may 
say, ‘tant pis pour les faits.’ 

2. Aristotle had a strong 
sense of the dignity of Human 
Nature; of the grandeur and 
worth of Man as Man, in con- 
trast with all the rest of animate 
and inanimate creation. He felt 
something of what a modern 
writer has called ‘the Enthusi- 
asm of Humanity.’ (See further, 
fLicce Homo, 3d ed. p. 162, etc.) 
This seems to be the key to his 
conception of the peyaddyuxos. 
The peyaddyvxos is one who is 
deeply conscious of the dignity 
of his Human Nature, and pene- 
trated by this consciousness is 
elevated thereby to live a life in 
all respects worthy of such an 
ideal. ‘He becomes a law unto 
himself’ (Gomep vépos Sv Eavra, 
as we read in viii. 10). Doubt- 
less this intense self-reliance of 
the peyaddéwuxos appears from 
our modern Christian point of 
view an inadequate foundation 
on which to build the whole 
structure of the moral character. 
But it may well be asked 
whether, apart from revelation, 
any nobler or more effective sti- 
mulus to Virtue can be suggested 
than the feeling that any other 
conduct is unworthy of the dig- 
nity of human nature. We may 
also remember that 8S. Paul 


appeals in a very similar manner 
to the feeling that sin is un- 
worthy of, and inconsistent with, 
our Christian profession and re- 
newed nature, and argues that 
we should therefore scorn to com- 
mit it. A well-known saying of 
Goethe’s recognises the value of 
this self-estimate: ‘If you would 
improve a man, it is best to begin 
by persuading him that he is 
already what you would have 
him to be.’ “5 
In contrast with the charac- 

ter we have described, the yav- 
vos is one who unworthily lays 
claim to such a dignity. He 
desires ‘ the loaves and fishes’ of 
virtue and worth. So long ‘as 
he can secure the honour and 
glory accorded to merit, he is 
more or..Jess indifferent to the 
grounds on which he obtains it 
(§ 36), since it is obvious that it 
can be obtained from men on 
secondary and morally indiffer- 
ent grounds (see §§ 19, 20). The 
puxpdyrvxos on the other hand is 
one who has no noble aspirations 
at all. -He is quite content with 
low and grovelling aims, and has 
therefore no chance of moral 
elevation. Hence Aristotle de- 
clares Littlemindedness to’ be a 
worse type of character than 
Vaingloriousness. The Vainglori-’ 
ous man does not shrink from 
grand and difficult tasks, he 
rather courts them, and his un-’ 
bounded self-confidence may 
sometimes even carry him - 
through (e.g. Cleon at Sphacteria, 

if we accept the estimate of him 
in Thucydides and Aristophanes). 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


235 





At any rate he will probably 
be elevated by actual contact 
with them, even as Dante says, 
when he has met the great Poets, 
‘che di vederli in me stesso 
m’esalto.’> Compare also Ten- 
nyson,_ Mary, Act I. 
Se. ii: 


Yet thoronghly to believe in one’s 
own self, 
So borg own self be thorough, were 


0 
Great things, my lord. 


But the Littleminded or Pusil- 
lanimous man can never rise to 
any great effort ; and this is pre- 
cisely the character which Dante 
brands in the well-known line, 
‘Che fece per viltate 
rifiuto’ (Inf. iii. 60)... 

_ We may account thus for~the 
strong denunciation of the 
xAtapoi in Rev. iii. 15, 16, and 
for the supreme contempt of 
Dante, in Jnf. iii. 36-51, for those 
‘Che visser senza infamia e senza 
lodo.’ In Rhet. I. ix. 11 peyado- 
Wuxta is described as dpery 
peyadov trointiKy evepyeTnudrar, 
pixpouxia dé rovvaryriov. Com- 
pare also La Rochefoucauld 
(Maz. 41), *‘Ceux qui s’appli- 
quent trop aux petites choses 
deviennent ordinairement incapa- 
bles des grandes.’ 

Two further points call for a 
few words of explanation : 

(1) The distinction between 
xavvétns and ddagoveia. 

(2) The apparent and real re- 
pugnance between Highminded- 
ness and Humility. 

(1) (a) It must be remembered 
that ddrafoveia is the Excess in 


il gran / 


relation to one of the three 
Social Virtues (viz. dAnGea) i.e. 
it has reference to a man’s bear- 
ing in and towards society. (See 
note on Catalogue of Virtues at 
the end of Bk. IL.) Xavydrns 
has no such reference necessarily. 
We see from its position in the 
Catalogue that it is more of a per- 
sonal Vice, even though its exer- 
cise must be more or less public. 
It relates rather to a moral state 
or condition of character, whereas 
addafoveia, though based upon 
this, relates especially to an 
outward manifestation of charac- 
ter. Hence Aristotle says, in 
IV. vii. 12, the moral estimate of 
dAafoveia depends much more 
on the purpose for which it is 
practised than on the mere fact 
of the tendency to, or capacity 
for, such conduct existing in the 
person himself. 

(8) Another distinction would 
seem to be this. The drafov 
lays claim to the possession of 
anything which can be the sub- 
ject of admiration (mpoorounrikds 
trav evddsarv, IV. vii. 2), especi- 
ally personal qualities, such as 
strength, cleverness, skill, etc. 
etc., and (as we judge from the 
opposition to dAnOeuvrixds, and 
also from the consciousness in- 
volved in the Vice of Defect, 
eipwveia), generally speaking, he 
is @ conscious deceiver: his Boast- 
fulness has its root in a vice of 
Untruthfulness. He knows that 
he is an impostor. The xavdvos, 
on the other hand, is most fre- 
quently himself deceived. His 
Vaingloriousness springs from the 


236 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 





root of personal Vanity, by which 
he is so blinded in his estimate 
of things, so ‘clouded with his 
own conceit,’ that he regards all 
occasions merely as opportuni- 
ties for self-display ; and this of 
course especially applies to great 
occasions—these being a prelim- 
inary condition of Xavverns, pee- 
yarowuxla and pixpoyuxia. 

It should be further observed 
that Aristotle attributes frequent 
eipwveia to the peyaddwuxos (IV. 
ill. 28’, which plainly shows 
that eipwveia is widely different 
from puxpowvyxia. 

2. It has sometimes been ar- 
gued (e.g. by Aquinas and others) 
that peyadouxia is not incon- 
sistent with Christian Humility. 
Without going so far as this, 
we ought at any rate to take 
into consideration the following 
points : 

(a) pixpoivxia must on no 
account be confounded with 
Humility, which has nothing in 
common with it, as has been al- 
ready sufficiently explained. See 
note on IV. iii. 37. 

(8) The modern popular notion 
of Humility is a very false one, 
in two ways especially :— 

(i) Humility is generally 
thought to consist in a conscious 
(not to say, often insincere) self- 
depreciation. In that sense it 
somewhat resembles eipwyeia 
both in its better and worse 
phases (see note on IV. vii. 15). 
Now the Humility of true great- 
ness is a just estimate of its 
power, not a depreciatory one. 
If it be consciously depreciatory, 


it is simply the ‘pride of mo. 
desty ’ (see IV. vii. 15). It only 
appears depreciatory to those 
who are lost in admiration of a 
standard above their own reach 
or aspirations. When Sir Isaac 
Newton said that in his highest 
efforts he felt as if he were only 
a child picking up pebbles on 
the shore of the boundless ocean 
of knowledge, that was a humble 
and yet a just estimate of the 
powers of human genius, though 
to an ordinary man it might 
seem unduly depreciatory. The 
Greeks, on the other hand, not 
having yet learnt how limited 
are man’s powers in the universe, 
could not understand how a low 
estimate of unusual powers could 
still be a just one. 

(ii) The popular notions of 
Conceit and Humility are simply 
a high or a low self-estimate, 
withoutany regard to the relation 
between the estimate and the 
merits: just as Liberality and the 
reverseare often popularly judged 
by the amount spent, without re- 
gard.to the relation which it bears 
to the means of the giver. 

At the same time, looking at 
several expressions in the chap- 
ter under consideration, we must 
admit that the modern notion of 
Humility as a Virtue was foreign, 
and perhaps necessarily so, to 
the Greek mind. As we have 
said, a low estimate, which is 
also a genuine and sincere one, 
of human power and human vir- 
tue, can come only from the con- 
sciousness of defeat and failure ; 
and it would be as much out of 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


237 





place amidst the first daring 
flights and as yet unbafiled efforts 
of the Greek mind, as melancholy 
would be in the sanguine years 
of childhood, which have not yet 
been sobered by disappoint- 
ment.! 

At the same time some sort 
of recognition of a feeling akin 
to humility occurs in the com- 
mendation allowed to the better 
type of eipwveia in IV. vii. 14. 

It is interesting to contrast 
with this picture what has not 
inaptly been described as S. 
Paul’s delineation of an ideal 
character in 1 Cor. xiii, espe- 
cially vv. 4,5, and 7. Also the 
total divergence of the ancient 
and modern conceptions of a 
perfect character is curiously 
illustrated by the following state- 
ment of a recent moralist, 
whether we accept it or not :— 
‘ Were the perfect man to exist, 
he himself would be the last to 
know it; for the highest stage 
in advancement is the lowest 


descent in humility’ (Archer 
Butler). 
It may be worth while to com- 


pare with Aristotle’s ideal sketch 
an actual instance of a character 
embodying many of the traits 
here depicted. Lord Macaulay 
in his Life of Pitt, p. 181 (Bio- 


1 Compare the grounds on which Arist. 
(Rhet. IL. xii. 11) states that the young 
are peyaArdiyuxor,—oure yap vmod tov Biov 
sep TETATELVOVTOL a TOV avayKaiwv 

é etow, and the old are wxpdyvxor 

ET canoaie reason (II, xiii. 5). Also 

PP. 22-24) notes the 

itttle ication pai in Greek Philoso- 

i to the problem of Evil, and accounts 
or the fect somewhat similarly. 


forth 


graphies, edition 1867), observes 
that Pitt may be considered as in 
many respects a noble embodi- 
ment of Aristotle’s conception 
of the peyadoWuyos. We may 
compare the following traits or 
incidents with the portraiture in 
this chapter : 

‘No person could hear Pitt 
without perceiving him to be a 
man of high, intrepid, and com- 
manding spirit, proudly conscious 
of his own rectitude and of his 
own intellectual superiority, in- 
capable of the low vices of fear 
and envy, but too prone to feel 
and show disdain (§§ 18, 22). 
Pride pervaded the whole man, 
. . . was marked by the way in 
which he walked, in which he 
sate, in which he stood, and 
above all, in which he bowed 
(§ 34). Several men of note (§$ 
26, 28) who had been partial to 
Pitt . . . were so much irritated 
by the contempt with which he 
treated them that they com- 
plained in print of their wrongs. 
. . - His ambition had no mix- 
ture of low cupidity. There was 
something noble in the cynical 
disdain with which the mighty 
minister scattered riches and 
titles to right and left among 
those who valued them, while 
he spurned them out of his own 
way’ (§§ 18 fin., 33, etc.). At the 
age of twenty-two he was offered 
‘one ofthe easiest and most highly 
paid places in the service of the 
Crown. The offer was at once 
declined, for the young states- 
man had resolved to accept no 
post which did not entitle him 


238 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 





to a seat in the Cabinet, and 
announced that resolution in the 
House of Commons,’ and that at 
a time when the Cabinet was 
usually restricted to about seven 
members, and even Burke was 
not included in it (cis Ta evTipa 
ph tévar 7) 08 mpwrevovow Got, 
§§ 27, 33). 

Lastly, it should be noted 
(and this perhaps increases our 
difficulty in taking anappreciative 
view of Aristotle’s sketch in this 

chapter), that now-a-days the 
habit of mind indicated by 
peyadowuxia is far less common 
than formerly, and even in com- 
paratively recent times, and that 
anything approaching to self- 
assertion is viewed with increas- 
ing repugnance. Mr. Millin his 
Essay on Liberty protests against 
the English dislike for eccentricity 
or conspicuousness of any kind, 
and deplores the tendency to a 
dull and dead level of mediocrity 
which society at present fosters, 
But be the cause what it may, 
the fact is undeniable. What 
would be thought now-a-days of 
such a title-page to a book, once 
so common, as ‘ A most learned 
and edifying discourse by .. .’? 
The late Lord Dalling writes, 
‘One of the absurdities of the 
English character of the present 
day, is that no one has an esti- 
mate of his intrinsic value.’ Yet 
it may well be doubted whether 
any great reform, religious or 
political, has been effected, or 
any deep impression left in the 
world’s history or literature, by 
any one who did not display the 


self-confidence and evenself-asser- 
tion of Aristotle’s xos 
in a considerable, pe prin to 


our modern notion, a somewhat 
distasteful degree, There is no 
more remarkable instance of this 
than that of Dante. This spirit 
breathes throughout the whole 
of his Divine Poem, He pro- 
mises immortal fame to those 
who are named by him in it: to 
be mentioned there, even for 
censure, is no small argument of 
distinction : he fears lest a timid © 
statement of truth, though per- 
haps increasing his present fame, 
should injure it with those ‘ who 
shall call these days ancient’: he 
boldly ranks himself among the 
six great poets of the world; and 
so on in innumerable other 
passages. Nor was this bold 
self-reliance limited to mere 
flights of poetry. Boccaccio 
relates that when appointed to 
go from Florence on an embassy 
to Boniface vi11., Dante hesitated, 
and assigned as his reason, ‘If I 
go, who remains? and if [ remain, 
who goes? So in the Convito 
(I. x.) he does not shrink from say- 
ing, ‘fidandomi di me pid’ ched’un 
altro.” Whatever may have been 
thought of this self-reliance at 
the time, the verdict of pos- 
terity has fully justified it; and 
may we not apply the reflection 
of Aristotle in a similar case, 
and ask, Ii this be so, 7s ovK 
drorov «i 6 br’ Corey . ae) aAn- 
Oevoera kar’ avrovd rd vmap ov 3 
(I. x. 7.) ‘There was a time’ 

(says Dean Church) when great 
men dared to claim their great- 


——  -t—”~—S 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


239 





ness ... in the consciousness 
of a strong and noble purpose 
and of strength to fulfil it.’ To 
take an instance of a more recent 
date, Wordsworth, in his Preface 
to his own Poems, undeterred by 
the storm of unpopularity and 
ridicule by which he was then 
assailed, confidently asserts the 
immortality of his work, and this, 
writes Professor Shairp, ‘is not 
vanity, but the calm confidence 
of a man who feels the rock 
under his feet, and who knows 
that he isin harmony with the 
everlasting truth of things.’ 
Merely to suggest other cases, 
without entering into details, the 
same self-reliance is conspicuous 


in men sodifferentas Mohammed, 
Savonarola (Milman’s Essays, p. 
9), Angelo Politiano(Roscoe’s Life 
of Lorenzo de’ Medici, p. 92, etc.), 
and in almost all ‘ self-made men,’ 
as they are styled in modern 
times. Certain itis that whether 
society likes or dislikes the habit, 
the peyadéwuxor, and often even 
the xavvor, are those who chiefly 
advance themselves, and arrive 
at distinction, more or less last- 
ing: so true to life is the re- 
flection of Goethe— 


Und wenn ihr euch nur selbst vertraut, 
Vertrauen euch die andern Seelen ; 


and again— 
So bald du dir vertraust, so bald weisat 
du zu leben. 










teh ey 


Wis ) fia gL aaM hob Lig? : ath 
be ~~ : o r 
; vada at ‘we 4 i ot ef 4 
at Pagan 3 
' : 
ae GUN TR Ad OS Va 
von ‘ 
: ; tj ) es TIPE S Teed ay 
} a * ah : ‘ iF, " x san 4 , . 
t 
é : 
: 
iy. 
oh Be: 
‘ hid 4 4 
: , 
: ' 
iY 
Wo 
i 
hs 
rh 
x 
Nic ' 
* 
i 4 
ays 
baie 
; 
t , 
‘ H 
‘ '¥ 
f 4 
& 
af 





APPENDIX. 


BOOK X. CHAPTERS VI—IX. 


ARISTOTLE now reverts to the subject of Happiness, the 
various questions arising out of the Definition in I. vii. having 
been disposed of. In two respects especially the following 
discussion differs from that in B. I. (1) The object now is 
not so much to give a formal Definition of Happiness, as to 
prove its general character to be contemplative (@ewpyrixy). 
(2) Happiness is here considered in the abstract and in its 
highest ideal development, as it is found in the life of the 
gods, and no longer under the practical limitations by which 
it is modified in the life of man (vii. 8). Thus in B. I. we 
were frequently reminded that it was not ideal Happiness and 
ideal Virtue but human Happiness and human Virtue that we 
were in search of. (See especially I. vi. 13 and xiii. 5, 6.) 
Now however it is argued that human Happiness is not the 
highest form of Happiness (viii. 1—38, etc.). Hence while 
Happiness is still affirmed to consist in an active state of 
Excellence (év rais kar’ dpernv évepyeiais, vi. 8), yet, since 
Excellence (dper2)) may be either Moral or Intellectual, it is 
proved (ch. vii. and viii.) that the latter is superior to the 
former on various grounds, and especially because Moral Excel- 
lence (implying, as it does, imperfection and the liability to 
evil) cannot be attributed to the gods (viii. 7). Consequently 
the Happiness of the gods, which is naturally the highest and 
most perfect, must depend on Intellectual activity. Hence we 
conclude generally that the perfection of Happiness consists 
in Intellectual activity (Oewpia—for which see Glossary, 
p. xli.). Practically none but the best of men, and these only 

Q 


Happi- 1, 2 
ness is 

a condi- 
tion which 


is 
(1) active, 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK x. 


242 





imperfectly, can ever approach to such perfection of Happi- 
ness. Most men can never rise above that which constitutes 
peculiarly human Happiness (evdarpovia avOpwrivn, I. xiii. 5), 
viz. the Excellence not of the higher portion (7d Adyov Exo) 
of the Soul, but of the subordinate part (rod értOvpnriKdv). 

Let this distinction then be borne in mind in reading these 
Supplementary Chapters. Aristotle has shown in the previous 
Books that man’s Happiness in this world consists in the due 
regulation of his actions and passions under the control of 
Reason. His purpose now is to show that the most perfect 
Happiness consists in the full development and activity of 
Reason itself, unfettered by the necessity of exercising any 
such control over the lower nature. In a word, if we might 
venture on such a modernism, we might say that hitherto he 
has discussed the Happiness of earth; now he is describing 
the Happiness of heaven. (See Supplementary Notes.) 


VL. Eipnuevor 8 trav epi tas aperas Te Kat didias 
Ae \ ‘\ S48 / 4 al > ‘ 
Kal NnOovas, NovTrOV rept EvdaLpovias TUTr@ SvENOEty, ETrELdH 


Cuap. V1.—Happiness does not consist in Amusement, but 
in Active Excellence. 


We have before proved (1) that Happiness is not a passive 
but an active condition; and (2) that it is a condition which 


Cuap. VI.—The following isa 
brief outline of the argument in 
the next three Chapters. (Ch. vi.) 
Happiness having been already 
shown (I. vii.) to be something 
sought for its own sake, and it 
being conceivable that either 
Amusement or active Virtue 
might be alleged as answering 
to that description, ch. vi. is 
devoted’ to proving that not 
Amusement, but Active Virtue, 
constitutes Happiness. (Ch. vii.) 


This Active Virtue, or rather 
Excellence, being either Moral 
or Intellectual, Happiness is 
is shown to belong to the latter. 
(Ch. viii.) Several reasons are 
given for thus asserting the 
superiority of Intellectual over 
Moral Excellence ; and the Chap- 
ter concludes with some remarks 
of practical detail. 

1. dperds, viz. Books II—VI. 

ttlas, Books VIII. and IX. 
noovas, Appendix to Book VII. 


CHAP, VI.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


243 





+ ED! / > / 
Téhos auTny TiWeuev Tov avOpwTriver. 


’AvaraBovor §7 


A / / AY >f e / 4 
2 TA TPOELpNuEVA TUVTOMWTEPOS AY ein O Novos. Hurrowev 
3 wv A 
& Ore ove éotw e€is' Kai yap T@ Kabevdovts Sia Biov 
/ Xx fal / ‘ a a 
vrdpxot ay, uray Saves Riov, Kal T@ Suotuxobvre Ta 
peyote, Ei 8) tadra un apéoxet, anna Hadov Els evép- 
ryeuly TLV, Oeréov, Kabamep € eV TOUS mporepov elpy Tau, TOD 
& evepyeiav at pév ciow avayxaias ai Sv &repa aiperai, 
€ ‘\ o<5% ed ‘ 2 / a 
at Se nal avtas, Snrov ott Thy evdaimoviay tav Kal? 
o22% e n \ / ‘ > a ef 3 ‘ 
auTas aipeTay Twa Oeréov Kat ou Tov dv adXo-° ovdevos 
3 yap evdens 7 n evdaipovia GAN avtapens. Kall auras § 10 
eiaiv aiperas ah av wndev emitnreirar Tapa TH evépyecay. 
Tovavrat Oy eiva Soxovow ai KaT dperny mpagers Ta 
yap KaNG Kat omrovoaia mparrew Tov Sv avTa aiperar. 
rn i ‘ rn > 4 > 
Kai trav radia Se ai ndetarr ov yap 80’ érepa auras ai- 


is complete in itself, and is sought for its own sake only. @ 
3 Now it might be thought that both Virtuous Actions and {tits own 
Amusements fulfil these conditions :—the former for obvious Such are— 
reasons; the latter, partly because their results are not neces- 


2. eimopev Ste ovx €&ts] viz. in 
I. viii. 9. He adds here the con- 
sideration introduced by kai yap, 
viz., that if Happiness were a 
mere state or condition (é&:s) it 
would not be inconsistent with a 
life of lethargy, and even of 
misery. The same argument 
was used in I. v. 6, to prove 
that Virtue (which is a é&:s, and 
therefore may be inactive) is 
not identical with Happiness. 

6. €v rois mpdrepor] Especially 
in the Definition of Happiness 
in I. vil. 

7. dvayxaias has the same 
meaning as Biatos (according to 


the usual explanation) in I. v. 8 
(note). Actions chosen only as 
means to obtain a further result 
(8? €repa aiperai) are ‘necessary’ 
or ‘compulsory,’ if we wish to 
secure that result. 

10. avrdpkxns] If any further 
result is sought by an action, that 
action is not avrdpkxns. Con- 
sequently if Happiness were not 
sought for its own sake it would 
not be adrdpxns, as it was shown 
to be in I. vii. 6, ete. 

14) rae, adiay al 70¢€tat] 
‘those amusements from which 
we derive pleasure.’ Conceivably 
some recreations may be prac- 


2) Desired 


244 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK x. 


poovrac’ Bramrovras yap an avrav paXNov } apedodrv- 
Tal, apedobvres TOV ooparey Kal THS KTnoews, Kara-— 
gevyovor & emt tas Tovavtas Suwywyas Tov evdatpovito- 
peveov ob TONDO, 810 Tapa Tos Tupavvons evdonipoiow 
ob ev Tais Tovavraus Staryoryauis EUTPamredot’ wv yap edi - 
VTA, ev TOUTOLS Tapexove odas avTous deis: Séovrar 
4 8e TOLOUTEDD. Aoxet per ouv evdarpovied Tatra eivat Soa 
Ks TOUS €v Suvacreias é ev TovTOUS amoaxonagery, oudev 8& 
lows onpetov ob TOLOUTOL eto" ou yap év TO duvacreb- 
ely 1) GpeTn ovd 6 voids, ad wv at omovdaiar Eevépryerat 
ovd et dyevoTot ovToL dvTEs NOoVIAS elALKpLVOUS Kal edev- 
Oepiov emi Tas cwpatiKas KaTadevyouow, Sta ToOTO Tav- 





ness eartot Sarily, or even usually, beneficial; and partly because princes 
consist in and their associates, whose happiness the world envies, devote 
because.’ their lives to amusement. ur first object then must be to 
fe cae, 4 show that Happiness cannot consist in Amusement. (a) First, 
areincom- those who, as we have said, find their happiness in Amuse- 
ice ment have no experience of any higher pleasure. They are 
showing no more fit to judge therefore what pleasures are the highest 
pleasure. than children are, who for the very same reason prefer Amuse- 
=o 

men 


tised merely as a duty, eg. 
because necessary to health, as 
when they are prescribed to an 
overworked student by physi- 
cians, in which case there is an 
ulterior result in view and the 
remarks which follow would not 
apply. (See Supplementary Note.) 

3. Tav evdaiponlonevav ot 
mono] ‘The majority of those 
who are commonly reputed 
happy.’ This was noticed also 
in I. v. 3. 

5. of ev tais «.7.A.] * Those 
who are skilful in such pastimes,’ 


i.e. those who have the art of 
ministering to their amusement, 


e.g. courtiers, poets, musicians, 


court-fools, or worse characters. 
5, 6. To edievrat and déovrat 
the nominative is of TUpavvot. 
To TapéXover the nominative is 
oi evr pameXot. 
10. cmovdatat eve ‘pryevat] ‘active 


states of excellence,’ which may 


be either Moral or Intellectual 
(as we have often seen before). 
dper7 is here named as the source 


of the former, vods as that of the 


latter, condition of activity. 


CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 245 





TAS OINTEOV aipeTwTepas Elva’ Kai yap ot Taldes Ta Tap’ 

5 avrois Towapeva Kparvora ovovTas elvan. Evnoyor 57, 

: dorep Tact wat avSpacw & erepa paiveras Tepea, obra 
Kat pavrous Kab even eoy. Kad arep OU TrOAAAKIS elp- 
Ta, Kea Tepes Kab 70a éoti Ta TO omovdatep Tovabra 5 
| outa" cxdore 87) 7) KaTa THY olxelav ew aipeTaTarn ey- 

6 epryaia, kat 7]? omovdalp Se 7 2 Kar THY aperny. Ove ¢ €v 
Tau apa y evdarpovia Kal yap atToTov TO Tédos elvar 
Tawdiay, Kat TpaywatevecOas Kai Kaxorrabeiy Tov Biov 
anata Tov Trailew yap. ” Arravta yap as eimety érépov 10 
evexa aipoupela ARV THS EvdaLpmovias’ Tédos yap avTN. 
Srovdakew dé wai woveiv wadias yapwv HrALOvov paiveras 
Kat Niav Tradikov Taitew 8 Straws ctrovdatn, kat ’ Ava- 
xapow, opbas eye Soxei avaTravoe yap éorKev 7 Tat 
Sia, advvatobvtes Se cuveyas Tovetv avarravaews S€ovTat. 15 


ment to anything else. And as there is a difference between 
the objects held in esteem by childhood and manhood, so there 
is naturally a difference between the objects held in esteem by 

§ good and bad men. The decision of good men (to whom, as 
often before, we appeal) is, that Happiness depends not on 
Amusement, but on Virtuous Action, and therefore we con- 

6 clude that it does so depend. (() Besides, is it not absurd to (¢) Amuse- 
say that we labour and toil all life long for ‘the sake of Amuse- piper psbat i 
ment, as would be the case if Amusement were Happiness (or work, not 
the Chief Good)? It is far more rational to regard Amuse- peta 
ment as existing for the sake of work (relaxation being some- Amusement 
times necessary ) than work as existing for the sake of Amuse- 


4, modAdks elpnral eg. LI. 
viii. 13, and passages quoted in 
note there. 

10. “Aravra yap x.t.d.] Since 
we may say that Happiness only 
is desired for its own sake, and 
everything else ultimately for the 


sake of Happiness, it will follow 
that if Happiness and Amuse- 
ment are identical, everything we 
do is with a view to Amusement, 
which seems a reductio ad ab- 
surdum. 


246 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK X. 





2 Or Bey etn N ao 
Ov 57). TENOS avarravors: yiveras yap évena Tis evep- 
7 yelas. Aoxel 8 6 evdaipwv Bios Kat aperny elvat ovTos 
\ X a >. > 3 3 a / 4 
Sé feTa oTrovons, GAN ovK ev Tatdia. Bedtiw Te KEeyo- 
/ a a \ ‘ 
MEV TH OTOVOALA TOV YENOL@V KAL TOV META TaALoLaS, Kat 
A / > ee" ‘\ J 2B eg / / 
Tov BeNTiovos aet Kat woptov Kal avOpwrrov oTrovdatoTEepay 5 
‘ ARs ‘ A / he \ 3 ; 
THY evepyeav' n Se TOU BENTiovos KpEiTT@Y Kai evdatpO- 
/ 4 3 4 4 oK a a ¢ a 
8 vixwTépa dn. ArrodavoEle T Av TOV TOLATLKOV NOOVAV 


ment: and if so Amusement ceases to be itself a final end. 


(y) Amuse- 7 (+) Again Happiness has been shown to be dependent on 
ment has no ‘ ° . 

necessary Virtue. Now Virtue is a matter not of Amusement but of 
connexion Flarnestness, and every one admits that what is earnest is 
paoat noble better than what is amusing, and if it be better, its practice 


must be nobler and more likely to lead to Happiness. This 
applies not only to our better, as distinguished from our lower, 
nature, but also to the better natures among men as dis- 
8 tinguished from the inferior. It is clear however that if 
Happiness should consist in Amusement, the lowest of man- 


1. ov 87 Tedos H avdravois| 
Thus Amusement is in fact after 
all not even an end desired for its 
own sake, Recreation is needed 
for the sake of work, and (as 
Aristotle says elsewhere) the 
busier we are the more we need 
amusement. 

évexa THs evepyeias] ‘in order 
that we may be able to work.’ 

3. peta orovdns=oarovdaios, 
in its literal sense, i.e. ‘serious,’ or 
‘earnest’; see note on I. viii. 13. 
Compare Archbp. Whately :— 
‘Happiness isno laughing matter, 
gay spirits and love of amusement 
(at6ta) are commonly spoken of 
as if a proof of Happiness, where- 
as the reverse is very often, per- 
haps generally, the case.” They 


are in fact rather an indication of 
the absence of repose either of 
Body or Mind, for which, as 
Aristotle has just pointed out, 
Amusement acts as a sort of 
compensation. This does not 
apply to the case of children, 
to whom madia is natural, as 
is admirably expressed by the 
etymology ofthe word, Compare 
also Addison in the Spectator 
(No. 381): ‘I have always pre- 
ferred Cheerfulness to Mirth. The 
latter I consider as an act, the 
formerahabit,of themind. Mirth 
is short and transient, Cheerful- 
ness fixed and permanent.’ (Cf. 
note on Bios réXetos, I. vii. 16.) 

7. 75n here almost=ipso facto. 


CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


247 





e AX % i432 / > @ WE Fae > 
0 TUX@Y Kal avdpaTrodoy ovy NTTOV TOV apioToU' Evdat- 
/ Ia \ > / / > ‘ \ / 
povias S ovbdeis ayOparrodep peradidwow, El uN Kal Biov 
> 
ov yap ev Tals ToavTaus Starynryais n evdarpovia, adn’ 
ey Tais Kat aperny evepyeiais, KaOdmep Kal mpdTepov 


eLpnTat. 5 
> ? ‘ ? / Pt ‘ > 
VII. Et & eoriv 7 evdaipovia Kat aperny evépyera, ev- 
» / oA X\ ” a 3 
hoyov Kata THY KpatioTnY’ alTn O av ein TOD apicTov. 


kind would be (to say the least) equally capable of it with the 
noblest, and this is obviously absurd, and inconsistent with 
what has already been proved. Hence we conclude as before 
that active Virtue and that alone can form the groundwork 
of Happiness. 


CHAP. VII.—Pre-eminence of Intellectual (Oewpntixn) over 
Moral Excellence. 


Happiness, being dependent on Virtue or Excellence, is tntenectual 


naturally dependent on the highest form of Excellence, viz. she high 
es eo 


2. ef yp) kat Biov] Zoi is mere see how Aristotle denied to a Excelence, 


for— 


animal life, in which all, slaves 
and free, have an equal share. 
Bios is life viewed in relation to 
its duties, occupations, and pur- 
suits, and nearly=(as Grant 
translates) ‘career.’ This latter, 
according to Aristotle’s notion, a 
slave could not have. He is 
merely a passive, though living, 
instrument in his master’s hands. 
Compare ‘A slave is a living 
machine, a machine is an inani- 
mate slave’ (VIII. xi. 6.) ‘A 
slave is a part of his master, he 
is like a living portion of his 
body, though separated from the 
rest’ (Pol. I. vi.). 

Such passages enable us to 


slave any independent career 
(Bios) and consequently any share 
in Happiness, as defined by his 
theory. Similarly, it will be 
remembered, in I. ix. 9, 10, he 
pronounces children and the 
lower animals to be incapable of 
Happiness (see note there). 
Recollect also that Aristotle 
maintained that man was formed 
by nature to be a member of a 
community (dices modrtixds 
dv@pwmos), and therefore life 
severed from the community (as 
that of a slave was) was neces- 
sarily imperfect, and conse- 
quently could not be happy (see 
note on I. vii. 6, fin.). 


248 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK x, 





Eire 8 vous TOUTO, elre ano Tl, 6 &n Kata plow Sone’ | 
dpxew at nycia bas kat evovay exew Tept Kahay Kal 
Oeiwv, etre Oeiov i ov kal avro, etre TOD év mpiv TO Geo 
TATOV, 7) TOUTOU evEepyela KATA THY oLKELaY apeTHY evn GY 


 TedAela evdaLpovia. 


"Ore & éati Ocwpynrixn, eipynrat. 5 
2 ‘Opodoyoupevor Se todr ay Sofevev elvae kab Tois mpore- 


pov Kat 7? ann bei. Kpariorn TE "ydip airy éoriv a evép- 
yeu’ Kal yap 0 vods Tay ev Hiv, Kal TOV Lites. mept 


Excellence of the noblest part of our nature in its 


est 


developement, whether we call it Intellect or whatever else it 


2 be which is most divine in man. 


Hence to prove that the 


(a) Itisthe highest Happiness consists in Intellectual activity we have the 
following arguments :—(a) Intellect is the noblest part of our 


excellence of 


the noblest 
da of man 
Kpatior). 


4, Kata tiv oikelay dperiy] As 
Aristotle said in I. vu. 14, Jin. 
Exagrov ed kara Tiy olxelay ape- 
TH amoren<irat. 

5. Gewpynrixn] The student 
must endeavour to form a clear 
conception of what Aristotle 
means by Oewpia, Cewpnriki, 
Gewpeiv, etc., before proceeding 
further. No one word in Eng- 
lish adequately represents the 
idea. See Glossary under Oewpia, 
p. xii. 

eipnrat] The nominative is 
i) TOUTOV (rou vovd) evépyera. The 
reference is very doubtful. Pos- 
sibly, speaking from memory, 
Aristotle may be referring to B. 
VI., where the functions of voids 
and of Intellectual Excellence 
generally are described. 

6. Kat Tots mpdrepov perhaps 
refers to I. v. 7, where Bios Oew- 
pnrixds is mentioned as one of 
the chief types of life to which 
Happiness has been held to be- 


long. Though Aristotle does not 
there assert that this is true, 
and in fact expressly reserves the 
consideration of the question, yet 
as he proves in that chapter 
that Happiness cannot tg, to 
any of the other types of 
enumerated, it may by i 

tion be assigned to this ved 
viz. Bios Oewpnrixéds. At any 
rate it is only said that the state- — 
ment in the text is ‘consistent — 
with’ (6uodoyovpevoy) what was 
said before. 

8. vovs has been explained in 
B. VI. to be the faculty by 
which we are capable of seeing — 
intuitively the truth of Axioms — 
or General Principles. These 
are the principles from which all 
demonstrative proof starts, and — 
they are the foundations u 
which all scientific knowl 
rests. Thus vods is the highest 
of our intellectual faculties, be- 
cause it deals with the highest 


CHAP, VII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 249 





3 2ovois. "Eri de ouvexerrarny Oewpetv TE yap Suvapcba 
quvexas parrov 7 mparrew oTLody, oloueOa Te Seiv 700~ 
vay Tapapepix Oat ht evdayzovia, ndiorn Se Tov Kar 
dperip evepryevov 7 kata THY codiay opohoyoupevas 
eotiv: Soxet ‘your y pirooopia Oavpacras ndovas & eXEW 5 
cabapiornt. Kat T@ BeBaiw, Wroyor Se Tois eiddcu TOV 


3 nature, and its objects are also the noblest. (8) Intellectual @ Itis 
activity is able to be more continuous than any other form of Hen oy, 


activity. Ae Pleasure is confessedly an ingredient of Happi- its activity 
ness, and the palm among pleasures, for purity and perma- ; orm) 

() ad pee 
and most important of all truths. as being a more modest one than most lasting 
Moreover it does not discover or godés. He would not call pleasure 
prove them, but it a himself ‘a wise man,’ but a 0m) 


them, it sees into them (dew 
Hence the statement made a 

(see the note on cipyrat, § 1) that 
the operation of vovs is Jew- 


a 2. Oewpeiv and mparrewy are 


emphatic and in contrast. 
3. mapapepixOa}] It was 
explained in [. viii. 10—14 in 


what sense Aristotle considers 
—. to be an ingredient in 

nodiorn Se x.7.d.] Observe 
the contrast between codia and 
pirrocopia. The pleasures of 
philosophy, or the pursuit of 
Truth, are commonly thought 
(Soxeit) to be of a very high 
order: confessedly, therefore, 
the pleasure of the possession of 
Truth (copia) must be higher 
still; for possession (as he pro- 
ceeds) must be better than 
pursuit; fruition better than 
aspiration. irdcodhos was a 
title first assumed by Pythagoras 


‘lover of wisdom.’ 

6. eAoyoy rots eiddot K.7.A,] 
‘It is reasonable to suppose that 
those who have attained know- 
ledge pass their time more plea- 
santly than those who are still 
seeking it.’ This, however, is a 
point much disputed, and the 
balance of general opinion is per- 
haps the other way. The saying 
of Lessing is well known: ‘Did 
the Almighty, holding in his 
right hand, Truth, and in his 
left, Search after Truth, offer 
me the choice, I should prefer 
in all humility, but without hesi- 
tation, Search after Truth.’ 
Pascal (Pensées, I. ix. 34) com- 
pares the pleasures of the acqui- 
sition and the pursuit of know- 
ledge to the pleasures of having 
won a game, and of actually 
playing the game. Similarly 
Butler, (Sermons, xv.), ‘ Whoever 
will in the least attend to the 
thing will see that it is the gain- 


eiennet scious possession of knowledge. 


250 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK X. 





4 Cntouvtoy ndiw thy Siaywyny elvan. 


"H te Neyowevyn 


oe of \ ‘ ‘ / > + a 
avTapKeta Trept THY OewpnTiKny pwadioT av ein’ TOV pev 
yap mpos To Cv avayKkaiwv Kat codos Kab Sixatos Kat ob 
Aovrrot S€ovrat, Tois 5é TovwovTois ixavas KeXopnYNnMEveV 
oi. / B28. \ A / \ 

6 pev Sixatos Seiras Tpos ods Sixaorpaynces Kat pel wv, 5 
e / ‘ » we / Se 4? an ‘ a 9 

opotws dé Kai 0 ooppov Kau 0 avdpeios kal TOV aXNOV 
exaoros, 6 Se coos kat kal avtov ov Svuvarat Oewpeiv, 
Kat bop ay coparepos 7 1s paddov" Bérriov & tows ou 


5 Epryous eyov, GAN Suws auTapKéoTarTos. 


Adckéa 7 ap 


nence, is allowed to belong to the pleasure of the pursuit of 


knowledge. 


Still greater then must be the pleasure of the con- 


(5) Intellectual activity is 


Papentent most self-sufficient and independent of external appliances. 
5 (€) This is the only sort of activity which can be truly said to 


ances 
avTapKeo~ 
rat). 


ing, not the having of it (know- 
ledge), which is the entertain- 
ment of the mind.’ Shakespeare 
again,— 

‘ All things that are, 
Are with more pleasure chased than en- 

joyed.’ 

Superior as the pleasures of 
knowledge are, it may perhaps 
be true of them as of lower plea- 
sures, that ‘pleasure unattained 
is like the hare we hold in chase, 
. « . pleasure attained is the 
same hare hanging up in the 
sportsman’s larder, disregarded, 
despised, dead’ (Horace Smith). 
Or, once more, in the familiar 
words of Pope, 


‘Man never is, but always to be, blest.’ 
It should, however, be remem- 
bered that Aristotle uses the 


words ‘possession of knowledge’ 
here in reference to his own doc- 


trine of Gewpia, é.e. an active frui- 
tion not a passive possession of 
it. See this fully explained in 
the Glossary under Gewpia. 

3. coos is taken as the type 
of Ssavonrixy dpern, Sixatos kat 
oi Aouroi represent 70K} dpern. 

4, kexopnynpevar] See note 
on I. viii. 15, dxopiynrov ces 

6. The cases of cad 
av8peios are further exp molt in 
§ 4 of next chapter. 

7. codds is not ‘wise’ in the 
popular sense, but one who has 
attained copia in the technical 
sense of the last section, one 
who has reached the goal of 
philosophy. The full fruition of 
copia is that Oewpia already 
explained. 

9, In §§ 5-8 Aristotle in the 
last place argues the superiority 
of intellectual activity to all 


CHAP. VII.} ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 251 





avry povn 8 aurny arya ic Bau ovdev yap an auTns 
yiverat Tapa TO Oewphoat, amo 8 Tov TpaktTav 7) TAELov 
67, y éXatrov mepurowoupeba Tapa TH mpakw. Aoxet Te 
H evdarpovia ev TH OYXOAD elvary acxodovpeOa yap wa 
oxondlamer, Kat Trohepovpev w elpyyny diyeopen. Tov 5 
bev ou TpaKTiKav dperdv ¢ ev Tols TONTLKOLS 4) eV TOS 
Trohepuxois n évépryeta” ai Se epi Tabra mpakteus SoKod- 
ow daoxonou eivat, at ev TrohepeKat Kal TAavTENds® ov- 
Seis yap aipeiras TO ToNELELV Tob mronepeiv évexa, ovde 
mapackevater Todepov Sofas yap av TravTedas puarpo- 
vos TU elvan, el Tous dirouvs oNepuious Trovoito, iva pa- 
xa Kal povor ryoyvowro. “Ear Sé Kai 7) ToD TrohuriKod 
Goxonos, Kal Tap avTo TO ToALTEverOaL TepiToLoUpMErN 


be desired entirely for its own sake : the only sort of activity in (c) It is the 
6 which we can repose, and this rest or repose is an essential Of cotivity 

characteristic of Happiness. Take the most striking develope- in which 
ments of practical (as distinguished from intellectual) activity, ahechaiele 
viz. War and Statesmanship. War is utterly inconsistent (rere rus) 
with repose, and it is inconceivable that it should be desirable 
per se: it can only be so for its results. To Statesmanship 
the same remarks apply. It excludes the idea of repose, and 
its pursuit always implies the ulterior aim of securing for one’s- 


other activity, because in it, and 4. év rij cxod7j] Happiness 


This idea is 


in it alone, we can absolutely re- 
pose and be satisfied (€v r7 cyoA7 
eotiv). That this cannot be said 
of any kind of action is proved 
by taking what are considered 
the noblest types of action (see 
beginning of § 7), viz. War and 
Statesmanship. They are essen- 
tially odo (lL. 8). We can- 
not rest in them. A fortiori we 
cannot do so in any inferior type 
of practical activity. 


implies repose. 
well expressed by Wordsworth: 


Craving peace, 
The central feeling of all happiness, 
Not as a refuge from distress or pain, 
A breathing e, vacation, or a truce, 
But for its absolute self; a life of peace, 
Stability without regret or fear, 
That hath been, is, and shall ‘be ever- 

more. 


12. 7 rod wodurixov] Under- 
stand from the preceding sen- 
tence either mpagis or evépyeca. 


252 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK xX. 





f \ \ / > / ae, ‘ a 
Suvacteias Kat TLuas 7 THY ye EVSALLOViAY GUT@ Kal TOS 
/ / 9 a A \ 
MoNTALs, ETEpay ovcaY THS TodTLKNS, nV Kat EnToUper 
Tae 5 > aN A ‘ ee . 
7 Sndov ws eTepay ovaav. Ev 8 Tay ev KaTa Tas apeTas 
/ c \ \ \ /. S / 
mpakewv Al TONTLKAL Kat TrONEMLKAL KaANEL Kat peyEeDeL 
/ @ 4 \ >,/ 
mpoexovaw, avtar © doyodor Kai Tédous Twos epievTas 5 
> ’ \ A a maw 
Kat ov St avtas aipetai ciow, n Se Tov vow EevEpyela 
fn a ‘ 9 a b 
amovon te Siadépew Soxet Oewpntixn ovca, Kat Tap 
e NS > ‘ > / . 4 ¢ ‘ > 
avrnv ovdevos épiecOar tédovs, exe Te HoovnY ol- 
/ ec ‘\ 4 ‘ a ‘ ‘ + 
xevav (avTn Sé cuvav&er Thy evepycvav), Kal TO AUTAPKES 
\ ‘ S Ne ¢ > U4 Ne 
&n Kal axodacTiKOv Kal atpuTov as avOpwor@, Kat doa 10 
+. la / > 4 ‘\ | Mee 
GANA TO MAKAPLM ATTOVELETAL, KATA TAUTHY THY EvepyeLaVy 
/ ¥ C / 2A oe / of a »*¢ 2 
daiverar ovta. H renrcia dy evdaimovia avTn Gv ein av- 


self or one’s country power, honour, or in short Happiness. 
Happiness then, if an ulterior aim of political life, cannot be 
7 identified with it. Intellectual activity then unites all the 
qualities now enumerated, and, if it be life-long, is the perfect 


1. ye draws attention to ry 
evoaoviay. If Happiness itself 
is an ulterior end of the States- 
man’s activity, we have the 
clearest proof that it is not iden- 
tical with it. 

2. érépavy ovoay ths moXtrTt- 
Kns] explained by map’ avrd 7d 
modureveoOa in 1. 13, p. 249. 
The prosperity which is secured 
by Statesmanship is obviously 
something different from the 
practice of Statesmanship itself : 
even as peace, the object of 
war, is different from war. In 
@ewpia or intellectual activity 
there is no such result separate 
from the activity itself. 

3. § 7 isa recapitulation. Ei 
8 must be understood with each 


clause up to that which com- 
mences with xal rd atrapxes 87), 
which is the apodosis of the sen- 
tence. 

7. omovd7] 
‘intensity.’ 

9. avrn cuvavéer rH evépyeray] 
‘This (i.e. the pleasure of it) 
helps to intensify the activity 
itself.’ 

10..cxoAacriKdr] ‘ capability of 
affording repose,’ in reference to 
§ 6 ; Grpurov (from rpva, to wear) 
‘freedom from weariness,’ See 
§ 3 (init.) and last chapter § 6 
(fin.). as avOpare, ‘so far as is 
possible for man.’ Co the 
limitation at the end of I. x. 
paxapiovs 8 avOpdrovus, ‘happy 


as men.’ 


‘earnestness,’ or 


CHAP. VII.] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


253 





Operov, AaBodoa pcos Biov Tédetov ovdev ap ATENES 


8 éore TOV THS evdarpovias. 


‘0 $e TowouTos av ven Bios 


Kpeirrov #) Kart ” avO porroy ov yap 7 dvOpords € ear ov- 
TH Rraceras, arn 7 a Oetdv te ev auT@ drape bop de 
Brae per TOUTO Tou owvberov, TOTOUT@ Kat a evepryeva 


TMS KaTa THY adv dperny. 


Ei: &} Oeiov 6 vous Tpos 


Tov avOpwrrov, Kai 6 KaTa TOUTOV Bios Geos ™pos TOV 
avOparmivov Biov. Ov xpn Se xara TOUS TapaivovvTas 
avOparwa povely avOpwroy 6 ovta ovde Ovnta TOV Ovm- 
TOD, adn ep doov evdexerau abavarigev, Kai mayra 10 
movelv ™pos To Shy Kara TO Kparearov Tov ev auT@ él 


‘yap Kat TT? oyK@ pouxepov éott, Suvaper Kat THOT NTE 7 TON 
9 MaNXov TavTov UTrEpexet. Adtee § av wat evar &xac- 


8 ideal of Happiness. ‘True, such a life is beyond man’s reach. such a life 
It is as much beyond such Happiness as he can attain to, as 
pure Intellect is beyond our composite and imperfect human human. 
nature. Still we must strive after that perfection which we 
ean never hope fully to reach, for the life of the Intellect is 
the life of that which is not only most divine in man, but 
9 which also constitutes each man’s true and proper self. From Still it is 


1. pros Biov réAewov] See 
note on I. vii. 16. 

5. tod cuvGérov] ‘the whole 
compound nature of man,’—in- 
cluding not only the divine ele- 
ment of intellect, but the animal 
body, with its passions, appetites, 
etc. See next chapter § 3, where 
this argument is more fully 
worked out. 

8. A favourite maxim of 
Greek writers : among others Cf. 
Eur. Alc. 799: dvras 8é Ovnrods 
Ovnra Kat ppoveiv xpewy. 

10. adaveritew\ ‘to act the 
immortal,’ The termination -i¢w 


often has the force of acting or 
imitating, without becoming, 
what the root of the verb implies, 
e.g. Mndifa, ‘to take the side of 
the Medes’; S:durrifa, ‘to join 
Philip’s party’; copitew, ‘to set 
up to be godds.’ 

12. r@ dyxp pixpdy] literally 
‘small in its bulk.’ This need 
not necessarily imply that Aris- 
totle believed the intellect (voids) 
to have ‘bulk’ at all, ie. to be 
material, any more than Horace’s 
‘divine particula aure.’ It isa 

popular way of speaking, 

13. eivae Exacros] i.e. ‘to be 


e : 
rather than 


most truly 
human, 


254 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK X. 





A of ‘ , \ ¥ / 
TOS TOUTO, El]Ep TO KUPLOV Kal Gpewov GToTroY oD yi- 
7K > Wi ¢ / ¢ a > , ¥. 
VOLT GV, &b fm TOV avTOU Biov alpotTo ada TLVOS ANOU. 
/ / / ‘ a ‘ A > 
To \exyOev Te mMpoTEepov Gpydce Kai VOY TO Yap obKELOY 
/ / / \ | BR ae » 
ExdoT@ TH PYTEL KPATLOTOY Kal NOLTTOV EOTW EKATTO. 
\ cet. / Mo \ ‘ A / 7 n 
Kai t@ avOpwr@ & 0 Kata Tov vovv Bios, evmep TovTO 5 
/. of a + > / 
padtota avOpwros. Ovros dpa Kat evdaipoveoratos. 
/ ie Se > IPO ES 
1 VIIL Aevrépas 8 6 xara thy GddAnv aperny’ ab yap 
> | oe,’ Bg 3 / / ‘ ae 
KaT avTny evépyeiat avOpwrixai: Sixaca yap Kat avdpeia 
\ \ \ \ > \ S ? / / 
Kal AANA TA KATA TAS apEeTas TPOS GAANAOUS TPATTOMEV 
? / \ / \ / / A 
ev TUVaNaYypacl Kat xpeLals Kat Tpagkeot TayToLas Ev 10 
na / A \ / / 
Te Tis Tabeot SuaTnpovytes TO Tpemov éExacTw. Tadrad 
9 / / 2 4 Wf \ \ / 
2 elvat haivera Tavta avOpwrixa. “Evia dé kat cvpBai- 
Ae, a / a ‘\ ‘ 
vew amo TOU owpaTos SoKEl, Kai TOAAA cUV@KEL@cOaL 


this point of view no other life could be so truly natural to 
man, nor, by consequence, so truly happy. 


CuHap. VIII.—Secondary position of Moral Excellence. 


Conversely, 1 Thus far we have shown how Intellectual Excellence holds 
that Moral the first place. We can also bring positive arguments to 
holdsa prove that Moral Excellence as compared with it holds a 
secondary secondary place in regard to Happiness. (i) First, it is 
ti) It is essentially human, and bound up with all the imperfections 
pssentially of man’s composite nature. In proof of this—(a) Justice, 
never can Courage, and other Moral Virtues in detail, have for the 
than this. sphere of their action the circumstances of ordinary human 


LS) 


life. 


each man’s self,’ ‘to constitute 
personality.’ Not a man’s fea- 
tures, or his body, or his appetites, 
or his passions, but his intellect, 
is his proper self, which distin- 
guishes him from all other men, 
and all other beings whatsoever. 
rovro pddtora avOpwmos in 1. 5 
has the same meaning. 


(8) Some Moral Virtues would have no meaning apart 


2. rwvos Gov is neuter, ‘of 
something else.’ 

3. Td AexOev mpdrepoy] viz. 
I. ix. 5. inert) 

7. Aevrépos 8€... v 
Underidand Bios evdaipwy éoriv. 

13. mokAa ouv@xerdoba ois 
maGeot] ‘has many points of 
connexion with the feelings,’ 


CHAP. VIII. ] 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


255 





a / A 3 / ‘ 

3 TOs Taecw 7 TOU NOoVs apeTn. Yuveteverar Se Kat 7 

aA an y+ > ‘al A ed A , ¥ 

dpdvyncis TH Tov HOovs apeTh, Kat aTn TH ppovncet, é- 

‘ an / > \ > 

Tep ab wev THS povncews apyai Kata Tas HOtKaS eiow 

apetas, To 8 opOov trav HOiKav Kata riv dpdvnow. 
/ @ val / 

Suvnprynpevar § avrat cat Trois waVec wept To cuvOerov 5 

a c ‘\ a / > + / NS 

v elev? at Se Tov auvOéTov apetai avOpwrixat. Kai 6 

/ ~> es > - Ede W'S / ¢ ‘\ A A 

Bios 8) 0 Kat avtas Kai n evdaipovia. ‘“H 8é Tov vov 


3 from the existence of a body and bodily appetites. (y) Prac- 


tical Wisdom, though a sort of crown to 


the Moral Virtues, 


is, together with them, concerned with our passions, and there- 


fore with the imperfections of our composite nature, 


Hence 


we conclude that any Happiness depending on Moral Excel- 


and therefore with our bodily 
nature. 

2. dpdvnots here as elsewhere is 
opposed to co¢ia, as practical wis- 
dom is opposed to speculative or 
theoretical. See note on II. vi. 15. 

In B. VL. it has been shown 
that there can be no virtue with- 
out this practical wisdom (ppdvn- 
ots), which is the guiding prin- 
ciple or intellectual side of all 
the Moral Virtues, and conversely 
that the possession of this prac- 
tical wisdom implies the posses- 
sion of all the Moral Virtues in 
detail, for, if practical, it must 
proceed to action. Hence the 
intimate connexion now asserted 
in the text between dpdynors and 
nOixat dperal, and of both to- 
gether with the passions and 
appetites of our nature, which it 
is their whole aim to regulate. 
The purpose of the argument is 
to show the inferiority of practi- 
cal wisdom (pdynais), whose 
activity is 70:x7) dpern, to intel- 


lectual wisdom (codia), whose 
activity is Gewpia.  Ppdynois 
being (in the sense explained) 
the crown of all Moral Excel- 
lences, as codia is of all Intellec- 
tual, the two classes are fitly 
contrasted under their highest 
types. Hence kal 7 pdrqois, 
‘even practical wisdom.’ 

5. cuynptnpevat| literally, ‘And 
these being linked also with the 
feelings concern our composite 
nature.’ Practical wisdom, and 
with it all Moral Excellence, are 
bound up with the affections 
(see IT. iii. 3, etc. etc.), and there- 
fore imply the imperfections of 
the lower part of our composite 
human nature, and thus never 
can be more than human. 

7. » evdatpovia] understand 7 
Kar avrdas. 

7 8€ rod vov] sc. evdat- 
povia. Kexopiopern sc. Tov Trab- 
éwv from the preceding sentence, 
Kexopiopern being opposed to 
curnpTnpevar 


256 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [Book x. 





Kexopuowerny TocovTov yap mept avis eipnoOe SvaKpt- 

4 Boca yap petCov TOU pore pevou | corn. Aokéee § dv 
Kal THS eKTOS xepnryias « ert peuxepov y €m €NaTTov Seto Pau 
TIS Ovens: Tov per yap avayKaiov appoiv Xpeta Kea 
é& icov éorw, el Kat padrov Svarrovet mept TO capa o 5 
TohuTUKOs, Kea boa Tovabra pu pov yap. civ Th Siapépow 
mpos dé Tas évepyetas monw Svoices. To pep yap édev- 
Ocpip Senoes ypnudtov mpos TO mpaTTew Ta edevOEpla, 
Kat T@ Sixaiw 57 eis Tas avramoddcets (ai yap Bovdn- 
gers adnros, mpoomavovyrat Se Kal ob pa Sixcawot Bodbneo- 10 
Oat Sixavomparyeiv), Te avdpeitp 8e Suvapews, elrrep errl- 
TENEL Tt TOV KATA THY perm; Kal TO codpovs eCovolas: 

5 mas yap SHros éotas 2 ovTOS 1 TOV Daw Tis ; apbio= 
Byretras Se woTepov Kupi@tepov THs apeTns 1) mpoatpeots 
lence can never be more than merely human Happiness, 

4 ii. While under no circumstances can the body and its wel- 
dovcadent’ ‘fare be wholly neglected, yet Moral, as compared with Intel- 
onexternal lectual, Excellence has much greater need of external cir- 
splgend cumstances, regarding at any rate the active exercise of each. 


stances, 
Moral Virtue cannot be practised, nor Moral Character mani- 
5 fested, without favourable circumstances; and the more ex- 


(ii) It is 


2. This is the converse aspect 
ofthe argumentin§ 4 of thelast ch. 

7. mpos dé tas evepyeias] ‘for 
their respective activities, there 
will be a great difference,’ viz. 
for those of Moral and Intel- 
lectual Excellence. 

ll. dvvdpews] ‘power’ or 
‘ stre é.g. a cripple or 
paralytic could not display active 
courage (emiTeAety Ta KaTa THY 
dperiy). 

12. e£oveia] ‘ opportunity’ or 
‘license to indulge.’ There 
would be no outward difference 


between the teetotaller and the 
drunkard if there were nothing 
but water to be had. 

14. audicByreira de métepov 
x.t.A.| The importance of inten- 
tion (r sr Rae was insisted on 
in ID. ii, 1, paddov ra FOn 
kplvew Tay mpdtewy. ‘ (Inten- 
tion) is a greater test of character 
than actions are,’ So also in IL. 
iv. 3, where the conditions neces- 
sary to a virtuous act were enum- 
erated; and among them is a 
deliberate resolution saison. from 
pure motives, ete, 


CHAP. vul.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 269 





Wy ai pate, as ev apdoiv ovens. To 8) rédevov Shrov 

OF ev aptboiv dy én. TIpos 8¢ tras mpdkeus rroddev Sel= 

Tas Kat Som dy peifovs dor Kal KaddXJLovs, Tredver. 

6 TG 8 Oewpodvt: ovdevds tHv TowvTwY mpos ye THY 
évepryeua pela, GAN ws elmrely Kal ewrodia éore pds 5 
‘ ‘ / e ¥ / ? \ / A 
ye THy Ocwpiav 7 8 avOpwios éott Kal Treiocs cvth, 
Gipeiras Ta KaT apeTny Mmpartew Senoetar ody Taov 
4 TovwovTwY Tpos TO avOpwrevecOas. ‘H Se rédeia evdai- 
povia Srt Oewpyrixn tis éotiv evépyera, Kal évredbev dv 

/ \ \ \ , c , 
gavein. Tous Qeovs yap padiota vrreiAndapev paxa- 
glous Kat evdaipovas elvar mpates Se roias amovetuas 
ypewr auTous ; ToTEpa Tas StKkaias; 7) yerotos pavouv- 


10 


cellent the Virtue, the more numerous are the circumstances 
6 required for its full development. All such circumstances 

are to Contemplation only hindrances, even when they cannot 
7 be dispensed with. iii. Finally, only Intellectual Excellence ii) Tt cam- 

can be attributed to the gods: for—(a) There are no circum. 2° be 


stances under which they could exercise some of the Moral oy ts got 


4, Observe the limiting and 
emphasizing force of ye here and 
inl. 6. 

6. 4 8 aOparos x.7.X.] In 
actual human life intellectual 
activity cannot rightly be severed 
fromm moral practice. So that 
the philosopher, like others, 
stands in need of these external 
appliances for the exercise of 
Virtwe. He does not however 
need them as a philosopher, but 
as & man among men, nor with a 
view to his peculiar work, in- 
tellectual activity. On the con- 
trary,though otherwise necessary, 
to it they are only impediments. 

8. avOparedew ‘to be a man,’ 


avOpanetverOa ‘to act one’s 
part asaman.’ The same differ- 
ence exists between the active 
and middle of many similar 
words, ¢g. dovrteio, mpecBeva, 
foriréeva, etc. Soin IIT. vi. 12 
avdpiler Oa ‘to play the man.’ 

9. evrevOev] The outline of 
the argument is—AIl activity 
must be either mpaxrixy, or 
TowmrTiKy, Or Oewpyriky. The two 
former cannot be assigned to 
the gods who are supremely 
happy, and yet they live, and 
live actively too. Hence their 
activity must be Gewpnrikn, an 
intellectual or contemplative 
activity. 


—— ——— 


258 ARISTOTLE’S ETRICS. [BOOK X, 





TAL cUVaAAATTOVTES Ka mapaxarabncas ar odidvres Kat 
doa TOLAUTA, 5 aa Tas apeiovs, Umropevovtas Ta po- 
Bepa Kat eorbuvedorras, 8 Tt KaROY ; E i) Tas ,edevBepious ; 
rim Se Swocovow ; arorov 8 ei Kai coraut autois vOpmLa La 
y Tt TovovToV. Ai Se cadppoves Ti adv elev ;  hoptsxos 6 
6 errawvos, OTL OvK exouae pavhas erOupias ; SueEvovor 
dé wavta haivoir av ta Tept Tas mpakeus piKpa Kab 
avakia Oeav. "Ada poy Gy Te wavTes UreiAnbacw — 
auTous Kat évepyciv apa ov yap 8 Kabevdew Bomep 


Virtues: (8) They have none of those moral imperfections 
which others presuppose: (y) If moral activity, and a fortiori 
productive activity, be excluded, there is only intellectual 
activity left. Therefore the activity of the gods, whose life is 
essentially a most blessed one, is contemplative or intellectual. 


5. {Poprixds | § gross,’ or ‘degrad- 
we ; see note on I, v. &B 
SeEcovor S€ mdvra «.r.d.| 
of the precise sense in which 
these Virtues are exercised 
in our experience the state- 
ment in the text is obviously 
true, Virtue being, as has been 
said, ‘goodness in a state of 
warfare.’ Whether there may 
not be a higher sense and a 
different sphere of action in 
which analogous Moral Virtues 
may be attributed to the Deity 
is another question, which the 
argument here leaves untouched, 
After all it is to some extent a 
question depending (1) on the 
precise meaning of the Greek 
words Sixas, oadpar, etc., 
as was the case in reference to 
ézxawos being inapplicable to the 
gods—see I. xii. 3. Also (2) still 


more on the Greek conception of 
the Divine nature, for which see 
Glossary sv. Oeds and dvors. 
We may well compare Butler’s 
argument, Anal. i. c. v. (p. 97, 

Angus’s edition). ‘Nor is our 
ignorance what will be the em- 
ployments of that happy com- 
munity, mor our consequent 
ignorance what particular scope 
or occasion there will be for the 
exercise of veracity, justice, and 
charity amongst the members of 
it with regard to each other any 
proof that there will be no sphere 


of exercise for those virtues. 


Much less, if that were possible, 
is our ignorance any proof that 
there will be no occasion for 
that frame of mind or character 
which is formed by the practice 
of those particular virtues and 
which is a result of it,’ etc. 


CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


259 


oe’ 





Tov *Evdupiova. To én Cove Tov ™ parrew adarpov 
pEvov, ETL 8e paddov TOU TOUELY, TL heimerat TARY bew- 
pia; Bore 7) TOU Oeov é evepryela, pakapiornte Siapépouca, 
Oewpntixn wy ein. Kai trav av per ivov 87 ” Taury 
8 cuyyevertarn evdatpovixoTarn. > mpstov Se Kat TO un 
perexew Ta dourra faa evdaupovias, THIS Tovabrns: evep- 
~yelas eorepnpeva téereiws. Tots per yap Oeois a amas 0 
Bios paxaprosy TOUS 8 avOparrors, ep Ooov Opoteopa Tt 
TIS TOLAUTNS evepryetas Umapyee trav § a&dXov fomv 
ovdev evdatpovel, errerdy ovdapr Kowavet Oewpias. "Ed 
Scov 87 Svateives 7) Oewpia, Kat 9 evdaipovia, Kat ois 
paddov Umapyet TO Oewpery, Kat evdaxpoveiv, ou Kata 
ovpBeBnkos anna Kara Ty Dewpiar auTn yap Kal 
avuriy tiia. “Dor ein av 7 evdatpovia Oewpia Tus. 


Hence we infer that as men approach to this ideal their 
8 Happiness is highest. Indeed we find a complete scale of 
corresponding degrees between Happiness and the capacity 
for intellectual activity. In the lower animals both are totally 
absent. In the gods, both are present in perfection. Among 
men, both exist imperfectly, but in exact proportion to each 
other: and we affirm that this correspondence is not acci- 
dental, but that it implies an essential connexion between 


1, rov mpatrew ‘moral action,’ 
Tov tmoiy ‘productive, or crea- 
tive, action.’ (See Glossary s.v. 
mpagis, moors.) The former 
has been excluded by the argu- 
ments in§7. As to the latter, 
it is clear from this passage! as 
well as many others that Aris- 
totle did not believe in God as a 
Creator in our sense of the word. 
He would consider such work as 
unworthy of him (poprixédy), in- 
consistent with the perfection of 


His nature and mode of exist- 
ence. See further Glossary s.v. 
Geds—gpuors. 

10. ovdev eddapovei] See note 
on I. ix. 9. 

The argument of § 8 closely 
resembles the process of Modern 
Induction called by Bacon ‘The 
Seale of Degrees,’ ‘ Tabula grad- 
uum,’ or by Mill, ‘The Method 
of Concomitant Variations.’ 

13. avry yap] ‘ For this in it- 
self (i.e, Gecpia) i is essentially ad- 


Human 


Happiness 
cannot dis- 


10 tages. 


a 


260 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 


[BOOK X, 





Aenoes 8é Kat TIS éxr0s evnweplas avOpame ovre: ov 
yap aurapens 1 guows ™pos TO Oewpety, andra Set Kal Td 


oawa Dryvaivewy Kat pony Kal THY doumay Ocparetay 
Umapyew. Ov pay oinréov ye TONY Kal peryaidaoy Serj- 


rerOas Tov evdaipovncovra, Fa bm evdéxerat aivev Tov 5 


exTos aya0av pakdpLov eivas: ov yap év TH vTepBorn TO 
avrapkes ovd 1) mpakis, Suvvatov Se Kat pn apyovTa yAs 


\ / / ‘ / ‘ ‘ ee 
10 Kat Oararrys mparrew Ta Kana’ Kal yap amo Mer; 


Swvair’ a ay TIS mparre Kara THY ' aperny. Tovro & €or 
ety é evarpry as" ob yap iSvorae TOV Suvarr ay ovY NTTOV 10 


Soxovot Ta emtEevkn Tparrewy, GNA Kat padXov. 


‘Txa- 


‘ \ a ¢ / A \ ¢ / 2 / a 
vov be tooad UMapXEW, EoTaL ‘yap o Bios evdaipuov TOU 


11 KaTa Tv dperny evepyouvros. Kai ao ohwY ée TOUS evdai- 


povas Lows arrepaivero Kanes, elma HET PLOS TOUS exTos 
KEXOpNYNj.evous, TemparyoTas Se Ta Kdddol, was wero, 


Happiness and Intellectual activity. And therefore again we 
assert that the highest Happiness is Intellectual. 


9 To descend once more to practical details. For man this 


continuous activity of Intellect only is a practical impossibility. 
He cannot be independent of some amount of external advan- 


mirable,’ a characteristic proved 
to belong to Happiness also in 
I. xii. 

§§ 9-13. The concluding Sec- 
tions recur to some practical 
questions connected with the 
conclusion now reached: the 
relation of Happiness to external 
circumstances ; the concurrence 
of Aristotle’s theory with those 
of previous philosophers, and, 
what is still more important, 
with facts; the superiority of 


That that amount, however, is not excessive, but mode- 
11 rate, theory, experience, and the teaching of the wisest among 


Happiness as now defined, owing 
to the good-will of heaven 
favouring that life which is 
‘likest God’s.’ 

3. rhv Aowrny Oepareiav=‘the 
other care that the body needs,’ — 
besides the securing of mere 
health and sustenance. jv in 
the next sentence is corrective. 
We must not take this ‘ depamreia’ 
to include too much. 

6. tmepBonj] Understand ré» 
éxtos ayabar. 








CHAP. VIII. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 261 





kai BeBioxotas c@ppovas’ evdeyeras yap meTpLA KEKTH- 
pevous mparrew & Sei. “Eoue 8: nai’ Avakaydpas ov 
mrovawov ovde SuvdaTny vTodaBetv Tov evdaiuova, evrav 
Srt ove dv Oavpdoeser et Tis GToTTos haven Tois ToAXoIS" 
ovTOL yap Kpivovet Tols ExTOS, TOUTwY aicOavdpevor po- 5 

12 vov. Suudwveiy Sy Tois Noyous eoikacw ai tov copay 
Sofas. Iiotw peév ovv xai Ta Tovadra exes Tiva, To 8 
arnbes ev Tois Mpaxrois ex TOV Epywv Kal Tod Biov Kpi- 
veTaL vy TOUTOIS yap TO KUpLoY. Korreiv 8) Ta Tpoel- 
pnueva Xpn emt Ta Epya Kai tov Biov emipépovtas, Kai 10 
cuvaddovtav wey Tois Epyois amodextéov, Suabwvovvtov Se 

13 Noyous UroAnrréov. ‘O dé Kata vodv évepydv Kal Tov- 
tov Oeparrevov Kat Svaxeipevos aptora Kat Oeopiieatatos 
€ouKey civas* eb yap Tis eripédea TOY avOpwTiver vTO 
Bedy yiveras, domep SoKel, Kai ein Av eUrNoYov yaipew TE 15 


12 men, combine to show. Still whatever weight we may assign 
to the authority of the wise, the last appeal must be to facts, 
and to the practical experience of life. To this tribunal we 
would refer all that has been asserted in the course of this 

13 treatise. One more practical consideration we subjoin. If, Those whom 
as is generally believed, the gods regard the affairs of men, peeB°Gs!°v" 
they will naturally love and favour those who are most like the he hy: 


the happiest 


2.’Avagaydpas ov rovawr] An- 
axagoras of Clazomena, in lonia, 
resigned all his property to his 
relations and gave himself up to 
philosophical study for some 
thirty years at Athens. 

6. trois Adyors = our defini- 
tions or theories, 

7. pev ovv, as usual, fixes a 
strong emphasis on the preceding 


word, and thus marks a contrast | 


between wiocrw and 1rd dAnéés. 


‘Some ground for belief may be 
afforded by such a consensus, but 
the test of actual truth is to be 
derived in practical subjects from 
facts and from life.’ Cf, Shake- 
speare, Henry V. Act. 1. Se, i.: 
So that the art and practic part of life 
Must be the mistress to this theoric. 
12. Adyous troAnmreoy] ‘we 
must take them to be mere 
+ , 


262 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK : 





avTous ™]? apiory Kat 7° ouyyevertare (rovro & av ein 
0 ) vows) Kal TOUS a ayam avras padiora TOUTO Kal TimavTas 
ayrevrovelv OS TOV pidov avrois ETL {LENOUHEVOUS Kat op- 
Oas Te Kai Kanas mparrovras. "Or 5¢ wavta Tada TO 
cope parie®? Draper, ovK adn ov. Ocopireoraros 5 
dpa. Tov aurov 8 eixos Kal evdaovertatov' woTE 
Kav obras en 0 coos pao evdaipon. 

tect 5. Sa Ap’ ou €& mept t rovre@y Kal TOV aperav, ete 5é kat 
pidias Kal ndovis | LKAV@S tpn rat Tols TUTFOLS, Téhos € exew 
oln'T €ov TH mpoaipecy, i xabamep Aeyerat, ode Sor ey 10° 
Tois mpaxtois Tédos TO OewpHnoas Exacta Kal yvOvar, ad- 


themselves. Such are those in whom Intellect and Wisdom 
are most developed. And all will admit that the greatest 
Happiness will be found in those whom the gods love best. 
Therefore from this practical point of view also, the highest 
Happiness is linked with Wisdom or Intellectual ‘Activity. 


CuaP. [X.—Conclusion of the Treatise on Ethics, and transition 
to the Complementary Science of Politics. 


: 
| 


Inconelue 1 This sketch of Virtue and subjects akin to it might now be 
must apply concluded, except that no theory on such matters can be con- 
our theories 

to practice. —-_ Cuap.IX.—ThisChapterforms at all. In the absence of any 


a general conclusion to the whole 
treatise. When we turn from 
theory to practice, Ethics must 
look for some authority to enforce 
its injunctions on those who will 
not hear. Failing the interven- 
tion of the State, Parental autho- 
rity must take its place. In 
either case a scientific study of 
Politics or of the principles of 
Statesmanship is a necessary 
sequel to that of Ethics, if theory 
is to be carried on to practice 


accessible means for such a study 
Aristotle proposes to write a 
treatise on the subject himself, 
and the concluding words of the 
Book lead us at once to the 
commencement of his treatise on 
Politics. 

10. ovx €orw év Tois mpaxrois 
k.t.A.] Compare I. iii. 6, 7d 
Tehos ov years GrAa mpakis: 
also IL. ii. 1, and many other 


passages. 








CHAP. IX.]} ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 263 





2 Aa padrov To mpaTrew avTa ; ovde Sn wepi aperns ia 
N Me ef >» . on , 
vov TO eidéval, GA Exel Kai xpre Pas Tetpar eo, iy et ra 
3 Tas aDews ayabot yevopeba. Ei bey ouv noay ol Aovyor 
avrdpxets Tpos TO TOUo aot ervetcels, Toros a ay pucBous 
Kat peyadous Sixaiws ebepov Kata Tov O€oyviv, nat eeu § 
av tovrous Tropicacbat: viv Sé haivovtas mpotpeacbat 
pev Kab Tapopphcat Tov véwy Tous édevOepious ioyverr, 
el et ee, Le n , A F 
700s T evyeves Kat ws adds pidoxaov Tomcat av Ka- 
TOKWYLLOV EK THS dperijs, Tous dé Trodous advvatetv pos 
4 ka\Noxayabiav mporpeypac Bau ov yap mepvxacw aido? 10 
mewapxety adnra PoBy, ove arexec Oat TOV pavrov Sia 
70 aicxpov ana Sia Tas Tipopias® maber 4p | Cavres 
Tas olKelas Hdovas SiwKxovct Kat Si ov avtat écovTas, 
\ ‘ > / / nA at A \ 
t O€ Tas avTiKerpevas AUTTAas, TOU Se KaNOU Kal 
c a ta / ? ¥ 4 5A 4 
@s adnOds 1d¢0s ovd’ Evvoiay Exovow, ayevotoL ovTES. 15 
‘ ‘ 4 / « / / > \ 
5 Tous 89 totovtous Tis av Noryos petappvOuicas ; ov yap 
oiov Te #) ov padvoy Ta éx TadaLod Tois HOeot KaTELANE- 
2 sidered complete until it is connected with practice. Mere 
3 theories of Virtue can never make men good, unless they are 
previously disposed to goodness. On the majority of man- Morel ie 
4 kind such theories have no effect whatever. 


With them We influence 
must appeal not to shame but to the fear of punishment : 


. except on 
pleasure is all they seek, pain the only thing they avoid: . ready fitted 
these therefore are the only feelings through which we can {p72celve 
5 influence them. Virtue is in truth hard enough to attain to, 
even when all circumstances are favourable; if they are other- 


wise, the voice of the teacher is powerless. 
should have enabled him to heal 


2. i ei ws Gas] ‘or by any 
other means that there may be’ 
—other, that is, than ¢yew kal 
xpno Oa. 

5. Theognis made this remark 
in reference to the dignity of the 
physician’s calling, if only the gods 


the minds and characters of men 
as well as their bodies. 

8. kaTok@yipov (kaTéxo) = 
‘capable of being influenced or 
restrained by.’ 

17. rois Woeor KarevAnppeva] 


tion of Vir- 


sn as dependa men arrive at 


on 


— 


Teaching 


x 
‘En ‘ 


264 


ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS, 


bse 





peva ayy peTaaTioa. ’ Ayyarryrov $ laws eat é 
TavTOV UmapxovTay Sv av émveucels Sonodpev ryiver Oat, 


6 perardBouuey Tis dperifs. TivecOau oy aryabous OvovT at, 


ob pev duce, ot o eer, ot Se didaxp. To pev ovv THs 
picews Sirov @s ouK ep’ nwiv dirdpxely adda dua Tivas 
Ocias aitias TOLS ws arbors euTUXeow imdpyer’ 6 be 
Aoyos Kal 7 bday pn WOT OUK aw dmacw loxvn, 

bey mpodieipydo bas TOUS eBeat THY Tov axpoatod pox 
pos TO Karas /Xaipew Kat puceiv, adomep viv TY Ope- 


7 Yrovcav To om Eppa. Ou yap | av axovaeve Aoyou amroTpé- 1 


Wovtos ovd av ovvein 6 Kata wabos Lav Toy § ovTws 


ing; (8) Intellectual teaching. 


6 Now there are three courses, as it is commonly held, by which 
Virtue. (1) Natural disposition ; 2) Moral train- 


The first is clearly beyond our 


control. As to the last, its influence varies in et ee and 
depends on the hearer’s mind haying been previous} 


7 like soil for the seed. Passion when supreme ee not hear, 


and indeed cannot understand, any argument but that of force. 


‘firmly fixed in the character.’ 
For a similar statement ef. I, 
iii. 8, Xanerdy drorpiyac Gat 
mdOos €yKexpwopévov TH Big. 
Also compare the expression 
ouverAnppeva peta Tis pavddry- 
ros in II. vi. 18. 

4. pice... ee... dday7] 
We might compare the various 


jcauses suggested in I. ix. for the 


acquisition of Happiness : mére- 
pov €ote pabnrov (= 8:daxn), i 
eO:orov i) @hos tos doxyriy 
(= eet), 7 7)! kara Tia Oeiay potpay 
7 kat dua TUXNY, (= piel). 

6. rots @s GAndas edruxéow] 
*those who are in the truest 
sense fortunate.’ Compare III. 


v. 17, rd ed wal rd Kadds 
art Neagheens 


inadequacy ai mere intellectual 

ing in Morals, on account 
of the undue prominence given 
to it by Plato, who held all 
Virtue to be (1) intellectual, 
didaxrdv. The words pn wor 
introduce the statement in a sug- 
gestive form, and almost = ‘ 
haps,’ or ‘it would seem that.’ 
is similarly used by Theo FPR we 
for the ‘ tilling’ of land, 


1l. ov® ad ‘he could 


8. mpodiecpyao ai] 


CHAP, IX.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 265 





eyovTa Tas oloy Te weTaTreioas ; Gdws T ov SoKel Ady 

8 Drretew TO mabos GAG Big. Aci $n TO 1Bos Tpou- 
TapKew TOS oucetov THS apeTns, oTepyoy TO KaNOV Kab 
Suaxepaivoy 70 aicxpov. Ex véou ny aryooryis opOiis 
Tuxelw pos dperny xarerrov un bm TOLOVTOLS Tpapey- 5 
Ta vopous To yap coppoves Kai KapTepLKas onv Ux 
OU Tots TONAOLS, GAXws TE Kal veo. Ato vopmors 
bei reray au THY Tpopny Kab Ta €TUTNSEU LATA’ oUK 

9 éorat yap dumnpa avynOn yevopeva. Ovy ixavov & 
tows vous évras Tpopys Kak emriedelas TUNELY op hips, 
GAN éredn Kat avdpwbevtas Set emurnSeverv avta Kat 
ebiferBau, kau Tepl TavuTa Seoipel? ay voor, Kat dws 
&n mept TaVT@ TOV Bio ol yap ToAXol ayayrey Maroy 

10 7) Aoy@ meapxovor Kat Enpiats 7) TO Kano. Avorep 
olovrat TivES Tous vomoberobytas Setvy pev Tapaxahety 15 
emi TH apeTny Kat mpoTpéerecOas Tod Kadovd yapL, ws 


10 


8 The second of the courses above named therefore alone re- 
mains; Moral training is our necessary starting-point in the we must 
formation of moral character; such training moreover must yr Vain. 
in childhood, and it can only be secured by the authority ing, and that 
of Law; for it must always be a painful process till we become pa yah by 
g accustomed to it, and especially so in youth, Moreover the ert 
majority of men (who yield only to force and to the fear of 
punishment) need to have their conduct and occupations thus 
regulated for them not in youth only but all through life. 
10 Henee it has been thought to be the duty of a legislator to 


not even understand.’ See note +d 700s veapds* ob yap mapa Toy 


on I. iv. 6 (8:6 Sei rois eOeow 
Hx9a K.7T.d.), and ef. od8 Evvorav 
ovow, ayevoror dvres, in § 4 of 
this Chapter. 
13. wept mavra rév Biov| For, 
as Aristotle says in L. iii. 7, d:a- 
déper F od8ev véos ri frcxiav 7 


xpévor 7 edAerypis. 

14. Sidmrep olovrai ties x.7.A.} 
Ancient and modern views of 
legislation are in marked con- 
trast in this respect. See note 
on I. xiii. 3, and ef. V. xi. l, 
6 vouos & py Kedever amuyo- 


Parental 
authority 
eannot ade- 


o 





266 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK x: 





DraKove oMevov TOV ereticids Tots beat T pony Leveon, are 
Boda. Se Kat adverrepors ovat KoNdcELS TE Kaul i Typ@pias | 
emvriB évait, TOUS Sa anuarous Odws eopilew TOV fev yap 
eT Lelie Kat TMpos TO KaNOV favre TO oye mreapynoew, 
tov &e pairov ndoviis 0 opeyopevov omy konatea bas do- 
mep vmrotiryioy. Au 0 Kai pact ety Tovavras yiver Bau Tas 
Auras al paomor evavrvobyrat Tas aryaTropevass noovais. 
Ei & ov», Kabarep eLpnTal, TOV ea devon ayabov Tpagij- 
vaw Karas det Kea eur Piva, ei’ obras & emurndevpacw 
ETLELKETL ony Kal par’ dKovra un? éxovta mparrew Ta 
pavra, Tavta Sé cyeryvour” av Brovpevors Kara Twa voov 
Kat taku opOny, € exovoay lox. ‘H | Bey ouv mar puKn 
mpooragis ovK Exel TO ioxupov ovde 70 avaryKaion, ovde 
57 Gdws 7) évos avdpos, wn Bacid€ws OvTos H TWOS ToE- 
ovtov 6 Se vowos avayxactuKny eyes Sdivapey, Koyos Ov 15 


11 
10 


12 


appeal to the nobler instincts of those in whom nature or good 
training has implanted such instincts, but to compel obedience 
from all others by pains and penalties, and, speaking gene- 
rally, by inflicting such pains as are most " opposed to the 
offending pleasures. All this implies a guiding Intellect, 
with power to enforce its decrees. Where then is this to be 
I2found? Parental authority, and indeed that of any single 

individual, except he be an absolute monarch, lacks that 


15. Adyos Sy x.t.A.] ‘being a 


It 


pever, te. ‘quod lex non jubet 


vetat.’ 

2. KoAdoers Te Kal Tipe@pias] 
For this distinction see note on 
ITT. v. 7. 

7. at pdduor’ evavriodvrat k.T.d.] 
Compare the argument in IL. ii, 
4, ai de iarpetar dia rev evarriov 
mepvKaoe yiver Oat. 

1l. ravra de yiyvoir dy] Se 
marks the apodosis or conclusion 
of the sentence. 


declaration proceeding as it were 
from wisdom and intelligence.’ 
i.e. Law expresses in an imper- 
sonal form the conclusions of 
human wisdom. As expressing 
such conclusions, it commands 
our obedience, as doing so im- 
personally and in the abstract, 
it does not excite our resentment. 
Aristotle in the Politics describes 
Law as vous dvev dpéfeas. 


CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 267 





amo Twos pporncews Kat vod. Kat rov pep avO porary 
exPaipouce TOUS evavrioupevous Tals opuais, Kav opOas 
auro Spacu %) oe vowos ovK éotey erayOns TaTTOY TO 
} erveunces. °Ev povy Se 77 AaxeSarpoviwv Tore per’ ONM- 


4. Aaxedaipovioy] See note on 
I, xiii. 3. 

8. kukAomikds Oeptorevov] In 

'. usion to the often-quoted patri- 

echal society of the Cyclops de- 

scribed by Homer, Od. ix. 114-5: 

Oeprorever 8 éxacros 

waiiwv 75 aAdxwv, ovS GAAjAwY adré- 
yourw. 

10. Spe aird SivacGai] ‘ that 

there be power to carry it out.’ 





you 0 vowoberns eypuehevay doxet memrouna Oat tpopys 5 
Te Kal emurndevparov ev be Tals mheioraus TOY TONewY 
e&nuednrat Tept Tov ToLovTaY, Kal bn ExaoTos ws BovXe- 
Ta, KUKAWTLKOS OewioTevaY Traidwv 75 adoyov. Kpa- 
TLOTOV fev OvY TO YyiyverOaL KoWWHY Erripédevay Kat opOnY 
\ A 2% 4 a > / ¢ / 

kat Spav avto Svvacbai: own 8 eLapedoupevor éExdotw 10 
Sdfevev Gv mpoonxew Tois aherépois TéKvows Kal pirows 
eis apeTny cvpBarrec Oar, 7) mpoatpetcOai ye. Madiora 
& ay todro Sivacbas Svfeev ex TaY cipnuevov vopobeTI- 

‘ / e ‘ ‘ » 5 ad 
KOS YEVOEVOS" al WEv Yap Kowal emypuehevaus Snrov OTe 
dia vopeov yeyrovras, ¢ emvevkets © at dua Tov orovdaiwv. 15 
Teypappevov S Fj aypaher, ovdev av Sofee _ duapeper, 
ovde Sv ay eis 4) Toddot TwaidevOncovtar, Somep ov 


power. Law however possesses it, and its interference is not 
resented as that of a fellow-man would be. Practically how- he state 
ever Law seldom even attempts such an aim; and, failing ¢ sould do so, 


seldom 


that, the duty devolves upon each individual in his own attempt it, 
sphere. It is clear however that he will best perform it by? Indivisnas 


ust there- 


becoming acquainted with the principles of Legislation, seeing f fore re do the 


* and. 

This is explained by €yovoay they must 
ioxvv in § 11 above. 

13. vopoderixds yevdpevos] 
Legislation is naturally the high- 
est branch of zrodurixy. See § 20, 
jin. of this chapter. At the very 
outset (in I. ii. 8) Aristotle de- 
scribed Ethics as zoXurexn Tis, and 
this concluding chapter brings 
out the connexion still more 
forcibly. 


268 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK xX, 





€Tl MOUTLENS KAL YUUVATTLKHS Kal TOY GAdwy emuTNdeU- 

watov. “Qomep yap ev Tais ToAcow evienver TA VOMILE 

Kat Ta €On, OVTH Kai Ev OLKiaLS Ob TAaTPLKOL AOYyOL Kal Ta 

en, Kal ETL Hadov Sua THY ouyyevevay Kai Tas evepye- 

cias" mpodmapxove yap oTepyovTes kal evrreOeis TH 

15 puoes. "En 8e Kat Siadépovow ai Kal & exaorov maudevas 

TOV Hower, aorrep emt lar puxns xaQodov per yap TO 
TUperTovre guppeper Houxia Kai aavtia, TWh 8 ices 

& Te WUKTLKOS Lows OU TacL THY aurny pany sepia 

ow. EgaxpiBove bat 87 dofeev & ay [GAXOV TO «ad éxac- 

Tov idias THS emipenelas yovopenns® fadXov yap, Tov 

mpoopdpov Tuyxdver EKaTTOS. "ANN emtpehn Dein pev av 

apuoTa Kal ev Kat iarpos Kal ypvag ris Kal Tas aAdos 

0 TO xabdrov Elda, OTL TACW y TOUS Touotade® TOU Kot 

16 vod yap ab emioTHwar A€yovtai Te Kal cio. Ov pay 

GANG Kal évos Twos ovdev Laws KwAVEL KAAS EeTTLpEd- 

Ojvas Kat averiotnpova dvta, TeDeapevov & axpiBas Ta 

cupBaiwovra éf éxacte 8 eurrevpiav, xabamep Kat 

tatpot evior Soxovaww éavTdv apioros eivat, ETep@ oUdEV 

sl 4 that the moral training of society—the main object of all good 

fibse which  legislation—and that of individuals must be guided by the 

shouldguide same principles, and also that parental authority is to the 

State ee, family what laws are to the State. The former has indeed 

The special the advantage of resting upon natural affection and mutual 

advantages ys good-will; and this home-training has the further merit that 

claimed for it can adapt its treatment better to the special circumstances 


Saber tage of individuals, and that it can enter into minuter details, But 


notsuper- even go it is best dealt with by those who have studied the pro- 
sede the use “pita ; Pe * s 
of such blem in its general form; just as the scientific physician sur- 


Eomermlage. £6 passes the empiric, although the latter may occasionally effect 


9. ov Thy avTny paxny mwepiti- similarly used in the sense of 
Ono.) ‘does not impart the same ‘conferring’ or ‘imparting,’ with 
Svin of fighting.’ TlepiriOévar is Kpdros, riysny, édevOepiay, ete. 


a 1x.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 269 


, > Ia e@ ¥ 
av Suvapevot erraprécar. Ovdev 8 Arrov tows TO ye Bov= 
4 lal / ‘\ , “ , 
oper Teyvixw yeverOar Kai Oewpntix@ ert To KaBodoU 
/ / eae. / > 
Badwcréov civas Sofevey dy, KaKeivo yvwpiocréov ws evdé- 
¥ a \ a > a 
vera eipntas yap Ott Tept TOUT ai emiothnua. Taya 
\ ‘ a / > > / / ra 4 
dé Kat T@ BovAopeve Sv emiperevas Bedtiovs Trosetv, evTe 5 
‘ ¥Y¥ 99, a / / ? 
MONNOUS, ELT ONVOUS, VomOOETLK@ TEeLpaTeoY yeverOaL, EL 
/ > / A / 3 
Sia vouav ayabot yevoipe? av. “Ovriwa yap ovv Kat Tov 
+t r a 2 ¥ A / > > 
mpoTeGerta dvaleivas KaN@S OVK ETTL TOU TUYOVTOS, ANN 
xy ‘ a 5Sa/ A > > A a 
elrep TiVOS, TOU elOOTLS, WoTEP Ee LaTpIKAS Kal TOV 
e wy b) / 3 » Sbfel 
} Kourav av eat emipehera tis Kal ppovncts. °Ap ovv 10 
> / ; rn +. 
peta TooTO emicKeTrtéov TrOOEV t) Tas vowoOeTLKOS ryévOLT 
y¥ / ee, a A \ rn a 
ay Tis; 2) KaOdTEp ET: TOV AdXrWV, TAaPA TOV TONTLKOD § 
/ . A / A - 95 PY > red 
pooptov yap eOoKes THS TodwTiKHS civat. ~“H ovy opovov 
/ 2 A a an a > fal 
daivetas eri THS TONTLKHS Kal TOV OLTaV EeTLTTNUBD TE 
\ , > ‘ ‘ a of. e > \ / 
Kat Svvapewv ; EV wéeVv yap TOLS aAXoLS OL avTOL haivovTat 15 





) startling cures. On the same principle then we maintain that 
the best educator in private life is he who understands the 

3 general principles of legislation. Next we ask—How is such These prin- 
knowledge to be acquired? At first we should be inclined “nies can” 


not be learn 
to answer—From Statesmen: but strange to say in Politics at present | 
theory and practice are dissevered. Those profess to teach statesmen, 


who do not practise, viz. the Sophists: others practise but do Hi matee oll 


7. tov mporebevra] ‘ any given 
case that may be put before you.’ 
This is the great point of differ- 
ence between scientific and em- 
piric knowledge. The latter may 
chance to achieve great success 
in one or two single cases (see 
§ 16 init.), the former alone can 
deal with any case. 

10. émipédera] ‘attention’ or 
‘practice.’ See IL ix 4, dia 
rivos pabnoews Kal émipedeias. 


@pdévnois also is specially prac- 
tical wisdom. See note on II. 
vi. 15 and B. VI. ¢. v. through- 
out. 

13. €d6xer] The nominative ap- 
parently is vopodecia understood 
from vowoerixds, and the refer- 
ence is probably (as Grant sug- 
gests) to L ii. 7, or it may be to 
VI. viii. 2. 

14, émornpay kai duvdauewr] 
See noteon Li. & 


XQ friends in their own profession, as they doubtless would if 


270 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. [BOOK xX. 








Tas Té Suvapers mapadibovres Kab evepyyoovres aT QUTOV, 
otov lar pot Kat ypageis: Ta o¢ TOM TUK emaryyé VTQL 
pep SudoKew ot codictat, mparret & avray ovdels, adn 
ol TroNTEVepEVOL, ob dobauev a av Suvapet Tui TOUTO mpar- / 
TEL Kea ewrreipla padrov 4 7) Svavoia: ove yap ypadov- 
TES, OUTE Reyovres mépt roy TowUroy paivovras (kairo 
KaddLov HV iows n Aovyous Sucavexous TE Kal Onpmyopt- | 
ous), ovd av TOMTUKOUS TETTOUNKOTES TOUS aperépous 
vies 7 Twas ad)ous TOV Piro. Evnoyov & Hy, ars 
edvvavto oUTE yap Tals Todeow cpuetvoy ovdev Kare 

mov av, ov avrois umapfat mpoedowT av waddov THs 
TovauTns Suvdpeas, ovde én TOUS pirraross. Ov Bay 
pourepov ye COLKED ” eurretpia oupBadrrecbas ovde yap 
eylyvort’ av dia TS TONTUKHS cuVnOeLas TrohuroKod’ 810 
TOUS epuepevors mept TONTLKNS eidevas mpoodelv & EOLKEV 1 
éurretpias. Tov de copictap ot eraryyeAdopevor av — 
not profess to teach, viz. Statesmen. As to the latter, they . 
seem to act by a sort of instinct and from experience rather 


than on fixed principles; they never write or speculate upon 
Politics; they cannot even train their children and their 


a9 


20 


they could. Still we would not depreciate the value of ex- 
perience, which is an essential condition of the knowledge of 
20 Statesmanship. As to the former (viz. the Sophists), they 


4, After oi rodcrevdpevor under- 
stand mpdrrovow. 

6. Kairow kaAAuoy x.t.A.] Not 
improbably a sneer at the states- 
man and orator Demosthenes, all 
of whose writings are oratorical 
and not political. 

' 12. od pay pixpdv ye x.T.A.] 
This is to correct the apparent 
depreciation of the value of ex- 
perience invoived in the above 


censure of practical statesmen. 

14. mrodutixns cvvnOeias] ‘fami- 
liarity with political life.’ The 
fact that this, apart from a body 
of fixed and conscious principles 
(l. 4), makes men statesmen, is 
a proof of the importance of prac- 
tical experience. 

15. mpoodeiv] On the force 
of this compound see note on 
Lx. 79. 


———EEE—————— ee ee ee ee Se 





21 


2 


Saal 


CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 271 





daivovtas Toppw evar tod Svddéarr Sdws yap ovde 


motov TL éoTW uy mept rota icaow* ov yap av TH 
avuTny 72 puTopuen ovde yelp eviBecay, ovd a av @ovto 
padtov eivas TO vopoberijoat ouvaryaryovrt TOUS evdox- 
povvras: TOV VOMwV" exreEaa bau 1a eivar TOUS api- 
oTOUS, domep ovoe Thy éedoyny ovcay ouverens Kat 
TO Kpivat OpOas péyioTov, MoTEp eV TOIS KATA povoL- 
KV" ob yap eumerpor mept Exacta Kpivovow opOdas Ta 
épya, cat Sv av i) was emitedeiTas cuVidow, Kat Tota 
Tolos cvvadet’ Tois 8 ameipous ayamntov To pn Siadav- 
Odvew e ev 7} KaKdsS TeToinTaL TO Epyov, WaTEp emt 

ypacucns. Oi be YOMOoL THS TrohaTunetis Epyous coikacuy" 
TOs ob &x TOUT@Y vopobersKos yevouT ay THs y TOUS 
apiotous Kpivar ; ov yap daivovtat ovd taTpiKol éx TOY 
know nothing about the subject they profess to teach: else 
they would not confuse it with, or even rank it below, the 
Art of Rhetoric, nor absurdly fancy that a mere selection of 
the best laws from various systems constitutes Statesmanship, 
forgetting that the whole pith of the matter lies in the principle 
on which the selection is made. Experience and practice 
alone, in this as in other arts, can qualify a man to form any 


but a very rough judgment of results, and still more of the 
means which lead to them. The mere study of collections of 


6. domep ovd€ thy éxdoyny 
x.T.A.] In what is called a sys- 
tem of ‘ Eclecticism,’ the real sys- 
tem is the principle on which the 
selection is made. The fact that 
the selected details form parts of 
other systems is a secondary and 
accidental consideration. 

10. trois & dreipots x.7.A.] The 
practical results of asystem when 
at work is a matter that any one 
living under it can form some 
opinion about. The means best 


adapted to secure any given re- 
sults, their compatibility with 
other conditions (60 ay... our- 
ade), and so forth, can only be 
estimated by those who have 
special training and experience, 
From the latter consideration 
Bacon says that popularity is a 
positive objection against any 
system of a philosophical charac- 
ter, and from the former he 
makes an exception in favour of 
‘ Politics and Theology.’ 


Hence we 
propose to 
investigate 
the subject 
of Politics 
for our- 
selves. 


22 


#3 


22 


23 


272 


ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 


[BooK x. 





ovyypapparey yiverOa Kairor meipavrai ye heyew 
5 / ‘ / > \ ¢ > Lal 

ov povov Ta Oeparetpara, adr Kai os iabeiey ap 

Kar ws Seb Ocpamevew éxdorous, Suedopevor Tas &€eus. 

Tavra dé Tots pe éwiret poss ahéerrua etvat Sorel, Tois 


S averiotnpoow aypeia. “Iows ovv kab Trav vom@v Kai 5 


TOV TONTELBY al cvvaryeryal Tois wev Suvapevots Oewpy- 
cab Kal Kpivat Ti KaX@s 7) TOUVaVTIOV Kal Tota ToLols 
dpworres, evypnor ay evn” rows & avev &ews Ta ToLavTa 


SieEwoior TO pwev Kpivew Kaas ovK dv bra, 
apa avropator, EVTVVETWTEPOL 8 eis rabra Tay av yé- 10) 


VOLVTO. 


ca 


Tlapadirdvrav ody tov mpotépey avépebyntov To Méept 
Ths vomobecias, avtovs emicKetracOat wadXdov Bértiov 
iows, Kat Srws 87) Tept qonsTeias, Srrws eis Sivapiy n 
rept Ta avOpworrwa pirocodia TéerewwOy TI p@rov pev 16 


laws can never make a man a Statesman. 


The most we can 


say is that such a study may be useful to those who have 
already gained something of the Statesman’s mind. 

The field then is still open: a fresh and independent in- 
vestigation of the true principles of Statesmanship is called 
for to complete the subject of the Science of Human Life. 
We propose therefore to undertake such an investigation, 
availing ourselves of the labours of our predecessors in that 


l. ovyypappadrer] ‘treatises,’ 
—not, as it is sometimes trans- 
lated, ‘ prescriptions ’—as is clear 
from what follows. 

10. evovver@repoi] ‘more in- 
telligent.? Though the study of 
medical treatises, or of collec- 
tions of laws, can never make 
men physicians or statesmen, it 
may make them more intelligent 
and ‘appreciative’ in such sub- 
jects respectively. 


15. wept ra avOpamwa 
copia] This term was considered 
by Aristotle to include Ethics, 
Economics, and Politics—three 
practical Sciences dealing with 
the life and conduct of man in 
reference to himself, to his family, 
and to society respectively. The 
subject of Economies, though not 
mentioned here, occupies the first 
Book of the so-called ‘ Politics’ 
of Aristotle. 





CHAP. IX. ] ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS. 273 





s ¥ ‘ / ” fel 5% a 
OU & TL KATA MEPOS eLpNTAaL KAaN@S UTO TAY TpoyEeve- 
/ ”~ > rn > a / 
oTépov meipabapuev emedOeiv, cira ex TOV cUrnypEevoV 
‘ r / \ 
mTodTea@v Oewpncar ta Troia awter Kat POecipes Tas 
/ fad / a a 
TONES KAL TA TOLa ExaoTAS TOV TOALTELOY, Kat Sia Tivas 
«JOEY \ val c \ > , , 
aitias ab pev Kadas, at Se Tovvavtiov TodTevorTat: 5 
/ \ 4 fe Te A / ‘ 
GewpnGevtay yap TovTwy Tay Gy waddov cvvidoimev Kat 
/ / ee ‘ rn we. rn 
Wola ToNTEia apicTn, Kal TAS éxaoTn TayOeica, Kal 
/ / a iW, / 9S > , 
Tice vopos Kat eect ypwpevn. Aeywpev ovv apéd- 
pevot. 


field, as well as of the experience supplied by constitutions 
that have already existed. Hence we may perhaps gather 
what is the most perfect form of government, and also what 
laws and customs are best suited to each particular form. 


2. pevav trodtrec@y] ‘col- as some suppose, in reference to 
lections oF constitutions ;’ in re- a collection framed by Aristotle 
ference to such ovvaywyai as are himself. Fragments said to be- 
mentioned above in §21; or else, long to such a work still exist. 





SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES AND 
ILLUSTRATIONS. 


P, 1, Li. 1. 4é8050s] See further Mansel’s note on Aristotle’s use of 
this word in Aldrich’s 8 Logie, Ch. vi. ‘De Methodo.’ Its use in the text 
may be illustrated by Poet. xix. 1, év rots wepi rijs prroptxiis kelaOw* Todro 
yap USiov madXov éxelyns Tis weObdov. 

P. 9, I. iii. 7. Stapéper 5 over, x.7.X.] Compare Ant. and Cleop. 
Act 1. Sc. iv.— 

* As we rate boys, who, being mature in knowledge, 
Pawn their experience to their present pleasure, 
And so rebel to judgment.’ 
Also see further the discussion on the etymology of dxodaela, in IIL 
dxparéow] The following extracts will illustrate, from a modern point 
of view, the difference between éyxparis and cdppwv: ‘He who refrains 
from gratifying a wish on some ground of reason (éyxparis), at the same 
time feels the wish as strongly as if he gratified it. The object seems to 
him desirable ; he cannot think of it without wishing for it. . . . On the 
other hand, when a stronger passion controls the weaker (cd¢pwr), the 
weaker altogether ceases to be felt. For example, let us suppose a bribe 
offered to two such men to betray their country. Neither will take the 
bribe. But the former may feel his fingers itch as he handles the gold. 
. The other will have no such feelings; the gold will not make his 
fingers itch with desire, but, perhaps, rather seem to scorch them. . . . 
The difference between the two men is briefly this, that the one has his 
anarchic or lower desires under control, the other feels no such desires ; 
the one, 80 far as he is virtuous, is incapable of crime; the other, so far 
as he is virtuous, is incapable of temptation. ... Or again, while a 
virtuous man is one who controls and coerces the anarchic passions 
within him, so as to conform his actions to law (éyxparts), a holy man is 
one in whom a passionate enthusiasm absorbs and annuls the anarchic 
passions altogether, so that no internal struggle takes place (swdpwr), 
and the lawful action is that which presents itself first, and seems the 
one most natural and most easy to be done,’—-(Hece Homo, pp. 148-150.) 
275 


a lr 


276 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





Hence in IV. ix. 8 Aristotle denies that éyxpdreca is, strictly speak- 
ing, a Virtue, but only dper4 ris pixr7. 

The distinction given in the Notes between dxd\acros and dxparis 
may be further illustrated by the statement in VII. viii. 1, 6 wév dxéda- 
oros ob perapeAnrixds. .. 6 5& dxparhs perapeAnrikds was. Also 
dxo\acla is described as cvvexis rovnpla like consumption, etc., dxpacla 
as ot ovvexis like epilepsy, etc. 

P. 12, L. iv. 4. éaerodagovcas] The former of the two explanations 
given in the Notes seems preferable, viz., that which is ‘obvious,’ or ‘on 
the surface,’= Latin ‘in promptu esse.’ This suits the two other places 
where the expression occurs in the Ethics, viz., I. v.4, 1V. viii. 4. Also the 
phrase éxvro) fs elvat occurs in Rhet., etc., in the sense of ‘to be obvious.’ 

——5. What is stated in the note on yrwpluwy .. . der7Gs is not 
only true of ‘a being of more perfect knowledge,’ but also of ourselves 
in the higher and more advanced stages of our knowledge. As Grote 
says, ‘Even facts are then employed, directed, modified, by an acquired 
intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of universal sig- 
nificant terms in which that capital is invested.’ Compare the distine- 
tion in the text with that drawn by Pope, Hssay on Man, iv. 361-2, 
between Human and Divine Love :— 

‘God loves from whole to parts: but human soul 
Must rise from individual to the whole.’ 

P. 18, I. iv. 6. As a further illustration of the necessity of personal 
experience for the appreciation of Moral facts or ideas, add John vii. 17, 
‘Ifa man will do (0éAy roetv) his will he shall know of the doctrine.’ 

P. 15, I. iv. 7. “Qe 5¢ pndérepov, t.¢e. neither the re nor the diérn 
The lines from Hesiod which follow are embodied by Livy (xxii. 29), in 
a speech of Minucius when acknowledging his bad treatment of Fabius. 

P. 16, I. v. 3. Booxnudrwv Bioy wpoapoiuevor] Compare Hamlet, 
Act rv. Sc. iv.— 

* What is a man, 
If his chief good and market of his time 
Be but to sleep and feed ?—a beast, no more.” 


P 17, I. vi. 5. 0éow SiapudAdrrwy] Perhaps it would be more correct 
to give @éois h.l. the more technical sense of a ‘paradox,’ which is 
assigned to it by the Definition in Zopics, I. ii., Oécis éoriv brédnyes 
mwapddotos Tay ywwpluwr Tivds Kara pirocoplarv. 

7. éyxuxAlors] Cf. Pol. I. vii. 2, where éyxtx\ua Staxorjyara are 
the ordinary daily duties of slaves. 

P. 37, L vii. 20. The explanation of ‘dpxat derived from experience ’ 








AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 277 





given in the notes, is different from that adopted in the earlier edition, 
and, I believe, more correct. Under any circumstances, éraywyy A.l. is 
not to be confused with the logical process of Induction, which (1) itself 
starts from dpxat, and does not give them; and (2) is a process to which 
Gewpodvras (denoting immediate apprehension) would not apply. ’Apxh 
here is simply ‘what one starts with,’ not necessarily (as in I. iv. 5) ‘a 
general principle’ (see Glossary, 8.v. dpxh). It may be ‘a general prin- 
ciple,’ as in Mathematics, which a reference to (sometimes) a single fact 
of experience is sufficient to establish without further or formal proof. 
Such a reference to experience would be érayuy? in the sense of this 
passage. Or it may be a simple fact, as the facts of observation in 
Physics and other a@ posteriori sciences, where again no further proof is 
required, e.g. ‘This body falls with a definite accelerating velocity ;’ or 
as in Morals (so this passage asserts), e.g. ‘This action is right,’ or 
‘ This approves itself to me,’ or vice versa. 

P. 37, I. vii. 21. Mercévas 52 x.7.d.] Observe the generality and vague- 
ness of this word (lit. ‘to go after’), as also of Qewpety (‘ viewed’ or ‘ per- 
ceived’), and of &\X\az &’ \Aws. Aristotle’s object here is not to enter 
upon the thorny subject of the nature of the evidence on which dpxal 
rest, but only to insist on the negative point, that at any rate there is 
never demonstrative proof or a direct establishment of the ddr. Grote 
(Fragments, p. 131) translates, ‘We ought in all our investigations to 
look after the dpx in the way which the special nature of the subject 
requires, and be very careful to define it well.’ 

P. 42, I. viii. 12. It may be worth while to quote at length the 
passage in Hicce Homo referred to in the note :—‘ Those who think that 
we should not make pleasure our chief object, yet commonly maintain 
that he who lives best will actually attain the greatest amount and the 
best kind of pleasure. . . . The practical objection to Epicureanism is not 
so much that it makes pleasure the swummuwm bonum, as that it recommends 
us to keep this swmmum bonwm always in view. For it is far from 
being universally true that to get a thing you must aim at it. There 
are some things which can only be gained by renouncing them. ... 
Now a practical survey of life seems to show that pleasure in its largest 
sense—a true and deep enjoyment of life—is also not to be gained artifi- 
cially... .’ So Mill, Autobiography, p. 142: ‘Those only are happy 
(I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their 
own happiness. ... Aiming at something else, they find happiness by 
the way. . . - Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be 
go,” [The same is true of bodily health, etc.] 


eee ae OT ¥ 


é 


278 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





P. 54, I. x. 11, ras rixas clot... rerpdryuvos] Cf. _ Par. 
xvii. 24, ‘ Ben tetragono ai colpi di ventura.’ 

——— 12. dvaddumret 7d kaddv] Cf. a similar metaphor in Bhakeepediile 
Taming of the Shrew, Act 1v. Sc. iii.— 

* And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds, 
So honour peereth in the meanest habit.’ 

P. 58, I. xi. 4. mpotrdpyew ... 4 mpdrrecOa] This corresponds 
with the distinction in Hor. A. P. 179, ‘Aut agitur res in scenis aut acta 
refertur.’ Compare the use of rpoirdpyew in LV. ii. 14, also in Rhett. 
J. ii. 2. Aristotle describes unartificial proofs as being 8oa wh 50 tye 
werbpicra G\Ad wpotmrnpxev. In the Poetics Aristotle several times 
refers to incidents which are éw rs rpavywolas, or &w Tod Spdmaros (cf. 
esp. the phrase Soa mpd rod yéyover, in xv. 7), and gives precepts for 
the management of such incidents, which rest on the fact noticed in this 
passage, viz., that they make a less distinct impression upon us; @g. in 
raference to such incidents, a dews ex machina is less objectionable 
(xv. 7): improbability generally is more admissible, e.g. the circum- 
stances connected with the murder of Laius and the marriage of Jocasta 
by CEdipus (xv. 7; cf. xiv. 6). 

—— 5. ov\N\oyioréov] Owing to the almost invariably technical use of 
this word in Aristotle for a logical conclusion or inference, this passage is 
frequently translated, ‘we must conclude.’ This does not however suit 
the general context, or the combination of particles 64 xal. It should be 
rather, ‘we must take into our calculation then this difference also,’ 
viz., the difference resulting from our being present to, or absent from, 
the scene of action, as well as the difference in weight among troubles 
themselves, even when we are present. On this latter difference cf. x. 
12. This sense of cvAdoyltecGar occurs in Hat. ii. 148, and in a passage 
still more closely parallel in Dem. de Fals. Leg. p. 356, éredav rods 
Katpods cudroylonral ris Ep’ Gy éypddn, Kal Tas brocxéoes, K.T.r. 

P, 59, I. xii. 1. Thus these three classes of Goods correspond to those 
in vii. 4, duydwecs being good as means; Tiwia good always per se as 
ends; éraiverd good per se as ends, and also good as means. In § 2, 7d 
motov Te elvat refers to the former condition of éwaverd, and 7d wpbs Tt 
was éxew to the latter. 

P. 62, L. xiii. 8. é£wrepixds] Besides the explanations of this word 
given in the note two others deserve notice—(1) It has been thought to 
mean simply any discourse or treatise other than that in hand. (2) 
Grote (Aristotle, i. 69) maintains the view that it means outside the 
regular method of Philosophy ; .e. discussion conducted in the method 





AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 279 





of Dialectic (in the technical Aristotelian sense), With the explanation 
given in the note compate that of &yxdkAror Adyor in v. 7. 

P. 69, IL. xiii. 20. It should be particularly noted that ¢pévqois, in 
spite of its constant connexion with Moral Virtue (cuwvé¢evxrar 4 dpbynots 
Ty To8 Hous dperq Kal atrn rH Ppovtoe, X. viii. 3), is itself an 
intellectual quality. Dante (Conv. iv. 17) thinks it necessary to bring 
Aristotle’s authority against the opinion ‘held by many’ that it was a 
Moral Virtue. In prtoof of this (besides the distinct statement in the 
text)—(1) It is diseussed by Aristotle in B, VI. among the dcavonrixar 
dperal; (2) In X. viii. Oewpla is shown to be superior to évépyeta xar’ 
dperhy on the ground of its superiority to the kindred intellectual 
excellence of dpéynots which is allied to them ; (3) Ppévnors is described 
in Rhet. I. ix. 13 as dperh Stavolas xa’ Fv ed BovdederOar Sbvavrat 
wept drya0Gv kal kaKGv Tov elpnuévwn els evdatuoviar. 

P. 77, IL, ii. 6. dpolws 5¢ xa ra word, x.7..] Compare Merchant of 
Venice, Act. 1. Sc. ii., ‘They are as sick that surfeit with too much as 
they that starve with nothing. It is no mean happiness, therefore, to 
be seated in the mean.’ 

P, 79, IL. iii. 2. ws 6 IAdrwr Gyo] Probably in reference to Laws, 
B, nu. 

P. 84, IL. iv. 8. Add tothe note on rafra dé, x.7.A.—The ‘ motive’ 
which led to the execution of some of Michelagnolo’s great works was 
(if we may believe tradition) mean and spiteful, but this, if true, does 
not affect our estimate of their artistic merit; nor do we think less of 
- Benvenuto Cellini’s Perseus because he consoles himself, on failing to kill 
an enemy, with the reflection, that, if God would permit him to complete 
that work, he would thereby crush his hated rivals more effectually than 
if he killed them with the sword. 

Again, as to the condition BeBalws cai dueraxwirws. If an artist 
wishes to destroy his work, being dissatisfied with it, and regrets having 
executed it, neither does this affect its artistic worth. In fact, artists 
are frequently bad judges of the relative merits of their own works (ef. 
Plato, Phedo, p. 274, fin.), and poets (among others notably Wordsworth) 
have frequently altered for the worse some of their finest passages. The 
artistic merit of such works or passages remains the same notwithstanding. 

P. 94, II. vi. 15. Illustrate further the necessity for adding the 


qualification ws » 4 dpdviyos dploeev (as explained in the Notes), by the 
reflection of Pope, Hssay on Man, 1. 169, ete, :-~ 


* Let pow’r or knowledge, gold or glory, please, 
Or (oft more strong than all) the love of ease; 


280 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





Thro’ life tis followed, ev’n at life’s expences 
The merchant's toil, the sage’s indolence ; 
The monk’s humility, the hero’s pride; 

All, all alike, find reason on their side.’ 


Also by La Rochefoucauld (quoted by Pattison, Zc¢.), ‘Il n’y a pas 
de violente passion qui n’ait sa raison pour s’autoriser.’ Again, the ‘so- 
called dictates of conscience and reason are sometimes only passions in 
the form of a syllogism’ (Ugo Foscolo). In B. VIL. c. iii. Aristotle ex- 
plains at length how Reason,may help a man to go wrong selon les régles. 

P. 95, II. vi. 17, etc. The refutation of the misconceptions of Aris- 
totle’s theory contained in these sections affords an answer also to another 
objection sometimes brought against it, that it makes the difference 
between Virtue and Vice to be quantitative only, and not qualitative; a 
question of degree merely, and not of kind ; so that Virtue is a little more 
or less of Vice, and Vice a little more or less of Virtue ; or, as it has also 
been put, that ‘ Virtue is only Vice a little exaggerated or a little con- 
trolled.” Take the following illustration :—Excess or defect of tempera- 
ture will (so to speak) destroy Water by converting it either into Steam 
or Ice ; a moderate degree (though within considerable limits) will pre- 
serve it in the form of Water: but Water is not a little more Ice or a little 
less Steam. The difference, though quantitative in respect of tempera- 
ture, is qualitative in respect of the resulting material. So Virtue differs 
from Vice qualitatively, and is not Vice increased or Vice diminished, 
though in respect of the ré0y and wpdétes, with which they deal, the 
difference may be mainly, or even wholly, quantitative. 

P. 97, Il. vii. This proof of the Definition of Virtue (as explained in 
the Notes) is a good instance of ‘Inductio per Enumerationem Simpli- 
cem,’ or (as it is sometimes called) ‘Perfect Induction’: since if the 
Catalogue of Virtues is complete, all the possible cases to which the 
Conclusion can refer have been examined in the Premisses. By the same 
method, any general proposition relating to a limited and ascertainable 
number of cases may be established, as, e.g., ‘all the Popes (until the 
present) have reigned less than twenty-five years.’ 

P. 99, IL vii. 3. EAAelrovres 52] In VIL. ix. 5 it is stated that dxpacla 
and éyxpdreia, like dxodacla and awdpoctvy, are defective in a third 
related term, and for a similar reason. 

P. 101, Il. vii. 8. évduxdfovra:] A legal term, relating to a double 
claim for some disputed object. Similarly, in IV. iv. 4, ds éphuns forxer 
dugicBnrety 7a Gxpa. Still it is clear that if there is Excess and Defect 
there must Ge a Mean, else how could the transition occur from the one 





>= ae 


AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 





to the other of these extremes? If the balance has turned, there must 
have been a point when it was even. This is admirably put by Pope 
(Essay on Man, ii. 207, etc.), when, speaking of ‘ extremes,’ he says— 
* Tho’ each by turns the other’s bound invade, 
As in some well-wrought picture light and shade, 
And oft so mix, the diff’rence is too nice, 
‘Where ends the virtue or begins the vice. 


Fools ! who from hence into the notion fall, 
That vice or virtue there is none at all’ 


P, 104, II. vii. 15. 6 52 éacyatpéxaxos, x.7.A.] It should be noted that 
Aristotle corrects himself on this point in Rhet. IL ix. 5, ‘O yap airés 
éorw émixatpéxaxos kal d0ovepds. In fact, they are (to borrow his illus- 
tration in c. xiii.) like the convex and concave sides of a circumference, 
TS boyy d00 dxwpicra weduxéra. The true defect of the feeling of véweors 
would be a sort of moral indifference, such as is typified in the popular 
(though perverted) conception of ‘a Gallio.” Also we might illustrate 
the feeling implied in véueors by Ps. Ixxiii. 3, etc., ‘I was grieved at the 
wicked ; I do also see the ungodly in such prosperity.’ In the present 
day the recognition of the virtuous side of Resentment (véweors), as well 
as that of Anger, Self-Esteem, and perhaps Ambition, has rather fallen 
into the background. (See further, note p. 238.) The following passage 


from Dr. Abbott’s most suggestive Bible Lessons (p. 175), on the 


Virtue of Resentment, is worth quoting :—‘ Anger is indifferent, being 
sometimes right and sometimes wrong; vindictiveness gives a selfish 
character to anger, and is always wrong. But there is an anger that is 
always right, such as one feels at the sight of cruelty, injustice, and 
oppression, a moral recoil of sentiment from evil.’ After pointing out 
the etymological significance of Resentment as ‘ recoil of sentiment,’ he 

‘ Resentment then is a Virtue, and a man who feeis no resent- 
ment at the sight of injustice is destitute of a true sense of sin. There 
is almost as great a deficiency of resentment in the world as there is an 
excess of vindictiveness.’ 

It may be worth while to compare the véueors of Aristotle with Resent- 
ment as depicted by Bishop Butler, and to contrast both with Anger in its 
legitimate manifestation by the wpéos, as in Lith. IV. c. v. 

Néweors, both in Hth. and Rhet., is emphatically connected with the 
undeserved prosperity of the wicked, rather than with the mere fact of 
their turpitude. See esp. het. Il. ix. 1, 7. Hence (1) it ‘marches 
with’ Envy ; (2) it is in some sense the converse to Pity, which is aroused 
by undeserved adversity (het. II. ix. 1). 





282 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





Resentment is (according to Butler) of two kinds, ‘Sudden Anger,’ 
and ‘ Settled Resentment.’ The latter is Resentment proper, and in that 
aspect it is aroused ‘ not by‘natural but moral evil,’ not by suffering, pain, 
or loss, but by injury ; ‘it is never occasioned by harm as distinct from 
injury.’ So again, ‘its natural object is one who has been in a moral 
sense injurious to oneself or others.’ 

Anger, on the other hand, (1) may be aroused (as Butler says) by mere 
harm as distinct from injury ;’ [though no doubt the ‘ harm ’ is often spon- 
taneously assumed to be also ‘injury.’ Cf. Hth. V. viii. 10, éwt dawouéry 
ddixla y dpyh éorw, also VII. vi. 1, 6 perv yap Abyos 4h pavracla, Sre HBprs 
} ddeywpla, édqrwoev 6 5é[Ovuds] Somwep cvroyiodmevos Sri Set TS TovobrTwy 
Toneueiv xaderalver 5) ebOUs] ; (2) it is more of a personal feeling [Aris- 
totle’s Rhet. Il. ii. 1, orw H dpyh pegs wera AUarys Te s pawopuévys 
did. Pawopuevny duywplay r Gv els abrdv # els adrod Twa ph rpoonkbyTws. 
So, 2b. II. iv. 30, Opyh éorw éx rv wpds éavréy. Compare Butler, 
Sermon viii. p. 437, ed. Angus]; (8) ‘its reason and end (says Butler) 
is to prevent and resist sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered 
merely as such.’ Similarly, Aristotle (Hth. IV. v. 6) notes that in its 
absence a man is not duvvrixés. 

In Rhet. Il. iv. 31, etc., Aristotle describes the feeling of pieos, in 
contrast with épyh, in terms which bring it into close resemblance to 
Butler’s Resentment, e.g. dpyh wept 7a Kad’ Exacra, «.. 7d 5 picos 
kal awpds Ta yévn’ Tov yap KNérrnv pice? Kal Tov ouxoddyrny das’ 
kal rd pév lardv xpbvy (cf. Hth. IV. v. 8, etc.) 7d & dviaroyp—kal rd 
Mev Adwns Epecis, Td Fé KaKOT—O pév dpyitduevos Avre?rat* 6 62 pues 
o8, K.T.r. 

P. 106, II. viii. 2. dvdpeios . . . mpds rdv Opacdy Seidbs] As, for in- 
stance, Fabius in the estimate of Minucius: ‘Pro cunctatore segnem, 
pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat’ (Livy, 
xxii. 12 fin.) 

P. 107, Il. viii. 7. Speaking generally, we may say that the Excess 
is better when the Virtue mostly relates to the encouragement of the 
Feeling with which it is concerned, and the Defect when the Virtue 
mostly relates to its repression. . 

P. 110, Il. ix. 4. We might illustrate edxcardpopo: h.l. by an expres- 
sion applied in Athenseus to Cheremon, that he was értxardg@opos émt 
Td &vOn, i.e. ‘ fond of dwelling on descriptions of flowers.’ 

P. 111, IT. ix. 8. 6 wév pcxpdv, x.r.d.] Hence it follows thatthe Virtu- 
ous mean is not like a straight line without breadth, but a moderately — 
wide path, not to be too closely defined, although after all— 





AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 283 





‘Sunt certi denique fines 
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.’ 


P. 118. It has been suggested that the same social principle probably 
underlies Dante’s classification of vices, in respect of their moral turpitude, 
(There is of course no such gradation intended in Aristotle’s classification 
here.) ‘Dante’s moral standard is wholly social. The worst crime is 
fraud, because it strikes at the root of society by undermining confidence 
[ef. Inf. xi. 55].... Next in the scale of evil is violence, less dangerous, 
because avowed and open. The most venial of the sins of Hell is incon- 
tinence, which chiefly concerns the individual alone’ (Symonds’ Jntro- 
duction, p. 120). 

Ii.i.11. In VIL ix. 4 Aristotle gives an instance of kad} d0r% over- 
powering a resolution to act in the case of the Neoptolemus of Sophocles, 
who was unable to abide by the determination which he had formed to 
deceive Philoctetes, xalro: 5: jdoviy otk évéuewev, GAA Kadfy. Of. 
VIL. ii. 7, where the paradoxical phrase oroviala ris dxpacta is suggested 
for this case. 

P. 119, IIL. i.13. Hence in the case mentioned by Jeremy Taylor, 
* He that threw a stone at a dog, and hit his cruel stepmother, said that 
though he meant it otherwise, yet the stone was not quite lost,’ the act 
would not be involuntary, not being érlAvrov xal év werapedelg. Some- 
what similar would be Aristotle’s condemnation of Pompey’s morality in 
Ant. and Cleop. Act 1. Sc. vii., when he will not consent beforehand 
“o a scheme of treachery, but regrets that it had not been carried out 
without his being consulted :— 


‘ Repent that e’er thy tongue 
Hath so edawed thine act; being done unknown, 
I should have found it afterwards well done, 
But must condemn it now.’ 


P. 120, Ill. i. 14. od doxe? &? Ayvouay mpdrrew ... GAN dyvodr] 
&:’ &yvoway wpdrrew is applied to an act caused by ignorance; dyvodp 
wparrew to an act which is merely accompanied by ignorance. 

P. 121, III. i. 17. Gomep Aloxtrdos Ta pvorixd] Alschylus is said 
to have been accused of divulging some portions of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries in one of his plays, and to have defended himself on the 
ground that never having been himself initiated, he must have done it, if 
at all, unconsciously. 

P. 122, III. i. 20. The conception of an Involuntary act is more 


284 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





definite and positive than that of a Voluntary act. Hence Involuntary 
is investigated first (as in Book V. Injustice is discussed before Justice, — 
cf. V.i, 8), and this Definition of ‘Voluntary’ simply excludes the two 
conditions which have been shown to constitute Involuntariness, Viz, 
Bla and % Kxa@’ Exacra &yvoa. The words od 7 dpxh év abr@ refer to 
the former, and eldé7: 7a Kad’ Exacra &v ols ) mpaks to the latter. In 
V. viii. 6, 7, Involuntary acts Big are described as druxtwara, those de’ 
Gyvowy as duaprhuara. . 

The supplementary §§ 21, etc., contain an argument similar to that in — 
§§ 11, etc. : as it was there shown that the violence of pleasure is not such 
as to constitute the involuntariness of compulsion, so it is contended here — 
that the blindness of passion or desire does not constitute the involuntari- 
ness of ignorance. 

P. 123, IDL. i. 25. dxotou Avrnpd] This is true in all cases, for 
dxovc.a Ble are of course Avrnpa at the moment (xara roy Katpdy, 3 6), 
and dxovo.a 5: dyvoiy are éridva (§ 18) as soon as we discover what 
we have done. 

27. gevxrd pév] The converse of the argument from de? in § 24. 
In that case we ought to do something; in this case we ought to avoid — 
something. 

“Arorov 5h, x.7.X.] The reason for this assertion seems to be that — 
so many of our actions proceed rather from unreasoning impulse than 
conscious and deliberate purpose, that we should have to relegate too 
large a proportion of our lives to the sphere of involuntary action on the 
supposition in question. The opponent’s contention would prove too 
much, as in § 22. Ta ddroya wdOy refer to Oupds and ériOupula; cf. Rhet. 
I. x. 8, droyor 5é dpétecs, dpyh Kal émOupla. ; 

P. 124, LI. ii. 3. Compare I. xiii. 18, 7rd 6é éiOupnrixdy Kal 
SAws dpexrixdy, which shows that éw:Oupla falls under Speéts as its 
genus. 

P, 125, III. ii. 6. It is difficult to find a precise equivalent for Oupds, 
but we can gather its meaning (1) from Plato’s use of @upds or 7d 
 Gvupoedés as the element of Spirit, or Will, or Resolution, or whatever it 
may be called, which gives practical effect to the abstract decisions of 
Reason, in its conflict with the éw:@vyla:, and causes the man’s action 
to follow i rather than them; (2) From Aristotle’s use of the word 
elsewhere, e.g. the description of the Spurious Courage of @upds (High 
Spirit or Impetuosity) in III. viii. 10, etc.; also the opposition of impulsive 
to deliberate action, ra éx Ouuod ... Ta ex wpovolas, Eth. V. viii. 9; 
also from its occasional interchange with dpyh, e.g. Rhet. I. x. 8, etc, 








AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 235 


Fth. Til. i. 24, V. viii. 9; also from the greater evil of dxpacla rod 
@vpod as compared with dxpacla rév émiduudv, Eth. VII. vi. (cf 
II. iii. 10, xarewdrepov jdovg wdxecOa 7 Ovpd). Hence I have 
ventured, though with much hesitation, to translate it A.J. ‘ Spirit,’ in 
the sense of an impulsive and resolute, but unreflecting, source of action. 
St. Hilaire, though translating the word by ‘colére’ in i. 27, paraphrases 
it in this chapter ‘la passion que le cceur inspire.’ 

P. 131, LIL. iii, 11-13. Oéuevoe rédos rt . . « dguoravrat] Shakespeare 
has described the process similarly in 2 Henry IV. Act t Se. iii.— 

‘When we mean to build, 
We first survey the plot, then draw the model; 
And when we see the figure of the house, 
Then must we take the cost of the erection ; 
Which if we find outweighs ability, 
What do we then, but draw anew the model 
In fewer offices; or, at least, desist 
To build at all?’ 

P. 186, II. iv. 4. In technical language, the orovdatos is related to 
rddnbés as the causa cognoscendi, not the causa essendi. Such a relation 
is similar to that claimed by the Vatican Council towards Papal Infalli- 
bility, as declaring, but not constituting, the Popes infallible. 

P. 137, Il. vy. 1. As a further illustration of Plato’s theory of the 
involuntary error of Vice, we might say that he regards a vicious choice 
as like that of a man who should take poison mistaking it for wholesome 
medicine. At the time he takes what he thinks is good for him, though 
it isin reality bad. He does not however choose it as such, and so he 
commits not a ‘crime,’ but a ‘ blunder,’ which, in Plato’s estimate at any 
rate, was better. Aristotle, in V. ix. 6, adopts language very similar to 
that of Plato, when he says oltre yap Bovderas obOels 8 uh olera elvas 
groviaioy. So also in Rhet. I. x. 8. 

P. 138, III. v. 4. oddels Exc rovnpds, x.7..] It should be noted that 
mwovnpos has the double sense of ‘wretched’ and ‘wicked’ (compare 
*cattivo’ in Italian),—language, in this and many other words, reflecting 
the natural tendency to connect physical and moral imperfections. The 
former sense was doubtless intended by the unknown author of the line 
quoted in the text, as the antithesis with wdxap would show. 

P. 139, III. v. 7-15. The general argument of these sections is that 
legislators never punish except for what is voluntary, and they are so 
careful about this as to follow up to their sources vicious acts, which 
might seem prima facie involuntary, and if they can trace them, how- 
ever remotely, to an avoidable cause, they treat them ag voluntary, and 





286 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





punish accordingly. So fully, therefore, do mankind generally hold the — 
voluntariness of Vice, that we are treated as responsible not only for 
our immediate actions, but also for all the demonstrable and inevit- 
able results of our actions, however little we may have contemplated 
those results. If we fire a train of gunpowder, we are responsible 
for the damage done at the other end, though it may be far beyond our 
reach. 

P. 148, IIT. v. 17. 8 wap’ érépov . . . edpvta] Compare Poet, c. xxii. 
§ 9, névov yap Trobro [rd pweragopixdy elvat] ore wap’ Gddou Ears AaBei, 
edgputas re onpetby éoriv. 

P. 147, IIL. vi. 10. iréyuia bvra] Lambinus translates, ‘iis impen- 
dentibus atque instantibus que mortem afferunt.” The following illus- 
trations are in favour of the interpretation ‘handy,’ or ‘ close at hand,’ 
rather than ‘sudden.’ In Pol, VII. (VI.) viii. 3, Commerce is said to be 
iroyuérarov wpds airdpxeay, the readiest or most handy means for 
securing independence. And Rhet. II. iii. 12, xexpovexéres, xat ph 
bréyuc TH Opy7n Svres’ waver yap dpyhv 6 xpbvos, where dréyui0s means 
‘while they are still close at hand to the feeling of anger’: ‘quum non 
recentes ab ira sumus’ (Muretus), [Compare r@ waGeiv 87. éyyurdrw 
xeluevov, Thuc. II, xxxviii. 1.] 

Twice in the Rhet. (I, i, 7, IL xxii. 11) the adverbial phrase ¢& 
imoyulov occurs =‘ suddenly,’ ‘on the spur of the moment,’ It seems pro- 
bable that Aristotle would have employed it here if that had been the 
sense intended, His meaning seems rather to be that courage is exer- 
cised not only when death actually occurs, but also in dangers like those 
of war, when it appears imminent or close at hand, even if it be ulti- 
mately escaped. Thus a prisoner may be actually led out ws éxt Odvaror, 
or Bdcavor, and even if he were released unhurt, might have displayed 
courage as genuine as if he had actually died, The passage will thus 
be very similar to that in Rhet. II. v. 2, where, after defining those things 
which are, strictly speaking, go8epa, Aristotle adds, cat ra onpeta Trav 
Toovrav poBepd’ évyyds yap palveras Td poBepdy* Tobro yap écre klvduvos, 
o8epod wrnawacuds. Cf. Statius Theb, vii. 702, ‘morti contermina virtus.’ 

P. 148, ILI. vii. 1,2. Compare Macbeth, Act 1. Sc. vile 


*I dare do all that may become a man; 
Who dares do more is none.’ 


P, 150, ILI, vii. 7, 8. Observe the two characteristics of the Opacds — 
here indicated—(1) his excess of confidence (§ 7); (2) his desire to dis- 
play his courage; he wishes ‘to appear unto men’ to be brave (§ 8). So 


AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 287 





also the Bdvavoos in IV. ii. 20. With the words év ols ody divarras 
jeyciras compare Merchant of Venice, Act m1. Sc. ii.— 
* There is no vice so simple but assumes 

Some mark of virtue on his outward parts, 

How many cowards, whose hearts are all as fa.as 

As stairs of sand, wear yet upon their chins 

The beards of Hercules and frowning Mars, 

Who inward searched, have livers white as milk; 

And these assume but valour’s excrement 

To render them redoubted.’ 


P, 150, ITI. vii. 9. Opacddecdor] Another instance of this character on 
its comic side may be found in Sir Andrew/Aguecheek in Twelfth Night. 
See especially Act mz. Sc. iv., and his disposition as described in Act 1. 
Sc. iii —‘ He is a great quarreler, but that he hath the gift of a coward to 
allay the gust he hath in quarreling,’ etc. 

P. 151, III. vii. 18. Very similarly Sir T. Browne, Rel. Med. i. 44 
writes,—‘ It is a brave act of valour to contemn death; but where life is 
more terrible than death, it is then the truest valour to dare to live.’ We 
might eompare with the opinion of Hadrian, quoted in the Notes, a well- 
snown order of the day of Napoleon, in which he declared any Frenchman 
who committed suicide to be a deserter from the army. So in Zthics 
V. xi. 2, 3 the Suicide is described as viv ré\w dédicGv, In Hamlet's 
celebrated Soliloquy (Act mi. Sc. i.) the question of Suicide is argued on 
oo similar to those in the text, but with the different result that 

possible future ills after death leave the balance in the cowardly 
calculation against suicide. Compare Claudio’s conclusion in Measure 
for Measure, Act 11. Sc. i—*‘ Ay, but to die,’ etc. 

P. 152, II. viii.2. Shakespeare represents Ulysses as plying Achilles 
with a similar argument—7'roilus and Cressida, Act m. Sc. iii— 


* But it must grieve young Pyrrhus now at home, 
When fame shall in our islands sound her trump, 
And all the Greekish girls shall tripping sing,—- 
“ Great Hector’s sister did Achilles win, 

But our great Ajax bravely beat down him.” ’ 


(Bo a few lines below)— 
* Ach. Shall Ajax fight with Hector? 
Patr, Ay, and perhaps receive much honour by him, 
Ach, I see my reputation is at stake.’ 


P. 153, IIL. viii. 5. Tacitus (Hist. iii. 18) notices the converse effect 


288 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





= 4 


of facility of retreat in diminishing the courage of soldiers: ‘Et propin- 
qua Cremonensium menia, quanto plus spei ad oft tanto minorem 
ad resistendum animum, dabant.’ ; 
6. Kev Tod wod¢uov] Another illustration of this might be 
found in the strange and dazzling costumes adopted by the Samnites, in 
B.C. 308, to strike terror into the Romans. The Dictator Papirius Cursor 
forewarned his troops of the unreality of such a display, ‘ horridum 
militem esse debere ... illa predam verius quam arma esse,’ etc.— 
(Livy ix. 40.) 
P. 156, ILI. viii. 11. Ovyod éfehavvdueva . « mpoopdyra] Compare 
Shakespeare, Ant. and Cleop, Act ut. Sc. xiii.— 
*To be furious 
Is to be frighted out of fear; and in that mood, 
The dove will peck the estridge ; and I see still, 


A diminution in our captain’s brain 
Restores his heart.’ 


—— 12. pvoixwrdrn, x.7.d.] In reference to the comparative amount 
of the elements of Ovuds and wpoalpects in Courage, Professor Mahaffy 
(Rambles in Greece, p. 146) remarks that the ordinary Greek Courage 
involved more @uzds than accords with our notions, but that these again 
seem to allow more of that element than Aristotle’s ideal of 
[See Introduction, p. xxxvi, etc., and note on ix. 4.] Greek generals, 
instead of advising coolness, specially incite to rage, doy mpoopléwper, 
etc., as if a man not in this state would be sure to estimate the danger 
and run away. 

P. 158, ILL. viii. 16. dElwpua] In Pol. Il. v.25, of undev dklwua rexrnuevos 
{‘ peu jaloux de leur dignité’ (St. Hilaire)] are opposed to Oupoeidets cal 
woneutxol dvdpes. See inf. p. 234 fin., on the advantage gained by even 
the xafvos in this respect. 

P. 161, IIL. ix. 6. €roor yap ofrou x.7.X.] Like the ‘ Luculli miles 
in Horace Hp. IL. ii, 26-40. 

P. 162, ILL. x. 8. PidroutOovs cat dipynrexods, x.7.d.] This seems te 





be preciaely the type of character assigned to the Athenians in Acts — 


xvii. 21, ‘who spend their time in nothing else but to hear and tell some 
new thing.’ 

P. 169, IIL. xii. 3. d6feve 5 Av, x.7.4.] The former of the cases men- 
tioned in the note would, in fact, be exactly that of Falstaff in his well- 
known soliloquy on Honour, 1 HenryZV. Act v. Sc. 1; or again in 
Sc. 3 (fin.), ‘Give me life: which if I can save, so; if not, honour comes 
unlooked for, and there’s an end.’ 


— 


AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 289 





P. 171, ITI. xii. 6. The absence of xdAacrs, indicated by the word 
dxédacros, is expressed by the Latin ‘improbus.’ Compare with this 
_ passage IL. iii. 7, where those who live xara wd0os are described as chil- 
dren in character. 

P. 182, LV. i. 30-32. A good illustration of this better type of dowros 
will be found in Timon of Athens, as depicted by Shakespeare in the 
first two Acts of the play. Compare especially with § 31 jin. Timon’s 
reflection in Act 1. Sc. ii.— 


‘No villainous bounty yet hath pass’d my heart ; 
Unwisely, not ignobly, have I given.’ 


Daute also recognises two somewhat similar classes of Prodigals, whose 
moral turpitude he considers to be so different that he places those cor- 
responding to Aristotle’s better type (§ 31) in the fourth circle of Hell, 
but the latter in the seventh circle, ranking them, in fact, with the 
Suicides. Of. doxe? 3 dardderd ris abrod clvar xal % Tis ovclas pOopd, 
ds Tod Sv Sd Tobrwy bros (§ 5). He also connects the Vice of the 
former with dxpacla, that of the latter with xaxla (Inf. xi. 70, etc.) 

P. 188, IV. ii. Meyadorpérea. I am inclined now, on the whole, to 
prefer the translation ‘ Magnificence’ for peyadorpérea. That word is 
not, it is true, in our usage limited,to the expenditure of money; but, 
on the other hand, it is not so restricted to the notion of mere amount as 
Munificence would seem to be. It is important to observe that the con- 
spicuousness and grandeur of the expenditure and its occasion is the 
essential point of difference between peyadorpérea and édevdepidrns. 
Naturally, greatness of amount is an almost necessary accompaniment of 
such conditions. Still it is only one form of the grandeur implied in weyaXo- 
mpémeia. Of. ofov péyefos (§ 10); also, diadéper 7d ev TH Epyw uéya Tod 
év TG Samavjuart (§ 18). Wesee also in both the Excess and Defect that 
display and showiness are an essential element in this group of habits. 
The Bdvavoos thinks most of the display, and that in reference to himself 
chiefly (§ 20). The weyadorperts thinks worthily and adequately of the 
display, and not exclusively in reference to himself. (Contrast éuyeAGs in 
§ 5 with Aapmrptvera: rapa wédos in § 20. See also w&s kddNorov Kal 
aperwdéorarov, § 9, etc. etc.) The pixpomperhs does not rise to a 
grand occasion at all. He is ‘paltry’ rather than merely ‘ sordid.’ 
Note that he too is described as ra uéyiora dvaddcas sometimes (which 
could scarcely be said of the ‘ Sordid’ man), but that he wishes to make 
a display and keep his money too; and so év puxp@ 7d xaddv drone? 
(§ 21). He lacks that almost ‘scientific instinct’ (see §§ 5, 10) by 

T 


290 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





which the meyadorperhs sets off with a ‘grand style’ (§ 19) all that 
he does. 

P. 198, IV. ii. 14. mpotrdpye ... && Tav mpoydvwy] Compare 
Shakespeare’s Henry VIII. Act 1. Sc. i.— 

‘Propped by ancestry, whose grace 
Chalks successors their way.’ 

P. 195, IV. ii. 19. od« edurépBryrov] Cf. iii. 24, It is related of 
Lorenzo de’ Medici, surnamed ‘the Magnificent’ (ueyadomrperys), that 
even in his childhood, having received as a present a horse from Sicily, 
he at once sent the donor in return a gift of much greater value, remark- 
ing, when reproved for profuseness, that there was nothing more noble 
than to overcome others in acts of generosity.—(Roscoe’s Life.) 

P. 198, IV. iii. 5. 7d KdddXos ev peydAw odpari] This notion enters 
into the Greek ideal even of female beauty, e.g. Homer, Od. xiii. 289, 
déuas 3 atxro yuvackt Kady Tre meyddyn Te ; Od. xviii. 248, éaet replerot 
yuvaikay eldés Te wéyebds Te (a sort of 8, Barbara after Palma Vecchio). 
So Aristotle, Rhet. I. v. 6, says, OnAecav F dperh, cHparos wev, KdArOS Kal 
péyeOos. 

P. 201, IV. iii. 16. pwelgous... moce?] Hence the relation of peyado- 

yuxla to the other virtues is somewhat like that of the Chief Good to the 
other Goods, as described by the words rac&v alperwrdry uh cvvapib- 
pounévy (I. vii. 8). Meyadowuxla unites and includes them all, and it 
also gives them an additional lustre, ‘ oloy xécuos ris,’ very much as 
peyarorpémea ‘sets off’ expenditure, xal dad rijs lons Samarfs. 
17. We might illustrate this lofty indifference of the weyakdwuxos 
to the opinions of others, by a saying of Angelo Politiano (Zp, iii. 24), 
‘I am no more raised or dejected by the flattery of my friends or the 
accusations of my enemies, than I am by the shadow of my own body; 
for although that shadow may be somewhat longer in the morning and 
the evening than in the middle of the day, I do not think myself a taller 
man at those times than I am at noon.’ 

P. 203, IV. iii. 21. “Avev yap dperfs, «.7.A.] Cf. La Rochefoucauld 
Maz. 25: ‘Il faut de plus grandes vertus pour soutenir la bonne for- 
tune que la mauvaise.’ 

P. 204, IV. iii. 25. Aoxodex 52, x.7..] Demosthenes contends that the 
reverse ought to be the case (De Cor. p. 316) :—éyw voulgw rév per eb 
wabdvra Sey pmeuvfijcac mdvra tov xpébvov, Tiv Sé woujoarvra evOds 
émireAfobat, ef det vdv pev xpynorod, rov 5¢ wh prxpowdxov moeiy Epyor 
avOpwrrov' 7d bé ras lilas evepyectas bropiprjokew Kat Aéyew puxpod detr 
Suordv eort TH dverdifecr, 





AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 291 





P. 205, LV. iii. 25. ra pév dws dxoder Ta 5 dndGs] Compare 
Shakespeare, Ant. and Oleop. Act mm. Sc. i.— 


*I have done enough : a lower place, note well, 
May make too great an act: for learn this, Silius, 
Better to leave undone, than by our deed 
at, too om ak a me when him we serve’s ied 


Who does i’ the wars more than his captain can 
Becomes his captain’s captain : and ambition, 
The soldier’s virtue, rather makes choice of loss, 
Than gain, which darkens him. 

I could do more to do Antonius good, 

But ’twould offend him.’ 


dio kal rv Oérw] Mr. Monro of Oriel College has kindly sent me 
the following note on this passage :— 

‘The reference to the prayer of Thetis is, I think, correct. Aristotle 
is probably repeating an observation made by one of the earlier gram- 
matici, the point being this:—In Jliad i. 394-407 Achilles advises 
Thetis to remind Jove of a great service she had done him, and which 
he tells at length. In the regular Homeric style the same story would 
be repeated in the prayer of Thetis, vv. 503-510, in place of which we 
only have the general form elrore 54 ce, x.r.’. Thetis does not relate 
her services—od Aéyex tas evepyeotas. This is just the sort of point 
which an ancient critic would notice, and I have no doubt that it had 
been noticed before Aristotle’s time.’ 

Similarly in Twelfth Night (Act mr. Sc. iv.) Antonio ob Aéyer ras 
evepyeclas to Sebastian, though compelled to hint at them— 


*Is’t possible that my deserts to you 
Can lack persuasion? Do not tempt my misery, 
Lest that it make me so unsound a man 
As to upbraid you with those kindnesses 
That I have done for you.’ 


P, 206, IV. iii, 27. dpydv Kat wedrAnriy, dX’ 4 Sov Tih, k.7.d.] Com: 
pare Hamlet, Act 1v. Sc. iv.— 
‘ Rightly to be grest, 
Is not to stir without great argument, 


But greatly to find quarrel in a straw, 
When honour’s at the stake.’ 


—— 29. Kal mpds dddov, x.7.d.] Contrast this with the description 
of the dpeckos in vi. 1. 9. He lives altogether wpds dor, and that, 


™ 





7 

iy 
' 
f 


292 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





dvev wdOous xal rob orépyew ols dusre? (ib. § 5). But if the peyahdyuxos 
does in any degree conform his words or actions to suit another, it will 
be for the sake of a friend. 
P. 206, IV. iii. 80. 085 pvnotkaxos] Compare Coriolanus, Act ¥. 
Sc. iii.— 
‘ Thinkst thou it honourable for a noble man 
Still to remember wrongs?’ 


P. 207, tb. 31. 088’ ad dv@pwroddyos] Contrast the yafvos, § 36 
(fin.), Aéyover wept air&Sv. Wordsworth’s well-known four sonnets on 
‘Personal Talk’ may also be referred to in illustration. 

ov8’ ad érawerixds] Compare what Thackeray says of Addison, ‘ He 
did not praise, because he measured his compeers by a higher standard 
than most people have.’ Pope describes the same trait in Addison, 
‘ Alike reserved to blame or to commend,’ but with a cynical imputation. 
—(Prologue to Satires, 1. 205.) 

5” &Bpw] Compare the account of 8Bpis, given in Fhet. II. ii. 5, as 
being 7d BAdwrew kal dureiv Ed’ ols alcxivn éort TH wdoxorrt, ph wa 
Tt ylyvnrat ait@ Gro... ol yap dvruroodyres ox bBpliovew GdrG 
riynwpodvrat. So (ib. § 4) éarnpeacpds (as resulting from xaradpdyyors) 
is obx va TL adT@, GAN Wa wh éxelvg. The grotesque and sometimes 
coarsely comic treatment of his subject adopted by Dante in that part of 
Hell called Malebolge (where various types of fraud are punished) is an 
indication of his utter contempt for sinners of that class. He is xaxoAéyos 
de’ bBpuw. ; 
33. uaddov Ta Kadd xal dxapra}] A constant demand for wtility 
Aristotle would apparently regard as a mark of rank ‘ Philistinism.’ Cf. 
Pol. V. (VIIL.) iii. 12, 73 gyrety ravraxod 7d xphoywnov Hxiora apybrre 
Trois meyaropixos Kal édevbépors. 

— 34. klynois Bpadeia ... at rAé~ts o doysos] So Malvolio in 
Twelfth Night, Act 11. Sc. iv., proposes to assume ‘a sad face, a reverend 
carriage, a slow tongue, in the habit of some sir of note.’ 

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. éaurdv daocrepet, x.7.A.] Compare Shakespeare, 
Merchant of Venice, Act u. Sc. vii.— 


* And yet to be afeard of my deserving 
Were but a weak disabling of myself’ 





Or again, Henry V. Act m. Sc. iv.— 


‘Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a sin 
As self-neglecting.’ 


AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 293 





So Dante on the demoralising effects of ‘viltate’ (uixpoyvxla), Inf. 
ii. 45, etc. (Cary’s translation),— Rus 
‘ Which o 


So overcasts a man, that he recoils 
From noblest resolution, like a beast 
At some false semblance in the twilight gloom.’ 


And La Rochefoucauld similarly of ‘ faiblesse : "—‘ La faiblesse est le seul 
défaut que l’on ne saurait corriger’ (Maz. 130). ‘La faiblesse est plus 
opposée & la vertu que le vice’ (Maz. 445). 

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. wpéyero yap, x.7.A.] The more so perhaps ae 
Aristotle (het. II. xiii. 9) states that a too great regard for self is a 
mark of puxpopuxla—pixpoyuxla ydp Tis kal atiry [sc. 7 Mav gidravria]. 

P. 213, IV. v. 3. With this definition of rpaérys compare Dante’s 
conception of it as being ‘not so much unresisting gentleness to evil as 
the righteous indignation which repels it without any feeling of personal 
irritation.’ —(M. F. Rossetti.) [See Supplementary Note on IV. iii. 31.] 
So in the Convito (iv. 17) he gives as a description of the rpaérys of 
Aristotle, ‘The Virtue which moderates our anger and our too great 
patience against our external ills.’ If we look only at the former aspect 
of it (see § 6, fin.), the zpos might degenerate to Hamlet’s description 
(Act 11. Sc. ii.), and become 


‘ Pigeon-livered and lack gall, 
To make oppression bitter.’ 


Further, Dante punishes this vice of defect (Accidia) in the same 
Circle with the vice of Excess (lracundia). These habits are dis- 
tinguished from véueors with its related vices, in that the former involve 
the notion of personal injury (including that of friends, 6 yap tos 
&repos avrés); also that they include what Bishop Butler calls ‘harm’ 
as well as injury. See also Supplementary Note on II. vii. 15. 

P. 214, IV. v. 8. wavovra 5¢ raxéws] Cf. Shakespeare, Henry VIII. 
Act 1. Se. i— 

‘ Anger is like 
A full-hot horse, who being allowed his way 
Self-mettle tires him.’ 


} pavepol eior| Cf. VII. vi. 3, 6 Ouswmdns od émlBovdos, ... dAAd havepéds. 
8,9] The first two classes here mentioned resemble the ‘ passion- 
ate’ and the ‘peevish’ of Bishop Butler’s eighth Sermon (p. 440, ed. 
Angus):—‘ As to the abuses of Anger, which, it is to be observed, may 
be in all different degrees (7 brepBodh xara, wdvra peév ylverat, § 7), the 
first which occurs is what is commonly called passion. . . . This dis- 





— 


294 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





temper of the mind seizes men upon the least occasion in the world, and 
perpetually without any reason at all, and by means of it they are plainly 
every day, every waking hour of their lives, in danger of running into 
the most extravagant outrages (§ 8). Of a less boisterous but not of a 
less innocent kind is peevishness (cf. of dxpdxodo, § 9), which I men- 
tion with real pity for the unhappy creatures who . . . are obliged to be 
in the way of it (cf. rots wddvora pidros, § 10). That which, in a more 
feeble temper, is peevishness, and languidly discharges itself upon every- 
thing which comes in its way (rpds wav édpylkot Kat émt avril), the same 
principle in a temper of greater force and stronger passions becomes rage 
and fury.’ 

P. 217, IV. vi. 2. dvcxodos] Equivalent to difficilis in Horace’s descrip- 
tion of Old Age, A. P. 173. Conversely, Dante mentions ‘ Affability’ (by 
which word he translates Aristotle’s ¢:Ala) as one of the four Virtues 
peculiarly appropriate to Old Age (Conv. iv. 27). 

P, 220, IV. vi. 8, fin. With this characteristic of gla compare * Let 
the righteous rather smite me friendly, and reprove me’ (Ps. cxli. 5). 
Also Shakespeare, Tivo Gentlemen of Verona, Act m1. Sc. i— 


‘Thus for my duty’s sake, I rather choose 
To cross my friend in his intended drift, 
Than, by concealing it, heap on your head 
A pack of sorrows,’ etc. 

IV. vi. 9. (As another illustration of the habits of the «é\at)—Swift 
in his Journal to Stella writes: ‘Did I ever tell you that the Lord 
Treasurer hears ill with the left ear, just as I do? I dare not tell him 
that I am so, for fear he should think that I counterfeited to make my 
court.’ A striking, though exaggerated, illustration of the Churl (6 r@ee 
dvoxepalywy) may be found in Apemantus (Z'imon of Athens), who stands 
in vivid contrast with the herd of xé\axes who surround Timon in his 
prosperity. . 

P, 222, IV. vii. 5. édv ux) rwos &vexa rpdrry] Some special motive 
may intervene as a disturbing force, and then the resulting act may not 
be a true index of general character, of what the man is év Blw redely. 
eg. one who is dvcepis xat ddcxodos by nature, may occasionally be — 
transformed by self-interest into a xéAaé. 

P. 223, IV. vii. 7. Ov yap wept rod év rats éuoroylats, x.7.X.] Hence 
one ‘who sweareth to his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it 
were to his own hindrance,’ would be classed as dlxacos rather 
aAnO 7s. . 

év ols . . - ddnbever] There is an abrupt change of construction here 


AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 295 





from dda wept rod év ols unbev diagéper . . . dAnGetovros, which the 
former clause would have led us to expect. 

P, 223, IV. vii. 8. rt u@dAov] The mercenary, interested, or malicious 
lie,is worse than the lie simple, just as xd\af is worse than dpeckos, 
or the d\afav dpyuplov évexa of § 11 is worse than the ddagdv of § 10. 
In the former case there would be falsehood and injustice as well. 

—— 11. The parenthetical use of 6 ddagay, if that reading be adopted, 
is exactly parallel to that of 4 éyxparis in VIL. ix. 2. 

—— 12. ov« év ri Suvdwe, x.7.d.] The interpretation given in the 
Notes is confirmed by the use of the same phrase in Rhet. I. i. 14, to 
distinguish the Sophist from the Dialectician; the essence of the former 
being the conscious use of a fallacious argument against an opponent 
not likely to detect it (argumentum ad ignorantiam). The motive, or 
‘particular condition of the Will’ (Grant), is the important point. 
Compare also the statement in VII. x. 2, that @pévyois differs from. 
Sewdrns (mere cleverness or shrewdness), xara Thy mpoalpesw. So in 
V. ii. 4, Aristotle observes that one who commits adultery Tod xepdalvew 
&vexa, would not be called dxéAacros, but dd:xos or wAeovéxryns. The dif- 
ference of purpose (apoalpecis) in that case, as in the case in the text, quite 
alters the moral character of the act. Cf. VIII. xiii. 11, and see Glossary. 

P. 225, IV. vii. 13. év adrots ra elpnuéva] év adrots refers to Ta 
roaira, and 7a elpnuéva are the qualities of being profitable, anc of being 
easily assumed without detection. 

—— 14. wddcora dé Kat obra] The xalis explained by a reference to 
§ 2, where 7a &vdoga were stated to be the sphere of dd\afgovela also. 

P. 226, IV. vii. 15. kal 7 Navy Areryrs drAafovexdy] Repudiating for 
oneself puxpd kal pavepd at once suggests, and is of course intended to 
suggest, a ‘par exemple!’ on the part of others, and so amounts to ‘ fish- 
ing for compliments.’ Dickens has familiarised us with types of this 
character in Pecksniff and Uriah Heep. In fact, this baser type of 
elpwrela approaches most nearly in Aristotle’s catalogue to the modern 
vice of Hypocrisy, and only needs the condition of being exercised in a 
moral or religious sphere to make it identical with it. The following 
illustrations may be added:—When Diogenes, treading on Plato’s 
carpet, ig said to have exclaimed, ‘I am treading on Plato’s vanity,’ the 
latter replied, ‘Yes, and with a different vanity of your own.’ So 8, 
Augustine, ‘ Vainglory often glories most vainly of the very contempt of 
vainglory.’ Congreve has indicated a more harmless type of the same 
disposition— 

* Careless she is with artful care, 
Affecting to seem unaffected.’ 


296 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 





La Rochefoucauld attributes to human nature generally this charac- 
teristic of Bavxoravovpyla—‘ On ne se blame que pour étre loué’ (Maz. 38). 

P. 227, IV. viii. 3. e8rporot] This quickness of intellectual movement 
in the edrpdmwedos stands in contrast with the afterthought-wit so 
happily described in the French phrase, ‘ esprit de l’escalier ;’ and it is 
similar in kind to the power of employing metaphor (rd yap e8 meradépew 
7d 7d Suorov Oewpety early), stated by Aristotle (Poet. xxii. § 9) to be a 
mark of genius. 

P. 228, IV. viii. 6. rdv xawév] This expression (as in the Poetics) 
does not refer to what is technically known as the ‘ New,’ but the 
‘Middle’ Comedy. The ‘New’ had not yet arisen. (See Donaldson, 
Theatre of the Greeks, sixth ed., pp. 68, etc.) 

mpos evoxnuoctyny] It does not, however, therefore follow that the 
latter method has the advantage from the point of view of morality. It 
is quite possible to maintain the reverse. Speaking of Shakespeare’s 
occasional alexpodoyla, Coleridge writes :—‘ It may sometimes be gross, 
but I boldly say that he is always moral and modest. (?) In our day, 
decency of manners (evcxypocdry) is preserved at the expense of morality 
of heart, and delicacies for vice are allowed (émévoium), whilst grossness 
against it is hypocritically, or at least morbidly, condemned.’ 

7. Tov e8 oxérrovra] Compare with this expression the defini- 
tion of edrpazeNa in Rhet. II. xii. 16, as weradevpévyn bBprs. 

P. 229, IV. viii. 9. de: 5’ tows cat oxdmrrecy] Juvenal (iii. 153) regards 
liability to ridicule as the hardest part of the lot of poverty; and La 
Rochefoucauld remarks, ‘ Le ridicule déshonore plus que le déshonneur’ 
(Maa. 326). 

—— 10. maou Svoxepatver] Compare Merchant of Venice, Act 1. Sc. i.— 





* And other of such vinegar aspect 
That they ’ll not show their teeth in way of smile, 
Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.’ 


P, 240 (Introductory Note to Book x.) The same distinction, derived 
doubtless from Aristotle, between the Active and the Contemplative Life, 
constantly reappears in Medieval writers. With Dante especially it is 
a favourite subject. He symbolises the antithesis in the Commedia by 
Leah and Rachel, and also (in a somewhat different aspect) by Matilda 
and Beatrice, and in the Convito by Martha and Mary. The following 
passage especially may be quoted in illustration,—‘ In truth it should be 
known that we can have in this life two kinds of Happiness, according 
as we follow two different good and excellent paths which lead us thither; 


AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 297 





the one is the Active Life and the other the Contemplative. The 
latter (though by the Active we arrive, as has been said, at true Happi- 
ness) leads us to the highest Happiness and Felicity [compare eddaluwv 
and waxdpros in I. x. 14], as the Philosopher proves in the tenth Book 
of the Ethics.’—Convito, iv. 17. 

P. 248, X. vi. 8. r&v wacdedy al jdeta] Such recreations as are sug- 
gested in the Note would fall under the head of cvudéporra rather than 
hdéa (see II. iii. 7). A higher class still might deserve the title of 
kana (see VII. iv. 5), and such the erovdatos would take pleasure in 
(§ 5), since he, like all men, needs dvdavois (§ 6). To such Aristotle 
would rather apply the term dcaywyh [cf. Pol. V. (VIII.) v. 10, 
Thy Staywyhy duoroyoupévws Set wh pbvov Exew 7d Kaddv AAG kal Thy 
7dovjv], and he would consider Music as fulfilling such a condition. 
The whole passage in Pol. V. (VIII) v. 10-13, should be comparec 
where Aristotle again explains why macd:é is often thought to be réXos, 
and why it is not really so. 

P. 246, X. vi. 6. ob 5) rédos % dvdmavors] Cf. Pol. V. (VIII.) v. 10, 
h yap mada xdpw dvaratceds dort... [) & dvdravois] rijs iid Toy 
mévwy d\bmns larpela tls éorw. 

P. 253, X. vii. 8. Od xph xard, x.7.d.] This standard of Happiness, 
though superhuman (xpelrrwy 7} xar’ dv@pwror), is still human, in the 
same way that the Christian standard of moral perfection is a true 
standard to set vefore men, even though the highest human efforts can 
never be otherwise than an asymptote in reference to it. 

P. 255, X. viii. 3. cuvégeverae 5 xal 7» ppdvyors, x.7..] Hence the 
dxparhs cannot be ¢pbyiuos, though he may be devds, see VII. x. 1. 
Also in VI. xiii. 6 we read, odx ofdv Te dya0dr elvar kuplws dvev dpovicews, 
ovdé ppdvipoy dvev ris HOcKijs dperfs, and in VII. ii. 5, rpaxrixds ye 6 
Ppdvimos. 

P, 256, X. viii. 4. al yap BovAnoes Gdnrot, «.7.r.] Compare Veature 
for Measure, Act 1. Sc. i— 


‘For if our virtues 
* Did not go forth of us, ’twere all alike 
As if we had them not.’ 


—— 5. The dispute as to the relative importance of intention or act, 
‘will’ or ‘deed,’ in Morals, twice referred to by Aristotle, may remind 
us of the later theological controversy respecting the rival claims of 


Faith and Works. u 


298 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. 


Sees 


P. 261, X. viii. 11. xplvover rots éxris rotrwv alodavduevos ubvor] 
Compare Merchant of Venice, Act u. Sc. ix.— 





* What many men desire! that “‘many” may be meant 
By the fool multitude, that choose by show, 
Not learning more than the fond eye doth teach; 
Which pries not to the interior.’ 


—— 13. el ydp ris éryéAsia, x.7..] Compare Addison, Cato, Act vy. 
Sc. i— 
‘If there ’s a power above us 
(And that there is all nature cries aloud 


Through all her works), he must delight in virtue, 
And that which he delights in must be happy.’ 


The following scheme will show at a glance the connection of Ch, 
Vi. Vill. 
desired for their 
results. 
Happiness not 
this, c. vi. § 2. 


évépyerar 


desired for 


madd. 
Happiness not this, 
5 ce. vi. §§ 3-8. 
themselves, 


HOLKHv. 
Happiness not this, 
; ¢c. Vii. 

\ évépyerat kar’ aperjy. 


Oewpytixyy. 
Happiness is this, c. vii 





AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 299 





[ Zhe occasion of a Fourth Edition being called for induces 
me to add a few more ‘Supplementary Notes and dllus- 
trations, some of which, it is hoped, may be interesting 
to more advanced students than those for whom the 
Jootnotes generally are intended. | 


P. 38, B. I. viii. 1. In illustration of this use of irdpxovra, 
compare Poet, xxii. 2, where ‘a riddle’ is defined, 7d déyorra 
imdpxovTa addivara ouvdya, i.e. ‘while describing actual facts to 
make an impossible combination.’ 

P. 66, B. I. xiii. 15. a\Aq ris bors ris Yuxjs] A good account of 
Aristotle’s theory of the three ‘ dices rijs Yuxfs’ in contrast with 
the view of Plato of three souls in one body (see Dante, Purg. iv. 
5, 6), will be found in Grote’s Aristotle, II. pp. 191-6, 221, ete. 
The varieties of soul are not mutually exclusive species of the same 
genus, but successive types of development, the higher types 
possessing all the properties of the lower, plus others of their own. 

Pp. 104, 281-2. aidws and véueois] We might add to the illustrations 
above given the Homeric conception of aléws and véueots. ‘If aman 
breaks @éus in any way, he feels that others will disapprove. This 
feeling is called aldds. Hence aldws has as many shades of meaning 
as there are ways in which @éu:s can be broken :—‘‘ sense of honour,” 
‘*shame,” ‘‘reverence,” etc. And the feeling with which he himself 
regards a breach of @éuws by another person is called véueois,— 
‘*righteous indignation.”’’ (Jebb’s Introduction to Homer, p. 55.) 

Pp. 119, 283, III. i. 13. Add the following illustration from Cic. 
Phil. Il. xii. § 29: ‘Quid refert utrum voluerim fieri, an gaudeam 
factum ?’ 

P. 146, IIL. vi. 5. odd ef Oappet wéd\dwov pactryoicba dvipetos] 
This is well illustrated by the following remarks of Fuller (Holy 
War, Vv. c. 2) in reference to many of the Templars having suc- 
cumbed to torture. ‘It is to be commended to one’s consideration 
whether slavish and servile souls will not better bear torment 
than generous spirits, who are for the enduring of honourable 
danger and speedy death, but not provided for torment, which they 


300 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES, 





are not acquainted with, neither is it the proper object of valour.’ 
Comp. inf. c. ix. § 6. 

P. 151, IIL. vii. 12. Add to the illustrations in the note the 
graphic contrast drawn by Livy (vii. 10) between the Gaul and 
Torquatus before engaging in single combat. He says of the latter, 
‘pectus animorum iraeque tacitae plenum, omnem ferociam in dis- 
crimen ipsum certaminis distulerat.’ Conversely, Tacitus ascribes 
both to the Gauls and Britons the habit censured by Aristotle in the 
text: ‘in deposcendis periculis eadem audacia, et ubi advenere, in 
detractandis eadem formido.’ (Agricola, c. xi.) 

Pp. 152-3, III. viii. 2, 3. In the following passage Dante 
recognises this form of courage due to aidds : 

But shame soon interposed her threat, who makes 


The servant bold in presence of his lord. 
Inf. xvii. 89, 90. (Cary’s Translation.) 


P. 176, IV. i. 11. r&v dm’ dperfjs] We may compare with this 
periphrasis the following expressions in the Epistle to the Romans: 
of €& épiOelas (ii. 8), of éx wepirop fs (iv. 12), of éx vduou (iv. 14). 

Pp. 205, 291, IV. iii. 25. Compare further Tac. Ann, v. 18 
(fin.): ‘Nam beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi 
posse: ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur’: which 


is thus commented on by Oldbuck in Scott’s Antiquary: ‘from thisa — 


wise man may take a caution not to oblige any man beyond the 
degree in which he may expect to be requited, lest he should make 


his debtor a bankrupt in gratitude.’ In Germ. xxi. (jin.) Tacitus — 


mentions as a proof of the generosity of the German barbarians, 
‘nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.’ 


P. 206, IV. iii. 28. elpwva 5& mpds rods rodd\ovs] Most mss. read — 
elpwvela (auct. Grant) which certainly avoids the great difficulty of — 


finding any construction for the accusative elpwva. 
P. 214, IV. v. 8. dvrarodidbacw x.7.d.] Thus Cleon (ap. Thucyd. 


Ill. xxxviii. 1) remarks that summary vengeance is always most — 
effective and satisfactory ; and conversely (in illustration of § 10) . 
Tacitus says of Domitian (Agricola, c. 42) that he was * praeceps in 


iram, et quo obscurior eo irrevocabilior.4 \y 





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